Well, they'd have to rely a lot on A-H troops in Romania, which I'm not sure H+L would find practical. The last two attempts to push against the Romanians stalled bloodily. Sure they can move lots of people around and push hard as part of a wider Russian offensive, but the Romanians held out so desperately there because they had nowhere to fall back to. Thinking that Russia just needs a good kick to crumble makes very little sense. Militarily, it makes no sense at all. And as for the February mutinies, well, the French had their own wave of mutinies, too... If you start in Marasesti, you're never going to reach Petrograd or Moscow. Not even frigging Kiev.
For Want of a Word – Stolypin endures
- Thread starter Stenkarazin
- Start date
Setting aside the Romanian morass, I don't think the Germans would expect to reach Petrograd, but Ludendorff & co may gamble that one strong breakthrough on the Russian Western front (maybe combined with a secondary offensive towards Riga) could completely disorganize the Russian positions, since it would force Brusilov (Southwestern front) to fall back lest he is enveloped and destroyed. Then the fate of the Romanian front would be sealed no matter what.
It is a bold gambit yes, and I think it is slightly less plausible than a Western Kaizerslacht, but as Luke Dalton said, the Germans could very well reckon that in terms of morale, discipline, material, entrenchements, etc., Russia is the weakest link. It also has the advantage of keeping the Ottomans in the war, since it woud likely paralyze any serious attempt of Yudenich to break in Central Anatolia.
Edit: the more I think about it I like it, because from a narrative point of view it is going to be perfect for a Russian-centered TL. The Russians would really suffer to get to the finish line. Cue even more traumatizing (and potentially fertile) effects on post-war Russia, her politics, culture, etc., etc. If it is plausible, I will go with it.
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Majority of the Poles, unlike the Circassians and Chechens, had not been routinely armed people and belonged to a completely different and much more ”civilized” (aka, peaceful) culture. Reference was just to show that the empire could withstand very serious and massive resistance without falling apart.
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Why not? OTL, Russia defeated Austria-Hungary in Galicia in 1914-1915. Russia repulsed Turkey's offensive, and then captured Erzurum. OK, in 1917 the Russian army is badly worn out, but it's also more experienced, and much better supplied and equipped.
I searched a little bit about Poland and the Anglo-French. I found this article in jstor:
Mankoff, J. (2008). The Future of Poland, 1914-1917: France and Great Britain in the Triple Entente. The International History Review, 30(4), 741-767. Retrieved January 22, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40213729
In general, it seems that everybody were happy to have an autonomous Poland (to what degree the autonomy, I know not) that included Galicia and Poznan at the very least.
Mankoff, J. (2008). The Future of Poland, 1914-1917: France and Great Britain in the Triple Entente. The International History Review, 30(4), 741-767. Retrieved January 22, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40213729
From what I gather, is that France would indeed try to help the Poles and cared, but not to the detriment of her own interests. Both France and Britain seemed to like the Sazonov plan for polish autonomy and annexation of the AH and German polish territory. Now Poznan and Galicia are a given. Sazonov wanted both Prussia and Upper Silesia as well and he was willing to support a french Rhineland. I think aspirations in Rhineland (other than Saarland) and Prussia were in truth a starting negiotiating position rather than core objectives.
In general, it seems that everybody were happy to have an autonomous Poland (to what degree the autonomy, I know not) that included Galicia and Poznan at the very least.
Yeah, like you shown to that unfortunate girl (after looting the Persian coast).PS: I was just joking. And I should add I have only but the utmost respect for Persia
I'm not a WW1 expert, but here's my 2 pfennig:
Coming up with a plan for the Germans in 1917 is hard, because with Russia holding they are rapidly running out of good options. Their allies are failing, their enemies are getting stronger, the supply situation is becoming critical and they have few reserves left.
I'd expect them to hold in place and try to build up reserves in spring-early summer while they wait to see if the U-boats will bring the British down. Remember that the U-boats were meant to be Germany's ace in the hole, the wunderwaffe that would cripple their most dangerous enemy and outbalance the entry of the Americans. Once the U-boats are seen to have failed, sitting and waiting for the Americans to turn up is clearly hopeless. they have to win and win fast, before the AEF simply swamps them.
