Chios? Lesbos? Lemnos? There has been no mention of such operations IIRC.
If Lemnos has not been taken, Samothrace would be a very daring target. OTOH, If Lemnos has been taken, Samothrace would be extremely vulnerable.
Essai en Guerre: an FFO-inspired TL
- Thread starter spkaca
- Start date
I assumed Chios and Lesbos fell after the Italian armistice, if not before. They were looking very shaky for the Axis already.
My guess is that the Samothrace show got put on in part as a diversion from a simultaneous operation against Lemnos. As Girolamo notes, the German war effort has started to fray at the edges, and Berlin cares little about the Aegean at this point.
Part 13.6
Extract from War in the Middle Sea, ch.20
The drive on Rome could only occur once the Allies had built up their strength considerably. General Olry noted, ‘The terrain just south of Rome appears flat, but much of it is reclaimed marshland heavily cross-cut by wide, water-filled ditches, which admirably suits the defensive.’ The Allies had a big advantage in armour, but this proved of limited use in the circumstances. Further east the ground rises to rugged hills, where the Germans had dug in strongly. The Allies had no great numerical advantage. The Germans had some twenty divisions nominally, though most were under-strength, and had plenty of artillery, though General von Rintelen complained frequently of ammunition shortages.
The Allies had also gained air superiority, not only over the battle front but to the north as far as Tuscany. In the summer this was not yet crushing, but would only grow. The Bomber Offensive against Germany had started to make Berlin nervous, so by contrast, its air power in Italy steadily declined. An OKL report complained ‘The Allies have now started to employ improved fighter types in large numbers in the Italian theatre, the British have the new Spitfire IX while the Americans and French have introduced the P-47D. These types outclass the Me109G by a dangerous margin.’ Nothing could be done, however, as all the best German machines had gone to protect the Fatherland.
The Germans had freed Mussolini from captivity and so could employ a handful of Italian units who had stayed loyal to him. However von Vietinghoff and von Rintelen had little confidence in their abilities, fearing for their loyalty - 'Marshal Balbo has now joined the Royal Government, and appealed to the loyalists as one Fascist to another,’ noted von Rintelen. ‘Hard to say what effect this might have, but we do not intend to take the chance.’ The Italian units therefore were mostly used on anti-partisan duties. During the summer a grim guerilla war smouldered in central and northern Italy...
The Germans made a priority of keeping the Allies at the greatest possible distance from Germany. An OKW staff report summarised Hitler’s concern: ‘Our effort must be to keep the enemy south of Rome until the winter, when the weather will impede his operations.’
No-one in Berlin doubted, though, that they faced a tall order. ‘They stand 50km from Rome, with at least six months of fair weather in prospect, perhaps seven,’ noted the OKW. ‘The summer weather will give their air power ample scope for operation, and we must expect the weight of air attacks to only increase.’ This point was borne out by the failure of the Valmontone counter-attack in early June, which the Germans attributed to the weight of Allied air power and artillery.
The long exposed coastline of southern France and northern Italy gave the Germans additional worries. ‘The enemy have performed many amphibious landings, they have mastered the technique,’ noted von Rintelen. ‘We need to retain a strong reserve to counteract this. But enemy sea and air power has hitherto meant that once a beach-head establishes itself, we cannot drive them back into the sea.’ The Germans particularly feared a descent upon the south of France, an anxiety which the French sought to aggravate. In part they made overt efforts by expanding airfields in Corsica and mounting numerous air raids on the Riviera coast; in part their effort was invisible, with elaborate deception efforts, such as deceptive radio traffic, made by EMME, the ‘Bakers’, who had by this time relocated to Bastia…
The Allies, however, had no intention of mounting any large amphibious operations, whether in Italy or France. In part this was due to a lack of landing sites in the area west and north of Rome. ‘We looked at Santa Severa, but the enemy have planted it thick with wire, mines and machine-gun nests. We also looked at sites between Livorno and Civitavecchia, but landings so far north would depend on base facilities in Corsica, which are not yet adequate. Besides, as usual, the same old problem,’ wrote General Olry in May. ‘Not enough landing craft. Attrition has been bad, and now the British have taken all their LSTs back, to train for OCEAN. I would like to take Rome this year, it would comfort us for the prolongation of our country’s suffering. London too would like Rome this year, but still more they want to please Washington. As for Washington, they have high hopes for Borneo, and their main interest in the Mediterranean is in the preparations for PRECIPICE.’
