For Want of a Word – Stolypin endures

[alexmilman]

@Stenkarazin posted while I was composing my reply. I was assuming that the Russian situation was broadly similar to OTL 1917 - the war seems to have followed the same course to date - and that while Stolypin has been able to protect the administration from both the Court party and Alix's disruptions and ease out some of the worst duffers, he hasn't had much free time to tackle the mass of muddle, waste and corruption that was the Tsarist war effort. Industry is still badly organised, logistics is still terrible, there are shortages of nearly everything and the generals are still fighting turf wars against each other and Stavka as much as against the Germans.

So the Russian army will be a bit better organised and a bit better fed and there will be fewer critical shortages of key things like artillery shells, but by German standards, it is still under-equipped, under-supplied, badly organised and badly led. The last major Russian operation on the Eastern Front (Brusilov's) failed badly when it came up against Germans.



- The Petrograd garrison, including the Tsar's trusted Guard regiments either completely failed to suppress the rising or actively joined it.

Of course, everything is open to the interpretations but, to start from the end, the Guards regiments of Petrograd garrison had little to do with the “trusted Guards”: the old Guards regiments pretty much perished on the first stage of a war and the regiments of that name had been packed with the reservists with no loyalty tradition.

Then, what you consider to be “a little bit better” is actually a fundamental difference because during the 1915 due to the shell crisis in the Russian army the Germans got an overwhelming advantage which caused huge Russian losses both in personnel and territory. “A little bit better” food supply would be extremely important both for physical condition of the troops and their morale.

Yes, even with the improvements Russian army is “under-“ pretty much everything comparing to the Germans but it would be able to held much better than in OTL. BTW, an argument about Brusilov is only partially meaningful: the German reinforcements arrived when the offensive already run out of steam: its logistics was overstretched and the losses were not adequately compensated. Taking into an account that at this time gaining a tiny piece of land from the Germans on the Western front was considered an allied victory, overall Brusilov’s performance was not bad at all.

Now, as far as waste and corruption are involved, of course they were a huge problem but they add nothing to your “Luddendorf’s logic”: they were there since 1914 so why would suddenly they become so critical in 1917/18? Actually (unless Stolypin was doing nothing over few previous years), at least some OTL problems like functioning of the railroads (which was one of the critical factors) would go away either completely or mostly. With the railroads we have a very good illustration, RCW: they had been functioning across the front lines to a great degree because it was well-understood that all sides involved would not hesitate to execute those whom they’d consider saboteurs. Taking into an account Stolypin’s personality, it would be logical to expect that the railroads would be operating under the martial law well before 1917.

Taking Petrograd (besides difficulty to accomplish) does not guarantee Russian capitulation. It can be a serious blow in the terms of the Russian military industry but not a deadly one and would make the German front vulnerable: they simply don’t have enough troops on the Eastern front for pulling something similar to 1941. The government can easily be moved to Moscow (as the Bolsheviks did when they feared the German advance on Petrograd) and the entertainment continues. With the French and Brits at least marginally adequate one would have to expect that they are going to use distraction of the German resources to launch a major offensive.

 

[alexmilman]

Yes, being lazy, I merely hinted at a better war effort under Stolypin-Polivanov rather than writing about it in detail.

So yes ITTL the state of the Russian army is better than OTL, and certainly vastly superior in terms of morale and discipline to OTL Russian army in 1917 after the February revolution.

But nevertheless Ludendorff would still reckon that the Russian army is in bad shape (it is, only not as bad as OTL) and the weakest link of the 3 main Allies. This would speak in favour of an all-out Eastern offensive to knock Russia out of the war, before going west for the Kaizerschlacht.... Or maybe not. There are many good arguments in favour of either scenario. In any case, West or East, it does not really matter in terms of outcome: the fascinating discussion people are having here about what would Ludendorff do illustrates that Germany is truly screwed, no matter what.

I am going to post a new installment today or tomorrow morning: heavy Teutonic vibes expected.

