For Want of a Word – Stolypin endures

So Russia ends up having much more Poles and annexes all Galicia and not just Eastern one. Episode with POW seems rather typical: this would not be the first case when enthusiasm and expectations of the foreign help went ahead of the realistic assessment of the situation (by that time worked only during the war of the 4th coalition with Nappy being around but failed in all other cases). So the hopes for independent Poland are dead and Nicholas has an excuse for not rushing with autonomy. Taking into an account that Russia is in possession of Turkish Armenia (and France and Britain want much bigger and profitable parts of the Ottoman Empire) the only really controversial part is fate of the Straits.

Actually, your scenario of the improving Russian-German relations may force France to adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward Russia because otherwise the French gains may start looking insecure.

And this will not become a long ongoing very bloody struggle for Russia, especially in a period of great economic and political struggle that's the aftermath of the greatest massacre know to man, sure not really. Dmowsky support and legitimacy will remain stable if he deliver something with his policy, otherwise soon or sooner he will become just a laughthinstock without any credibility and unfortunely statistically speaking Nicky and co. capacity to take the right decision are very low, not considering that while we don't know much about the type of fascism that will take helm of Russia in the future...well at least in OTL in general this type of regime don't have that great record regarding minority rights.

An improved Russian-German relation can also bring the British to support much much more France at Versailles or being much more 'strict' regarding reparations; not considering that if Petrograd become much more cozy with Berlin well support for this https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhenish_Republic and the general occupation of the Rhur will be increased.
Hell, with this type of policy Italy unlike OTL will not find much opposition in France and UK regarding his expansion of influence in the balkans, especially if against Serbia that will be perceived as a russian ally and in this scenario the russian delegation can huffin and puffin but there is little that they can do except protest as they have spent already a lot of political capital.
Basically this is not the end of WWII with Stalinist Russia in firm control of half of the continent, lot of legitimancy and even some level of popular support in the occupied zone; no this is a Tsarist Russia with a problematic economy, political troubles looming, massive loss in term of blood and treasure, ongoing terrorist act in the polish land that will probably become only worse if a political solution is not found, a leadership that's can be described as subpar if one want to be kind but lucky as she had just survived a potential revolution. In poor words, the entire russian infrastructure is shacky and can't obtain all what she want or project power everywhere while the rest of the entente accept the fait accomplit, plus Sazonov idea of take trade agreements instead of money unlike the rest of the entente will probably be beneficial like a bullet in your reproductive organ. Sure it's a smart idea but the german leaderships that's more or less like OTL will go for the hyperinflation plan and we have seen what will produce, so become more tyed to the german economy will be hardly a good thing, plus there will be the occupation of the Rhur and ITTL the plan of separate it from Germany will have probably much more support.


Well, seriously nobody can really consider Nicky, his wife and the cronies that generally obtain their favor competent on their job...even before the war, there was a reason that in OTL Russia fall on revolution and civil war; as i said, they made look the italian political class of the time competent and this is an achievement. Expecting this type of men to create a steady and competent postwar leaderships for a nation that had suffered so much loss in human and material terms and with all the political and social consequences it's almost ASB.

Sure even the rest of the entente was dependent of american loan, still the russian situation is worse, not only she is indebted with the British and the French due to the war cost that has been financed and the prewar loan, but she also need a lot of money to rebuild his economy and infrastructure, just in OTL Russia had more than 2200000 dead in WWI, before the civil war and almost 4 million of wounded and ITTL the numbers and destruction will be higher due to the prolonged fight and the German 'hail mary' offensive). Sure for now the civil war seem not in program, still things will not going back as before after such massacre and chaos is unavoidable especially with the current leadership
 
Random question #1 - Does Denmark get the whole of Schleswig (which I think includes Kiel),or just Northern Schleswig as OTL?
Random question #2 - I don't see any mention of Eupen-Malmedy - any changes on the Belgian-German frontier?
Random question #3 - OTL at least some of the German colonies were (officially) made mandates of the League of Nations - is the League stillborn TTL?