The Algiers government disliked its weak bargaining position, but could do little about it. ‘We depend so much on the Americans, we must defer on this grand strategic question,’ noted Mandel to de Gaulle. ‘But we do not have to like it.’ The Americans did agree to support one amphibious operation off the Italian coast, namely operation BRASSARD, the capture of Elba, which French troops carried out in June. ‘This gives the enemy artillery positions within range of the coast at Piombino,’ noted OKW nervously, ‘thus further complicating our supply problems.’
The offensive on Rome would take the form of a conventional land battle. Preliminary operations in the hills, the accumulation of stores, and the improving of the air position, occupied the late spring and early summer. June also saw a brief diplomatic incident when General Gott’s staff used the great abbey at Monte Cassino as a headquarters, leading to a German air raid that damaged the building, and strong protests from the Vatican. Gott, who Brooke considered exhausted, now went back to London, General McCreery replacing him in command of 8th Army...
Operation MASQUE commenced in late July and two months of bitter fighting followed, which cost the Allies over 50,000 casualties, mostly American, by far the most costly campaign of the war so far for them. ‘We thought Corsica had been tough, but we hadn’t seen the elephant yet,’ wrote one US infantryman of the 34th Division. ‘Heat, dust, mosquitoes and death, every day for weeks on end.’ The Allies had placed great hopes in the massed use of armour, especially the Sherman tank, which had now for the first time fully replaced older models among the US and French forces. It generally performed well, but most of the hard yards had to be gained by infantry, usually after heavy bombardments. After one costly failed attack in August, General Patton suffered a breakdown and was relieved of command. ‘We need him, so send him on leave - we can’t have George go crazy,’ noted the President, ‘or at least, not any crazier.’
...US air power repeatedly proved the factor that gave the Allies the edge, but this came at great cost. On September 5th US bombers attacked railway targets in and around Rome, but suffered heavy losses after missing the rendezvous with their fighter escorts. ‘Fifty planes gone, destroyed and damaged, in one go,’ noted General Clark, the new commander of 5th Army, ‘that hurts.’ The losses however spared the little town of Castelgandolfo, with its Papal palace, from destruction, as they forced cancellation of a planned air raid against the place. ‘Just as well in my opinion,’ noted Clark. ‘Attacking under the Alban hills was a mistake. We need to rest II Corps. The Germans need flanking out of Rome, and Bethouart thinks he has the men to do it.’
General Bethouart’s XIX Corps, mainly Moroccans and Algerians, had trained intensively for this operation, and in less than a week they pushed through the hills between Avezzano and L’Aquila that had hitherto resisted repeated Allied efforts. The French thus struck the decisive blow that drove the Germans out of Rome, though they did not reap the reward themselves of capturing the place: that honour went to US II Corps on 2nd October, with French units following. General Clark had hoped to take the surrender, but he suffered a car accident outside Frosinone that kept him in hospital for a week. ‘Still he deserves as much as anyone to be called the liberator of Rome,’ noted Marshal Balbo. Instead on the 3rd General Bethouart rode into the Piazza Venezia aboard a Sherman tank, to the acclamations of the people.
Hitler then replaced General von Rintelen with von Vietinghoff as supreme commander in Italy, but he could do no more than extract most of his forces from the trap that began to close with the simultaneous breakthrough of 8th Army further east. ‘The Allies did nothing especially smart, except for the French breakthrough in the hills,’ von Vietinghoff wrote. ‘But then, with their air power, they had small need for cleverness.’ The Allies continued the pursuit as far as the Civitavecchia - Pescara line, where the front stabilised in October, then became static for the winter.
The drive on Rome could only occur once the Allies had built up their strength considerably. General Olry noted, ‘The terrain just south of Rome appears flat, but much of it is reclaimed marshland heavily cross-cut by wide, water-filled ditches, which admirably suits the defensive.’ The Allies had a big advantage in armour, but this proved of limited use in the circumstances. Further east the ground rises to rugged hills, where the Germans had dug in strongly. The Allies had no great numerical advantage. The Germans had some twenty divisions nominally, though most were under-strength, and had plenty of artillery, though General von Rintelen complained frequently of ammunition shortages.
The Allies had also gained air superiority, not only over the battle front but to the north as far as Tuscany. In the summer this was not yet crushing, but would only grow. The Bomber Offensive against Germany had started to make Berlin nervous, so by contrast, its air power in Italy steadily declined. An OKL report complained ‘The Allies have now started to employ improved fighter types in large numbers in the Italian theatre, the British have the new Spitfire IX while the Americans and French have introduced the P-47D. These types outclass the Me109G by a dangerous margin.’ Nothing could be done, however, as all the best German machines had gone to protect the Fatherland.