Of course, it is entirely up to you but if the weakest link did not fell apart during the preceding years, why would one expect that it would now, especially when the criteria for falling apart is unclear? Causing heavy losses? Did not work so far and if the Russian supply situation is better than in OTL then it would cost serious losses to the Germans, which they can’t afford. Territory? Hardly matters. Taking Petrograd? Too optimistic and not a guarantee of the Russian capitulation.

Of course, the Western direction not too promising either unless the Germans manage to cut between the French and Brits, push the Brits to the sea and <blahblahblah>. which is also extremely optimistic by 1917.

 

[Stenkarazin]

Of course, it is entirely up to you but if the weakest link did not fell apart during the preceding years, why would one expect that it would now, especially when the criteria for falling apart is unclear? Causing heavy losses? Did not work so far and if the Russian supply situation is better than in OTL then it would cost serious losses to the Germans, which they can’t afford. Territory? Hardly matters. Taking Petrograd? Too optimistic and not a guarantee of the Russian capitulation.

Of course, the Western direction not too promising either unless the Germans manage to cut between the French and Brits, push the Brits to the sea and <blahblahblah>. which is also extremely optimistic by 1917.

Yes exactly. With Russia still in the war by the end of 1917, any German gamble is per force extravagantly optimistic, bordering on delusion. But I cannot see Ludendorff simply throwing the towel. He has to try something, preferably something big and bold and "decisive". Even if he didn't, peace negotiations would almost certainly fail as long as Germany is not comprehensively defeated.

 

[Hertog Jann]

My two cents on the topic of a german attack: Ludendorff's strategy during Kaiserschlacht was summed in his words in "let's punch a hole and see what happens next".

The Germans needed a quick victory. Even the most delusional general knew that time is against them. To utilize the "punching a hole" strategy where is more easy to do? In the east it is 567km from Riga to Petrograd. In the west it is 82km from St Quentin to Amiens.

I have no idea if in a "Russia Fights On" timeline the Germans would attack or stay at the defensive due to Entente pressure. But I think that if they attacked, what makes sense from Ludendorff's thinking is an attack in the West.

 

[alexmilman]

He has to try something, preferably something big and bold and "decisive".

Dilemma similar to one that Boni from Die Csárdásfürstin was facing: “I have to do something, I have to do something .... I have to drink!” 😂

He already tried big and bold in 1915 and it turned to be anything but decisive because the war keeps going on. Why didn’t he try in OTL before “Kerensky Offensive” and instead kept trying to kick a hole in Franco-British defenses? The Russian army in your TL is in a better situation than in OTL so why would Ludendorff change his OTL position 180 degrees? So far motivations are unclear.

 

[Merrick]

Of course, everything is open to the interpretations but, to start from the end, the Guards regiments of Petrograd garrison had little to do with the “trusted Guards”: the old Guards regiments pretty much perished on the first stage of a war and the regiments of that name had been packed with the reservists with no loyalty tradition.

Maybe - but will outsiders recognise this, or will they just assume that the Guards regiments in Petrograd must be the Tsar's most trusted troops?
And the fact that the "old Guards" are mostly dead on the battlefield and the regime has not been able to replace them is itself evidence of decline.

Then, what you consider to be “a little bit better” is actually a fundamental difference because during the 1915 due to the shell crisis in the Russian army the Germans got an overwhelming advantage which caused huge Russian losses both in personnel and territory. “A little bit better” food supply would be extremely important both for physical condition of the troops and their morale.

By the timeline, this is still a Russian army that was thrashed at Tannenburg, was broken at Gorlice-Tarnow, has failed to sustain an advance against the Austrians and has lost pretty much every battle it has fought against the Germans. The popular stereotype of the WW1 Russian Army is of half-trained, half-fed peasant conscripts being sent over the top unarmed by uncaring officers and told they can pick up the rifles of their comrades who have already been shot down in the latest futile assault. Like the "lions led by donkeys" stereotype of the Western Front, this is slanted and exaggerated but not wholly false. The Russian army was chronically short short of equipment, sometimes even of basic small arms. Some of this was production issues in an under-industrialised economy, some of it was terrible organisation and logistics. Living conditions at the front were poor, many officers were strikingly indifferent to the suffering of their men and infighting between rival generals crippled large-scale planning. All of this had a tendency to get worse as the war went on and the losses piled up. Better administration at the top may ameliorate some of this but won't make the whole problem go away.