Random question #4 (sorry) - Who's in charge in Berlin? I'm assuming that Ludendorff and Hindenburg fell with the Kaiser and with no German Revolution, Ebert isn't Chancellor and the Social Democrats didn't get to proclaim a republic. So has the civilian government (which was pretty much a dead letter under the First Quartermaster) been reconstituted or is the country still under de-facto military rule?
If I've got it right, when the Armistice TTL was signed the German Army was still holding the Hindenburg Line in the west and the Russian advance had got no further than Russian Poland. The revanchists and stab-in-the-back mythmakers are going to have a field day, particularly if they can claim it was the civilians who forced the peace on the army.


Wilson's position is significantly weaker TTL - not only is he one of a Big Five rather than Four, but the war ending five months early means that the Entente powers are that much less in debt to the US, and of course no-one can claim that it was the AEF who won the war. I can see even the British and French being fairly short with the man who turned up after the fighting was over (US casualties must have been pretty minimal) and tried to dictate terms.

As far as Poland (and the Treaty generally) goes, the Russians have clearly decided to go for reconciliation with Germany, which makes sense from their perspective - with Austria-Hungary gone and no German interest in the Balkans, the two countries don't have a whole lot to fight about and Prussia and Russia were mostly friendly from the Partitions up to the 1880s (Ghost of Empress Elizabeth: We could have strangled those maniacs in their cradle , now tell me why we didn't!) . On the other hand Poznan and Memel are going to sting (not as much as Danzig did OTL, but still...) I think any long-term reconciliation will depend on what the post-war German government thinks of Muscovism.

Meanwhile, I'd expect the French to be far more worried about signs of Russo-German co-operation than about anything that happens to the Poles. And the British are not going to want to see a Russian Constantinople.

1/ I left that ambiguous on purpose. I don't imagine Russia being so fond of referenda, so they would give Denmark the whole of Schleswig without fretting about asking the local denizens. But Kiel makes this point important. It seems to me that the city is situated in Holstein, just below the border with Schleswig, but I may be mistaken.

2/ How typical of me to forget about Belgium. Of course they get "les cantons rédimés" and a mandate on Ruanda-Urundi (and this little island off the coast of Italy).

3/ I will have to address the League at some point. I can't see why the SDN couldn't happen ITTL. In the meantime I left the phrasing vague, but these are most probably mandates as OTL.

4/ The likely scenario is that Ludendorff has left to Sweden as OTL. A civilian government entrusted with the peace negotiations (as mentioned in one of my threadmarked posts). This government is probably made of a mix of liberal civil servants, Zentrum, and SPD. I will address the German political scene at some point (revolution or not, etc).

5/ Stab-in-the-back is going to be a thing ITTL, yes. There could an interesting element in the fact that the delegation sent West was made of Reichstag members (in the hope of appeasing the Western Allies) was the peace delegation on the Eastern front was, more classically, made of officers and diplomats (because there was no added value in sending liberal politicians to Russian generals). We could see a variation on the "stab-in-the-back" along the lines of: "While our military was negotiating a honourable peace with Russia, Messrs. Ernzberger & co betrayed us to France and Britain !".

6/ France will be in a very delicate situation during the next stages of the Paris Conference (and after). Holding closely to the Russian Entente in the hope that it will neutralize any Russo-German rapprochement seems the most probable French policy. This in turn has an impact on France's policy regarding Czeko, Greece, Romania... and Britain.

7/ Constantinople is going to be the next sticking point, indeed. But the negotiations will be overcome by events happening on the ground. Not necessarily to Russia's advantage.
 
1/ I left that ambiguous on purpose. I don't imagine Russia being so fond of referenda, so they would give Denmark the whole of Schleswig without fretting about asking the local denizens. But Kiel makes this point important. It seems to me that the city is situated in Holstein, just below the border with Schleswig, but I may be mistaken.
You may be right - I've had a look at a map and the Schleswig-Holstein border looks to run into the Kiel fjord about halfway down, just north of the city proper. OTOH, that's where the Kiel Canal is, and it looks to me that the canal loops into Schleswig for a short section between Kiel and Rendsburg.
 