The Germans had freed Mussolini from captivity and so could employ a handful of Italian units who had stayed loyal to him. However von Vietinghoff and von Rintelen had little confidence in their abilities, fearing for their loyalty - 'Marshal Balbo has now joined the Royal Government, and appealed to the loyalists as one Fascist to another,’ noted von Rintelen. ‘Hard to say what effect this might have, but we do not intend to take the chance.’ The Italian units therefore were mostly used on anti-partisan duties. During the summer a grim guerilla war smouldered in central and northern Italy...
The Germans made a priority of keeping the Allies at the greatest possible distance from Germany. An OKW staff report summarised Hitler’s concern: ‘Our effort must be to keep the enemy south of Rome until the winter, when the weather will impede his operations.’
No-one in Berlin doubted, though, that they faced a tall order. ‘They stand 50km from Rome, with at least six months of fair weather in prospect, perhaps seven,’ noted the OKW. ‘The summer weather will give their air power ample scope for operation, and we must expect the weight of air attacks to only increase.’ This point was borne out by the failure of the Valmontone counter-attack in early June, which the Germans attributed to the weight of Allied air power and artillery.
The long exposed coastline of southern France and northern Italy gave the Germans additional worries. ‘The enemy have performed many amphibious landings, they have mastered the technique,’ noted von Rintelen. ‘We need to retain a strong reserve to counteract this. But enemy sea and air power has hitherto meant that once a beach-head establishes itself, we cannot drive them back into the sea.’ The Germans particularly feared a descent upon the south of France, an anxiety which the French sought to aggravate. In part they made overt efforts by expanding airfields in Corsica and mounting numerous air raids on the Riviera coast; in part their effort was invisible, with elaborate deception efforts, such as deceptive radio traffic, made by EMME, the ‘Bakers’, who had by this time relocated to Bastia…
The Allies, however, had no intention of mounting any large amphibious operations, whether in Italy or France. In part this was due to a lack of landing sites in the area west and north of Rome. ‘We looked at Santa Severa, but the enemy have planted it thick with wire, mines and machine-gun nests. We also looked at sites between Livorno and Civitavecchia, but landings so far north would depend on base facilities in Corsica, which are not yet adequate. Besides, as usual, the same old problem,’ wrote General Olry in May. ‘Not enough landing craft. Attrition has been bad, and now the British have taken all their LSTs back, to train for OCEAN. I would like to take Rome this year, it would comfort us for the prolongation of our country’s suffering. London too would like Rome this year, but still more they want to please Washington. As for Washington, they have high hopes for Borneo, and their main interest in the Mediterranean is in the preparations for PRECIPICE.’
The Algiers government disliked its weak bargaining position, but could do little about it. ‘We depend so much on the Americans, we must defer on this grand strategic question,’ noted Mandel to de Gaulle. ‘But we do not have to like it.’ The Americans did agree to support one amphibious operation off the Italian coast, namely operation BRASSARD, the capture of Elba, which French troops carried out in June. ‘This gives the enemy artillery positions within range of the coast at Piombino,’ noted OKW nervously, ‘thus further complicating our supply problems.’
The offensive on Rome would take the form of a conventional land battle. Preliminary operations in the hills, the accumulation of stores, and the improving of the air position, occupied the late spring and early summer. June also saw a brief diplomatic incident when General Gott’s staff used the great abbey at Monte Cassino as a headquarters, leading to a German air raid that damaged the building, and strong protests from the Vatican. Gott, who Brooke considered exhausted, now went back to London, General McCreery replacing him in command of 8th Army...
Operation MASQUE commenced in late July and two months of bitter fighting followed, which cost the Allies over 50,000 casualties, mostly American, by far the most costly campaign of the war so far for them. ‘We thought Corsica had been tough, but we hadn’t seen the elephant yet,’ wrote one US infantryman of the 34th Division. ‘Heat, dust, mosquitoes and death, every day for weeks on end.’ The Allies had placed great hopes in the massed use of armour, especially the Sherman tank, which had now for the first time fully replaced older models among the US and French forces. It generally performed well, but most of the hard yards had to be gained by infantry, usually after heavy bombardments. After one costly failed attack in August, General Patton suffered a breakdown and was relieved of command. ‘We need him, so send him on leave - we can’t have George go crazy,’ noted the President, ‘or at least, not any crazier.’
...US air power repeatedly proved the factor that gave the Allies the edge, but this came at great cost. On September 5th US bombers attacked railway targets in and around Rome, but suffered heavy losses after missing the rendezvous with their fighter escorts. ‘Fifty planes gone, destroyed and damaged, in one go,’ noted General Clark, the new commander of 5th Army, ‘that hurts.’ The losses however spared the little town of Castelgandolfo, with its Papal palace, from destruction, as they forced cancellation of a planned air raid against the place. ‘Just as well in my opinion,’ noted Clark. ‘Attacking under the Alban hills was a mistake. We need to rest II Corps. The Germans need flanking out of Rome, and Bethouart thinks he has the men to do it.’