Now, as far as waste and corruption are involved, of course they were a huge problem but they add nothing to your “Luddendorf’s logic”: they were there since 1914 so why would suddenly they become so critical in 1917/18? Actually (unless Stolypin was doing nothing over few previous years), at least some OTL problems like functioning of the railroads (which was one of the critical factors) would go away either completely or mostly. With the railroads we have a very good illustration, RCW: they had been functioning across the front lines to a great degree because it was well-understood that all sides involved would not hesitate to execute those whom they’d consider saboteurs. Taking into an account Stolypin’s personality, it would be logical to expect that the railroads would be operating under the martial law well before 1917.

I'm not trying to argue that anyone would expect that things would suddenly get critical in the spring of 1917. But the OTL February Revolution did not come out of nothing. The OTL collapse of the army in the second half of 1917 was not solely the doing of the Revolution and the Provisional Government (though heaven knows the Petrograd Soviet didn't help). It was the culmination of a lot of things that had been building over years of war - the loss of so much of the 1914 army at Tannenburg, the further huge losses in the retreat across Poland, the belief that the generals were mismanaging the war, the useless sacrifice of the Guards regiments, the shortages of shells, of machine-guns, sometimes of bread and boots and blankets, the belief that neither the officers nor the government cared for the sufferings of the soldiers, the massive losses even in "successful" offensives...
And behind the lines there is the draft, the constant bad news from the front, rising taxes and inflation, the belief that the Imperial government are a bunch of over-privileged clowns who got in on breeding and corruption, long hours and low wages, the bread shortages in the cities, the belief that the capitalists are getting fat on the suffering of the workers and soldiers...

TTL, all these things are still there. They may be there somewhat less intensely and the government may be handling them rather better, but they're still there. Otherwise, there would not have been a rising in Petrograd in the first place.

Murphy's Law of Thermodynamics says everything gets worse under pressure. The Russian Empire has been fighting a losing war for three years now under virtual blockade conditions (yes, a trickle gets in through Archangel and Vladivostok but the major Baltic and Black Sea ports are closed for the duration). If the Germans want to know what three years of blockade and total war can do to a country, they can look in their coffee cups, full of ersatz-coffee made from acorns, they can talk to their supply officers, who are finding even basic rations ever-harder to obtain, they can look at their own units, an increasing number of which are made up of teenaged draftees and over-age reservists held together by a diminishing core of veterans. Then they look East and ask "If it's got this bad in the prosperous, developed, well-organised German Empire, how much worse must things be in Russia?"

 

[Merrick]

@Stenkarazin - something I didn't ask and I don't think has been mentioned.
With the Petrograd Rising suppressed, presumably a certain Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov is still in exile in Switzerland?

 

[alexmilman]

Maybe - but will outsiders recognise this, or will they just assume that the Guards regiments in Petrograd must be the Tsar's most trusted troops?
And the fact that the "old Guards" are mostly dead on the battlefield and the regime has not been able to replace them is itself evidence of decline.


By the timeline, this is still a Russian army that was thrashed at Tannenburg, was broken at Gorlice-Tarnow, has failed to sustain an advance against the Austrians and has lost pretty much every battle it has fought against the Germans. The popular stereotype of the WW1 Russian Army is of half-trained, half-fed peasant conscripts being sent over the top unarmed by uncaring officers and told they can pick up the rifles of their comrades who have already been shot down in the latest futile assault. Like the "lions led by donkeys" stereotype of the Western Front, this is slanted and exaggerated but not wholly false. The Russian army was chronically short short of equipment, sometimes even of basic small arms. Some of this was production issues in an under-industrialised economy, some of it was terrible organisation and logistics. Living conditions at the front were poor, many officers were strikingly indifferent to the suffering of their men and infighting between rival generals crippled large-scale planning. All of this had a tendency to get worse as the war went on and the losses piled up. Better administration at the top may ameliorate some of this but won't make the whole problem go away.


