problem also remains that annexing more of the aegean coasts means that the Turkish minority in Greece would expand.....otl during the 1919-22 war around 5% of the Greek population were Turks, adding more of the Aegean coastline means around 10% to 15% turks, which is not exactly a good thing for the Greeks if they want to remain democratic, or the Turks if the Greeks decide to say 'what is democracy?'
For Want of a Word – Stolypin endures
- Thread starter Stenkarazin
- Start date
Assyrians were a majority nowhere and not even plurality anywhere for this to happen in ottomans lands by this point however. They were scattered in between Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian and Pontic Greek provinces.
True, but that didn't prevent the Greeks from asking for it IOTL, shouldn't discourage them ITTL. Population exchange can be on the menu. Plus, there are many ways to tweak popular representation.
Russia would have to decide what is worse : a British puppet holding most of the Aegean coastline (and maybe Gallipoli)... or a solid Turkish-Anatolian State dreaming of reconquering Armenia/Eastern Anatolia ? The answer to this question would inform Russia's attitude towards the Turkish National movement.
AlexG
Banned
Thinking rationally: As Russia you prefer a weak British client-state holding the Aegean on both sides as a trade off for 1. making the black sea into a Russian lake. 2. The incorporation or creation of an enlarged Armenia, and creating a Kurdish state to further create a buffer zone between itself and the Franco-British.
Turkey in this scenario would be internationally cut off from all corners, the French and British cut it off from the Balkans, western Anatolia and all of Arabia, and the Russians have cut it out of Eastern Anatolia, the Caucuses, Istanbul, and Northern Mesopotamia.
ITTL Turkey is left with Central Asia Minor....that's it.
If a Nazi Germany would have risen up ITTL this Turkey would side with it quick, fast and in a hurry.
Turkey in this scenario would be internationally cut off from all corners, the French and British cut it off from the Balkans, western Anatolia and all of Arabia, and the Russians have cut it out of Eastern Anatolia, the Caucuses, Istanbul, and Northern Mesopotamia.
ITTL Turkey is left with Central Asia Minor....that's it.
If a Nazi Germany would have risen up ITTL this Turkey would side with it quick, fast and in a hurry.
I m pretty sure that the British would prefer to have a greek-controlled Gallipoli Peninsula in addition to greek Imbros and Tenedos. The Russians would also prefer to keep both locations. Basically, it is down to you to decide what balance to keep. Either russian Gallipoli/ greek Imbros/Tenedos or all of them greek seem plausible. I doubt though that the British would allow Imbros and Tenedos to become russian and the Russians cannot force the issue.
I think if it comes to choose between inner Thrace or the Gallipoli peninsula, the Russians would choose Gallipoli in a heartbeat. Russia doesn't need inner Thrace as it only adds management problems. Constantinople in any case is defended by the Catalca Line https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d2/Borbe_kod_Čataldža.svg
In any case, Constantinople will be a russian outpost, a fortress to defend the Bosporus Straits, not a core region. To defend it in depth in the current turkish Thrace borders will be difficult and would require huge investment and several armies. Gallipoli can also be turned into a fortress by simply fortifying the 6km-wide isthmus of Bolayir. The fact that in OTL Sazonov didn't give a damn about inner Thrace is telling.
Also it is good that you didnt go forward with the greek attack towards Constantinople, because in OTL 1914 and 1915 Venizelos was very mindful not to provoke Russia but accomodate the Bear was much as possible when it came to claims to Constantinople. Being a very capable diplomat, he would need to have a stroke to needless provoke Russia.
I think so as well. The Russians would prefer the asiatic shore to be turkish and the British to be greek. A possible accomodation may have been the OTL Venizelos proposal that the Turks could keep the asiatic shore of the Dardanelles (Sanjak of Biga) and Greece keeps the area around the Bandirma-Smyrna railroad and more lands in the south.
In this case, the asiatic shore stays turkish, while it is detached by the rest of Turkey by the greek zone that extends to Pandirma.
In that case, Greece would look to compensate with lands further south than the OTL Smyrna Zone, where greek interests clash with italian ones. To accomodate the Italians, the Italian Anatolia may be pushed further south and east. In tha senario, Greece may get the Aidin Sanjak (in yellow) where there are large greek populations and the Italians get permanently the sanjaks of Burdur and Antalya. Antalya is a strategic location after all, that may serve as entrepot for the central Anatolia.
Well, as I said before the inner part of Thrace is useless for Russia. Constantinople has a mixed population that due to economics alone (a major port or service hub) will have a christian majority very quickly, without any ethnic cleansing. The Greeks are a known quantity in the Russian Empire, with hundreds of thousands them in the Black Sea ports and Caucasus. The Greeks of Constantinople are not rebelious mountaineers, but an urban population that was well used to be part of a multi ethnic empire- a muslim empire that is. I think they would welcome russian rule, for both bein co-religionists and providing them with a huge imperial market - the Greeks were burghers and heavily involved in trade, banking and industry.
The same applies for the rest of the christian minorities of Constantinople that were also well used to be part of a multi ethnic empire.
In the other hand, I think it is extremely plausible that if Russians get the Gallipoli peninsula they will expel the turkish population. In March 1914 there were 8,220 Turks, 16.137 Greeks and 1,190 Armenians. As soon as the war started, the Greeks and Armenians were expelled. That leaves only the ~8,220 Turks for the whole peninsula. Russia can turn the peninsula into a purely russian " island", very easily and very quickly. The point is that if they don't expel the turkish minority they would have to call back the previously expelled greek majority. That doesn't give room for russian settlers in this strategic outpost. Instead, they can use the previous atrocities to justify turning the peninsula into ethnic russian: they only need 25,000-30,000 settlers in total.