That means a big offensive in either the west or the east (or offer peace, but offering peace means both accepting that the war is lost and getting rid of Ludendorff/Hindenburg and probably the Kaiser. I'd expect them to make a peace offer to Russia, based on pre-war borders and don't ask what happens to the Serbs, but that is expected to be rejected and mostly aimed at morale).
In the west, OTL the Nivelle Offensive ran from April-May 1917, resulting in failure, heavy casualties and mutinies in the French Army. There is a potential window for a German offensive here, but they'd need to be transferring troops from the East in the spring, when they still have faith in the U-boats. The British launched a successful attack at Messines in June and kicked off Passchendaele at the end of July. I'd imagine that the ability of the British to launch a major offensive would be enough to convince the High Command that the U-boats weren't going to win the war. OTL, I think all but 3 of the 80-odd German divisions on the Western Front were cycled through the Flanders meatgrinder and by mid-autumn they had essentially no reserves left.
Once Passchendaele kicks off, I don't think the Germans will be in a position to launch a major attack in the West - any fresh troops they get from the East will go to holding the line in Flanders. A summer offensive is possible, aimed at the weakened French post-Nivelle and taking advantage of Russian paralysis post the Petrograd rising. This would require Ludendorff to go all-in on the western front before he knows the outcome of the U-boat campaign. If he tries, I doubt it will end well - he ends up forestalling Passchendaele and all those British troops and shells that OTL went into the Flanders mud are sent to support the French instead. And the British have a lot of reserves and a lot of shells.
In the East, the Rumanians are an obvious target - OTL Mackensen tried and failed to knock them out in Summer 1917. OTL, the Western Allies were doing all they could to build up the Rumanians because they were the last functioning Allied army in the East as the Russian disintegrated; TTL they are probably more interest in helping the Russians so the Rumanians may be weaker.
The case against targeting the Rumanians is the same as the case against targeting the Italians - even if successful, it doesn't win the war. For the Germans to pull off a victory, they need to occupy Paris and Petrograd - or more generally knock out two of Russia, Britain and France - before summer 1918, when the American will arrive in strength. Fiddling around in Moldova doesn't get them there. However, the Ukraine and its grain production seems to have had a hypnotic effect on the Germans in 1917-18 OTL, so I can see it happening as part of a more general southern offensive towards Kiev. For the Germans this has the advantage that the campaigning season is long than in Livonia and a southern offensive makes maximum use of allied troops to bulk out the overstretched German army. The Austrians will not see this as an advantage, but there's a potential deal - limited German support for Caporetto (8 divisions OTL) in return for offensive support in Galicia. The downside is terrible logistics, and the Russians, if they can hold together, have a lot of space to trade for time.
To land a decisive knock-out on a major enemy, I keep coming back to a Northern offensive aimed at Petrograd. The German army has dominated the Russian in almost every battle since Tannenberg - Gorlice-Tarnow was the one major breakthrough of the war. Even if they weren't clutching at straws, the Germans will look at the Petrograd rising and tell themselves that Russian morale, both military and domestic, is cracking. Will the Russian soldiers even fight for the generals who had their comrades cut down in Petrograd? Even if they do, can they resist an all-out German drive on the capital? And if Petrograd falls, and the Tsar with it. won't everything else, including the Ukraine and Rumania, drop into their laps? The logistics are easier here too - the region is better developed and they can use naval transport in the Baltic. Rationally it's a long shot - 500km to go against everything the Russians have left - but at this point anything is a gamble.
AFAIK the German high command, even under von Hindenburg and Ludendorff, pretty much always believed that the war would be won or lost in the West, at least before the February Uprising and even more the disintegration of the Russian army after the failure of the Kerensky Offensive completely changed the equation and forcing Russia out of the war in a short amount of time looked to be a realistic possibility for the first time in the war.