And this will not become a long ongoing very bloody struggle for Russia, especially in a period of great economic and political struggle that's the aftermath of the greatest massacre know to man, sure not really. Dmowsky support and legitimacy will remain stable if he deliver something with his policy, otherwise soon or sooner he will become just a laughthinstock without any credibility and unfortunely statistically speaking Nicky and co. capacity to take the right decision are very low, not considering that while we don't know much about the type of fascism that will take helm of Russia in the future...well at least in OTL in general this type of regime don't have that great record regarding minority rights.

An improved Russian-German relation can also bring the British to support much much more France at Versailles or being much more 'strict' regarding reparations; not considering that if Petrograd become much more cozy with Berlin well support for this https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhenish_Republic and the general occupation of the Rhur will be increased.
Hell, with this type of policy Italy unlike OTL will not find much opposition in France and UK regarding his expansion of influence in the balkans, especially if against Serbia that will be perceived as a russian ally and in this scenario the russian delegation can huffin and puffin but there is little that they can do except protest as they have spent already a lot of political capital.
Basically this is not the end of WWII with Stalinist Russia in firm control of half of the continent, lot of legitimancy and even some level of popular support in the occupied zone; no this is a Tsarist Russia with a problematic economy, political troubles looming, massive loss in term of blood and treasure, ongoing terrorist act in the polish land that will probably become only worse if a political solution is not found, a leadership that's can be described as subpar if one want to be kind but lucky as she had just survived a potential revolution. In poor words, the entire russian infrastructure is shacky and can't obtain all what she want or project power everywhere while the rest of the entente accept the fait accomplit, plus Sazonov idea of take trade agreements instead of money unlike the rest of the entente will probably be beneficial like a bullet in your reproductive organ. Sure it's a smart idea but the german leaderships that's more or less like OTL will go for the hyperinflation plan and we have seen what will produce, so become more tyed to the german economy will be hardly a good thing, plus there will be the occupation of the Rhur and ITTL the plan of separate it from Germany will have probably much more support.



Well, seriously nobody can really consider Nicky, his wife and the cronies that generally obtain their favor competent on their job...even before the war, there was a reason that in OTL Russia fall on revolution and civil war; as i said, they made look the italian political class of the time competent and this is an achievement. Expecting this type of men to create a steady and competent postwar leaderships for a nation that had suffered so much loss in human and material terms and with all the political and social consequences it's almost ASB.

Sure even the rest of the entente was dependent of american loan, still the russian situation is worse, not only she is indebted with the British and the French due to the war cost that has been financed and the prewar loan, but she also need a lot of money to rebuild his economy and infrastructure, just in OTL Russia had more than 2200000 dead in WWI, before the civil war and almost 4 million of wounded and ITTL the numbers and destruction will be higher due to the prolonged fight and the German 'hail mary' offensive). Sure for now the civil war seem not in program, still things will not going back as before after such massacre and chaos is unavoidable especially with the current leadership
Well, this is one way to look at the situation but so far I have no reason to agree with your assessment and conclusions except, perhaps with a chance for Italy to ask for a little more land.

On a subject of getting reparations with technology you are plain wrong because this is exactly what Russia needed. Gold is not a critical problem: Russia still has a considerable amount of it and has big gold deposits East of Ural. On the Franco-Russian relations you also seemingly did not get an right idea. France was going to insist upon the reparations anyway and in OTL it did occupy the Rhineland all the way to 1930 so there is no change and it is obvious that France can’t maintain it forever. What is changing is a potential long-term shift of a power balance and your “solution” is the worst possible because it keeps pushing Germany and Russia closer. The Brits in this equation are quite irrelevant as a guarantor of the French security so the French politicians, if they have brains, would try to minimize the growing German-Russian ties and hostile attitude is not going to work.
Edit: after writing this I read @Stenkarazin earlier post and found that we are on the same page regarding that issue. France is going to be more accommodating to Russia to keep it as an ally. 😜

