How many million tons of grain and oil was it worth to Stalin to control the Straights?
How much of our modern consensus of the inevitability of Allied victory in WWII is due to information after the fact?
- Thread starter Kalga
- Start date
How many million tons of grain and oil was it worth to Stalin to control the Straights?
Please do double-check. I posted from a quick google search, but do note its the "UK", not the entire British Empire.
Again, I have to emphasize that Tooze wrote only within the context of the Nazis at war with an Allied coalition including the US and USSR. The discussion at hand, of where the British fought alone, this has no place in Tooze's work. The gist of Tooze is that fighting such an overpowering enemy alliance were overpowering. The idea that fighting the British alone would have tested the Germans as much is not a feasible one.
Was that ever on offer from Hitler? The idea that Hitler could tolerate the Soviet conquests of Finland, Turkey, Iran and Korea is, rather, implausible. IMHO. Any moves in that direction would mean Germany would rapidly trigger a German attack on the USSR.
Garrison
Donor
The gist of Tooze's work is the miserable state of the Nazi economy, that doesn't improve just because the USA isn't in the war.
I'm still on page 5 of the thread and still reading, but I want to comment that I find very stupid, and probably propagandistic, the whole concept of
"The Allies and the Soviet Union as drooling morons who went on and on giving thousands of tons of resources to Germany completely free. With no legitimate reason for it. With zero expectation of profit. Except, of course, for nothing more than vague promises that maybe one day they will be paid. And in many cases not even that. Knowing full well that these resources are being used by Germany to rearm. Which is not a secret because Germany is not even making an effort to hide its plans, but they do nothing more than repeat to everyone who wants to listen to them that they want war."
I'm open to considering that I'm probably missing a lot of nuance in this (mainly because this is the interpretation I've gotten from various mentions of this concept. In many cases explained in a very poor way, if not limited to the " explanation" to "read X book, everything is very well explained there").
But as described what it does is make it look like the Allies are being deliberately stupid to an almost ASB degree. It defies common sense too much.
"The Allies and the Soviet Union as drooling morons who went on and on giving thousands of tons of resources to Germany completely free. With no legitimate reason for it. With zero expectation of profit. Except, of course, for nothing more than vague promises that maybe one day they will be paid. And in many cases not even that. Knowing full well that these resources are being used by Germany to rearm. Which is not a secret because Germany is not even making an effort to hide its plans, but they do nothing more than repeat to everyone who wants to listen to them that they want war."
I'm open to considering that I'm probably missing a lot of nuance in this (mainly because this is the interpretation I've gotten from various mentions of this concept. In many cases explained in a very poor way, if not limited to the " explanation" to "read X book, everything is very well explained there").
But as described what it does is make it look like the Allies are being deliberately stupid to an almost ASB degree. It defies common sense too much.
David Flin
Gone Fishin'
In very general terms, once UK, USA, and USSR are in the war on the same side, any Nazi victory scenario is pretty much dependent upon
If the Allies are anything other than wilfully stupid to a ludicrous degree, the outcome of the war is pretty much settled and all that remains are the details on how and when that outcome is achieved.
It is true that Nazi victory would probably require either keeping the US or the USSR out, or the UK withdrawing from the war before either of those entered.
From what I understand, it seems that the problem is that it is somehow assumed that all the leaders of 1940 believed that Germany wanted to conquer the world but at the same time was so pathetically weak that it was just a matter of "showing toughness" and holding out until begin to collapse, no matter how long it takes and no matter how much has to be sacrificed in the name of inevitable victory.
Which is not so clear to me that it was believed at the time. In 1940 there was generally not the degree of fetishization and obsession with the economy that exists today. Even if it had been shaken by the First World War, the idea that determined, well-led and morally high soldiers could defeat materially and numerically superior enemies still existed to some extent. (This was the war that decidedly buried this assumption.)
Nothing I have seen in the descriptions of history makes me see Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt crunching numbers on a pad to conclude that "our victory is inevitable, we have economics on our side." Or that they would decide to absolutely ignore every factor other than the economic one, which is what I have seen here and in other threads in various answers: people "operating" under the assumption that the allied plans are based exclusively on economic assumptions and cost/benefit relationships.
Ironically, I think the Allies are credited with what I have seen called here "the fascist view of the enemy": the enemy is both immensely strong, an existential threat that must be contained at any cost, and pathetically weak, enough just show a little firmness and they will start to fall.
Garrison
Donor
Prior to Sickle Cut the British and French were expecting to fight a war of attrition, exhausting the Germans while building up their own resources and if the Germans had stuck to their original plan it would have worked because the German economy was that weak, without looting France it would have been in severe trouble. The British and the French had their empires to draw on for resources, and without Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe bases in France they would have been relatively secure. They also had substantial supplies coming from the USA. They were certainly intending to show toughness but they had every intention of conserving their armies. It was only the massive gamble of Sickle Cut that unhinged these plans.
Churchill was Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 20s. While he's not remembered as a great Chancellor, he was in post for enough years to acquire at least some grasp of economics and he showed he knew the importance of production in both world wars.
As for the "Germany was too weak" proposal, the rearmanent of the late 1930s was spurred by concerns over the rapidly growing military strength of Germany - especially with respect to their airforce. But there was also awareness from at least 1934 that the German economy (like pretty much everyone else's in Europe) was shaky.
I can't say how the relative merits of military force and the economy were viewed at the time, but after WW1 it would be recognised that economic strength can only be applied if you survive militarily.
From both axis and allies you could look for confidence but not certainty.
Edit: added a missing half sentence.
As for the "Germany was too weak" proposal, the rearmanent of the late 1930s was spurred by concerns over the rapidly growing military strength of Germany - especially with respect to their airforce. But there was also awareness from at least 1934 that the German economy (like pretty much everyone else's in Europe) was shaky.