Even the creation of the Hindenburg line and resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare were part of that strategy, the idea was that the German army in the west could rebuild its strength by defending the fortified and more defensible Hindenburg line (thus reducing German casualties from the expected Anglo-French offensives in 1917), while USW was supposed to degrade the strength and morale of Britain and especially the British army in France, and the Germany army in the West, having recuperated and rebuild by staying on the defensive in 1917, could go on to offensive once again 1918, knock France out of the war or force it to sue for peace after which Britain, under siege by the U-boats, would sue for siege as well; at least that was the highly optimistic plan, which shows that Germany high command was willing to engage in desperate gambles to win in the West. Without massive unrest in Russia IMO von Hindenburg/Ludendorff don’t change their thinking that the war will be won or lost in the West even after it is clear that USW has failed. They will know that an offensive in France in 1918 is a huge gamble and the odds don’t look good, but IMO is it either that or losing the war in their mind.
Plus, even if von Hindenburg/Ludendorff believe that knocking Russia out of the war in 1917 would be possible, that would solve the problems of millions of American troops arriving in France by 1918/1919, while trying to knock France out of the war does (the Americans after all are unlikely to send their troops to fight in Russia); after that without France being a continental foothold for Britain and the US Germany could turn around East and force some sort of favorable peace with Russia.
IMO an IATL Kaiserschlacht in the west in 1918 conforms much more to the prevalent thinking of the German high command in WW1 and the strategic situation of the Germany than trying to knock Russia out of the war. What is possible is that Germany foregoes the Battle of Caporetto, decides to keep the transferred troops in the East and conducts an offensive against Riga with the goal of degrading the offensive capabilities of the North-Western Front so that afterwards units can be transferred to the West for the war deciding offensive in the West without the Eastern Front being in danger of disintegrating under a Russian offensive in 1918 (German estimates of Russian morale weakening after the February riots would even support that cause, as the Germans are IATL likely to believe that Russia is getting weaker but not that it is on the brink of collapse).
This could lead to great Russian gains in 1918 against Austria-Hungary (also minor gains against Germany) as the Russian army, buoyed by the success in Anatolia and the improved supply situation, goes on the offensive in Galicia once again, which coupled with an Italian offensive against Austria-Hungary could knock it out the war in the (early) summer of 1918. This would force Bulgaria to sue for peace as well, especially as Romania is still in the war and threatens it from the east. The Ottoman Empire, now cut off from their German ally and buckling under the pressure of new offensives by the British and Yudenich and with the Bulgarian surrender Constantinople under threat, also has no chance but to sue for peace. Germany, having thrown the dice in the West and lost worst than IOTL, its allies having surrendered and seeing that Russians are advancing in the East (now that Austria-Hungary is out the war the Russian advance against the weakened German army in the East gathers speed), decides that war is lost and throws in the towel and the war is over by July-August 1918.
Even the creation of the Hindenburg line and resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare were part of that strategy, the idea was that the German army in the west could rebuild its strength by defending the fortified and more defensible Hindenburg line (thus reducing German casualties from the expected Anglo-French offensives in 1917), while USW was supposed to degrade the strength and morale of Britain and especially the British army in France, and the Germany army in the West, having recuperated and rebuild by staying on the defensive in 1917, could go on to offensive once again 1918, knock France out of the war or force it to sue for peace after which Britain, under siege by the U-boats, would sue for siege as well; at least that was the highly optimistic plan, which shows that Germany high command was willing to engage in desperate gambles to win in the West. Without massive unrest in Russia IMO von Hindenburg/Ludendorff don’t change their thinking that the war will be won or lost in the West even after it is clear that USW has failed. They will know that an offensive in France in 1918 is a huge gamble and the odds don’t look good, but IMO is it either that or losing the war in their mind.
Plus, even if von Hindenburg/Ludendorff believe that knocking Russia out of the war in 1917 would be possible, that would solve the problems of millions of American troops arriving in France by 1918/1919, while trying to knock France out of the war does (the Americans after all are unlikely to send their troops to fight in Russia); after that without France being a continental foothold for Britain and the US Germany could turn around East and force some sort of favorable peace with Russia.