I'm not trying to argue that anyone would expect that things would suddenly get critical in the spring of 1917. But the OTL February Revolution did not come out of nothing. The OTL collapse of the army in the second half of 1917 was not solely the doing of the Revolution and the Provisional Government (though heaven knows the Petrograd Soviet didn't help). It was the culmination of a lot of things that had been building over years of war - the loss of so much of the 1914 army at Tannenburg, the further huge losses in the retreat across Poland, the belief that the generals were mismanaging the war, the useless sacrifice of the Guards regiments, the shortages of shells, of machine-guns, sometimes of bread and boots and blankets, the belief that neither the officers nor the government cared for the sufferings of the soldiers, the massive losses even in "successful" offensives...
And behind the lines there is the draft, the constant bad news from the front, rising taxes and inflation, the belief that the Imperial government are a bunch of over-privileged clowns who got in on breeding and corruption, long hours and low wages, the bread shortages in the cities, the belief that the capitalists are getting fat on the suffering of the workers and soldiers...

TTL, all these things are still there. They may be there somewhat less intensely and the government may be handling them rather better, but they're still there. Otherwise, there would not have been a rising in Petrograd in the first place.

Murphy's Law of Thermodynamics says everything gets worse under pressure. The Russian Empire has been fighting a losing war for three years now under virtual blockade conditions (yes, a trickle gets in through Archangel and Vladivostok but the major Baltic and Black Sea ports are closed for the duration). If the Germans want to know what three years of blockade and total war can do to a country, they can look in their coffee cups, full of ersatz-coffee made from acorns, they can talk to their supply officers, who are finding even basic rations ever-harder to obtain, they can look at their own units, an increasing number of which are made up of teenaged draftees and over-age reservists held together by a diminishing core of veterans. Then they look East and ask "If it's got this bad in the prosperous, developed, well-organised German Empire, how much worse must things be in Russia?"

Sorry, but your logic is hardly convincing because so far it is not backed by anything beyond the stereotypes, not all of them being correct.

To start with, I have no idea about the source of your stereotypes but, with the universal conscription being in place since 1860s, the stories about half-trained peasants do not make too much sense: there were already few age groups who passed through the mandatory training. Actually, before being sent to the front the new recruits had been passing through training. Can’t tell how much the war-time training was differing from country to country but it did exist.

“Half-fed” was not exactly correct even in OTL (the problem was with cutting a number of the meat days, which was not exactly starvation) and AFAIK the stories about soldiers being sent to attack without the rifles typically belong to 1941 and even then are not quite correct. You keep repeating the vague stereotypes without any specifics so it is rather hard to figure out if you are talking about some specific important issues or just repeating some generalities you heard somewhere. The same goes for the “lions” of the Western front: most of them also were half-<whatever> just with more artillery and machine guns.

Now, regarding the officers, to start with, it does not look like the French, British or German officers had demonstrated dressier care about their subordinates but, FYI, by 1917 most of the Russian officers under the colonel’s rank had been the “war-time officers”: either soldiers promoted for bravery and assign through the short officer training or the teens, predominantly from the middle class, who were graduated from the war-time junker schools. In other words, an overwhelming majority of the officers had been from the middle (or low) class and did not have any serious social gap between them and the soldiers. The losses in the Russian army was high but it is not like any of the Allied armies scored any success against the Germans with the small losses: the Western Front was a meatgrinder in which, except for the initial stage of the war, the tangible successes were minimal, to put it mildly: from your statement one may assume that all the allied generals always had been acting in a perfect concert, unlike the quarrelling Russian commanders but, where were the brilliant results of their cooperation, perfect (presumably) logistics, great order in a rear, well-fed and perfectly trained soldiers, and whatever are other items on the list? What justifies a condescending attitude, which is plain unfair?

