Extract from ch.12, The Fall of the Rising Sun, Brendan Green
...by February 1944 no-one could doubt that famine had Java in its grip. Refugees by first hundreds then thousands tried to escape to Sumatra in small boats, risking their lives to do so: the Japanese fired on these boats at every opportunity. ‘These Javanese deprive us of their labour and valuable small vessels,’ wrote one Kempeitai officer, ‘we are therefore entitled, in the interests of Asian Co-Prosperity, to take harsh measures, as against deserters.’
The Allies fed the refugees, but did very little to assist in Java itself, as the place no longer had any military significance. ‘Japanese ships and aircraft based there largely immobilised by lack of fuel,’ noted General Montgomery, ‘all our efforts must focus on coming campaign in Borneo.’ Estimates of the fatalities in Java vary widely, but cannot have been less than a million: a terrible vindication, however little wanted, of the Dutch warnings of the previous year…
The British high command had other priorities. General Montgomery spent the rainy season re-organizing his force - now designated 12th Army - and training it for further operations, though he recognised Borneo was currently low on the Allied priority list. ‘Little need for further advances in Borneo,’ wrote the General. ‘Japanese position there has much in common with Hejaz problem in last war. Turks could not abandon holy cities, but their long supply line made sustaining their position very costly. Similar considerations apply.’ Allied submarines wrought havoc on Japanese shipping trying to bring reinforcements: ‘we drown them in job lots,’ commented General Morshead. The Japanese found it increasingly difficult to extract oil from Borneo, as Allied aircraft sank the tankers, either by direct attacks or by mining the ports.
March brought the end of the rainy season, and increasing indications of an impending Japanese offensive in Borneo. Although Japanese casualties at sea had been high, enough troops had reached Borneo to make the offensive possible: all or part of six divisions. Montgomery had six divisions awaiting them: three Indian, two Australian, one British, and he visited all of them ahead of the battle. His main advantage was in armour - though this found few opportunities for employment - and more importantly in the air. ‘The Jap,’ Montgomery explained to his men, ‘a wily and wiry little fellow, likes to infiltrate and encircle. He knows he cannot win with firepower, we outgun him. He relies on panic and despondency. There will therefore be no panic or despondency. If he gets in behind you, form a perimeter and call up the planes.’
...Antagonism between Monty and his corps and division commanders had grown to a dangerous level, and this could have had serious consequences, as orders were executed tardily and sluggishly. However, the campaign that followed took the form mostly of a “soldier’s battle”, where higher-level direction took second place to the actions of junior officers and even NCOs. Time and again Allied units, individual battalions or even companies, found themselves cut off, and most applied Monty’s advice successfully. ‘The Dakotas and Hurribombers did as much as the Brens and 25-pounders,’ he wrote later. ‘The airmen saved the Army from its mistakes.’
Although the Japanese thrusts lost impetus by May, fighting dragged on throughout the summer, though the outside world lost interest as events elsewhere took centre stage. ‘We became a forgotten army,’ wrote one officer, ‘fighting a private war, as it seemed.’ Despite heavy casualties and difficult terrain, 12th Army made ready a counter-stroke in early June, using two fresh divisions - Indian 11th and British 2nd, formed together as VI Corps. The initial plan had been for an amphibious operation, but Wavell informed Montgomery in April ‘that I should expect no landing craft at all in 1944, all were needed on other fronts. Therefore men on foot, resupplied by air, must do all.’ The march that followed turned Japanese deep infiltration tactics against them. In early August VI Corps emerged on the north bank of the Rajang River, captured Sibu and cut the Japanese lines of communication. Japanese logistics, already badly strained, collapsed. ‘Although western Borneo still contained tens of thousands of the enemy, they had lost all cohesion,’ wrote Montgomery. ‘Mopping up took several months, and required large forces. We estimate that the enemy lost more to starvation and disease than in combat.’
In the meanwhile, Allied armour, for once able to use adequate roads, pushed northwards rapidly to take Miri before the rainy season, with the Grant tanks of Probyn’s Horse entering the town with fuel tanks almost dry, and holding the place for an entire day before the infantry caught up. The RAAF provided air cover, some crews flying six missions a day. ‘A strong enemy counter-attack must have overrun us,’ wrote one Indian officer, ‘but we held on by bluff and Beaufighters.’ The Japanese still held the Seria oilfield as the rainy season commenced, but it had become useless, as it was now within range of Allied fighters and even heavy artillery. ‘We strafe anything that moves by sea,’ noted an RNZAF Hurricane pilot in a letter home. ‘Dangerous work at low level, but worth it.’ The Japanese could no longer store or export the oil, though it was needed more than ever as the American war machine continued its advance through the Pacific. ‘The American assault on the Philippines coincided with the collapse in Borneo,’ wrote Admiral Yamamoto. ‘We needed the oil to mount a naval counterstroke, but we could not get it even from Sarawak to Luzon. The full, final collapse of the Japanese war effort had become a matter of time.’