How much of our modern consensus of the inevitability of Allied victory in WWII is due to information after the fact?

[Glenn239]

I understood that Glenn's point is to criticize that all the plans of "British victory in WW2 inevitable" happen because Germany is destroyed against a USSR with a suicidal lemming mentality that keeps attacking and attacking no matter how many millions of casualties it suffers.

Which is a pretty serious problem with many "British victory" plans, in many conflicts.

Yes. Of all the Great Powers in WW2, the one that took the path that it least wanted to take was the Soviet Union. All the others - the Germans, British, French, Italians, Japanese, even the Americans, all of them arrived on the path that they themselves had a great deal of choice in making. The USSR, in contrast, was more like Denmark or Poland, it was thrust into a war it didn't ask for by an opponent it didn't want.

For posters to assume that Stalin would act against Germany in a situation where the Soviets, and not the Germans, chose what the Soviets were to do, I find this highly questionable. I don't think Stalin had any intention of ever attacking Germany if left to his own devices. Maybe some jostling in Eastern Europe for this trinket or that. Maybe a partition if it were clear that Germany was about to fall to the West anyways. Those make sense. But, the idea that the Soviets attack Germany in order to establish US global hegemony? This seems totally unrealistic to me. IMO, that's the last thing Stalin would have done.

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

Going back to the original post, I think hindsight has made it hard for people to accept the idea that unconditional surrender WASN'T the only option (at least for Germany).

People look at the economic and demographic clout of the United States, tie it in with the Casablanca Conference and then use the hindsight of knowing the true strength of America as proof that none of the allies will except anything less than unconditional surrender.

I find this to be false. For Germany, I do believe that they have a chance to force a conditional peace of they play their cards right, and they don't lose that chance until making the fatal decisions to launch Operation Citadel and attempt to hold Tunisia.

If Germany can withdrawal from Tunisia in good order, hold onto most of Italy, beat back any attempt at the French coast, and continue bleeding the Soviets without wasting manpower (and thousands of aircraft) on costly offensives, then they should be able to hold on by 1946, By which point Japan is defeated and the American public begins to lose interest, the Soviets are bled white, and the British are exhausted (and hopefully Hitler is killed). In such a scenario, I do think Stalin at the very least would be willing to agree to a conditional peace (with the right terms).

 

[HexWargamer]

The USA won at 5:29 a.m. July 16, 1945. Everything that happened on the ground in Europe (or in the Pacific) after that didn't really matter.
The USA would have no reason to accept any sort of conditional peace in Europe (it's hard to see what Hilter had to offer anyway ?)

 

[wcv215]

The gist of Tooze's book is that Germany was overmatched fighting a coalition of three Great Powers. To take Tooze's conclusions and attempt to apply them to a war against Britain alone is putting Tooze far out of context from what Tooze was actually talking about.

That is…a conclusion…considering the war doesn’t even start until halfway through, and only the last third is focused on the war when it involved all three major Allied Powers: The Soviet Union, the British Empire, and the United States.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Yes. Of all the Great Powers in WW2, the one that took the path that it least wanted to take was the Soviet Union. All the others - the Germans, British, French, Italians, Japanese, even the Americans, all of them arrived on the path that they themselves had a great deal of choice in making. The USSR, in contrast, was more like Denmark or Poland, it was thrust into a war it didn't ask for by an opponent it didn't want.

The USSR voluntarily allied with with Germany in 1939, in the conscious expectation that Germany would start a war with Poland, France, and Britain, in direct contradiction of the extreme ideological confilct between them. Stalin told the Politburo at that time that this policy was intended to embroil the the USSR's enemies in war with each other. I.e. Germany was an enemy. This war would exhaust them all. I don't recall whether he said anything that explicitly referred to future Soviet attacks in that future situation, but IIRC that was a clear implication at least.

The USSR voluntarily invaded Poland in 1939.

The USSR voluntarily invaded Finland in 1939 (the Winter War).

The USSR voluntarily invaded Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940.

The USSR voluntarily invaded Romania in 1940 (there was some fighting).

For posters to assume that Stalin would act against Germany in a situation where the Soviets, and not the Germans, chose what the Soviets were to do, I find this highly questionable. I don't think Stalin had any intention of ever attacking Germany if left to his own devices. Maybe some jostling in Eastern Europe for this trinket or that. Maybe a partition if it were clear that Germany was about to fall to the West anyways. Those make sense. But, the idea that the Soviets attack Germany in order to establish US global hegemony? This seems totally unrealistic to me. IMO, that's the last thing Stalin would have done.

If the US is not involved in the war, it will not become global hegemon.

 

[durante]

Yes. Of all the Great Powers in WW2, the one that took the path that it least wanted to take was the Soviet Union. All the others - the Germans, British, French, Italians, Japanese, even the Americans, all of them arrived on the path that they themselves had a great deal of choice in making. The USSR, in contrast, was more like Denmark or Poland, it was thrust into a war it didn't ask for by an opponent it didn't want.

