Essai en Guerre: an FFO-inspired TL

I somehow have the marches Colonel Bogie and A Bridge Too Far playing in my head simultaneously...
Just the effect I was after...
I always enjoy the individual viewpoints in this TL, especially as they are told as excerpts from memoirs or personal letters. That individual touch adds a definite feel of realism to the tale.
There is a deliberate choice of style here: telling a story in a personal memoir effectively tells the reader that the subject will survive. Although there is something to be said for keeping the reader in suspense on this point, I prefer to keep my major characters alive for the most part, perhaps because I become somewhat invested in them.
I wonder if the Bulgarians will prove more fleet-footed in their attempt to change dance partners in this TL? I can't imagine the Germans will take such a threat to Ploesti and the whole southern flank of the Eastern front without great prejudice.
They will certainly not let Bulgaria go easily - though once the Red Army enters Rumania - OTL in late summer 1944; probably slightly accelerated in this TL - the whole Balkans will become untenable. Perhaps the battle of Targu Frumos (and the wider spring offensive) goes differently. OTL an initial Soviet success received an effective German counter-attack, but perhaps in this TL the counter-attacking forces might have been drawn off by impending crisis on the Greek front? I need to think this through, since that would imply the first contact between Allied and Soviet forces would come not on the Elbe but somewhere between Sofia and Bucharest.
 

Driftless

Donor
I always enjoy the individual viewpoints in this TL, especially as they are told as excerpts from memoirs or personal letters. That individual touch adds a definite feel of realism to the tale.

There is a deliberate choice of style here: telling a story in a personal memoir effectively tells the reader that the subject will survive. Although there is something to be said for keeping the reader in suspense on this point, I prefer to keep my major characters alive for the most part, perhaps because I become somewhat invested in them.

Thinking more on the memoir/letter method, you also give the writer limited knowledge of wider events at-that-point-in-time, which is realistic. There's no omniscient view when you're in the middle of a smaller segment of a grand event.

OTL, even the Marshall's, Alanbrooke's and so on, often saw a murky picture that didn't completely clarify till later. Obviously, they had a tremendous grasp of how things appeared at a point in time, and how they wanted events to proceed, but no sure fore-knowledge that events would indeed go as planned. Even Ike's famously un-used note to be released describing the failure of the Normandy landings, shows that contigencies at every level were possible.
 
Part 15.2
Extract from Marianne and John, by Charles Montague, ch.18

News of the attempt on Hitler’s life in January took some time to filter out: the Nazis placed a clampdown on any reports. However, by the end of the month both London and Algiers had independently learned of the event. An anti-Nazi officer had apparently detonated an explosive device - accounts differed exactly what - while Hitler, Himmler and Goering were inspecting a new set of winter uniforms. A last-minute change to the programme meant that Hitler was already leaving the room when the device went off, killing the bomber instantly, while the blast struck Goering and killed him also; but Goering shielded the others. Himmler suffered serious injuries, but Hitler himself was merely knocked to the floor and left the building without needing medical assistance. ‘The luck of the devil,’ commented M. Mandel, ‘as usual. The bad fat man is dead. Our airmen worry this might make the Luftwaffe more effective.’ Hitler’s security precautions, already considerable, reached new levels of paranoia.

The Nazi vengeance came swiftly, with thousands of arrests and hundreds of executions of anyone considered lacking in loyalty…

February saw a portentous spat between London and Algiers over the Indochina question, the first of many. The British and Americans wished to send SOE and OSS agents into the country to encourage and support anti-Japanese resistance, which had already become widespread. Algiers rejected the idea. ‘Even if it means a weaker resistance to the Japanese, they do not want us there,’ wrote General Marshall.’ Many suspected that with victory now assured, Algiers did not want to create a bigger political problem in Indochina than would inevitably arise anyway. ‘The resistance there claims 250,000 men under arms,’ wrote General Olry. ‘Exaggerated of course, but I foresee much trouble in that quarter. We need to have more troops out there, ready for the day we return, but we cannot spare any from PRECIPICE.’