The sliver of land that connects Gallipoli to Constantinople is of limited value to Russia, so I doubt they would give much thought to settle it, as there is no point defending beyond Catalca and Gallipoli.
I think a population exchange will take place regardless the timeline's POD. Ever since 1914, the Ottoman policy makers had decided against having a christian minority in their country. In 1914, even with a neutral Greece there was an expulsion of something like 250,000 Greeks from Anatolia. In the east, after the russian collapse, the liquidation of christian minorities continued after the armistice. I dont see how a population exchange is to be avoided under these conditions. The only other option is to have a unilateral liquidation of the remaining christian minorities, even after this more damaging ottoman collapse, something not plausible. Not to mention that in OTL with Turkey in a much much stronger position, there wasnt a single turkish policy maker that didn't like the idea of a population exchange. Certainly Venizelos would go for it.
Overall, I don't see how a population exchange is to be avoided.
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IMO, Russia would have to chose between prestige and practicality.
Of course by 1918 the brouhaha about “restoring” Tsargrad and putting the cross back on Saint Sophia seriously worn out and even as a slogan was not getting to give regime a serious extra popularity in the “masses”. As an issue of a general prestige, with Russia gaining all Galicia, German Poland and Memel, plus a big chunk of the Turkish Armenia, specifics of the Straits bargain do not matter too much. Still, we can’t completely discount importance of being stupid and fully exclude the most idiotic approach to the issue (*).
From a purely practical perspective, Russia would need just a control of the European side of the Bosphorus to prevent the hostile warships from entering the Black Sea. Enough space to build fortifications (facing the land and the sea) with enough of a coastline to provide a convenient landing and supplies by the sea. All that “strategic depth” is nice on the map (just as the “warm water port” on the Far East) but the 1st obvious question is “against whom?” It is extremely unlikely that Turkey, Greece or Bulgaria are going to start war with Russia in a foreseen future and if there is a major war with participation of the “big guys” the troops located in the area are going to end up hostages with Russia not having adequate means for evacuating them by the sea and difficulties to supply them. Approximately the same goes for moving the Black Sea base to Constantinople: it immediately becomes vulnerable without adding anything substantial to the Russian geopolitical goal of turning the Black Sea into the Russian lake. Few small and medium warships patrolling Bosphorus area should be enough in a time of peace and when it comes to war the strait has to be mined (and coastal fortifications should prevent its cleaning). Plus the Black Sea fleet can be posted just outside the exit. Needless to say that in a peacetime even the issue of supplying Constantinople with food posses a serious dilemma: with the limited capacities of the Russian merchant marine providing an adequate supply without disrupting the existing trade is going to be problematic and reliance on the neighbor states creates unwanted dependencies (I was under impression that most of the supplies had been traditionally coming from the Asiatic side so this specific dependency is definitely unwelcome). And permanently keeping there a big number of troops adds to the problem.
On a diplomatic front, minimal final demands give Russian diplomats a good bargaining tool on the really important issues like “Polish question”: Russia agrees on the British presence in the Dardanelles (as a part of the “international control of the Straits”) and Britain recognizes the problems in the Polish-populated regions as Russian domestic issue.
For the domestic consumption this can be useful for not having the educated classes not get overly excited about the western allies: “not that we really wanted Constantinople but these ungrateful Brits and French did not deliver it to us” (“We suspected that the guests stole our silver spoons. Later we found the spoons but the unpleasant feelings are lingering”).
In general, when assessing the Russian domestic and foreign actions one always should keep in mind a fundamental principle formulated by Fieldmarshal Munnich: “Russia is fundamentally different from other countries because it is governed directly by the God. Without this assumption it is impossible to imagine how such a country manages to exist.” 😂😂😂😂😂😂
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(*) After all, unquestionably very intelligent Witte was quite enthusiastic about the idiocy of Port-Arthur and Dalnii and what you left Russia with (😜) is a set of not too bright butt kissers. So if Nicky or, more important, Alix, is getting an idea regarding “Constantinople governorship” and a naval base in it, this issue is going to get a top priority regardless the obstacles and inconveniences (BTW, speaking of the population, the Bulgarians were supposedly friendly to Russia - never fought against it but there is still plenty of the Turks). But perhaps, with all other issues, this one is not on the top of her priorities list?
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I think people are correct that Russia would be likely to prioritize the establishment of satellite sates south of the Caucasus over direct possession of Constantinople, as what they want there is control of the straits - something which is easier to get the other great powers to agree to via Greek ownership and a Rusian naval base. Turning Gallipoli into a Russian Gibraltar will allow them to close the straits during war and give them permament influence over Greece as the guarantor that Constantinople will remain theirs.
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With certain limit, sure everybody in France will want to keep Russia as an ally and will do a lot to obtain that...still the recent moves regarding Germany (plus all the situation with the Poles, that's not that great PR in general) will raise a lot of concern in Paris and while in OTL she don't have any other option that attache herself to the UK and USA and so accept a lot; here can become closer to the UK and/or Italy to try to create a counterbalance, even because i doubt that after such war people in charge in London will look very kindly to a Russo-German condominion in Europe. So if Petrograd move towards Germany, there will be diplomatic answer and countermove if only to show that two can play the game
Sadly yes, war make a lot of strange bedfellows and a lot of past hate can be 'temporary' forgotten and giving support to Enver against the Russian to limit their influence, hell Italy helped Ataturk against the greeks giving his troops supply, ammunition and place where training.