For posters to assume that Stalin would act against Germany in a situation where the Soviets, and not the Germans, chose what the Soviets were to do, I find this highly questionable. I don't think Stalin had any intention of ever attacking Germany if left to his own devices. Maybe some jostling in Eastern Europe for this trinket or that. Maybe a partition if it were clear that Germany was about to fall to the West anyways. Those make sense. But, the idea that the Soviets attack Germany in order to establish US global hegemony? This seems totally unrealistic to me. IMO, that's the last thing Stalin would have done.

To clarify, when you say "trinket", you are referring to countries with millions of people?

 

[Fulton 44]

1. Once the Axis was opposed by 2 out of the big 3 there was no hope of an Axis victory although there may be a very slim possibility of a kind of stalemate if all sorts of assumptions are made.
2. So you have to go early in the War to come up with a possibility of a different result.
3. I think that the closest thing to a possible scenario for Axis success would involve - 1.no Dunkirk, 2. an immediate and coordinated focus on the Mediterranean, 3. leading to an early fall of Malta (I know that this is controversial but there is good evidence that the UK thought of it as indefensible in July 1940), 4. Spanish cooperation in the neutralization of Gibralter, 5. All sorts of lucky breaks allowing Axis forces to penetrate deeply into Egypt and 6. A panicky British withdrawal from Egypt, 7. Turkey becoming a very friendly neutral and 8. the Med becoming an Axis lake.
4. Even at this point, the UK would probably continue the war and the USSR would still be a formidable potential opponent, but then
5. With incredible luck in early 1941, there is an earlier launch to the offensive and 1. a much more friendly outreach to minority nationalities, and potentially anti-communist individuals within the USSR, and 2. luck with the weather lead to the fall of Moscow and a degree of confused disintegration of the Soviet regime.
6, You wind up with a stalemate against a weakened Soviet regime somewhere along a defensible line which leaves the Axis with substantial oil and other resources.

This all involves lots of Axis luck in terms of Allied behavior, neutral behavior, weather, military decisions, etc. But I do not think it is absolutely impossible. One way to think about this is to question whether there is any other scenario which is less unlikely.

 

[CaptainCalvert]

Fulton 44's post is interesting. Point 5 (Barbarossa) is probably the hardest to accept.
The delayed start was weather-related, which is usually viewed as ASB unless changes are very limited.
Not treating the Soviets like vermin would require a different Third Reich. This is the biggest challenge as without Destiny, Willpower, Inherent Superiority etc etc would WW2 even have happened?
Doing better in Africa would require a bigger commitment, but most of all it would still take time, so all the troops and transport there would be unavailable for Barbarossa.
However, the abiliy to bring in a substantial reinforcement of battle hardened veterans in about mid 43 could be very useful.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

It incurs immediate massive costs and risks, but does so at a time and place when the Japanese think, perhaps correctly, that they have the best possible chance of overcoming those costs and risks to achieve their goals. Waiting and seeing means letting the United States choose when to attack...

Not at all. If Japan attacks Britain and the Netherlands in 1941, but not the US, that does not mean Japan can never strike first against the US. Any US action against Japan must be preceded by a long period of US preparations. If the President is an isolationist, there must be a change in US leadership. Congress must appropriate billion$ for military and naval bases in the Philippines, equipment for the Philippine armed forces, and expansion of US forces. The bases must be built, Filipino soldiers must be recruited and trained, and US forces deployed to the Philippines. None of this can happen overnight or in secret.

To be fair, some of it was already happening in 1940: notably, the Two-Ocean Navy Act. But nothing that actually threatened Japan was possible for years - unless Japan goaded the US into immediate all-out action by attacking the US. OTL, crypto-interventionist FDR created enough of a threat to provoke Japan to attack the US. If FDR is succeeded by an isolationist in 1941, there will be no such provocation.

Japan could execute the Southern Operation, rout the Royal Navy, occupy New Caledonia and Fiji, and neutralize Australia. with no risk of US intervention. If the US later changed policy and began preparing for intervention, then Japan could strike the US - from a far stronger position.

I would also take exception to the "not probable" comment. In fact the assumption you have been making throughout this discussion is that Wheeler is in office when Japan is making these decisions, which seems like an odd assumption to me. The comments bringing up Wheeler specified that he was elected in 1932, so he would have hit the two-term limit in 1940,

This thread has become somewhat garbled on this point, and I (unwittingly) contributed. The first post mentioning Wheeler was

Had there been a President Wheeler/Taft/Vandenburg/Dewey, the UK would almost certainly have lost and the USSR would have become Eastern Germany...

Orser subsequently made posts to this thread which actually referred to another thread:

President Burton K. Wheeler in charge of an isolationist US during WWII

which he had started at the same time. In that thread, the OP had Wheeler elected VP in 1932 (not with FDR) and President in 1936. I posted in this thread, thinking of the other thread, which I had also read (but don't consider very plausible).

My thought, which I never clearly expressed, was that Wheeler could be elected in 1940. He he formed a campaign committee and was ready to announce as soon as FDR was out. Neither Garner or Farley had a real chance of being nominated, IMO, and I don't know of anyone else who was prepared to move. If FDR had a health crisis that happened or was disclosed just before the convention, the nomination would be up for grabs, and IMO Wheeler could have a good shot at it.