IMO an IATL Kaiserschlacht in the west in 1918 conforms much more to the prevalent thinking of the German high command in WW1 and the strategic situation of the Germany than trying to knock Russia out of the war. What is possible is that Germany foregoes the Battle of Caporetto, decides to keep the transferred troops in the East and conducts an offensive against Riga with the goal of degrading the offensive capabilities of the North-Western Front so that afterwards units can be transferred to the West for the war deciding offensive in the West without the Eastern Front being in danger of disintegrating under a Russian offensive in 1918 (German estimates of Russian morale weakening after the February riots would even support that cause, as the Germans are IATL likely to believe that Russia is getting weaker but not that it is on the brink of collapse).
This could lead to great Russian gains in 1918 against Austria-Hungary (also minor gains against Germany) as the Russian army, buoyed by the success in Anatolia and the improved supply situation, goes on the offensive in Galicia once again, which coupled with an Italian offensive against Austria-Hungary could knock it out the war in the (early) summer of 1918. This would force Bulgaria to sue for peace as well, especially as Romania is still in the war and threatens it from the east. The Ottoman Empire, now cut off from their German ally and buckling under the pressure of new offensives by the British and Yudenich and with the Bulgarian surrender Constantinople under threat, also has no chance but to sue for peace. Germany, having thrown the dice in the West and lost worst than IOTL, its allies having surrendered and seeing that Russians are advancing in the East (now that Austria-Hungary is out the war the Russian advance against the weakened German army in the East gathers speed), decides that war is lost and throws in the towel and the war is over by July-August 1918.
Appointments. Stipends. Jobs are for people who need to work to eat. Appointments, Positions, Stipends, Purposes, Avocations are for those who subsist off the labour of others and only engage in activity for reasons.
Yes, yes, of course. I should have made a disclaimer about my rather poor grasp of English before starting this TL.
It might be a point of contention with the Western Allies, but as far as I see it, Russia would prefer the Hohenzollern to keep their throne. Wilhelm II would almost inevitably go, but his son could accede to the throne. In any case it would be a much diminished monarchy and, at least in the first half of the 20's, the bourgeois coalition (SPD, Zentrum, and centrist liberals) would hold sway pretty much like OTL.
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I agree I think a Hohenzollern remaining on the throne is highly likely, one thing that could occur would be separating the Kingdom of Bavaria from Germany proper. Either way provided there are Russian boots in Germany, it forestalls the 'stabbed in the back' mythos from developing.
No worries. Your historical knowledge of multiparty 1917 Petrograd surpasses mine greatly. It isn't meant with hostility, only with generosity. You push your historical knowledge to the point your english degrades. Your meaning was clear. My russian doesn't exceed dobrie dien.
I agree that that was the official OTL strategy (in as much as Ludendorff had an overall strategy). I just don't think that the strategy is practical TTL, and in particular, I don't think a Kaiserschlacht in the west in 1918 is possible while Russia remains in the war.
In 1917, the German army on the Western Front was outnumbered and on the defensive - hence the withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line. I've seen a figure of ~150 German divisions facing ~190 Allied. Now a defensive strategy in 1917 may even up the numbers a bit - the Nivelle Offensive may have cost the Allies 15 divisions' worth of casualties more than the Germans - but overall an attrition strategy favoured the Allies, who could afford to lose 5 soldiers for every 4 Germans even before the Americans arrived. Barring a British collapse due to U-boats, I can't see the Germans getting even to numerical parity in 1918 without massive reinforcements. Did Ludendorff seriously think he could break the French in 1918 with no advantage in numbers?
OTL the reinforcements came from the East, where Germans forces were reduced from ~70 divisions at their peak to ~30ish at Brest-Litovsk. Now if the Russian army doesn't conveniently collapse, I don't think the Germans can pull half their forces out of the East and expect the other half to hold the line. I can see a smaller drawdown (say 10-15 divisions) following the Petrograd Rising, which would give them strength for Caporetto or a limited offensive in the West, but nothing like the numbers they'd need for a serious attempt to reach Paris.