Sure, but it's easier get an agreement with the British and the French as they target area that not are core turkish like Iraq and Syria and OTL showed that agreement can be reached regarding oil revenue share and border adjustment; plus any political demagoguery regarding the OE will pale in comparisation of Russia become a lot more friendly with Germany.
'only victory matters' really? Come on, next what will be? Some comment over the weak and decadent western people? Seriously, the attitude has been absent in the SU due to the civil war (and a revolution with a following civil war will be probably the only way to really mobilize people for combat and even in that case foreign adventures will be very difficult if not to support a potential friendly revolution) and the fact that after the SU had done a lot of internal propaganda regarding the 'mighty external enemy', plus at the time the only attitude that was relevant was the one the nasty mustachoed man in Moscow.
ITTL the 'not again' attitude will afflict also the people of Russia as well, at least till the fascist regime will take power and will try to flame up the general population; in general the soldiers will return at home with the general economy in shamble and a lot of social problem boiling till the point of explosion, it seem the Nicky the third had not really learned a lot and he will probably try to go back as before with some little change...honestly i doubt that it will work, so political instability here we come.
There are not only the death, but the enormous numbers of crippled, the one that cannot work anymore or can work less than before and they will need help in the form of pension or other type of assistance and so the time to figure out plausible solution gained will be almost zero.
Regarding the economy in the immediate postwar, well sure Russia has resources, but as others there is the need to divert the economy from the war effort to peace mode, a job that's hardly easy and frankly the only product that the rest of the continent want from her is food (that btw can be effectively used as a mean to politically pressure the rest of the entente in a much more efficient and realistic mode than what's left of the imperial army) but this is a good that also the russian population need. Plus as i said earlier, there is the question of the loan, the one previous of the war and the one guaranteed by the British for financing the war and the ones that are needed for rebuilding and as the other victorious nation of the entente, this are not only a pressure point that Wilson can use and had used in OTL to get his point at home. Gold is good, gold is important but not only can be a chain to your economy (especially at the time) and if used to much the price lower and there is a lot to pay, plus i don't know how much of that gold was used as collateral for the previous loan, that's amounted to a total of 11 billions of rubles (pre war included), in any case at least in OTL 1917 the British conditioned their extension of the loan to the deposit of 2 billions of rubles worth of gold in UK and Canada as a safe measure and i doubt that ITTL they have done differently. Not considering that the civil war in OTL had made Russia skip all the economic downturn of the continent, ITTL the Tsarist goverment will be forced to find solution to that crisis...and the other crisis that will soon rear his ugly face aka the Spanish influenza as there is no way that's has butterflyed away and frankly i don't really think that they are up to the task.
Regarding Poland, well the 'legitimate alternative' will work only if she can deliver something, otherwise they will quickly become irrilevant and branded as collaborationist by their own people and indiscriminate retaliation work just on the brief period unless you go for massive killing, terror and deportation...the downside is that you also send the economy in the WC and not really in a good moment.
It's irrilevant if the russian foreign policy is panslavic or not, frankly i don't even took that in consideration; it's simple that becoming cozy with Germany immediately have consequences. You say that Czechoslovackia will be Russia friend due to the economic ties, well economy dosn't really relate in this way othewise France and Germany will have been BFF and if Russia is Germany friend, the Czech will want some other friend that keep her safe as there is the Sudetenland question.
The terrorism before the war will be look like a block party due to the returning soldiers and the general economic downturn with all the raising inflation that was running already due to the 'finance trough printing money' politics (at least in OTL); all that will be amplified by Nicky III and his apparent believe that things will go back as normal as before the war with maybe some superficial change, plus capitalist especially in this moment want to be sure of the place they are investing, sure they can still give you money but they will charge much more.
Italy ITTL will have probably British support unlike OTL, due to their desire to mantain a certain balance and Russian...friendly overture towards Germany.
Well, in peacetime ukrainian and russian foodstuffs found their way to Georgia. The flag of the ship is not important when an additional market is added. And if profit is to be made, I am pretty sure many shipwoners will raise the russian flag and register their ship in Odessa. Such an example is that after the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, many greek shipowners raised a russian flag as it helped business. A century later, when the Suez Canal was opened and trade with India flourished, greek shipowners registered their ships in London, raised the Union Jack and went on with business.
I would bet that economically-wise, Constantinople will be a net gain as it can become a "Singapore" of sorts, that controls also the trade of Bulgaria and Romania. Crimean salt, ukrainian wheat and beef, Azov Sea fish are cheaper than imports from Anatolia or Greece.
With the French yes, as soon as they pulled out of Cilicia. However, the Mosul Question was a major issue for the Turks, as it was considered a core part of the turkish nation according to the Misak i Milli- the National Pact/Oath.
However, in TTL the Turks are in much worse situation. In OTL, they had one field army intact (the Caucasus Army, former 3rd Army) in 1918 and the Entente was not in a position to occupy Anatolia, other than some ports and Cilicia. In this timeline though, the Russians have occupied half of Anatolia by 1917. I guess when the ottoman armies disintagrated in 1918, the Russians were not sitting idly but they advanced in the face of a collapsed opponent. At the very least they should have occupied Ankara (to reach a railhead) and Kayseri. And why not? In OTL the British with much smaller forces advanced to Mosul after the collapse and the French landed in Lebanon, Syria and Cilicia. The Italians landed from Kusadasi to Antalya and advanced inland. If these armies advanced after the ottoman collapse, why the russian armies would just stand still?