General Bethouart’s XIX Corps, mainly Moroccans and Algerians, had trained intensively for this operation, and in less than a week they pushed through the hills between Avezzano and L’Aquila that had hitherto resisted repeated Allied efforts. The French thus struck the decisive blow that drove the Germans out of Rome, though they did not reap the reward themselves of capturing the place: that honour went to US II Corps on 2nd October, with French units following. General Clark had hoped to take the surrender, but he suffered a car accident outside Frosinone that kept him in hospital for a week. ‘Still he deserves as much as anyone to be called the liberator of Rome,’ noted Marshal Balbo. Instead on the 3rd General Bethouart rode into the Piazza Venezia aboard a Sherman tank, to the acclamations of the people.
Hitler then replaced General von Rintelen with von Vietinghoff as supreme commander in Italy, but he could do no more than extract most of his forces from the trap that began to close with the simultaneous breakthrough of 8th Army further east. ‘The Allies did nothing especially smart, except for the French breakthrough in the hills,’ von Vietinghoff wrote. ‘But then, with their air power, they had small need for cleverness.’ The Allies continued the pursuit as far as the Civitavecchia - Pescara line, where the front stabilised in October, then became static for the winter.
In a way this is where some of the biggest butterflies would flap their wings, but I feel unsure how much detail to go into. One thing I think I will have to deal with is the Setif-Guelma massacre of 1945, or else justify its absence. On the one hand the basic building blocks for something like that are still in place. On the other hand, possibly with a less traumatic war (in some respects, though not all) the French authorities would have a different approach to the Algerian demands. On the gripping hand, I can't see any French government being willing to confront the pieds-noirs, and the pieds-noirs would not accept anything even a little bit like Algerian nationalism. I suspect differences of opinion on this question would contribute to the breakdown of unity in the French government even before it gets chance to move back to metropolitan France.
I can see them getting Paris as OTL. Not Berlin - though I have a different great city in mind.
Thank you.
Thank you.
My feeling is that George was a psychological time bomb, and was sure to go off at some point.
Deleted member 2186
Seems it got already its first and second nomination, so its in the running, but there are a lot of other good TLs that want the same award this year.
Part 13.7
Extract from The Footsteps of History: the war diary of Eustace Marcel
September 3rd 1943
So now it has been four years of war; time enough for Frederic to start high school and Margot to go from crawling to running. The progress of the war enables one to say for certain that they will see Paris before Frederic qualifies for the call-up; how long, I wonder? Perhaps the times demand that I set down a few thoughts regarding how the war goes.
Rome will surely fall soon. The boss does not want to spend much effort in Italy beyond that, and the Americans agree. The year becomes late for a descent upon the Riviera, and besides such an attempt clearly works best in concert with the invasion from England. So it must wait. The enemy must see that it will fall on him next year; the great mystery remains - what means does he yet possess to resist us? Yves works with the Bakers, and they surely know much of what goes on, their electrical ears hearing the story of the enemy’s transmissions, of men and machines going to and fro. But Yves clams up whenever I raise the subject. All I have gleaned is that there is a kind of intelligence that is even more than Top Secret, they call it Ultra.
The question of the enemy’s true strength one could only answer if we truly knew what goes on in the East. Things look bad for the Germans there. The Red Army has re-crossed the Dnieper, and the Germans shot their bolt in the summer. But a force that seems small in the East might fill the map better in the West. At all events, our men will play their part nobly. We have a great army forming in Corsica. We have American equipment now, tanks with radios, aircraft with engines that roar less sweetly but much louder than a Hispano-Suiza. From the little I have heard from our military men, they talk much more confidently now. Yet a debacle such as May 1940 leaves a long shadow, and I confess I will believe only when I have seen, like doubting Thomas.
At any rate the Air is all right. We must never again allow ourselves to fall behind in air-power. The Army brass in Algiers seeks always to deflect criticism for the debacle by blaming Vuillemin and the Air, evidently self-serving, but true enough. At least that is mended, but the whole aviation sector will need shaking up after the war. We have indulged that sector - management and workers both - more than enough. Paul is with GB6 now, they have the newest B-24s, he says; a far cry from the little Breguet 19 that he took me up in, that time in ‘34. He defies the odds with every mission. He told me recently of an ordeal he went through over Genoa, when they came back riddled with holes. The English have punished the German cities severely of late; our policy has been to stick with precise bombing, but it is costly for us, and I think the AdA would like nothing better than to join in a few of those thousand-bomber raids.