Now it's possible that Ludendorff is somehow persuaded to go for Schleiffen II - leave only a minimal force in the East with orders to fight a delaying action back to the Vistula and gamble he can win in the West before the Russians have got anywhere useful, but my read on the man was that he was a land-grabber who despised the Russians and hated ordering retreats. It's also possible that he fails to do the maths in time and sticks with the losing attrition strategy until he wakes up in Spring 1918 and realises that the Americans are coming and the German Army won't be strong enough for a Western offensive before they arrive. (Then I'd expect panic offensives on all fronts followed by collapse).
Even with a dose of Teutonic optimism, just how practical is knocking France out of the war in mid-1918? Assume that Ludendorff can somehow scrape up the reserves to get to 180-190 divisions in the West, assume that - despite all precedents - the German Army manages to break the front and drive towards Paris - then what? In 1870, with the Prussian at the gates of Paris, the French Army shattered and the French Empire toppling, the French response was to elect a provisional government to carry on the fight. In 1918, with the bulk of their armies still fighting, their allies in the field and massive American reinforcements only months away, will the French simply quit and bar their allies from their territory? Even a successful offensive will stretch German logistics and exhaust their supplies and reserves. Ludendorff can't afford another 4-month Siege of Paris, not with a million British on one flank of his new salient and a million Americans on the other. And those Americans are going to be landing in (and supplied from ) Bordeaux and St Nazaire and Cherbourg and Le Havre, which are all even harder for the Germans to get to than Paris. In short, the Germans don't just have to get to Paris, they have to get to Paris with enough supplies and fresh troops to launch an immediate follow up - and that's hard enough to do even without a third of his army tied up in the East.
Then - Russia. OTL, the Russian army - and the Russian state generally - was on a steady slide to disintegration from mid-1917 on and the Germans could simply sit back and watch. TTL, the Russians, most inconveniently, appear to be recovering. Sitting and watching them get stronger is a poor option if the Germans hope to send forces West in 1918. The window of opportunity is in mid-1917, when the Russian army is still recovering from the Petrograd rising, morale is dubious, the supply situation is poor and the best Russian units and generals are in the Caucasus.
And there's the political dimension. I doubt any German could seriously convince themselves that the French would collapse in revolution on news of even a major German victory. But the Russians have come close to collapse even without the push. The Tsar has fired half his generals and is being held up by Gurko's bayonets. So - attack, force Gurko to put his Cossacks and Tatars in the front line where German artillery can deal with them, and watch Russia go up in flames behind him - or more likely, await the crawling peace offer as the Tsar realises he has to preserve his army to resist revolution.
Plus - again no-one will be telling Ludendorff that the oppressed Bretons or Basques or whoever are ready to rise in the German cause as soon as they hear the guns. But there are going to be plenty of people saying that the Poles or Balts or Finns or Ukranians are ready to rally to a German Army of Liberation. So, strike now, crush the Russians while they're weak and then send everything West for the sledgehammer against the French in 1918.
Do the Germans think that Russians are close collapse IATL, though? Even IOTL it wasn’t clear that Russia was collapsing after the February Uprising, that only became apparent after the Russian army began to more or less disintegrate after the failure of the Kerensky Offensive. IATL I think Russia doesn’t look to be in the best state, but not close to collapse, to German observers . Plus, the regime still has the opportunity to retreat and trade land for time (a time-honored Russian tradition that the German high command is very much aware of) and preserve its regime protection forces. So, I am not sure that von Hindenburg and Ludendorff would believe that forcing Russia out of the war in 1917 would be possible.
That pretty much mirrors my thinking, except that I think the Germans will be doing their offensive against Russia in 1917 (possible against Riga, where the Germans had been planning an offensive for quite a while) not to knock Russia out of the war, but to relieve pressure on their allies (especially the Ottomans) and degrade the fighting capabilities of the Russian Northwestern Front so that is unlikely to be in a state to go on the offensive in 1918.