As far as the “blockade” is involved, please be more specific: it resulted in the shortages of which specific items? Repeating generalities is very convenient but not very convincing. BTW, the volume of the “trickle” you are talking about in OTL was so high that the imports kept being stockpiled at the ports of entry. With less inept administration (as in this TL) this issue would be at least partially remedied: during the WWII practically the same railroads (RR Moscow-Yaroslavl-Archangelsk was functioning since 1898 with the additional extensions being built prior to WWI) had been handling much greater volumes of the LL supplies. Murmansk RR had been built during WWI in 1914-16 with 138,000 workers being deployed. During the same period Archangelsk RR was changed from a narrow to the standard gauge and in 1916 the last segment of the Trans Siberian RR, most across the Amur River was completed. The serious problems started only after the February Revolution. If anything, one of the first acts of WWI was regulation limiting exports from Russia (industrial materials, agricultural products, timber, etc.). Industrial production kept growing all the way to 1917 (with 1913. - 100%, 1914 - 101, 1915 - 114, 1916 - 122) and the same goes for the volume of cargo carried by the railroads (1914 - 97, 1915 - 123, 1916 - 148). Productivity in industry between 1914 and 1916 grew by 8%.

Not sure if 20% of the machine guns and 40% rifles imported (out of 100% used) in 1915 really amount to a “trickle” and the same goes for other items.


Shortage of coffee was not a problem in Russia: the universally popular drink was tea and it was not imported by the sea. If, as stipulated by this TL, Russian supply situation is better than in OTL than the Germans would not have to go into a guessing game: they would easily find rations-related information from the POWs and to see that their artillery fire is not remaining unanswered.

 

[Stenkarazin]

@Stenkarazin - something I didn't ask and I don't think has been mentioned.
With the Petrograd Rising suppressed, presumably a certain Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov is still in exile in Switzerland?

Yes, Ilyich is still lounging on the terrasse of Café l'Odeon in Zurich, cannot do much else. (I imagine some German intelligence officers could come up with a hared-brain scheme about dropping Lenin in Estlandia in order for him to make his way to Petrograd, but Lenin would categorically refuse this. He was not very brave).

Other famous OTL Bolsheviks are pretty much still where they were before the February uprising: Trotsky in America, Stalin and Kamenev in internal exile in Siberia, Lunacharsky is also in Switzerland, etc.

As for the Bolsheviks in Russia proper, they were either arrested in the aftermath of the uprising, or have gone underground. As hinted in a previous installment, they might merge with the Left SR's and take up terrorism.

 

[Stenkarazin]

Late 1917 – The battle for Riga

“And now again, the German drake has reared its head on the pale grey shores of Livonia”.

Excerpt of A.M. Remizov, Lay of the Ruin of the Russian Land, 1919.

“No true-blooded German can reconcile himself with the fact that those lands, where some of the greatest pages of the history of our Volk were written, remain under the yoke of the Great Horde. If only Hutier’s efforts had not been sabotaged by those pampered “pacifists” of the Zentrum… A historical opportunity was missed, and as a result, Dorpat, Riga, Reval, all old German cities, still suffer under the Slavic-Tatar knout!”

Excerpt from the speech of a Deutsche Volk Front candidate, Konigsberg, 1928.

In October 1917, the German High Command launched an offensive on the Northern front, aiming to take Riga. The goal of the offensive was to test Russia’s defenses and keep the Ottoman Empire in the war (expecting that a breakthrough on the Northern front would dissuade the Stavka from launching another Anatolian offensive). Above all, the Riga offensive was politically motivated: Ludendorff and Hindenburg needed a victory to raise German morale and keep the peace party at bay. In order to execute this offensive, the German High Command had to decline Vienna’s pleas for an offensive on the Italian front. The reality was that Germany could not spare enough divisions to make it happen. The Austrians would have to hold it together for a few more months.