Algerian politics keeps demanding my attention. The great question of the day is the treatment of those Arabs who have joined our forces. A blind man could see that this is no mere military question. The boss wants to go far in conciliating the Arabs, since he places all other things behind the military need for manpower. He has certainly felt the influence of M. Churchill in this regard. But De Gaulle is against almost all the Arab demands. Now I hear that Abbas fellow and some others are putting together a Manifesto. Perhaps we could nip this in the bud, but that will lead to trouble. Could we not co-opt those people? But then our problem with the pied-noirs becomes acute. We need them too. Such thoughts lead only to gloomy places, I will trust to Providence.
In Greece, we will surely push further north this year. Our V Corps has written another page in the story of our love for the home of civilisation. (Some trouble, I hear, with some of the colonials wanting home leave; but it would be bad for the morale of the 'metro' troops, since after all they cannot go home yet.) After we take Salonika, what then? I see political complications innumerable in the Balkans. So many of our meetings revolve around these questions. Shall Sofia, Bucharest and the rest fall into the orbit of Moscow, or ours, or London’s? The boss said to me last week, ‘I know M. Churchill thinks much of this. He would have us take the leading role with Bucharest and Belgrade, while he thinks most of Athens and Sofia. But I think a big moustache might block the view for both of us.’ Perhaps we shall not be able to go back to the way things were. We are so much tied to the Anglo-Saxons now, the Little Entente is a memory, a footnote. Didier said to me, ‘To think how much of my life I spent on it, and where are those years now?’ One thing is sure: the time is past when Turkey could hope to play much part. If they had come in when we needed them they would have reaped rewards; now we need them no more, and indeed if they were to join they might create greater impediments than they removed. The Aegean is our lake now - look at what happened on Lemnos and Samothrace.
I spend little time thinking of the Far East, though I think the Boss worries about it a great deal. The Indochina question could give us difficulties. Beyond a doubt the Anglo-Saxons would rather avoid the place entirely. They think of great movements by sea, as is their wont, through the Pacific and Philippines, into Japan itself. We can do nothing to determine the course of events there - we count for little more than the Dutch - with Washington, we count for less even than Chungking. At any rate once Borneo falls the Japanese will surely have to give in? They have no oil. We would feel content with a return to the status quo ante - provided Tokyo gave assurances, withdrawal from the mainland would suffice. The papers talk always of Japanese fanaticism, but their diplomats back home always struck me as reasonable men.
So much for the war, after forty-eight months… Forty-eight months into the last one would have brought us to August 1918 and the beginnings of the collapse of the German army. Perhaps it will come sooner than we think. I wonder what the German army thinks of their dear Leader now?
September 3rd 1943
So now it has been four years of war; time enough for Frederic to start high school and Margot to go from crawling to running. The progress of the war enables one to say for certain that they will see Paris before Frederic qualifies for the call-up; how long, I wonder? Perhaps the times demand that I set down a few thoughts regarding how the war goes.
Rome will surely fall soon. The boss does not want to spend much effort in Italy beyond that, and the Americans agree. The year becomes late for a descent upon the Riviera, and besides such an attempt clearly works best in concert with the invasion from England. So it must wait. The enemy must see that it will fall on him next year; the great mystery remains - what means does he yet possess to resist us? Yves works with the Bakers, and they surely know much of what goes on, their electrical ears hearing the story of the enemy’s transmissions, of men and machines going to and fro. But Yves clams up whenever I raise the subject. All I have gleaned is that there is a kind of intelligence that is even more than Top Secret, they call it Ultra.
The question of the enemy’s true strength one could only answer if we truly knew what goes on in the East. Things look bad for the Germans there. The Red Army has re-crossed the Dnieper, and the Germans shot their bolt in the summer. But a force that seems small in the East might fill the map better in the West. At all events, our men will play their part nobly. We have a great army forming in Corsica. We have American equipment now, tanks with radios, aircraft with engines that roar less sweetly but much louder than a Hispano-Suiza. From the little I have heard from our military men, they talk much more confidently now. Yet a debacle such as May 1940 leaves a long shadow, and I confess I will believe only when I have seen, like doubting Thomas.