IMO it is likely that Germany foregoes Caporetto, keeps the divisions that IOTL were transferred to the Italian Front in the East, conducts a limited offensive against Riga designed to weaken the Russian armies as much as possible in late Summer to Autumn 1917, transfers as many units as possible afterwards to the Western Front to achieve numerical superiority there and hope for the best for 1918.
Again, the odds aren’t good for the Germans and there are risks associated with stripping the Eastern Front bare with the Russians still in the fight, but the German high command knows that if Germany doesn’t knock out France in 1918, then the coming avalanche of Americans means that Germany loses the war and nothing Germany does in the East is going to change reality. For the Germans its either do or die in the West in 1918.
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Well, your logic is seemingly convincing but it also seems that your premise is that the Russian situation is exactly the same as in OTL with the exception of February events. Probably this is justified by the fact that the author did not describe any changes related to the continued Stolypin’s tenure all the way to the February events leaving an impression that he was hibernating all the war years until push finally came to shove (😜). However, if his tenure goes uninterrupted from the years prior to the war, it is reasonable to expect that some of the OTL problems are either minimized or removed because they had been caused by the plain and simple administrative ineptitude. And the problems related to the army would be on the top of the list. For example, the shell crisis, which was conductive to the great German successes of 1915 may not happen or could be fixed faster than in OTL (*). With the war being less “one-sided” moral of the troops would be higher and scope of the failures would be smaller.
Now, as far as the impact of the TTL uprising, I think that you are exaggerating it. To start with, even in OTL Petrograd’s garrison was no more than 40,000, which in WWI would be peanuts. Second, it was mostly filled with the reservists, the people whom the front troops would disdain (we are fighting while they are enjoying life in the rear). Gurko’s army in TTL is one more small potato created for crushing rebellion and the Cossacks are a single division within it (I suspect that author was talking about the Wild Division or some ad hoc formation similar to it). BTW, the Cossacks had been actively engaged in OTL WWI fighting on various fronts and even the TTL Gurko’s “wild” units would be taken from the front so the irony about them facing the Germans is somewhat misplaced (😜).
The German strategic plan based upon the failed uprising looks excessively optimistic because the Russian government demonstrated its strength and ended up being politically stronger (with opposition in Duma being dwarfed) than before the uprising, the uprising did not get any support on the fronts and dismissal of some of the top commanders could only change Russian situation to the better because it is hard to imagine that the replacements would perform even worse: by that time there was already a pool of the capable younger commanders blocked from a further promotion by the absence of the vacant places on the top.
More or less the same goes for the key premise: fall of Petrograd triggering Russian capitulation. First, short of a complete disintegration of the Russian army, an offensive all the way to capturing Petrograd seems to be excessively optimistic and, even if the success is achieved, who said that it makes capitulation inevitable? If anything, the events of TTL demonstrated that Petrograd is pretty much irrelevant as far as the war effort is involved (except for Putilov Plant and perhaps couple other industrial plants) and administration can move to Moscow. OTOH, even a successful offensive (without taking any significant number of troops from the West) can dangerously extend the German front creating a long narrow “tongue” vulnerable to the flank attack. All this was not a consideration in OTL due to the absence of organized resistance but situation in TTL is seriously different. Realistically, it can be expected that the offensive will end capturing Riga but this would not end the war.
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(*) It took all the way to 1916 to figure out that, instead of reliance upon already overloaded big industrial plants, orders for the shells could be distributed to the numerous tool shops. Brusilov complained that when his offensive started, his front (designated for a supporting action) had severe rationing of the artillery shells (which partially and rather ironically explains chosen innovative tactical arrangements and the following success).
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Yes, being lazy, I merely hinted at a better war effort under Stolypin-Polivanov rather than writing about it in detail.
So yes ITTL the state of the Russian army is better than OTL, and certainly vastly superior in terms of morale and discipline to OTL Russian army in 1917 after the February revolution.
