…The first matter of discussion at the Second Wilmington Naval Conference was the inclusion of Germany into the treaty system. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement had effectively placed Germany within the system, therefore it was argued that they might as well be included in the conference itself. The British were in favor of this, the French were opposed and almost everyone else was neutral on the matter. In the end the French decided to cave on the matter, in exchange for loopholing in a few extra ships in the unregulated miscellaneous category…
…It was clear from the beginning of the conference that their could be no extension of the building holiday, the lesser powers with the exception of Spain and the Netherlands were all laying down new ships, Britain was as well and the United States and Japan were preparing to. Reduction of total tonnages was similarly a non-starter, a proposal to reduce by one ninth would leave Britain too short on ships for her requirements, while neither the US nor Japan were willing to do so.
Instead it was proposed by Britain that the individual limits on Battleships be reduced to 40,000 tons and 15” guns and the limitations on aircraft carriers to 25,000 tons. This would reduce the individual cost of each unit and keep the capability gap between the large units the US and Japan wanted to build, and the smaller units the UK needed for global coverage minimal.
The lesser powers at the conference agreed to the UK proposal, as it made things easier for them, though the Italians would have to lie on the size of their planned 15” battleships. The US was willing to agree with the carrier proposal, as their carriers under construction were 25,100 tons and only needed to shave a bit off. The US was also willing to agree to the 40,000 ton limitation for battleships, as they felt they could design an acceptable battleship on that tonnage with certain compromises. They were not however willing to drop the 16” limit, given their lack of a 15” gun and the development of a newer 16” design underway. Given the presence of so may 16” ships already, 14 US, 8 Japanese, 6 British and 1 Soviet, this revision was agreed to.
The problem soon proved to be Japan. Japan was willing to agree, provided their “legitimate concerns” were addressed. Namely that because Japan had only 4 ships above the 40,000 ton limit, compared to 10 each for the US and UK, and by lesser amounts, Japan should get a tonnage increase to 630,000 tons, or 70% of the bigger powers to compensate. They further wanted an increase in cruiser and destroyer limits to 200,000, 160,000, 120,000 and 160,000 tons for A, B, and C class cruisers and destroyers respectively, to account for their increased requirements due to their ongoing support of the “legitimate Chinese government” based in Manchuria.
This was completely unacceptable to the United States, as it would make achieving an acceptable force ratio against Japan in the Pacific far too difficult. The US delegation thus flat out refused to compromise on this matter. Given this choice they would settle for a simple renewal of the total and individual ship tonnage limits of the previous conference.
The US found itself surprisingly isolated on this. Italy quickly backed the Japanese proposal in a diplomatic quid pro quo for recognition of Ethiopia. This was followed by Germany, who saw no case where they might be fighting Japan and would prefer the lower limits set out to save money for the Army and Air Force. Spain supported the Japanese proposal for a similar reasons, they were never going to fight Japan and smaller ship sizes thus made the smaller ships they could afford more competitive.
The really surprising part was that France and the Netherlands, both of whom were worried about potential Japanese aggression against their colonial possessions, were considering Japan’s position and that Britain was not dismissing it out of hand despite the IJN being the RN’s premier threat. The former two were well aware that they could not fight the Japanese on their own, and expected to have British help, making Japan stronger was seen as outweighed by making the smaller ships they planned to build more competitive. The British, with the most direct contact with the Japanese were worried about a failure of the treaty system, given the tone of the Japanese negotiators. If the Japanese withdrew that would mean an expensive naval race at the time expansion to the RAF and British Army was eating the budget. Strengthening Japan was thus seen as the lesser evil provided it remained substantially weaker than Britain.
The British, French and Dutch thus began working on a counter proposal, that they hoped would get the Japanese to agree while still being less than what they demanded. Namely from 70% in Capital Ships and 80% in lesser units, they hoped to try 67% or 65% and 75%. This along with a united front might be enough for the US to agree, and thus the treaty system to be salvaged. Failure of course would see the Japanese leave and the treaty system break down…
…The planned compromise was soon overtaken by events. Namely the outbreak of the civil war in Spain saw the Spanish delegation divided, with the military side supporting the Burgos government while the civilian side supported the Madrid government. This led to the suspension of the Spanish delegation and the exit of Spain from the Treaty system…
…The Spanish distraction extended negotiations over a potential compromise long enough for fighting in China to heat up again as the government of Inner Mongolia violently asserted its autonomy against the KMT with Japanese aid in Chahar and Suiyuan provinces. This seeming aggression on the part of a Japanese proxy saw the British, Dutch and French delegations forced by PR to abandon their support of a compromise. The 40,000 ton reduction was thus taken off the table.
However the Japanese remained adamant about an increase in lighter units due to their “legitimate security concerns in supporting the legitimate Chinese government,”. This was of course unacceptable to the US, or now the British, French and Dutch. The Japanese government thus left the conference for “failing to address their legitimate security concerns,” effectively sealing the end of the Treaty system…
…In an effort to salvage something the remaining powers agreed to continue to abide by the overall tonnage limits and individual ship limits as long as Japan did, and to make no more than the “minimum necessary” diversions to match the Japanese…
…The failure of the Second Wilmington Naval Conference saw the functional end of the interwar Naval Arms control system, and with it the experiment in multilateral arms control it represented. Never again would voluntary arms limitations agreements involving multiple nations occur…
-Excerpt from Naval History Between the Wars, Harper & Brothers, New York, 2007