At any rate the Air is all right. We must never again allow ourselves to fall behind in air-power. The Army brass in Algiers seeks always to deflect criticism for the debacle by blaming Vuillemin and the Air, evidently self-serving, but true enough. At least that is mended, but the whole aviation sector will need shaking up after the war. We have indulged that sector - management and workers both - more than enough. Paul is with GB6 now, they have the newest B-24s, he says; a far cry from the little Breguet 19 that he took me up in, that time in ‘34. He defies the odds with every mission. He told me recently of an ordeal he went through over Genoa, when they came back riddled with holes. The English have punished the German cities severely of late; our policy has been to stick with precise bombing, but it is costly for us, and I think the AdA would like nothing better than to join in a few of those thousand-bomber raids.
Algerian politics keeps demanding my attention. The great question of the day is the treatment of those Arabs who have joined our forces. A blind man could see that this is no mere military question. The boss wants to go far in conciliating the Arabs, since he places all other things behind the military need for manpower. He has certainly felt the influence of M. Churchill in this regard. But De Gaulle is against almost all the Arab demands. Now I hear that Abbas fellow and some others are putting together a Manifesto. Perhaps we could nip this in the bud, but that will lead to trouble. Could we not co-opt those people? But then our problem with the pied-noirs becomes acute. We need them too. Such thoughts lead only to gloomy places, I will trust to Providence.
In Greece, we will surely push further north this year. Our V Corps has written another page in the story of our love for the home of civilisation. (Some trouble, I hear, with some of the colonials wanting home leave; but it would be bad for the morale of the 'metro' troops, since after all they cannot go home yet.) After we take Salonika, what then? I see political complications innumerable in the Balkans. So many of our meetings revolve around these questions. Shall Sofia, Bucharest and the rest fall into the orbit of Moscow, or ours, or London’s? The boss said to me last week, ‘I know M. Churchill thinks much of this. He would have us take the leading role with Bucharest and Belgrade, while he thinks most of Athens and Sofia. But I think a big moustache might block the view for both of us.’ Perhaps we shall not be able to go back to the way things were. We are so much tied to the Anglo-Saxons now, the Little Entente is a memory, a footnote. Didier said to me, ‘To think how much of my life I spent on it, and where are those years now?’ One thing is sure: the time is past when Turkey could hope to play much part. If they had come in when we needed them they would have reaped rewards; now we need them no more, and indeed if they were to join they might create greater impediments than they removed. The Aegean is our lake now - look at what happened on Lemnos and Samothrace.
I spend little time thinking of the Far East, though I think the Boss worries about it a great deal. The Indochina question could give us difficulties. Beyond a doubt the Anglo-Saxons would rather avoid the place entirely. They think of great movements by sea, as is their wont, through the Pacific and Philippines, into Japan itself. We can do nothing to determine the course of events there - we count for little more than the Dutch - with Washington, we count for less even than Chungking. At any rate once Borneo falls the Japanese will surely have to give in? They have no oil. We would feel content with a return to the status quo ante - provided Tokyo gave assurances, withdrawal from the mainland would suffice. The papers talk always of Japanese fanaticism, but their diplomats back home always struck me as reasonable men.
So much for the war, after forty-eight months… Forty-eight months into the last one would have brought us to August 1918 and the beginnings of the collapse of the German army. Perhaps it will come sooner than we think. I wonder what the German army thinks of their dear Leader now?
I don't know what is the rank or position of Eustace Marcel, but in September 1943 it is perhaps not the good time for him to talk about the invasion from England. If the Allies are in Corsica and Rome, an invasion of southern France or nothern Italy might be an option. The demand for a second front comes from Stalin, but the exact details are perhaps not known for the basic people.spkaca said:
Still a good work! The strategic debate about Balkans and Turkey is realistic.
Loïc
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I don't know the exact dynamics of Algerian politics at this point, especially after taking account of the ATL changes, but I suspect the idea of a partition would unite the Arabs, settlers and Government in rejection - one of the few things that would unite them.
I disguise my knowledge gaps with vagueness. M. Marcel I imagine as a senior functionary (a civil servant, not a politician), senior enough to meet regularly with M. Mandel, and to talk as an equal with Mr. Lyttelton (e.g. part 6.6). From the range of his interests he evidently has quite a wide brief.
The alt-DRAGOON is the operation I've teased as PRECIPICE. It will go a bit differently to OTL.
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iddt3
Donor
/S Sure, we could do it by who is where. The Pied Noir get the coast, and the Algerians get the rest to run as they will. You might think of it as a ... Reservation for the Arabs. Or an Arabstan. I'm sure such a division will be just and equitable for all involved. /S
Sarcasm aside, so long as Arabs are second class citizens, there's no division or proclamation that can really satisfy them. And the Pied Noir will never stand for Algerians being equal to them.