Of course I don't mean that the Russians would have any intent to annex Anatolia (the Armenian Highlands are not a geographic part of Anatolia). But having an army occupying the core territory of your enemy is always good leverage for negotiations.
I think that a total ottoman collapse would make the Italians, French and Greeks bolder compared to OTL, so it is added pressure.
The one thing that's looking clear is that the Turks are going to come out of the Peace Conference utterly screwed, Which, given the way they reacted to Sevres OTL, could make life interesting for whichever Powers end up occupying Constantinople or parts of Anatolia.
Whatever may have been promised during the war, I sincerely doubt that the British will accept Russian control of the Dardanelles as well as the Bosporus - especially since Greece is an ally and will also be expecting rewards.
And don't read too much too soon into Russian-German cooperation - yes, they may have worked out a pragmatic solution in Poland, but the Russians have still helped themselves to a fair chunk of German territory (plus reparations), and memories of the slaughter on the Dnieper will take time to fade.
Whatever may have been promised during the war, I sincerely doubt that the British will accept Russian control of the Dardanelles as well as the Bosporus - especially since Greece is an ally and will also be expecting rewards.
And don't read too much too soon into Russian-German cooperation - yes, they may have worked out a pragmatic solution in Poland, but the Russians have still helped themselves to a fair chunk of German territory (plus reparations), and memories of the slaughter on the Dnieper will take time to fade.
The problem is that they cannot react as in OTL: they won't have a field army intact and they will have to deal with hundreds of thousands of refugees from the eastern provinces, created by the 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918 advances. If there is a national uprising, they begin with controlling half or a quarter of the territory they controlled in OTL 1919. There won't be the material of the OTL Caucasus/3rd Army, nor the spoils they captured in 1918 after the russian collapse. They have fewer men, fewer weapons, smaller territory, fewer allies (Soviet Union) and more enemies. They cannot hope to field a regular army (Kuva-yi Nizamiye) against the foreign invaders
In OTL it was a close run, basically against only the small, inexperienced greek army that was led by incompetent officers and left after 1921 without material help from the Entente. And they managed to beat the Greeks due to their regular army, not the irregulars (Kuva-yi Milliye). Even the greek army on its own, never mind the Russians, could easily deal with the irregulars.
I agree that this is possible and even that at the time of peace possession of Constantinople can be a net gain - after all, it is a big transit port and the Russians will have a greater control over the imports and exports coming to and from Bulgaria and Rumania (and this would include the imports/exports of Hungary and perhaps even Austria shipped by the Danube). But in the case of any serious unpleasantries the area turns into a huge liability which is much more difficult, if not impossible, to protect against a major attack. OTOH, even with Constantinople not being in the Russian hands, the Med-Black Sea trade through Odessa had been flourishing so, besides control of the Rumanian & Bulgarian goods, Constantinople adds little: the Russian goods still have to be carried by land to the Black Sea and Azov Sea ports and then shipped across the sea(s).
Anyway, as I already said, in this TL, just as in OTL, the shape of the demands would be probably defined not by the practical considerations so it is up to @Stenkarazin to define whichever considerations would prevail. I'd put probability of Constantinople scenario slightly over 50% regardless of what I personally think on the subject. The same goes for "strategic" territory around the Straits but on that issue the Brits may ...er... help by denying an opportunity to commit a major stupidity. You brought Singapore as an example but don't forget what did happen to it during WWII and the same goes for some other isolated places. Plus, Russia already had its own disastrous example so there is a non-zero chance that a more modest approach is going to prevail, especially taking into an account that in this TL a head of the Russian delegation (BTW, which Trepov? Fedor Jr. or Alexander?) is a flamboyant incompetent (probably Fedor) and much more experienced French and British politicians should be able to outplay him.
Only as economic value. In terms of defending the place, the closest analogue would have been the Gibraltar. Frankly, I dont see why it would have been difficult to defend Bosporus. As yourself said, forts with coastal artillery and mines are enough, no fleet is needed or a massive army. Especially if the Gallipoli peninsula becomes russian (even without a russian asiatic shore or the nearby islands), you just fill the place with artillery and naval mines, put some sunflower seed oil in a hot pan and add the corn. The popcorn will be ready soon and you watch the enemies bashing against a natural fortress.
The other important butterfly would be having a land border with the british client/ally. Everybody will be right to assume that Greece will remain allied with Britain. However, sharing a land border with Russia of all countries, adds the gravity of being next to one of the world's largest land armies. Nobody in Greece will ever be sure that Russia won't just move a few hundred thousand of their land army - unlikely as it may seem with our hindsight- and stomp over Greece. They would make sure that the Bear is placated in all minor issues and take Britain's side only in the gravest situations. After all, for a peninsula in the Balkans, it is better to be invaded by Russia than blockaded to starvation by a naval power (Britain). However, if there is no land border to be shared, Greece can ascertain more autonomy vis-a-vis Russia.
Do yourself a favor and learn Russian history. Peter I was a glorified figure and he cost Russia anything between 20 and 25% of the population. How about Sheremetev’s famous “Don’t cry, Gosudar, the women will give birth to the new soldiers!”. Glorified 7YW, besides being pointless, was extremely costly in lives and yet Kunersdorf and even Zorndorf had been glorified. Suvorov’s glorified storm of Ismail cost 4,500 out of 28,000. The Napoleonic wars cost hundreds of thousands and they were lauded.