The Riga offensive was a success[1]. The divisions of Hutier were able to cross the Dvina and smash Ruzski’s lines, who had to evacuate Riga after sustaining horrific losses. Gurko seized the occasion to finally get rid of Ruzski and appoint Dukhonin in his stead, but all that the new commander of the Northwestern front could was to trade space for time. For a moment, panic griped Petrograd where the government feared that the Germans were aiming at taking the capital, but it quickly appeared that Hutier’s offensive was limited in scope and would not go much further than Riga.

Ludendorff and Hindenburg, who had desperately needed a victory to keep the peace party at bay, made the most of the success of the Dvina. German propaganda went on overdrive. Parallels with the Geste of the Teutonic Knights were too tempting not to exploit to the fullest. In much the same way that Tannenberg had been spun as a revenge for the battle of 1410, Riga was hailed as a rematch of the “Battle on the Ice” which had seen the Teutonic Order defeated by Alexander Nevsky, even though there was a good 250 km between Riga and the shores of lake Peipus.

This deluge of propaganda explains why, since the end of the war, some historians have suggested that, if the Germans hadn’t halted their offensive, they could have conclusively destroyed Dukhonin’s army and directly threatened Pskov (and possibly even Petrograd). This could have led to another uprising in Petrograd, deeply paralyzing the Russian leadership. The Tsar would have been forced to sue for peace, and Germany would have been able to redirect all her might towards the great decisive battle in the West as soon as February 1918.

This is highly debatable. After all, despite suffering grievous losses, Dukhonin’s army had not been destroyed. Pskov was 280 km away from Riga, and Petrograd a good 500 km. Even in the unlikely event that Hutier had been able to develop his offensive and directly threaten Petrograd (which he would have reached by winter), it is by no means certain that Nicholas II would have agreed to peace.

Regardless of its merits, this theory appealed to many Germans in the 20’s-30’s. The idea was too tempting to eschew: in one single stroke, Germany could have won the war and, more importantly, put a victorious end to the age-old struggle between the Teutonic race and the Slavic hordes, on the same fields where, eight centuries earlier, the Drang Nach Osten had been defeated by the Novgorodians. For the German volkisch right, the blame laid somehow with the German peace party, those defeatist civilians who delayed the efforts of Ludendorff and Hindenburg to deal the fatal blow to Russia. The fact that Germany offered peace talks to Russia just after the Riga offensive only strengthened this theory, which conveniently forgot that said peace feelers were ventured by Zimmerman with the full acquiescence of the German high-command, who probably acquiesced only to assuage the feelings of the peace party and earn some political breathing space before the decisive battle scheduled for early 1918.

In any case, the half-hearted peace feelers addressed by Berlin to Petrograd through Stockholm were destined to fail. The German High Command only wanted to feed something to the Reichstag, and the Russians, who knew that time played in their favour, had no intention to enter a separate peace just because they had lost Riga.

Nevertheless, the situation in Russia remained fraught with tension. The afterglow of the Anatolian offensive could not completely erase the deep structural and political issues which plagued the empire. An underground revolutionary organization, made of Bolsheviks and Left SR’s, had started a campaign of terror and sabotage in Central Russia. Russia’s finances were in tatters, and the February Uprising had led to a severe drop in industrial and military production which was had not yet been overcome, despite the government’s best efforts to ramp up production in other industrial cities. Despite the urgings of its allies, the Stavka was still extremely cautious about committing to a mass offensive. The loss of Riga only comforted them in that idea. It was best, agreed Polivanov and Gurko, to let the Central Powers exhaust themselves, and focus on a renewed offensive against Turkey, maybe around February-March 1918.

