For the RN, anecdotally:I knew the Military intelligence knew that. I was just looking for the view of the man on the ground.
The submariners were confident that the ANA ASW was going to be ineffective before the conflict, and did not change that view during it.
The Harrier pilots, if Ward is accurate, had very recently had an asymmetric ACM exercise against an F-15 squadron out of Bitburg, whom the RN regarded as the USAF's tip of the air superiority spear, and come out clear victors. Their opinion of the Argentine air force was not high, as the Argentine pilots would be on the edge of their fuel range, with generation-old French SARH missiles rather less capable than the Sparrows that the USAF had not been judged able to use successfully, and rear-aspect-only IR seekers compared to the all-aspect AIM-9Ls whose delivery Reagan and Weinberger expedited for the (British) FAA's edification, and doctrine from Galland in the 50s. The ANA carrier was flying Skyhawks which one of the RNZAF secondees had flown, and were regarded as not a threat in air combat, further, 25 de Mayo had a suspect plant which would limit the loadout of any strike anyway.
On the other hand, the surface fleet knew that the number of Exocets > 0; it was a seaskimmer that Sea Dart/Cat/Slug was not intended to deal with; and the Sea Wolf frigates were relatively few in number, had limited ready rounds for their launchers, and would likely be used to protect the carriers leaving the poor sodding matelots on the rest of the ships woefully exposed. Later on, they determined that the Argentine pilots had both piloting skills and also balls of steel, to come in at modern air defences so low that their bombs sometimes wouldn't arm... but sometimes they would..
Obviously David has a better understanding than I, but both from memory and chatting with some people with more than my casual knowedge, at the time, there was not a clear sense in Westminster, Whitehall, or on the Clapham omnibus that "Argentina was doomed." There was a clearer sense that "the Argentine Navy and Air Force will be unable to stop the RN getting the British Army ashore," yes, in no small part because the islands are just a long way away from the mainland but lack a runway big enough for fast jets. It was clear before the Corporate task force reached Ascension that the British ground forces were going to be outnumbered and not enjoying the armour or artillery dominance that they would like, even before Atlantic Conveyor was lost with the majority of the heavy airlift capability still on board.Looking back it's easy to say Argentina was doomed but all the sources at the time and people who lived through it dont seem to treat it as if it should have been an easy war. So I was wondering what the men in the field knew about these kind of things.