In few years (or even faster) even the participants are going to forget the horrors and concentrate on the glorious part (post-RCW, post-WWII) and the decorations would be proudly displayed.
Read what Caulaincourt wrote about Napoleon: a commander never was reprimanded for the losses as long as he was victorious. The attitude was not uniquely Russian. BTW, allied practices on the Western front were reflective of the same attitude so your sarcasm is rather irrelevant.
I have no idea what you are trying to say but the “heroes” of the RCW had been glorified and most of its pre-wwii existence the SU had uninterrupted militaristic hysteria and I’m not even going into post-wwII attitudes (“we need one victory and we‘ll not be shy about the cost”).
The rest is just repeating the same generalities reflecting your opinion. I already got it and expressed my disagreement.
yeah sure, that was the attitude of the commanders during wartime, i can honestly say that no italian commander as ever been reprimanded for having punished (with the death penalty) his men for the 'cowardice' of failing a direct assault against fortified position so what?...This is peacetime when all the payment for that is asked and we are talking about the civilian population, that's a lot different and the consequence of such attitude had signed the rest of the century. I'm talking about the soldiers coming home and found an economy in shamble after seeing unimaginable horror and for what? It's not WWII when they faced an existential menace in the true meaning of the word, this is WWI and senseless massacre it's the best definition of it and we are talking about a goverment like the one in A-H basically more at home in the 18th century than modern time, how they will cope with all the postwar problem? Because while i may not know much of russian history is hard to believe that things will go back as before and 99% of the time, change in such system happen with a lot of violence and chaos involved.
Plus just in term of numbers compare the napoleonic war with WWI is like compare the measle with the bubbonic plague and even in term of % of the population, the loss in the last conflict were much higher.
There is also the fact that honoring the heroes and the event...doesn't mean being eager to repeat the feat as you don't forget that kind of horror, nobody really forgot it in the west and i doubt that will happen in the east.
Yeah as i said, you need the URSS paranoia and fear of the 'mighty external enemy' to keep things this way with tons and tons of propaganda...and if you do that well it's much harder make friends and influence people, especially if you are part of the world economy
The Soviet goverment public attitude clashed with the much more prudent reality, the URSS and the USA really really and i mean really tried to avoid a direct war between them (especially in Europe), even more after the warscare of the Cuban Crisis.
And what generalities i repeat? That while Russia is in a much much better position than OTL as she avoided (for now) the revolution and the civil war and she is at the winner table, there are still the enormous economic and social consequences of the war to take in consideration (not including the coming pandemic) and his goverment not only is more apt for the napoleonic period but lack a lot of competent men? That such consequences will influcence her behaviour and power at the peace conference, p
That while she had a better hand at the game and can extend his influence, she is hardly in a position to dominate his surrounding like post -WWII?
That she will not escape the postwar troubles that had afflicted the rest of the world? That while she had avoided the February revolution, a lot of the problem at his core still exist
This talk reminds me of what I was reading in Hew Strachan's The First World War, where our current views of the war are actually fairly att odds with the immediate recollections of those who actually experienced it. As I recall, in Britain and France it wasn't until the end of the 20s that the common view of the Great War became universally pessimistic. During the 20s there were multiple different views, including a great deal of pride from soldiers. Indeed, Armistice Day for the the first decade of its existence was actually a day of celebration for most, with people going to restaurants and packing the streets to celebrate, not a completely solemn event. A lot of the memorials we see now actually had captured artillery pieces next to them, representing a miture of sadness at the deaths and pride at the victory.
Point is, don't assume the civilian population are going to immediately assume modern day 21st century attitudes to the war. I can't speak to Russian attitudes at the time, but victory has a way of making many things acceptable.
Point is, don't assume the civilian population are going to immediately assume modern day 21st century attitudes to the war. I can't speak to Russian attitudes at the time, but victory has a way of making many things acceptable.
Well, Gibraltar has an advantage of being pretty much secure against a land attack because Spain was not involved in any anti-British fighting for a very long time. Then, I’m afraid that you misunderstood my point regarding defense. It looks like we both agree regarding defense of Bosphorus - an access to the Black Sea can be denied (for quite a while) by holding a limited fortified area near its entry, mining the strait and having the Black Sea fleet supporting area with its firepower.
But what I was saying is that defense of the whole Straits area with Constantinople is a completely different task in the terms of its logistic complexity, scope of the required fortifications, number of troops, etc. Just the coastal fortifications may not be enough if enemy lands a considerable force outside the Straits (as happened with Sevastopol during the CW) so you need to have the extensive fortifications covering your holdings on Asiatic (Gallipoli) and European (Constantinople) sides and to keep a considerable number of troops garrisoning them. Practically any breach of the perimeter puts Constantinople within a reach of the enemy artillery and there is no easy way to evacuate the population and you can’t bring in the Black Sea fleet into Marmara because it becomes vulnerable and in the case of a fast retreat you may not have time to mine Bosphorus. In other word, you are more vulnerable without adding anything substantial to your main military goal of closing Bosphorus. I’m not talking about the economic value at the time of peace: it is obvious.