Willkie was already the Republican nominee, and there are reasons to think his candidacy was doomed. (Robert Heinlein wrote that Willkie more or less self-destructed.)

So Wheeler could have been President in 1941-1945, which would be a major change and IMO would make Allied victory close to impossible.

Acting against the Philippines at all is predicated on the Japanese attacking southwards into the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Which requires France to have fallen. Which means that Wheeler is most likely out of office.

Not if he is elected in 1940.

I'm not sure why you're constantly talking about what Wheeler might or might not do when he isn't likely to even be in office anymore by the relevant times.

There's no particular reason to think he would have been President at any other time. He made plans to run in 1940, but not in any other year.

Even a more isolationist United States will likely be building up powerful naval forces that they could move to the Philippines, in principle. You can repeat "but it will take several years" and "but the Philippines will become independent" until you're blue in the face, but if you are a Japanese strategic planner considering the situation this looks exactly like the kind of situation where a preemptive strike is handy.

They certainly can, but this indicates nothing about the actual effectiveness of the forces. They have to assume that the soldiers in question will be able to fight effectually and effectively with what they have.

They know that the Philippine Army is mostly untrained recruits, many of whom don't even have weapons.

In any case, weak forces mean that the Japanese can easily overrun the islands and prevent them from being used against them in the future. The whole point is that the Japanese are removing a future threat and securing the supply lines to the Dutch East Indies and Malaya against any possible future American threats, which does not require that America can actually current threaten them, merely that the Philippines is indeed located where it is and does indeed have naval and air bases which the United States could use. Which it was and which it did.

The naval and air bases in the Philippines were small and primitive. They could support no more than a handful of warships or aircraft.

Among other things, during the Russo-Japanese War, when Roosevelt inserted himself.

How does a US diplomatic initiative, which Japan asked for, constitute US interference with Japanese military operations? How does that one incident, forty years earlier, establish an American record of such interference?

I think you are greatly overestimating the amount of independence any potential post-war ...

Post what war? You're arguing for Filipino collaboration with the US in starting a war against Japan launched after several years of preparation.

... Filipino government will have...

It's not even clear that the Philippines would have cooperated with unilateral US intervention against Japan in OTL 1941. Such intervention would have led to quick Japanese conquest of the Philippines with dreadful consequences for the population. The Filipinos could see that - and could see no good reason for letting that happen. That was why they discussed declaring independence and neutrality if the US tried any such thing. I can't say how that would have played out, but it would be very awkward for the US to have to send soldiers to arrest the Philippine leaders and enforce US authority at gunpoint. That would be a colossal embarrassment for any US President calling for a declaration of war on Japan. Of course the Japanese were too blind to see it.

Once the Philippines are formally independent, the US would have no legal basis whatever for coercing Philippine participation in the war.

... and in any case as I specifically said, several times, waiting for the Philippines to become independent would, indeed, be the smart move. The problem is that it also requires waiting several years doing nothing...

Why? Will Japanese moves into SE Asia somehow cause the US to cancel its long-planned grant of independence? In 1941, an isolationist-led US will not go to war on the other side of the Pacific for the sake of other countries' interests, nor expect to do so in the future. So Japan can go right ahead with its conquests. And it would be very unlikely for the US to embark on a huge and costly military and naval build-up in the Philippines to support a future war with Japan for those other countries' interests. Especially since by the time such a build-up had proceeded far enough to support such a war, the Philippines would be independent.

That was rather my point. Since the President is elected, it was entirely possible that America's policy could dramatically change in short order.

I'll restate that for you: since the government of any country is composed of human beings who may be replaced (because they die, or leave office by law, or lose elections, or are overthrown), it was entirely possible that any country's policy could dramatically change in short order.

Therefore Japan must immediately attack any country which could in the future possibly have the power to attack Japan with dangerous force. The USSR, for instance.

Clearly annexation of the Philippines and other U.S. territories in the western Pacific, i.e. Guam. This would make it impractical for the United States to act in East Asia in any case without having to fight its way through Japanese-controlled seas where they could apply the Mahanian tactics they liked to attrit the U.S. force and ultimately annihilate it.

As of 1941, if the US tries to act in East Asia against Japan, Japan could easily seize Guam and the Philippines, achieving that exact result. There is absolutely no need for Japan to fight a pre-emptive war with the US now, unless the US President is likely to initiate action against Japan from the Philippines during Japan's Southern Operation. That seemed true of FDR OTL; it would not be true of Wheeler.

 

[Workable Goblin]

This is a pointless argument where we are clearly arguing entirely different things (I am discussing Japanese viewpoints and their likely thought processes, you are discussing what the United States is likely to actually do, which have little relationship with each other) and are totally failing to convince each other of our points of view. I don't see any use in further discussion.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

This is a pointless argument where we are clearly arguing entirely different things (I am discussing Japanese viewpoints and their likely thought processes, you are discussing what the United States is likely to actually do, which have little relationship with each other)

No. We are discussing what the Japanese would think the US would do.