Now, Russia is, of course, in a troubled economic situation but so are Britain and France. But Russia has a lot of resources which it can keep selling (as was the case in OTL) and France does not. If it is hostile, it is losing Russian market to the Germans and gains nothing. Russian government is incompetent, granted. But most of the time between 1700 and 1918 (in thus TL) Russia had governments of various degree of incompetence and managed to survive and even extend its power. Not that the governments of France and Britain had been excessively competent, otherwise WWII (“unnecessary war” as Churchill called it) would not happen (at least in the form it did). But “incompetent government” does not always mean a complete disaster: under incompetent NII Russian economy kept growing not only all the way to 1914 but to 1916 (in OTL). Terrorism was a routine thing since the reign of AII and here it does not have support among the “educated classes” (which was a critical factor) and narrowed to the “Polish issue” to which majority of the Russian population never sympathized. Even within the Polish territories it is going to be marginalized both by “legitimate alternative” and free hand on the repressions: outsiders may keep huffing and puffing but they can do nothing and the terrorists don’t even have a convenient safe haven abroad: Germany is distinctively unsympathetic, the same goes for Czechoslovakia and neither Austria nor Hungary (not bordering with the Polish territories) would risk alienating Russia over this issue. To get any sympathy, there would be a need to cross few borders and France will offer ... a sympathy.

As for the Balkans, you are seemingly too much into your own ideas to pay attention to what @Stenkarazin wrote: Russian delegation is not panslavic and neither are “those who matter“ at home. Which means that the lesson is learned and the efforts in that direction are going to be minimal. OTOH, Czechoslovakia is going to be pro-Russian both based upon the experience of WWI and because Russia is going to be a potential big market for the Czech production (unlike France of Britain).

Now, about the losses. They were terrible but, on a purely cynical level, they are lessening pressure on the agricultural lands so the crisis is postponed and there is a time to figure out plausible solutions. AFAIK, both in Britain and France the losses in WWI produced “not again” attitude which lasted all the way to 1939. This attitude had been absent in the SU and is going to be absent in this TL Russia due to the traditional attitude “only victory matters”.

Actually, Russia ends the war in almost WWII scenario with the friendly neighbors in Central Europe but, unlike WWII it also ends up with sincerely friendly Germany. The whole of it including the temporarily occupied (by the French) areas. And, of course, the destruction to the economy is much smaller and, with country being open to the foreign investments, many of the OTL post-WWII issues do not exist. Politicians may keep redrawing the maps but when capitalist sees a profit......
 
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5/ Stab-in-the-back is going to be a thing ITTL, yes. There could an interesting element in the fact that the delegation sent West was made of Reichstag members (in the hope of appeasing the Western Allies) was the peace delegation on the Eastern front was, more classically, made of officers and diplomats (because there was no added value in sending liberal politicians to Russian generals). We could see a variation on the "stab-in-the-back" along the lines of: "While our military was negotiating a honourable peace with Russia, Messrs. Ernzberger & co betrayed us to France and Britain !".

You really should try your hand in the foreign politics, this one is simply Machiavellian! Sticking knife into the back of civilian government while pleasing the German miniltary and nationalists and providing an ideological basis for having a powerful ally and all this in a single sentence! My sincere admiration. 😂😂😂😂😂
 
With Wilhelm III on the Imperial throne, does this mean that the monarchs of the constituent part of the empire i.e., Bavaria, Saxony, etc. retain their thrones as well?
 
From the Russian view: I think they'd push for such a thing in order to have another ally alongside an enlarged/incorporated Armenia.
From the Franco-British view: Hell no. They'd be very much against further weakening Turkey because of their fear of Russia.

TTL with a victorious Russia around? Sevres will probably look like a slap in the hand most probably...
 
With Wilhelm III on the Imperial throne, does this mean that the monarchs of the constituent part of the empire i.e., Bavaria, Saxony, etc. retain their thrones as well?