As for the Japanese, Indochina had proved a headache out of proportion to its size. ‘A year ago we had six divisions there, and thought that excessive,’ wrote the Emperor the same month. ‘Now we have ten. The guerilla warfare there makes China look like a tame kitten next to a tiger. Very many unfortunate excesses have occurred.’ Despite this and many other demands on its manpower, Tokyo developed plans for offensives in both China and Borneo.
 
very good chapter and ho! ho! goting is dead, who is it the new marshall of Luftwaffe
Probably Milch? I haven't worked that out (I assume Udet committed suicide as OTL) - though by this point the LW is becoming less and less relevant to events.
 
Part 15.3
Extract from ch.12, The Fall of the Rising Sun, Brendan Green

...by February 1944 no-one could doubt that famine had Java in its grip. Refugees by first hundreds then thousands tried to escape to Sumatra in small boats, risking their lives to do so: the Japanese fired on these boats at every opportunity. ‘These Javanese deprive us of their labour and valuable small vessels,’ wrote one Kempeitai officer, ‘we are therefore entitled, in the interests of Asian Co-Prosperity, to take harsh measures, as against deserters.’

The Allies fed the refugees, but did very little to assist in Java itself, as the place no longer had any military significance. ‘Japanese ships and aircraft based there largely immobilised by lack of fuel,’ noted General Montgomery, ‘all our efforts must focus on coming campaign in Borneo.’ Estimates of the fatalities in Java vary widely, but cannot have been less than a million: a terrible vindication, however little wanted, of the Dutch warnings of the previous year…

The British high command had other priorities. General Montgomery spent the rainy season re-organizing his force - now designated 12th Army - and training it for further operations, though he recognised Borneo was currently low on the Allied priority list. ‘Little need for further advances in Borneo,’ wrote the General. ‘Japanese position there has much in common with Hejaz problem in last war. Turks could not abandon holy cities, but their long supply line made sustaining their position very costly. Similar considerations apply.’ Allied submarines wrought havoc on Japanese shipping trying to bring reinforcements: ‘we drown them in job lots,’ commented General Morshead. The Japanese found it increasingly difficult to extract oil from Borneo, as Allied aircraft sank the tankers, either by direct attacks or by mining the ports.

March brought the end of the rainy season, and increasing indications of an impending Japanese offensive in Borneo. Although Japanese casualties at sea had been high, enough troops had reached Borneo to make the offensive possible: all or part of six divisions. Montgomery had six divisions awaiting them: three Indian, two Australian, one British, and he visited all of them ahead of the battle. His main advantage was in armour - though this found few opportunities for employment - and more importantly in the air. ‘The Jap,’ Montgomery explained to his men, ‘a wily and wiry little fellow, likes to infiltrate and encircle. He knows he cannot win with firepower, we outgun him. He relies on panic and despondency. There will therefore be no panic or despondency. If he gets in behind you, form a perimeter and call up the planes.’

...Antagonism between Monty and his corps and division commanders had grown to a dangerous level, and this could have had serious consequences, as orders were executed tardily and sluggishly. However, the campaign that followed took the form mostly of a “soldier’s battle”, where higher-level direction took second place to the actions of junior officers and even NCOs. Time and again Allied units, individual battalions or even companies, found themselves cut off, and most applied Monty’s advice successfully. ‘The Dakotas and Hurribombers did as much as the Brens and 25-pounders,’ he wrote later. ‘The airmen saved the Army from its mistakes.’