But nevertheless Ludendorff would still reckon that the Russian army is in bad shape (it is, only not as bad as OTL) and the weakest link of the 3 main Allies. This would speak in favour of an all-out Eastern offensive to knock Russia out of the war, before going west for the Kaizerschlacht.... Or maybe not. There are many good arguments in favour of either scenario. In any case, West or East, it does not really matter in terms of outcome: the fascinating discussion people are having here about what would Ludendorff do illustrates that Germany is truly screwed, no matter what.
I am going to post a new installment today or tomorrow morning: heavy Teutonic vibes expected.
PS: I am currently reading about Poland in the years 1914-1918, fascinating stuff. A few days ago @CommonwealthVictory asked me if Roman Dmowski would play a role in post-war Poland. Now that I am reading about him: yes, he is definitely going to play a role, given that he bet on the good horse in this fight.
I think we're on the same page here, if not necessarily the same line
I agree that getting to Petrograd on 1917 is highly optimistic (and they would likely expect Russia to sue for peace before the army got there). I was trying to emphasise that the Germans need go all-out. Limited operations to take Riga or Rumania or wherever don't solve their big problem, which is that they have to land a knock-out by autumn 1918, before both their allies and their economy collapse completely and enough Americans land in France to squash any offensive there.
If the plan is for a Great Western Offensive in 1918, then to free up troops they have to hurt the Russian armies in Poland and Livonia badly enough that they can't contemplate a serious offensive in 1918, even against severely weakened opposition. Hindenburg & Ludendorff need a second Tannenburg, or a second Gorlice-Tarnow. Petrograd would be the cherry on in, but nothing less is likely to do.
@Stenkarazin posted while I was composing my reply. I was assuming that the Russian situation was broadly similar to OTL 1917 - the war seems to have followed the same course to date - and that while Stolypin has been able to protect the administration from both the Court party and Alix's disruptions and ease out some of the worst duffers, he hasn't had much free time to tackle the mass of muddle, waste and corruption that was the Tsarist war effort. Industry is still badly organised, logistics is still terrible, there are shortages of nearly everything and the generals are still fighting turf wars against each other and Stavka as much as against the Germans.
So the Russian army will be a bit better organised and a bit better fed and there will be fewer critical shortages of key things like artillery shells, but by German standards, it is still under-equipped, under-supplied, badly organised and badly led. The last major Russian operation on the Eastern Front (Brusilov's) failed badly when it came up against Germans.
This is as much about interpretation as anything else, and I can only speculate about what sort of reports the Germans are likely to have received and which of them they're likely to believe. (There were neutral ambassadors in Petrograd who no doubt will be shooting off cables to their Ministries as soon as the lines are open, so they won't be wholly dependent on the Russian official version). But from what the the Germans have heard:
- There was an anti-government uprising in Petrograd, the capital of the Russian Empire,the police were overwhelmed and the government lost control of the city
- The Petrograd garrison, including the Tsar's trusted Guard regiments either completely failed to suppress the rising or actively joined it.
- This was not some relatively peaceful protest or general strike, there were revolutionary mobs run wild, looting and pillaging and respectable citizens being slaughtered in the streets.
- Something calling itself the Soviet popped up, declared itself the supreme authority in the city and incited its followers to armed attacks against loyalist forces both inside and outside the city.
- At the climax of the uprising, senior government officials and prominent politicians were murdered out of hand by the followers of the Soviet
- The government was only able to suppress the rising by bringing in loyalist troops from outside the city.
Now this is all lurid and somewhat exaggerated and yes, the disorder did not spread and the government was able to put down the uprising. But I think the Germans can be forgiven for concluding that the government and its soldiers have lost trust in each other and the Tsar's authority now rests on a relatively small cadre of loyal troops. If such a thing had happened in, say, Vienna, I think everyone would conclude that things were going very wrong in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Besides, what option do they have? If Ludendorff & co conclude that the Russian army and state remain intact and strong enough to resist a German attack, then that means no reserves for the drive on Paris in 1918, which means that the Western Offensive is likely to fail, which means they lose the war. Leaders in this sort of situation tend to grab for whichever straw seems to offer a hope of victory, and the German High Command were no better than most.