Of course, the obvious question is who is a potential enemy in this TL? This is still 1918 and benefit of a hindsight is not there. Britain is still an ally and, anyway, repetition of the CW seems to be highly unlikely, especially if there is no conflict of interests over the Ottoman ME possessions and this seems to be the case: Russia is getting Armenia and Britain and France are free to share the rest so everybody should be happily chewing their pieces of a pie (well, maybe Italy and Serbia are not 100% happy but none of them is relevant within this context).
Then goes an aspect you mentioned: paranoia based upon the wild perceptions, like a potential Greek fear of the Russian invasion. Not that there is any logical reason for such an action but Russia not holding Constantinople practically eliminates such a scenario if just because there is no launch area on which Russia can land a force needed for such an invasion. Perhaps scenario minimizing everybody’s paranoia is Constantinople and the area around it being made into free city like Danzig. This way nobody holds it and everybody prevents the rest from possessing it. If the Brits are holding Gallipoli or the European side of the Dardanelles, it is even better in the terms of cooling the situation: no potentially “irresponsible” side (aka one that is not a major power) would risk to destroy this status quo.
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Exactly. It is not like anybody anywhere (Russia including) would be ready to jump into a new major war or that the political and economic alliances would immediately trigger a new major war but it is not gloom and doom all over the place either. Every country has its problems and each of them is finding its own way out of them. The point remains that the improved Russian-German relations are not immediately triggering war with France and even not necessarily result in seriously cooling relations: prior to WWI both France and Germany had major (private) investments into Russian economy.
As for your last point, I think that for a while the Russian government would be getting a considerable credit for victory, the losses would somewhat lessen the land crisis and continuation of the existing resettlement policies could provide a temporary solution (and at least some of the new territories could accommodate some settler). The labor laws already were there and continuation in the same direction would also let some steam out. The financial issues are still there but nobody is pressing for an immediate repayment of the debts (at least before WWI Russian loans had been quite popular investment in France providing a steady income). Well, “everybody” has debts at that time so nothing unique there and there is a general understating that putting things back on tack is going to take time.
Great exchanges all around. Really help me to envision the dynamic of negotiation regarding the Straits and Constantinople. I will post about it (Austria-Hungary / Turkey / The Straits) soon, hopefully.
Note on Germany-Russia: I concur with @Merrick . It is way too early to talk about a Russo-German rapprochement. As far as the situation goes in 1918-1919, it simply amounts to German authorities and militias reasserting their authority in Silesia with the tacit acquiescence of the Russians, who are busy suppressing the Polish insurgency in Poznan and West Prussia. Beyond that, Germany is still punished by Russia: loss of Memel, Poznan, Southern part of West Prussia, war reparations, etc.
True that the new men in charge in Petrograd, being of the Durnovo school of thought, are more inclined to pro-German sympathies, but it doesn't really transpire as of yet (they may also be given the boot before long). Also true that the resolution of the Western Poland crisis will be seen as a gesture of (relative) Russian goodwill by Berlin, but again, it shouldn't lead to outright reconciliation and friendship, no matter what a few Russian courtiers may privately desire. As for French leaders, they obviously would have preferred Russia not to suppress Western Poland, but as far as they are concerned, the Entente is still valid as the best antidote against German revanchism. Same for the Czechoes: they are not going to turn away from Russia anytime soon. I don't dispute that Czecho statesmen might be more politically at home in Paris/Cambridge/Princeton than Irkutsk, but, whatever their political persuasion, the fact remain that they now share quite a long border with the Russian empire. Estranging themselves from Russia out of fear of German irredentism would be a peculiarly stupid thing to do.
Note on Germany-Russia: I concur with @Merrick . It is way too early to talk about a Russo-German rapprochement. As far as the situation goes in 1918-1919, it simply amounts to German authorities and militias reasserting their authority in Silesia with the tacit acquiescence of the Russians, who are busy suppressing the Polish insurgency in Poznan and West Prussia. Beyond that, Germany is still punished by Russia: loss of Memel, Poznan, Southern part of West Prussia, war reparations, etc.
True that the new men in charge in Petrograd, being of the Durnovo school of thought, are more inclined to pro-German sympathies, but it doesn't really transpire as of yet (they may also be given the boot before long). Also true that the resolution of the Western Poland crisis will be seen as a gesture of (relative) Russian goodwill by Berlin, but again, it shouldn't lead to outright reconciliation and friendship, no matter what a few Russian courtiers may privately desire. As for French leaders, they obviously would have preferred Russia not to suppress Western Poland, but as far as they are concerned, the Entente is still valid as the best antidote against German revanchism. Same for the Czechoes: they are not going to turn away from Russia anytime soon. I don't dispute that Czecho statesmen might be more politically at home in Paris/Cambridge/Princeton than Irkutsk, but, whatever their political persuasion, the fact remain that they now share quite a long border with the Russian empire. Estranging themselves from Russia out of fear of German irredentism would be a peculiarly stupid thing to do.
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October 1918 to March 1919 – The Paris Conference (II) – Austria-Hungary – Turkey
October 1918 to March 1919 – The Paris Conference (II) – Austria-Hungary - Turkey
“Thus perished Austria. This time, there was no Russian Tsar to save the House of Hapsburg from their own misdeeds. They had betrayed us time and again, and now finally they paid the price of their folly and stupidity. But there were more important consequences that the fate of Emperor Charles. For more than an millennium, the Balkans had been the battleground between two irreconcilable civilisations: Latin, Catholic Western Europe on one side, and, on the other side, the Greek, Orthodox, Slavo-Byzantine Oikouménè, whose banner was raised by Russia after the destruction of the Eastern Roman empire, brought by the treachery of the Latin Crusaders. Now [in 1919], finally, Byzantium was avenged, and the Latin sphere was pushed back to the Alps”.
Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov, interview on Russian television, 1989.
Austria-Hungary (Treaties of Trianon and St-Germain)
By the time the Paris Conference opened, the Austrian-Hungarian empire was already gone. USA and France wanted to recognized the reality on the ground: Budapest, Zagreb, Prague, Krakow had declared their independence in June 1918. Krakow was now in Russian hands, Zagreb had voted to unite with Belgrade in a great Southern Slav state. It made sense to give full statehood and independence to the other parts of the empire, which were already de facto independent since June-July 1918. Russia didn’t oppose that, on the contrary. None of Russia’s relative goodwill towards Germany applied to Austria-Hungary. They might have been a few reactionaries who felt queasy about redrawing Central Europe along national lines, but they were few and far between. For the huge majority of Russian decision-makers, the Austrian empire had to go. Whatever their political persuasion, whatever president Wilson’s fantasies, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would, by their geographical position, inevitably fall under Russia’s influence.
Thus perished the old, multinational empire of the house of Hapsburg. From the Russian point of view, Emperor Charles paid the price of half a century of irresponsible and treacherous foreign policy, from the stab-in-the-back of the Crimean War to the Bosnian crisis of 1908.
Some Russian diplomats, Kudashev among them, might have been willing to show relative leniency towards Hungary, so as to draw it away from Germany and towards Russia, but there were simply too many allied nations interested in carving a piece of the lands of St-Stephen. After four years of carnage, Russia was not the one to refrain Romania and Serbia from getting their fill. In one desperate bid to lighten the outcome of the negotiations, the Hungarians put in office a liberal government which appealed directly to President Wilson and decreed the disarmament of what was left of the Honved. It didn’t help them. The Treaty of Trianon was a tragedy for the Magyars, but there was nothing they could do, especially with the presence of Russian troops in Galicia, Bukovina and Slovakia. In the following years, the tragedy of Trianon would feed deep resentment within Hungary, and the reversal of its provisions would become the main goal of Hungarian foreign policy.
As for German Austria, it instantly went from being the heart of a multinational aristocratic empire to becoming a small, provincial, bourgeois republic with an oversized capital. The new Austro-German political leadership, made of petty bourgeois in drab clothes, seemed relatively happy with that. They didn’t dream of reclaiming Carniola, or Trieste, or Bohemia. Their only “forbidden” desire was to be allowed to unite with Germany in the undetermined future: this was smacked at the behest of France and Italy, and the Austrian politicians meekly complied. Beside that, governing their minuscule republic from Viennese palaces too beautiful for them, under ceilings too high for them, was abundantly enough for these drab little men who had betrayed the dynasty without which they would have remained backward Bavarian backbenchers for all eternity.
Provisions of the Treaties of St-Germain-en-Laye and Trianon:
“Thus perished Austria. This time, there was no Russian Tsar to save the House of Hapsburg from their own misdeeds. They had betrayed us time and again, and now finally they paid the price of their folly and stupidity. But there were more important consequences that the fate of Emperor Charles. For more than an millennium, the Balkans had been the battleground between two irreconcilable civilisations: Latin, Catholic Western Europe on one side, and, on the other side, the Greek, Orthodox, Slavo-Byzantine Oikouménè, whose banner was raised by Russia after the destruction of the Eastern Roman empire, brought by the treachery of the Latin Crusaders. Now [in 1919], finally, Byzantium was avenged, and the Latin sphere was pushed back to the Alps”.
Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov, interview on Russian television, 1989.
Austria-Hungary (Treaties of Trianon and St-Germain)
By the time the Paris Conference opened, the Austrian-Hungarian empire was already gone. USA and France wanted to recognized the reality on the ground: Budapest, Zagreb, Prague, Krakow had declared their independence in June 1918. Krakow was now in Russian hands, Zagreb had voted to unite with Belgrade in a great Southern Slav state. It made sense to give full statehood and independence to the other parts of the empire, which were already de facto independent since June-July 1918. Russia didn’t oppose that, on the contrary. None of Russia’s relative goodwill towards Germany applied to Austria-Hungary. They might have been a few reactionaries who felt queasy about redrawing Central Europe along national lines, but they were few and far between. For the huge majority of Russian decision-makers, the Austrian empire had to go. Whatever their political persuasion, whatever president Wilson’s fantasies, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would, by their geographical position, inevitably fall under Russia’s influence.
Thus perished the old, multinational empire of the house of Hapsburg. From the Russian point of view, Emperor Charles paid the price of half a century of irresponsible and treacherous foreign policy, from the stab-in-the-back of the Crimean War to the Bosnian crisis of 1908.
Some Russian diplomats, Kudashev among them, might have been willing to show relative leniency towards Hungary, so as to draw it away from Germany and towards Russia, but there were simply too many allied nations interested in carving a piece of the lands of St-Stephen. After four years of carnage, Russia was not the one to refrain Romania and Serbia from getting their fill. In one desperate bid to lighten the outcome of the negotiations, the Hungarians put in office a liberal government which appealed directly to President Wilson and decreed the disarmament of what was left of the Honved. It didn’t help them. The Treaty of Trianon was a tragedy for the Magyars, but there was nothing they could do, especially with the presence of Russian troops in Galicia, Bukovina and Slovakia. In the following years, the tragedy of Trianon would feed deep resentment within Hungary, and the reversal of its provisions would become the main goal of Hungarian foreign policy.