Although the Japanese thrusts lost impetus by May, fighting dragged on throughout the summer, though the outside world lost interest as events elsewhere took centre stage. ‘We became a forgotten army,’ wrote one officer, ‘fighting a private war, as it seemed.’ Despite heavy casualties and difficult terrain, 12th Army made ready a counter-stroke in early June, using two fresh divisions - Indian 11th and British 2nd, formed together as VI Corps. The initial plan had been for an amphibious operation, but Wavell informed Montgomery in April ‘that I should expect no landing craft at all in 1944, all were needed on other fronts. Therefore men on foot, resupplied by air, must do all.’ The march that followed turned Japanese deep infiltration tactics against them. In early August VI Corps emerged on the north bank of the Rajang River, captured Sibu and cut the Japanese lines of communication. Japanese logistics, already badly strained, collapsed. ‘Although western Borneo still contained tens of thousands of the enemy, they had lost all cohesion,’ wrote Montgomery. ‘Mopping up took several months, and required large forces. We estimate that the enemy lost more to starvation and disease than in combat.’

In the meanwhile, Allied armour, for once able to use adequate roads, pushed northwards rapidly to take Miri before the rainy season, with the Grant tanks of Probyn’s Horse entering the town with fuel tanks almost dry, and holding the place for an entire day before the infantry caught up. The RAAF provided air cover, some crews flying six missions a day. ‘A strong enemy counter-attack must have overrun us,’ wrote one Indian officer, ‘but we held on by bluff and Beaufighters.’ The Japanese still held the Seria oilfield as the rainy season commenced, but it had become useless, as it was now within range of Allied fighters and even heavy artillery. ‘We strafe anything that moves by sea,’ noted an RNZAF Hurricane pilot in a letter home. ‘Dangerous work at low level, but worth it.’ The Japanese could no longer store or export the oil, though it was needed more than ever as the American war machine continued its advance through the Pacific. ‘The American assault on the Philippines coincided with the collapse in Borneo,’ wrote Admiral Yamamoto. ‘We needed the oil to mount a naval counterstroke, but we could not get it even from Sarawak to Luzon. The full, final collapse of the Japanese war effort had become a matter of time.’
 
Part 15.4
Extract from ch.14, The Gray Waves: a history of the Battle of the Atlantic, Walter Schluter


...although none of these attacks succeeded fully. The Kriegsmarine surface fleet had effectively ceased its war by early 1944, lack of fuel by itself doing what direct Allied attacks had not: but the Allies could not know this. As far as Admiral Cunningham, the new First Sea Lord, was concerned, the Bismarck and Tirpitz posed a serious threat as a fleet in being, and tied down several major units urgently needed elsewhere, above all for OCEAN and PRECIPICE, and the ongoing campaign in Borneo.

Thus the Fleet devised operation JADE. For this the RN provided the Ark Royal, the old carrier Furious and several escort carriers - all the most modern carriers had gone to the East. The Ark was overdue for modernisation, but the need to neutralise the ‘Ugly Sisters’ took priority. Two KGV-class battleships went along as escort. The French contributed the Richelieu, on her final mission with the Home Fleet before she too went East. Finally, the new aircraft carrier Jean Bart took part, somewhat controversially; her captain believed her air group was insufficiently trained, but the chance to hit the German fleet could not be missed, and Algiers directed her participation. ‘Two old grandmas and a slip of a girl,’ summarised the Admiral in command. In all some 200 aircraft would take part, the largest carrier-borne operation ever carried out in Atlantic waters. Bad weather forced repeated postponements, but a brief favourable window arose in April.

...the planes took off in the dark, and struck early in the morning of the 19th, hitting both battleships numerous times, though most of the bombs lacked the weight to cripple the ships. During the first wave damage was mostly confined to the superstructure. However, in the second, one Dauntless dive-bomber from the Jean Bart apparently suffered damage on its dive and crashed directly into the Bismarck, the blast penetrating the armour and starting a fire that left the battleship unable to move. The Bismarck in fact had suffered damage beyond local repair, and only moved again after the war, when she went to the breakers: a sad end for such a ship. The Germans took several months to repair the Tirpitz, which the Allies could therefore discount during the crucial period of the spring and summer. Total losses were six aircraft.