Yess, I guess. At some point I will need to write something about German politics in the immediate aftermath of the war, but I think it plausible that in TTL with no Kiel Mutiny and the war ending 4 months earlier, there is no council revolution, and the progressive forces focus on reforming the Reich rather than proclaiming a Republic. But then radical socialist agitation might come up in 1919.

I hope so as I always liked Bavaria.

Don't know why just have a sentimental attachment to it.

Me too. Especially since the Wittelsbach are the true heirs to the thrones of England and Scotland.
 
From the Russian view: I think they'd push for such a thing in order to have another ally alongside an enlarged/incorporated Armenia.
From the Franco-British view: Hell no. They'd be very much against further weakening Turkey because of their fear of Russia.
But wouldn’t it be ....er.... “Wilsonian”? You know, national state and all that stuff (I still can’t figure out how the Czechs and Slovaks amounted to the same nation ....) 😂
 

AlexG

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But wouldn’t it be ....er.... “Wilsonian”? You know, national state and all that stuff (I still can’t figure out how the Czechs and Slovaks amounted to the same nation ....) 😂
Sorry which one? The Armenian national state with its non-genocided borders and the Kurdish nation or the part about the strong Turkish state?
 
Sorry which one? The Armenian national state with its non-genocided borders and the Kurdish nation or the part about the strong Turkish state?
Kurdish state. Taking into an account what Britain and France did to the Ottoman Empire and how the new states were created, I would not overestimate degree of their concern about well-being of the Turkish state. BTW, I’m not sure that the Kurds had been “strengthening” any of the states in which they ended up.
 
Kurdish state. Taking into an account what Britain and France did to the Ottoman Empire and how the new states were created, I would not overestimate degree of their concern about well-being of the Turkish state. BTW, I’m not sure that the Kurds had been “strengthening” any of the states in which they ended up.

Considering the growing warmth of the Russians and Germans, I can picture Britain and France shaking hands with the likes of Enver Pasha.

Overlooking genocide is a tragically common act done for the sake of geopolitical interest.
 
Considering the growing warmth of the Russians and Germans, I can picture Britain and France shaking hands with the likes of Enver Pasha.

Overlooking genocide is a tragically common act done for the sake of geopolitical interest.
Indeed. But hands shaking, embraces and kisses would not stay on the way of getting the oil-rich areas. Neither would the domestic political demagoguery.
 
Considering the growing warmth of the Russians and Germans, I can picture Britain and France shaking hands with the likes of Enver Pasha.
In contrast to the 19th century, Turkey cannot become the british shield and they are currently broken. Not to mention that in OTL both French and British had agreed for the Russians to control Bosporus and the Gallipoli Peninsula (but not the Dardanelles' asiatic shore). Actually they were more at ease to give away Istanbul that coming to an agreement on Poland. Throughout the war, when the British wanted to direct russian ambitions to the least bad option (for british interests) , was in the Straits and the Ottomans.

Not Turkey has lost its intrinsic value- to keep the Russians out of the Mediterranean. The next chokepoint is the Dardanelles entrance, currently controled by Greece, where the Entente had established a naval base in the island of Limnos to support the Gallipoli Campaign and after their defeat, to blockade Goeben and keep her inside the Dardanelles. The Russians may keep Bosporus: they will never be able to project power in the Mediterranean with a british client covering the Straits.

Greece also happens to have a very anglophile prime minister who was willing to become the british client/stooge/enforcer in the region. Lloyd George had a great relationship with Venizelos whom he admired and viewed as an upcoming british client in the Levant.
 
In contrast to the 19th century, Turkey cannot become the british shield and they are currently broken. Not to mention that in OTL both French and British had agreed for the Russians to control Bosporus and the Gallipoli Peninsula (but not the Dardanelles' asiatic shore). Actually they were more at ease to give away Istanbul that coming to an agreement on Poland. Throughout the war, when the British wanted to direct russian ambitions to the least bad option (for british interests) , was in the Straits and the Ottomans.