Thus 1917 came to an end. Ludendorff and Hindenburg, having secured their political position in Germany, now prepared for the decisive battle that would decide the fate of the German Empire*.
​

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[1] So pretty much as OTL. Yes, the Russian army ITTL is in way better shape than OTL in September 1917, but it remains inferior to the Germans, and besides there is no timeline where Ruzski is not an execrable commander. Plus, given the political necessity to score a victory, Ludendorff commits more troops than OTL to this offensive, which allows Hutier to break through even in the face of a better Russian opposition than OTL.
* No more dithering. Next installment will deal with the Great Decisive Battle.​

 

[La Rouge Beret]

Great update and at the end of the day Russia might be on the ropes to use a boxing parlance, but it is still very much in the fight. While you have spoken about the improvement in the Russian logistical chain due to Stolypin at the helm, is there any chance of greater American supplies with their entry to the war? Presumably like WW 2 it would be shipped to Vladivostok and then delivered westwards via the Siberian express.

 

[Bookmark1995]

Great update and at the end of the day Russia might be on the ropes to use a boxing parlance, but it is still very much in the fight. While you have spoken about the improvement in the Russian logistical chain due to Stolypin at the helm, is there any chance of greater American supplies with their entry to the war? Presumably like WW 2 it would be shipped to Vladivostok and then delivered westwards via the Siberian express.

It wasn't until 1918 that America's entry really began to have an impact.

So I doubt American supplies will matter, since the Germans will be on the rope by then.

 

[Nuka1]

Regardless of its merits, this theory appealed to many Germans in the 20’s-30’s.​

I wonder what will happen in the 40’s that will eschew them of that theory?

 

[Stenkarazin]

Early 1918 - Which Way, Teutonic Man?

As 1917 was coming to a close, the situation was dire for the Central Powers. Due to the British blockade, food had become a major issue in Germany and Austria. Submarine warfare had not yielded the expected results. Vienna feared that another Italian offensive in the Alps would be able to break through the front. In the Middle-east, the Turkish positions in Northern Iraq and Eastern Anatolia seemed to invite a new Allied offensive. The American Expeditionary Forces were set to arrive in France. Disagreement was mounting in Austria as in Germany, where the Reichstag had, in the Spring of 1917, adopted the so-called “Peace Resolution”. The German High Command had been able to stave off the peace party’s efforts by the victory of Riga, but it was only a matter of time before they would seriously threaten Ludendorff’s power.

In his novel “La bataille d’Occident”, French writer Eric Vuillard[1] writes about the fascination that Clausewitz’s thought exercised on the German military mind. Since the beginning of the war, the German strategists had been obsessed with the idea of achieving the Great Decisive Battle™ that would seal the fate of the war. This had only became more urgent by the end of 1917. A decisive victory was made all the more imperative since the entry of the United States in the war. Sending divisions to stabilize a secondary front in the Middle-east or in Italy held no appeal to our Teutonic masterminds. If they kicked either France or Russia out of the war, then the diplomats would have ample time to mitigate the Turks’ and Austrians’ losses.

The victory on the Dvina was only a respite. Ludendorff and his colleagues knew that their authority was threatened, and that lest they tried something decisive, the war would soon be lost. Now was the time for the Great Decisive Battle that would decide the fate of our civilization, or something like that. Now or never.

But where to strike? The German High Command had always believed that the decisive battle was to take place in the West, but they had to acknowledge that they just couldn’t launch a massive offensive on the Western front without stripping the Eastern front bare. If they did that, even the most feckless Russian general would immediately seize the opportunity. As Ludendorff told one of his aides: “Little good it would do us to enter Paris only to learn that the Russians are in Krakow and Lemberg”. So, by January 1918, Ludendorff and Hoffmann had reckoned that no successful Western offensive could take place before knocking Russia out of the war. Once Russia was out, or at least thoroughly incapacitated, Germany had maybe a fighting chance to turn and knock out France in time before the American contingents arrived in substantial number. This could seem incredibly unrealistic, but these were desperate times for the Germans. They convinced themselves that, given the sorry state of the Russian army, the frailty of its war effort, the mediocrity of its commanders, one good push could shatter Russia’s resistance, and possibly provoke a new wave of upheavals and mutinies within Russia. Then there was also the argument of food: the German planners deluded themselves in thinking that a successful offensive would allow them, one way or another, to lay their hands on the grain supposedly awaiting them in Ukraine .