‘If the operation had gone ahead even a week later it could not have done so much damage,’ noted Admiral Ciliax. ‘We would have had better smoke-screens in action and additional guns.’ The Ark Royal suffered serious damage from an accidental fire on the return to Scapa, and now bowed out, as it proved for good, as she did not emerge from her rebuild until the end of the war. Admiral Godfroy considered it a good start for the Jean Bart. ‘Once you get to the East, we will look for more such actions,’ he signalled.
 
Only six planes lost is a very good rate of return for such an op. Pity about Ark Royal although it forces the rebuild to be done properly. I wonder whether anybody will come up with the idea for angled decks in the near future? Great start to the career of the Jean Bart. Further tests await out East.
 
Only six planes lost is a very good rate of return for such an op. Pity about Ark Royal although it forces the rebuild to be done properly. I wonder whether anybody will come up with the idea for angled decks in the near future? Great start to the career of the Jean Bart. Further tests await out East.
In Operation Tungsten (to which this is a rough equivalent, in intent at any rate) aircraft losses were four. In this case, the opposition might be tougher (two BB AA batteries instead of one), but the Allies are using more aircraft, and in general the more you send, the fewer you lose. So overall I've called it a slightly higher loss for somewhat more damage done.
I suspect Ark Royal might not get a full rebuild/ modernisation - even with the more favourable circumstances of the ATL resources will be tight immediately post-war and the RN will have to make hard choices about which carriers to retain. Or possibly the RN will spend 1944-5 rebuilding her at vast expense, anticipating a prolonged Pacific campaign, and then find the war ends before she gets there.
 
Has this person made an appearance here?
Félix Éboué


One of those interesting people that are overlooked.
No, though I suspect in a TL where the Algiers Government has to (of necessity) push for greater employment of African manpower, and accelerated development of African economies (perhaps by enlisting US aid to develop infrastructure), he would have a significant role to play, and might even get into the Algiers Government in some capacity - maybe by creating some kind of Ministerial role - Minister for Colonial Development or some such.
 
Part 15.5
Extract from ch.13 of To the stars the hard way: a history of 50 Wing RAF by Bertram Owen

...the high command had noted the Wing’s performance in destroying precision targets during the drive on Rome. Wing Commander Braden travelled to Algiers on March 30th for a highly secret meeting. ‘On his return he seemed unwilling to talk much,’ noted Squadron Leader Hunter, ‘which we all finally understood on the 1st when he explained what we had to do. Some of us thought it an April Fool, but quickly realised it was much too sticky a business for fooling.’

The operations that followed, collectively known as VISION, had their genesis two months earlier, when the Hungarian dictator Horthy began to explore the possibility of making a separate peace with the Allies. Berlin swiftly learned of this and acted to prevent it, sending German troops to occupy Hungary in March. For good measure they also acted against Bulgaria, where the Regents had also been putting out peace feelers. The consequent dissolution of the Bulgarian army created a temporary vacuum at the front. The Allies had not planned any offensive for the spring, and did not at this time wish to risk over-extension, but O’Connor took the opportunity to advance past Drama at little cost. Prince Kiril fled to the Allied lines, as did many civilians, especially Bulgarian Jews; but the Jews of Hungary had no such nearby refuge.

The Supreme Council discussed the matter soon afterwards. ‘This has the makings of yet more tragedy,’ noted M. Mandel, ‘half a million Jews live in Budapest.’ Mr. Churchill agreed, and the Allied air forces were again directed to explore their options. ‘Hitherto we had no means to do anything directly against these ghastly Nazi persecutions,’ wrote Churchill later, ‘but now we had bomber bases near Pescara, which offered better prospects. The opposition of the airmen was beaten down.’ Not only the airmen opposed the idea. ‘A folly of Mandel’s, this scheme,’ wrote de Gaulle, ‘it is a distraction from our main effort, that offers little prospect of success.’

