Invasion of the Kuriles from Alaska

[Don Quijote]

I recently read The Thousand Mile War (highly recommended) and towards the end it mentions Allied plans to invade the Kuriles, with an earliest date of autumn 1943, but more likely the following year. The Americans had put a lot of effort into the construction of military bases and airfields in the Aleutians, and bombed Paramushiro in the northern Kuriles from mid-1943 onwards, diverting significant Japanese forces to northern defence duties, but the plans came to nothing.

This was partly due to the lack of Soviet co-operation, which made the logistics difficult - Paramushiro was within bomber range from Attu, but not fighter range. But if the invasion is delayed until 1944, the Mustang will come into its own here, as well as possibly long range twin-engined fighters. Alternatively, even if the Soviets didn't want to actively participate, it's not beyond the realms of possibility that they could let the Americans use airfields in Kamchatka.

One problem is going to be a major diversion of resources - this will eat into troops and ships which were to be used in the south and central Pacific. But an argument could be made that it would be worth bypassing rather than capturing a couple more Pacific islands, when instead the target is Japanese soil. Thoughts?

 

[sloreck]

The questions here are: what does this do for the US that other operations don't do, are there resources for doing this without major robbing of other plans, and finally how do you do this in the crap conditions that exist in this part of the world most of the time. While the Kuriles are closer to Japanese targets than the Marianas, for example, providing the logistics to build bases there, as well as supplying them will be an issue. Weather conditions in the Aleutians and the Kuriles OTL kept lots of potential missions on the ground, if bombers are grounded a significant percentage of the time due to weather bases are of limited use. Those conditions will make it difficult for the amphibious craft (like LSTs) and the troops on them on the trip from the Aleutians to the Kuriles. Most of the Central Pacific assaults were made using only carrier based aircraft, not any land based, so that is not a difficulty per se - however f the sea state/weather prevents carrier aircraft from flying that is a problem.

All in all this could have been done, but the benefits would be less than using those same resources elsewhere, at least in my opinion. Now if you throw in doing this to keep the Russians out, unlike OTL, the equation may change.

 

[Arkenfolm]

Could it be used as a springboard to invade Sakhalin in order to make sure Sakhalin stays out of Soviet control during the Cold War?

 

[Deleted member 9338]

Could it be used as a springboard to invade Sakhalin in order to make sure Sakhalin stays out of Soviet control during the Cold War?

I am certain the Soviet Union would not be happy with this

 

[Don Quijote]

Could it be used as a springboard to invade Sakhalin in order to make sure Sakhalin stays out of Soviet control during the Cold War?

Very doubtful, it's more likely that the Americans will have to offer the Soviets something in return for the use of airfields in Kamchatka.

 

[riggerrob]

North Pacific storms limit invasions to the summer months, when skies are hazy and visibility limits flying.

 

[Don Quijote]

North Pacific storms limit invasions to the summer months, when skies are hazy and visibility limits flying.

Fine, summer 1944. I would say that the autumn '43 plans were a bit too optimistic anyway. However, Attu was taken in the spring, and the Eleventh Air Force was pretty resilient even in the face of horrendous weather - which of course works both ways, grounding the Japanese as well.

 

[raharris1973]

Soviets are not going to let their territory be used until they are ready to get in themselves. Doing summer 1944 ops in the Kuriles unilaterally might encourage early Soviet involvement so they don't miss the bus.

Of course if US forces interpose themselves by getting the Kuriles and Sakhalin or Hokkaido before Soviet entry, then there won't be a fear of Soviet invasion as an incentive to encourage Japanese surrender, since Americans will be blocking the path.

On seeing themselves shut out of islands, Russia could retaliate by simply not getting into the war, or by doing a bigger mainland campaign in Korea and China.