I can't say how the relative merits of military force and the economy were viewed at the time, but after WW1 it would be recognised that economic strength can only be applied if you survive militarily.
From both axis and allies you could look for confidence but not certainty.
Edit: added a missing half sentence.
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The gist of Tooze's book is that Germany was overmatched fighting a coalition of three Great Powers. To take Tooze's conclusions and attempt to apply them to a war against Britain alone is putting Tooze far out of context from what Tooze was actually talking about.
Assuming Germany fails to defeat France in 1940, the question for 1941 is what Stalin will do with the free hand. There will be no Barbarossa, and therefore, no Indochina or Pearl Harbor. The Anglo-French will not have the stomach for the casualties necessary for WW1 scale offensives, so the western front will stagnate awaiting the Americans. But, with the war in Europe stalemated and the Western powers in no danger of immediate defeat, US isolationism could actually increase in strength.
The French and British would have used 1918 and Plan 1919 tactics for a Broad Front strategy. Gather overwhelming force, especially artillery, at selected points. Assault the enemy position with a tank heavy force and use infantry to mop up remaining strongholds. Stop when counterattacked, which will be quick given German tactical ability.
Rinse and Repeat in another sector. Until German reserves of material are exhausted. A war of attrition of shells and machines (tanks, artillery, aircraft etc.) as much as manpower. The Allies will have a massive superiority in material that will exhaust German resistance by late 1942, maybe 1943.
At some point Stalin will decide to cut off supplies to Germany (unless paid in IP and advanced technology). Even then he will 'liberate' the German occupied half of Poland once sure a German defeat is inevitable. With East Prussia as his reward.
I think those numbers are way off. $870 Million for total Uk production is miniscule and total lend lease must have been over $30Billion. I seem to recall Britain sent America $8Billion in reverse lend lease! It also helps to recall that lend lease started as miniscule but only really got going after Pearl Harbour.
Perhaps he is counting only lendlease sent in 1941?
I looked up Quora. Apparently it is a subsidiary of Yahoo where people post questions for other people to answer. It is unmoderated and statements can and often are from people with an undeclared axe to grind. The site has a trust index average of 1.79 out of 5 for what value that has. I would rather trust Wikipedia😀
None of that would happen. What would actually transpire is that the Soviet Union and United States would independently make the moves that would decide the outcome of the war in Europe.
Odd how Britain inevitably is to win WW2, but many of the schemes to do so require the Soviets to cooperate to the purpose of a British victory.
Anyways, the Germans historically could not defeat a coalition of Britain, the US, and the USSR, so adding France in for the 4th with the Allies not having to do D-Day is certainly a fast track to American global hegemony. Italy and Japan will remain neutral, then join the Allies and by 1945 Stalin will be completely isolated, probably even worse than was the case historically. So what would be the Soviet alternative strategy to cooperating to achieve US global domination? To arm Germany to the teeth such that the Allies are not able to cave in the Western Front. Might work, might be beyond their power, but either way, I hold little doubt but that Stalin would fully understand that if Germany went, the Allies would roll the Soviet Union back east of Poland and Rumania, and maybe even further than that if circumstances were favorable.
Joke, right ?
Just to be clear, by almost any measure (start with territory gained) the Soviets won WW2, the USA came second (by economic measure) and everyone else was amongst the loosers, includng the British (WW2 leading to the dissolution of their Empire plus it took them 60 years to pay back war debt to USA*)
*On 31 December 2006, Britain made a final payment of about $83m (£45.5m) and thereby discharged the last of its war loans from the USA
I understood that Glenn's point is to criticize that all the plans of "British victory in WW2 inevitable" happen because Germany is destroyed against a USSR with a suicidal lemming mentality that keeps attacking and attacking no matter how many millions of casualties it suffers.
Which is a pretty serious problem with many "British victory" plans, in many conflicts.
Which essentially requires another country to keep sacrificing blood and treasure by blasting the enemies of the British Empire to shreds with no expectation of gain.
How could you possibly say "no expectation of gain"? I don't agree that the Soviets clearly "won" World War II--they took far too many losses for that--but they clearly came out of it with tremendous territorial gains and the neutralization of what had been a major geopolitical threat to their west (i.e., Germany). That would still be the case in a timeline where the United States wasn't helping out, except actually even more so because they could probably dominate all of Europe, period, instead of just Eastern Europe. This affords them access to a lot of resources and advanced technology at no cost to themselves, and provides a enormous geopolitical buffer (which, recall, had been a major goal of Russian rulers for a long time by this point). These are clearly huge gains that they could make by "blasting the enemies of the British Empire to shreds". It's not like the British by themselves could realistically block them from taking over most of Europe if they can crush the Nazis, after all.
There's also no discussion of "a USSR with a suicidal lemming mentality that keeps attacking and attacking," merely a concept that they will probably stab Germany in the back if they see it as advantageous. And there are certainly advantages to be gained by such a stab, if the Germans are stalemated and losing; territory in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland and Prussia, neutralization of Germany as a threat, a seat at the peace table, and (especially if the Red Army performs well) dissuasion of any post-war attacks by the Allies (which I view as unlikely in any case, no matter what the French and British will suffer enormous expenses and casualties fighting the Germans and I severely doubt that there will be the appetite to follow this up with another much larger war). It could be compared to the Soviet attack on Manchuria from OTL or the Italian attack on France. Selling weapons to the Nazis so that Germans can die killing British and French soldiers is all well and good, but only up to a point.
From an American prospective, when the Two Navies Act was introduced in Jun 1940, it's clear the US Navy wasn't going to let the US lose a war no matter who the US was facing. Any popular doubt would be removed by June 8th 1942.
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