The forces allocated to VISION comprised 50 Wing and the French 4th Groupe de Bombardement (GB4), recently re-equipped with the latest variant of B-24 bombers. This unit had trained for night operations as part of the cancelled operation INTENTION. Now they changed their focus. Their directive read, ‘You will undertake attacks on rail targets in the Krakow - Katowice - Ostrava triangle, in order to impede and disrupt German operations in that region.’ The crews, British and French, disliked the riskiness of the operation, which would strain the capabilities of their aircraft, but when informed as to the nature of the “German operations”, did not hesitate to carry out their mission.

Four VISION missions took place in April. Each took roughly the same pattern, with the Mosquitoes of 50 Wing finding and marking the targets, before GB4 bombed them. ‘We knew our accuracy might not reach our usual standards,’ noted Squadron Leader Hunter, ‘particularly since we did not have OBOE.’ Some damage was done, with a rail bridge being brought down near Ostrava and several others damaged. However, the Germans re-routed most traffic without much difficulty, and repaired most of the damage in a few days (though one bridge over the Oder went unrepaired until the war ended). The deportations from Budapest to Auschwitz were largely unaffected...

GB4 paid most of the price. The Mosquitoes of 50 Wing suffered only five losses, all to flak or accidents; their speed protected them from night-fighters. However these last brought down eighteen of the B-24s, ten of them on the final mission (VISION IV) on April 28th, as it seems the Germans had worked out what the Allies were doing, and concentrated their fighters to intercept. GB4 was shattered, and was pulled out of action to recover, only returning to combat in the last days of the war. 50 Wing returned to other missions in support of PRECIPICE. ‘Never did hairier ops than those, even in ‘41,’ wrote Wing Commander Braden.

These events brought political repercussions. ‘Painful losses,’ noted Mandel, ‘but these were risks we had to run, to demonstrate that the values of the Republic truly have universal meaning.’ De Gaulle, who felt vindicated in his scepticism, expressed himself icily. ‘Meagre results at great cost,’ he said. ‘I hope certain gentlemen can reflect on this.’ Some writers have said this sad affair caused the definitive split between himself and Mandel, which dominated French political life for the remainder of the war and beyond. In fact it represented one factor amid many; evidently a collision between two such strong personalities must have happened eventually.

Historians have continued the strife ever since. Were the VISION missions merely a costly failure? Or did they have some symbolic value that in part justified the cost? In the last analysis, we cannot definitively answer these questions. But the men of 50 Wing played their part as well as they could.
 
Part 15.6
Extract from ch.3 of Herbert Molins, Du sel et sol: histoire militaire de la campagne en Europe

The Algiers government naturally wished for substantial French participation in OCEAN, hence the movement of 2nd Division to England in the winter. General Eisenhower approved the alteration of the plans to allow 2nd Division to land on the first day - the beach being renamed accordingly from UTAH to UNION. In order to prepare, the division took part in various exercises of which the last and largest was code-named TIGER. Its commander, however, General de Hautecloque, decided on 26th April to cancel any further exercises. ‘We know enough about amphibious landings by this time,’ he said. ‘I’ve lost count how many we’ve done.’ The US Navy agreed. ‘OCEAN is too close now,’ noted Admiral Kirk, ‘we need to rest the crews and finish our preparations in port. I have no hesitation agreeing with General de Hautecloque.’ Kirk’s decision ruffled feathers. ‘Extremely concerned the French have not rehearsed adequately,’ wrote General Brooke. ‘COSSAC are up in arms. Still it is Kirk’s decision to make at this point. On their head be it!’
 
Split between Mandel and De Gaulle bodes ill for the future, but not as immediate as what might occur on UNION Beach. I hope they've rehearsed enough, but wonder whether anybody can rehearse enough for such an operation.
 
Split between Mandel and De Gaulle bodes ill for the future, but not as immediate as what might occur on UNION Beach. I hope they've rehearsed enough, but wonder whether anybody can rehearse enough for such an operation.
Too much practice on an exercise like this in the same place, with the same units, and doing the same thing every time, makes them too complacent when you have to do it for real. You get the same outcome which does not necessarily show what is wrong after you fix the problems that you find from doing it over and over again there the same way. The way to do it is to change it around go different places and do different things.
 