Not Turkey has lost its intrinsic value- to keep the Russians out of the Mediterranean. The next chokepoint is the Dardanelles entrance, currently controled by Greece, where the Entente had established a naval base in the island of Limnos to support the Gallipoli Campaign and after their defeat, to blockade Goeben and keep her inside the Dardanelles. The Russians may keep Bosporus: they will never be able to project power in the Mediterranean with a british client covering the Straits.

Greece also happens to have a very anglophile prime minister who was willing to become the british client/stooge/enforcer in the region. Lloyd George had a great relationship with Venizelos whom he admired and viewed as an upcoming british client in the Levant.
In the scenario outlined above do you think that the former Ottoman Battleships seized by the Brits could be given to the Greeks? Now that would be an ironic twist of fate.
 
(I still can’t figure out how the Czechs and Slovaks amounted to the same nation ....) 😂
The same way the Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians, Serbs and Macedonians were considered to be the same nation? The Western powers could sometimes be almost Russian in their notions of Slavic brotherhood, and tended to skate over minor local differences when it came to putting states together.
To be fair, the various Czech and Slovak nationalist movements had pretty much united around the cause of Czechoslovakia before the end of the war.

I'm interested in seeing what the Russian line will be towards the Austro-Hungarian successor states TTL - do they back Czechoslovakia and Serbia/Yugoslavia in their claims against Austria and Hungary (and Italy in Serbia's case)? Presumably no Bolsheviks means no Bela Kun regime, so what's their attitude to Hungary?
 
In contrast to the 19th century, Turkey cannot become the british shield and they are currently broken. Not to mention that in OTL both French and British had agreed for the Russians to control Bosporus and the Gallipoli Peninsula (but not the Dardanelles' asiatic shore). Actually they were more at ease to give away Istanbul that coming to an agreement on Poland. Throughout the war, when the British wanted to direct russian ambitions to the least bad option (for british interests) , was in the Straits and the Ottomans.

Not Turkey has lost its intrinsic value- to keep the Russians out of the Mediterranean. The next chokepoint is the Dardanelles entrance, currently controled by Greece, where the Entente had established a naval base in the island of Limnos to support the Gallipoli Campaign and after their defeat, to blockade Goeben and keep her inside the Dardanelles. The Russians may keep Bosporus: they will never be able to project power in the Mediterranean with a british client covering the Straits.

Greece also happens to have a very anglophile prime minister who was willing to become the british client/stooge/enforcer in the region. Lloyd George had a great relationship with Venizelos whom he admired and viewed as an upcoming british client in the Levant.
After the CW Russia did not have means to project power to the Med and eve by the time of CW its main interest was in not letting the foreign warships into the Black Sea. Besides, even with the new dreadnoughts built during the wwi Russian Black Sea fleet would be inferior to what the Brits had on the Med or could bring to the Med with a relative ease. Then, what would be the strategic purpose?
 
In the scenario outlined above do you think that the former Ottoman Battleships seized by the Brits could be given to the Greeks? Now that would be an ironic twist of fate.
I doubt it. The Greeks may finish their Salamis. In any case, the British in OTL wanted the Greeks to have a flotilla navy not a battleship navy. Destroyers, submarines and scout cruisers. What I find more plausible in this senario is for Greeks to gain the asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, along with the OTL Smyrna Zone (enlarged probably) and the (ITTL strategic) Smyrna - Bandirma region that included the railroad.

After the CW Russia did not have means to project power to the Med and eve by the time of CW its main interest was in not letting the foreign warships into the Black Sea. Besides, even with the new dreadnoughts built during the wwi Russian Black Sea fleet would be inferior to what the Brits had on the Med or could bring to the Med with a relative ease. Then, what would be the strategic purpose?
That is true.
During the Great War, the British reached to the conclusion that a russian Constantinople doesn't mean power projection to the Mediterranean as they can easily put a cork in the Dardanelles bottle. The cork in question is the anchorage of Limnos and control of the Aegean- therefore, Greece.