During the winter 1917-1918, the German planners discussed which way should go the Eastern offensive. There were strong arguments in favour of an offensive on the South-eastern front, towards Ukraine. This would effectively seal the fate of the Romanian front, relieve the pressure on Austria-Hungary, and allow Germany to conquer the fertile lands of Little-Russia, whose inhabitants could be convinced to rally to the Germans in return for vague promises of Ukrainian statehood. The destruction of Brusilov’s army, combined with the loss of Ukraine, would surely break the Emperor’s morale and force him to seek peace.

But Hoffman argued that the aim of the offensive should not be to cripple Russia, but to behead it. The offensive had to take place on the north-eastern and northern front, towards Smolensk (and/or Petrograd). A successful breakthrough in Western Russia would in any case force the Stavka to order a general retreat like in 1915, which would seal the fate of the Southern and Romanian fronts anyway.

A choice had to be made. Ludendorff, Hoffman and their acolytes knew that they only had one chance, and could not miss it[2].
​

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[1] As OTL, 2014. I could have changed his first name to Erich, Vladimir or Franklin Delano Woodrow, but I haven’t thought this far in the future.
[2] So I have decided for an Eastern offensive, after giving careful consideration to all the fascinating arguments put forth by commentators of this thread, arguments that I have tried to succinctly present in this installment. But which way? I tend to incline for Hoffman’s proposal, but of course Ukraine is a tempting target…​

 

[Stenkarazin]

I wonder what will happen in the 40’s that will eschew them of that theory?

good point, it's only that I haven't thought that far in the future. Basically havent' determined yet if Germany is going to eventually veer closer to Russia in the late 20's - 30's, or if the anti-slavic volkisch right is going to prevail. It also depends on another great war happening in the 30's-40's or not.

 

[Salvador79]

Well, the offensive in the East might not be the more plausible, but at least it is the more interesting version, giving us battles that never occurred IOTL etc.

Hoffmann's plan makes slightly more sense, but in the OHL, Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided, and they often cared little for the advice their army group leaders gave. Though I'm not sure Ludendorff wouldn't also go for Petrograd in the first place. This is not OTL, there is no reason to hope for a Faustschlag-like success, thus no reason to hope for Ukrainian grain.

 

[La Rouge Beret]

The Germans in this update really feel like an increasingly desperate gambler needing to roll a succession of sixes in order to remain at the table. Right now Russia just needs to stay in the fight and, to trade land for time. Since once the Germans are over extended and shift the bulk of their forces westwards, the Russian forces can recover their lost territory.

 

[Hertog Jann]

Maybe - but will outsiders recognise this, or will they just assume that the Guards regiments in Petrograd must be the Tsar's most trusted troops?
And the fact that the "old Guards" are mostly dead on the battlefield and the regime has not been able to replace them is itself evidence of decline.

Basically every army fighting had its pre-war elite formations wiped out. The British, French, Germans and Austro-Hungarians. Why would anybody think that Russia was the exception to the rule that applied to everybody including themselves? I mean sure, the Spanish that are not fighting the Great War, may assume as much. But I doubt the Germans or the British would think something like that.

 

[Stenkarazin]

Basically every army fighting had its pre-war elite formations wiped out. The British, French, Germans and Austro-Hungarians. Why would anybody think that Russia was the exception to the rule that applied to everybody including themselves? I mean sure, the Spanish that are not fighting the Great War, may assume as much. But I doubt the Germans or the British would think something like that.

True. But the critical difference between Russia and, say, Britain, is that it is well established (since 1905) that the Tsar has to rely on his army to keep his throne... and February 1917 has shown obvious cracks in this army's loyalty.

 

[CommonwealthVictory]

True. But the critical difference between Russia and, say, Britain, is that it is well established (since 1905) that the Tsar has to rely on his army to keep his throne... and February 1917 has shown obvious cracks in this army's loyalty.

Does this mean that after the Great War Russia will have big military reforms?