Part 14.1
Part 14. Arma virumque
Extract from A History of Modern India, ch.11, by Warren Semyonoff
Until 1943 London had paid only lip-service to Indian political developments. Mr. Churchill saw everything through the prism of military needs, and concerned himself above all with how India could contribute to the ongoing campaign in southeast Asia. However, as 1943 progressed several factors brought a reconsideration in London.
Washington had increasingly brought pressure to bear for some political initiative, seeing this as a necessary adjunct to India’s military mobilisation. ‘London expects our aid in the Indies, and we have given it. We need their cooperation sending aid to China, and they are doing that. The missing piece, as we see it, is unlocking India’s potential to support both efforts on a grander scale.’ Thus wrote Mr. Hull in early 1943, and in doing so he expressed the President’s own views.
Meanwhile the British Government went through a private dispute during 1942-3. Following the loss of Mr. Eden, Mr. Amery had become the new Foreign Secretary, and in this powerful position inside the War Cabinet, he supported Mr. Lyttelton, the new Secretary of State for India, when he became convinced of the need to push ahead with Dominion status for India ‘no later than 1944’ - even if the war remained unfinished. In this they received the support of Labour members of the Government. Records of this debate indicate that all concerned - on every side - assumed that Dominion status would mean independence not long after…
In the summer of 1943 Mr. Churchill bowed to the pressure and accepted Mr. Lyttelton’s offer to travel to India in person. For a time Churchill pressed for the inclusion of Sir Stafford Cripps in the mission, but he preferred to remain in Greece ‘since negotiations between the KKE and the Government have reached a critical and delicate state,’ as he put it. (Historians have long speculated on Mr. Churchill's motives for backing Cripps so strongly: an intention to derail the process has been alleged, but never proven.) Also as part of the deal, Mr. Lyttelton insisted on the recall of the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, who he felt had been in office too long. With hindsight Mr. Churchill’s agreement to this, in ‘a moment of weakness’ as he later described it, proved crucial. The Viceroy had become highly unpopular and distrusted in India, and his removal was an essential step in creating the conditions for political progress. Only one man could replace him, and so General Wavell became the new Viceroy in late August, with his prestige high, fresh from the success of the invasion of Borneo.
With the arrival of the Lyttelton and Wavell team, the riots, strikes and demonstrations that had roiled the much of country for much of 1943 eased off. Both Congress and the League realised that this would be a decisive moment. The compromise that resulted was the only one that stood any chance of agreement by all parties concerned. Certainly every factor had to fall into place just so to reach agreement, and to the last moment the possibility of failure remained…
Under the Delhi Accord, Dominion status, in a modified form, would take effect in January 1944, with all-India parliamentary elections to occur that year. The Accord included enhanced autonomy provisions for Muslim-majority regions and provinces; Mr. Jinnah declared himself satisfied that these met the requirements of the Lahore Declaration, and though he faced substantial opposition within the League on this question, his authority survived. Lord Wavell would be the last Viceroy, his title reverting to Governor-General.
Though the Accords did not spell it out, the negotiators on both sides understood that the chief tasks of the Dominion government would be to fight the war more effectively, and to prepare for independence. Some difference of opinion remained between British and Indian views about whether these tasks should occur in parallel or in series. The strongest proponent of the latter view was Mr. Churchill, who preferred to see independence as a theoretical eventuality, whereas Congress politicians saw their tasks as being very much parallel. Mr. Amery wrote later, ‘I had to suffer through numerous difficult late-night ‘Winston-specials’, and I hesitate to say I would have given the Accords my support if I had known what I would face as a result.’ However, the deed was done. ‘They will call this the Miracle of Delhi,’ said Wavell to Lyttelton. ‘I would not have believed it possible.’
Extract from A History of Modern India, ch.11, by Warren Semyonoff
Until 1943 London had paid only lip-service to Indian political developments. Mr. Churchill saw everything through the prism of military needs, and concerned himself above all with how India could contribute to the ongoing campaign in southeast Asia. However, as 1943 progressed several factors brought a reconsideration in London.
Washington had increasingly brought pressure to bear for some political initiative, seeing this as a necessary adjunct to India’s military mobilisation. ‘London expects our aid in the Indies, and we have given it. We need their cooperation sending aid to China, and they are doing that. The missing piece, as we see it, is unlocking India’s potential to support both efforts on a grander scale.’ Thus wrote Mr. Hull in early 1943, and in doing so he expressed the President’s own views.