The advantage the Russians get is not a "warm port" but turning the Black Sea into a russian lake, where Ukraine or Russia can trade by sea with Georgia and Armenia and the entirety of the Empire with Romania and Bulgaria, without any concern of a blockading force. It is a considerable economic zone that is safe from hostile fleets.
 
I'm interested in seeing what the Russian line will be towards the Austro-Hungarian successor states TTL - do they back Czechoslovakia and Serbia/Yugoslavia in their claims against Austria and Hungary (and Italy in Serbia's case)? Presumably no Bolsheviks means no Bela Kun regime, so what's their attitude to Hungary?

Re Austria-Hungary: my first idea was to find a way to keep the remnants of AH united under a loose federation, but I had to acknowledge the implausibility of it. There is really no pro-Austrian faction whatsoever in Russian circles, and in any case by the Paris Conference the empire has already dissolved itself. We are not in 1848 anymore, Russia is not going to send troops to Budapest or Vienna to restore Charles on his throne.

I think it is pretty probable that Russia would back not only the Czechos and the Serbs, but also the Romanians.

Re Italy: Italy is in a better position ITTL since no Caporetto, a decisive 12th Isonzo, and Soninno being able to work without the hindrance of Orlando. But, that being said, Belgrade has behind her a powerful ally that she hadn't IOTL. There is also the fact that ITTL Russia will not allow Serbia to annex Montenegro, so Russian diplomats will be all the more eager to support Serbia's claims in Istria and Dalmatia.

So, all in all, I envision Italy getting a better deal than IOTL, but still feeling kind of cheated (getting less than London 1915, no German colonies, etc.).

Re Hungary: Indeed without October 1917, I reckon there is no chance that Bela Kun and the Lenin bois can take power in Hungary. The plausible course is that Hungary gets a liberal government as OTL which tries to appeal to Wilson in a desperate attempt not to be completely screwed at Trianon.

Some Russian diplomats (Kudashev, Giers) may entertain the idea of going easy on Hungary, so as to detach it from Germany and keep Romania in check.... But... the war has just ended, untold sacrifices have been made, and, aside from Serbia, Romania has to be rewarded, if only to justify the absolute morass of the Romanian front. So I guess that Hungary is going to get roughly the same treatment as OTL. Russian troops stationing in Galicia will ensure that Budapest can do nothing but swallow the pill.


In contrast to the 19th century, Turkey cannot become the british shield and they are currently broken. Not to mention that in OTL both French and British had agreed for the Russians to control Bosporus and the Gallipoli Peninsula (but not the Dardanelles' asiatic shore). Actually they were more at ease to give away Istanbul that coming to an agreement on Poland. Throughout the war, when the British wanted to direct russian ambitions to the least bad option (for british interests) , was in the Straits and the Ottomans.

Not Turkey has lost its intrinsic value- to keep the Russians out of the Mediterranean. The next chokepoint is the Dardanelles entrance, currently controled by Greece, where the Entente had established a naval base in the island of Limnos to support the Gallipoli Campaign and after their defeat, to blockade Goeben and keep her inside the Dardanelles. The Russians may keep Bosporus: they will never be able to project power in the Mediterranean with a british client covering the Straits.

Greece also happens to have a very anglophile prime minister who was willing to become the british client/stooge/enforcer in the region. Lloyd George had a great relationship with Venizelos whom he admired and viewed as an upcoming british client in the Levant.

I doubt it. The Greeks may finish their Salamis. In any case, the British in OTL wanted the Greeks to have a flotilla navy not a battleship navy. Destroyers, submarines and scout cruisers. What I find more plausible in this senario is for Greeks to gain the asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, along with the OTL Smyrna Zone (enlarged probably) and the (ITTL strategic) Smyrna - Bandirma region that included the railroad.


That is true.
During the Great War, the British reached to the conclusion that a russian Constantinople doesn't mean power projection to the Mediterranean as they can easily put a cork in the Dardanelles bottle. The cork in question is the anchorage of Limnos and control of the Aegean- therefore, Greece.

