Historians routinely fault Alexander Kerensky for not withdrawing from WWI. Russia wasn't just losing badly, the war crippled the economy and millions of Russians were killed. When Kerensky kept Russia in the war and his offensive failed, popular support for his democracy evaporated and within months the Soviets came to power. Had Kerensky decided to negotiate a withdrawal from WWI in summer 1917 instead of escalating the war, how long would his government have lasted?
How Long Would Kerensky's Government Have Lasted if He Withdrew From WWI?
- Thread starter Amadeus
- Start date
The truth is that even if Kerensky wished to pull Russia out of the war, it's very unlikely that he could have. The Russians may have despised the war and all the disasters that it brought, but they feared humiliation at the hands of the Germans and a cutoff of Entente aid which had been keeping the Russian economy and war machine afloat just as much. Even the Bolsheviks, who were in a far worse position than the PG, only conceded to a peace with Germany when they stopped 200 kilometers away from Petrograd and threatened to take the city itself.
Chances are that if the Provisional Government attempts to sue for peace, it will fall victim to a counter-coup attempt to get Russia back in the war, like a counterpart of the Kornilov affair, or even a Bolshevik uprising.
But, either war, even if Kerensky peaces out and manages to weather the ensuing chaos, his government is not bound to last long. This is because the Provisional Government was, well, provisional. The Constituent Assembly of 1918 would replace it, and it's highly unlikely that Kerensky would be able to stay as the leader of Russia after the election, even if he sues for peace - the Socialist Revolutionaries are much more likely to come out on top there.
Chances are that if the Provisional Government attempts to sue for peace, it will fall victim to a counter-coup attempt to get Russia back in the war, like a counterpart of the Kornilov affair, or even a Bolshevik uprising.
But, either war, even if Kerensky peaces out and manages to weather the ensuing chaos, his government is not bound to last long. This is because the Provisional Government was, well, provisional. The Constituent Assembly of 1918 would replace it, and it's highly unlikely that Kerensky would be able to stay as the leader of Russia after the election, even if he sues for peace - the Socialist Revolutionaries are much more likely to come out on top there.
How is Kerensky going to do this? The Kadets and moderate socialists would violently oppose it. [1] Kornilov and the other future White generals would oppose it. (To quote an old post of mine: "Kornilov was definitely for continuing the War. 'The Provisional Government, under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets, acts in full agreement with the plans of the German General Staff . . . I cannot betray Russia into the hands of its historic enemy, the German tribe, and make the Russian people slaves of the Germans.'" https://books.google.com/books?id=kdQFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA107)
And the Bolsheviks would be the first to cry "treason" and "sell-out to German imperialism." Of course, they were in favor of peace, they would explain--but with the German "workers and soliders," not Wilhelm II. If reminded that the German workers and soliders were not in power, the Bolhseviks would reply that if only Russia got rid of the PG and established a genuine Socialist government, a German revolution would be sure to follow...
Kerensky wouldn't last a day if he tried to pull off a Brest-Litovsk.
[1] To see the political impossibility of Kerensky making peace, one just has to look at the moderate socialist parties on which he depended for his support. I'll recycle something I wrote some time ago about the extraordinary tenacity of Russia'a moderate socialists on the war:
In December 1917 the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries held its Fourth Congress. The extreme left of the party had already defected to form the Left SR Party but there were still people of quite left-wing views at the Congress. One of them, Kogan-Bernstein, proposed that the forthcoming Constituent Assembly summon the Allies to begin peace talks without delay, and in the event of their refusal or failure to reply within a specified time limit, Russia would have a free hand. The resolution did not say how this freedom would be used, but it did at least imply separate action if not a separate peace. The resolution was voted down 72-52 with 32 abstentions. (Oliver Radkey, *The Sickle under the Hammer: the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule*, p. 192.) And this was after not only the disastrous summer offensive but the October insurrection! Yet *even then*, only one-third of the mainstream SRs were willing to demand tangible progress toward peace, even at the cost of breaking with the Allies. So how likely were they (or their similarly-minded Menshevik comrades) to do so several months earlier?