Meanwhile the British Government went through a private dispute during 1942-3. Following the loss of Mr. Eden, Mr. Amery had become the new Foreign Secretary, and in this powerful position inside the War Cabinet, he supported Mr. Lyttelton, the new Secretary of State for India, when he became convinced of the need to push ahead with Dominion status for India ‘no later than 1944’ - even if the war remained unfinished. In this they received the support of Labour members of the Government. Records of this debate indicate that all concerned - on every side - assumed that Dominion status would mean independence not long after…
In the summer of 1943 Mr. Churchill bowed to the pressure and accepted Mr. Lyttelton’s offer to travel to India in person. For a time Churchill pressed for the inclusion of Sir Stafford Cripps in the mission, but he preferred to remain in Greece ‘since negotiations between the KKE and the Government have reached a critical and delicate state,’ as he put it. (Historians have long speculated on Mr. Churchill's motives for backing Cripps so strongly: an intention to derail the process has been alleged, but never proven.) Also as part of the deal, Mr. Lyttelton insisted on the recall of the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, who he felt had been in office too long. With hindsight Mr. Churchill’s agreement to this, in ‘a moment of weakness’ as he later described it, proved crucial. The Viceroy had become highly unpopular and distrusted in India, and his removal was an essential step in creating the conditions for political progress. Only one man could replace him, and so General Wavell became the new Viceroy in late August, with his prestige high, fresh from the success of the invasion of Borneo.
With the arrival of the Lyttelton and Wavell team, the riots, strikes and demonstrations that had roiled the much of country for much of 1943 eased off. Both Congress and the League realised that this would be a decisive moment. The compromise that resulted was the only one that stood any chance of agreement by all parties concerned. Certainly every factor had to fall into place just so to reach agreement, and to the last moment the possibility of failure remained…
Under the Delhi Accord, Dominion status, in a modified form, would take effect in January 1944, with all-India parliamentary elections to occur that year. The Accord included enhanced autonomy provisions for Muslim-majority regions and provinces; Mr. Jinnah declared himself satisfied that these met the requirements of the Lahore Declaration, and though he faced substantial opposition within the League on this question, his authority survived. Lord Wavell would be the last Viceroy, his title reverting to Governor-General.
Though the Accords did not spell it out, the negotiators on both sides understood that the chief tasks of the Dominion government would be to fight the war more effectively, and to prepare for independence. Some difference of opinion remained between British and Indian views about whether these tasks should occur in parallel or in series. The strongest proponent of the latter view was Mr. Churchill, who preferred to see independence as a theoretical eventuality, whereas Congress politicians saw their tasks as being very much parallel. Mr. Amery wrote later, ‘I had to suffer through numerous difficult late-night ‘Winston-specials’, and I hesitate to say I would have given the Accords my support if I had known what I would face as a result.’ However, the deed was done. ‘They will call this the Miracle of Delhi,’ said Wavell to Lyttelton. ‘I would not have believed it possible.’
Not the subject of the current piece but how is KKE in ANY position to negotiate with the government in TTL? Greece south of the Olympus remained under control of the government, which government in all likehood is a coalition between the Liberals and the royalists till some time in 1941 with the 1936 parliament reconvened. KKE had less than 6% of the vote, it would had likely gotten something in the 15% range had it taken part in the elections in OTL 1946. TTL it should be somewhere in between call it 10% in free Greece with no means of coersion, the police is intact, nevermind the army. What about occupied Greece? Epirus was mostly dominated by the Venizelist EDES in the first place. In Macedonia in OTL ELAS did smash up all opposition, aside from Fosterides guerrillas, mostly Pontic Greeks, in the east which were two strong to be destroyed (and also Fosterides unlike his fellow non-communist guerilla leaders attacked first) and several Pontic Greek villages in the west that turned to tacit cooperation with the Germans receiving arms from them. Now there was a thing in common in all three groups. All contained large if not overwhelming numbers of Venizelists in their ranks, importantly in the case of ELAS including Venizelist officers. ELAS would be nothing without the influx of Venizelist officers and men persuaded or coerced into its ranks. Only TTL there is a basic difference. Instead of the Venizelist political leadership mostly spending 1941-42 worrying about the king not returning post liberation and aside from a minority not actively pursuing organizing their people into a resistance movement here they are part of government. So come 1942 in Macedonia you had Venizelist led resistance organization(s) backed from Athens and the Communists vying for support... only both the Venizelists that joined EAM and the ones who kept independent from it or opposed it would be likely joining their people given the option. Which puts KKE in the minority there as well...
For the reasons you set out, they probably aren't; but Sir Stafford might have got it into his head that it is super-important for the KKE to join the coalition government (which in my notes I've called the MEA, standing for métopo ethnikís ámynas or something like National Defence Front; as always happy to be corrected if that's a bad phrase or translation). Cripps' determination to stay in Athens probably reflects Cripps' misjudgement - about Greece, and his own importance - rather than the realities of the situation.
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