The advantage the Russians get is not a "warm port" but turning the Black Sea into a russian lake, where Ukraine or Russia can trade by sea with Georgia and Armenia and the entirety of the Empire with Romania and Bulgaria, without any concern of a blockading force. It is a considerable economic zone that is safe from hostile fleets.

Thanks, very good input. Of course, despite this strategic assessment, Britain may not be too fond about Russia getting Constantinople, but not to the point of provoking a crisis on this issue. I would have liked to go for an intermediate solution, such as turning it into a "free city" or the Sultan keeping it under the supervision of a Allied commission*, but ITTL Constantinople is almost certainly going to be annexed by Russia.

*(I had imagined a rather fun scenario where, supported by Britain, Greece pushes militarily in Thracia and Asia minor... which leads Russian agents and diplomats to secretly encourage Mustafa Kemal and Bulgaria in attacking Greece. Once Greece has been thoroughly thrashed in this short Greek-Turkish-Bulgarian war, Russian diplomats waltz in and offer their mediation, basically screwing Greece over and brokering an entente between the Sultan and Kemal. Machiavellian stuff, but I guess TTL does not allow it).

Nevertheless, some stumbling blocks/incertainties remain:

1/ The extent of Russian projected gains in Thracia/the Straits:

I found the following on wikipedia:

Russia would acquire “...the city of Constantinople, the western bank of the Bosphorus, of the Sea of Marmara and of the Dardanelles, as well as southern Thrace to the Enez-Midye line... and... that part of the Asiatic shore that lies between the Bosphorus, the Sakarya River and a point to be determined on the Gulf of Izmit, and the islands of the Sea of Marmara, the Imbros Islands and the Tenedos Islands.”

If accurate, it is quite extensive. It basically gives Russia a long coastal stripe from Constantinople to (including) Gallipoli, plus the Eastern shore, plus, most crucially, Imbros and Tenedos: this would considerably weaken the effectiveness of the British-Greek "cork" that you mention if Russia can build a naval base in Imbros or Tenedos (again, provided the wikipedia article is reliable).

The Russians are going to push for the application of the wartime to its fullest extent, but Britain might oppose the Russians going all the way to Gallipoli and Tenedos/Imbros.

2/ Greek ambitions: Venizelos might want to use the divisions between the Great Powers and his great relationship with Lloyd George to push his advantage as much as he can in Eastern Thracia: getting Constantinople is out of the question (barring a cataclysmic revolution in Russia in 1919-1920), but he could very well entertain the idea of getting the Gallipoli peninsula and other parts of Eastern Thracia

3/ Inland Eastern Thracia: if I'm not mistaken, the wartime agreement said nothing about inland Eastern Thracia. Letting the Sultan keep it seems improbable. Greece could covet it, but it's certainly less attractive that the Gallipoli peninsula. Russia could push for the annexation of the whole of Eastern Thracia to give strategic depth to her annexation of Constantinople. Could this lead Russia to give up her claims on Gallipoli, Imbros and Tenedos?

4/ The eastern shore: if kept out of Eastern Thracia by Russia, Greece is indeed going to push for more annexations on the Eastern shore, all the way from Smyrna to the sea of Marmara. But I wonder if the Russians wouldn't prefer to see a weakened Ottoman/Turkish State rule on the Eastern shore rather than a British stooge. (This question is also linked to what will happen in Anatolia regarding Kemal, the National movement etc.).

5/ How Russia will deal with her new province of Thracia-and-the-Straits? It's great to finally restore Tsargrad to the true faith, but then what? The majority of the population (Greeks, Turks, Bulgarians) will hold no particular love for the Russians (the Armenians are probably the most well-disposed towards the Tsar's rule). How do you rule this "kingdom"? Encouraging Russian/Armenian immigration? But I guess this is a problem for tomorrow, not for the Paris Conference.

Re Kurdistan: Someone asked if Russia would push for an independent Kurdistan. I think an independent Assyrian state is more probable. IOTL Russian agents discussed with political and religious Assyrian leaders in 1915-1916. And let's not forget that the Kurds acted as henchmen to the Ottomans in their genocidal policies.
 
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