If there was anyone who just might have filled this role, it could have been Victor Chernov, leader of the left-center of the SRs, a man who had resigned from the PG protesting its dilatoriness on the issues of peace and land reform, and a man who was very popular in the Russian village. If only Chernov's faction of the SRs had either gained control of the party or formed their own party; if the Constituent Assembly elections had been held months earlier; if Chernov's backers had won; and if the Assembly had made Chernov Prime Minister of Russia, the country would at least have had a leader of greater legitimacy than Kerensky and perhaps more willing to confront the Allies. Chernov later claimed that while he had opposed a separate peace in 1917 he would have been willing to consider one as a last resort if the struggle for a general settlement had meant the immolation of Russia on the altar of the Allied cause. Unfortunately, Chernov's actual conduct during 1917--including during the Fourth Congress--was marked by constant compromising with the pro-war right-center of his party, and as Radkey remarks "if he could not see signs of immolation in the situation of December, 1917, then he would never see them." (p. 190)
And the Bolsheviks would be the first to cry "treason" and "sell-out to German imperialism." Of course, they were in favor of peace, they would explain--but with the German "workers and soliders," not Wilhelm II. If reminded that the German workers and soliders were not in power, the Bolhseviks would reply that if only Russia got rid of the PG and established a genuine Socialist government, a German revolution would be sure to follow...
Kerensky wouldn't last a day if he tried to pull off a Brest-Litovsk.
[1] To see the political impossibility of Kerensky making peace, one just has to look at the moderate socialist parties on which he depended for his support. I'll recycle something I wrote some time ago about the extraordinary tenacity of Russia'a moderate socialists on the war:
In December 1917 the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries held its Fourth Congress. The extreme left of the party had already defected to form the Left SR Party but there were still people of quite left-wing views at the Congress. One of them, Kogan-Bernstein, proposed that the forthcoming Constituent Assembly summon the Allies to begin peace talks without delay, and in the event of their refusal or failure to reply within a specified time limit, Russia would have a free hand. The resolution did not say how this freedom would be used, but it did at least imply separate action if not a separate peace. The resolution was voted down 72-52 with 32 abstentions. (Oliver Radkey, *The Sickle under the Hammer: the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule*, p. 192.) And this was after not only the disastrous summer offensive but the October insurrection! Yet *even then*, only one-third of the mainstream SRs were willing to demand tangible progress toward peace, even at the cost of breaking with the Allies. So how likely were they (or their similarly-minded Menshevik comrades) to do so several months earlier?
If there was anyone who just might have filled this role, it could have been Victor Chernov, leader of the left-center of the SRs, a man who had resigned from the PG protesting its dilatoriness on the issues of peace and land reform, and a man who was very popular in the Russian village. If only Chernov's faction of the SRs had either gained control of the party or formed their own party; if the Constituent Assembly elections had been held months earlier; if Chernov's backers had won; and if the Assembly had made Chernov Prime Minister of Russia, the country would at least have had a leader of greater legitimacy than Kerensky and perhaps more willing to confront the Allies. Chernov later claimed that while he had opposed a separate peace in 1917 he would have been willing to consider one as a last resort if the struggle for a general settlement had meant the immolation of Russia on the altar of the Allied cause. Unfortunately, Chernov's actual conduct during 1917--including during the Fourth Congress--was marked by constant compromising with the pro-war right-center of his party, and as Radkey remarks "if he could not see signs of immolation in the situation of December, 1917, then he would never see them." (p. 190)
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Were the Bolsheviks in better touch with soldiers, workers and peasants view on the war than moderate socialists?
They seemed to be, because the Bolsheviks won their support or acquiescence, while committed support for the moderate socialists seemed thin on the ground.
Why did such a gulf arise between non-Bolshevik Socialist leaders and the masses of Petrograd'ers, urban workers and garrison troops?
They seemed to be, because the Bolsheviks won their support or acquiescence, while committed support for the moderate socialists seemed thin on the ground.
Why did such a gulf arise between non-Bolshevik Socialist leaders and the masses of Petrograd'ers, urban workers and garrison troops?
Cook
Banned
The Bolsheviks seized power from the Soviets through an armed coup. That they did so while proclaiming the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" should not disguise the fact that they were taking power from the established multi-party Soviets.
It would have fallen immediately; the overwhelming majority of the SR remained in favour of continuing the war and drive out the Germans.
It seems the general consensus on this thread is that 1917 is too late to save Russia from Communism, or from a fascist style coup. Withdraw from the war and get overthrown, continue the war and lose and you still get overthrown.
Cook
Banned
It's not a valid assessment; had the SR and Mensheviks in the Petrograd Soviet responded to the overwhelming evidence that Lenin was about to stage a coup, the Bolshevik putsch would have been dead in the water. As to a fascist style coup, it was never on the cards.
Militarily the best option was for the Russian army to remain entirely on the defensive in 1917, as Brusilov advised, and rebuild the army prior to resuming offensive operations in 1918; basically what the French army did.