As for German Austria, it instantly went from being the heart of a multinational aristocratic empire to becoming a small, provincial, bourgeois republic with an oversized capital. The new Austro-German political leadership, made of petty bourgeois in drab clothes, seemed relatively happy with that. They didn’t dream of reclaiming Carniola, or Trieste, or Bohemia. Their only “forbidden” desire was to be allowed to unite with Germany in the undetermined future: this was smacked at the behest of France and Italy, and the Austrian politicians meekly complied. Beside that, governing their minuscule republic from Viennese palaces too beautiful for them, under ceilings too high for them, was abundantly enough for these drab little men who had betrayed the dynasty without which they would have remained backward Bavarian backbenchers for all eternity.
Provisions of the Treaties of St-Germain-en-Laye and Trianon:
- Galicia-Lodomeria and Bukovina to Russia;
- Slovakia and the lands of the Bohemian crown to form the Czechoslovak state;
- Transylvania to Romania[1];
- Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Vojvodina to Serbia[2];
- Bay of Kotor to Montenegro[3], whose annexation by Serbia was firmly refused by both Russia and Italy - This was the only area where Kudashev and Sonnino were able to find common ground.
- To Italy: Trentino, South-Tyrol, Trieste, Istria, part of Carniola, recognition of her hold on Valona and the recognition of a protectorate on Albania[4]. On the other hand, Italian’s claims on Northern Dalmatia as per the treaty of London were considerably curtailed by the Conference: only Zara and its immediate surroundings were awarded to Italy. The question of Fiume was solved to the dissatisfaction of both Italy and Serbia: Russia, who opposed Belgrade’s efforts to annex Montenegro, supported the Serbian claims on Fiume, but met the opposition of the Western Allies who by that stage resented any Russian-backed proposal. Thus plans were made to turn Fiume into a “free state” like Saarland, if only as a provisional measure.
The Ottoman Empire (Treaty of Sèvres) – First terms
- The bulk of the lands conquered by Yudenich during the war are erected into a “kingdom of Armenia” (all the way to Sivas in the West and Van in the South) and a “grand-duchy of Trebizond” (all the way to Sinop) with a constitutional status similar to Finland’s.
- Syria and Cilicia become French mandates, despite Russian claims to extend the kingdom of Armenia to the Mediterranean. France also gets a zone of influence projecting from Cilicia into Anatolia.
- Palestine and Iraq become British mandates, despite Russian hopes to form an Assyrian state in Northern Iraq.
- The space between the Kingdom of Armenia and the Mandates of Syria and Iraq is split in British and French French zones of influence, which could be erected into a Kurdish state in an undetermined future.
- Cyprus' annexation by Britain is confirmed;
- Italy is granted an economic zone of influence in south-western Turkey;
- Greece annexes Ionia (Smyrna and its area), as well as a few Aegean islands still in Turkish hands.
- Provisions regarding what’s left of the Ottoman State: disbandment of the army under Allied control, reestablishment of the Capitulations, reparations, etc.
This proved relatively easy. Negotiating on the fate of Constantinople and the Straits would prove much more complicated.
[1] More or less as OTL.
[2] As OTL. A referendum would be held to draw the final border in Carinthia/Slovenia.
[3] IOTL Montenegro was denied a seat at the Conference despite Italy’s support, and was accordingly annexed by Serbia. It cannot happen ITTL, since the Russian monarchy has very closed links to the Montenegrine royal family. Thus with Russian support Montenegro keeps its independence and gets something out of the Conference.
[4] Several factors explain the better outcome for Italy ITTL: a better position at the end of the war (no Caporetto, decisive 12th Isonzo), no divergences between Orlando and Sonnino as the latter is the sole negotiator at Paris, Boselli being too old and in any case too undistinguished to challenge his Foreign Minister. On the other hand, Russia is there to bolster Belgrade’s claims (especially since Petrograd wants to keep the Serbs out of Montenegro). So, all in all, a marginally better outcome for Italy. Yet the Italians are still disappointed, because they hoped that their decisive contribution to victory would enable them to ask for more, ie., more Dalmatian coast, some German colonies in Africa, a more direct protectorate on Albania, a protectorate on Montenegro, etc. Of course Italy also receives promises regarding the Aozou Strip in Chad and Jubaland as OTL.
[2] As OTL. A referendum would be held to draw the final border in Carinthia/Slovenia.
[3] IOTL Montenegro was denied a seat at the Conference despite Italy’s support, and was accordingly annexed by Serbia. It cannot happen ITTL, since the Russian monarchy has very closed links to the Montenegrine royal family. Thus with Russian support Montenegro keeps its independence and gets something out of the Conference.
[4] Several factors explain the better outcome for Italy ITTL: a better position at the end of the war (no Caporetto, decisive 12th Isonzo), no divergences between Orlando and Sonnino as the latter is the sole negotiator at Paris, Boselli being too old and in any case too undistinguished to challenge his Foreign Minister. On the other hand, Russia is there to bolster Belgrade’s claims (especially since Petrograd wants to keep the Serbs out of Montenegro). So, all in all, a marginally better outcome for Italy. Yet the Italians are still disappointed, because they hoped that their decisive contribution to victory would enable them to ask for more, ie., more Dalmatian coast, some German colonies in Africa, a more direct protectorate on Albania, a protectorate on Montenegro, etc. Of course Italy also receives promises regarding the Aozou Strip in Chad and Jubaland as OTL.
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