Split between Mandel and De Gaulle bodes ill for the future, but not as immediate as what might occur on UNION Beach. I hope they've rehearsed enough, but wonder whether anybody can rehearse enough for such an operation.
Too much practice on an exercise like this in the same place, with the same units, and doing the same thing every time, makes them too complacent when you have to do it for real. You get the same outcome which does not necessarily show what is wrong after you fix the problems that you find from doing it over and over again there the same way. The way to do it is to change it around go different places and do different things.
I feel that the Allies have enough depth of experience that omitting exercise TIGER won't hurt. After all in this TL the Franco-British forces began substantial amphibious operations as early as 1941 (e.g. operations CONCAVE and ROBERT, back in parts 5 & 6) - they have had a lot of practice - albeit mostly in the Med. So the E-boats won't get their chance.
The next update finally gets us to operation OCEAN. Re-reading what I have written, I hope it doesn't seem too summary. D-Day and its follow-up operations remain the most stupendous campaign of all time for complexity, and I don't want to underplay the challenges. However in this ATL the Allies will land their blow slightly earlier than OTL and in greater force, which gives them significant advantages relative to OTL. My main concern has been around the weather in May 1944 - I have assumed it would have been about as cooperative as in June - not very, but just permissive enough.
 
Part 16.1
Part 16. I have seen the hungry ocean gain


Extract from ch.4 of Herbert Molins, Du sel et sol: histoire militaire de la campagne en Europe


Poor weather prevented the landings earlier in the week. ‘We were keyed and ready to go on Monday, but it seemed the weather would stop us until the favourable moon period was over,’ wrote General Eisenhower later. ‘Thursday was the last possible day, so on Wednesday evening the mood was sombre until Group Captain Stagg turned up with, at last, good news.’

...the grand tableau unfolded at last on the morning of Thursday 11th May 1944, a day to be evermore remembered as Jour J or D Day, operation OCEAN. And as Algiers had insisted, Frenchmen were among the first to land. Each regiment of 2nd Division has at some time or other claimed to be first ashore, but such considerations are of merely antiquarian interest, and General de Hautecloque has always steadfastly refused to give his opinion. What is in no doubt is that by nightfall the Allies had a secure beach-head, and the men of 2nd Division had linked up with the American paratroopers on their flank. The division would fight under American command for the remainder of the Normandy campaign…

General Kesselring, commanding the German forces in the theatre, commented later: ‘the same pattern we had previously seen repeated itself. We could not prevent the enemy from seizing a beach-head, as they had the initiative and could choose their time, concentrate their forces. We could not drive the enemy back into the sea with counter-attacks due to their naval gunfire support. We could not drive off the warships due to the enemy air superiority, which also slowed the assembly of counter-attacking forces.’

The Luftwaffe had placed high hopes in its new guided bombs, the Fritz-X and Hs-293. These had seen small-scale use in the Aegean, but were still something of a mystery to the Allies. ‘We didn’t quite understand how they worked, and they worried us greatly,’ commented Admiral Kirk. ‘In the event our air cover prevented them from doing serious damage.’ Although these weapons sank or damaged numerous ships including HMS Manchester, the largest ship sunk in the landings, the Admiral correctly appreciated their limited strategic significance. Within a few weeks the Allies, including “the Bakers” - the experts of the EMME - had evolved electronic countermeasures.

Kesselring proved a master of defensive tactics, and the fight in the bocage cost the Allies heavily. But the end result was rarely in doubt. General Alexander’s forces, Canadian 1st and British 2nd Army, fought repeated fierce tank battles in the east, not taking Caen until mid-June, but frustrating the German desire for a co-ordinated counterattack.

Then in late June US forces broke out in the west in operation SERPENT, threatening to encircle the entire German 7th Army. No effective riposte was possible, as by this point the French and US armies had landed in the south - operation PRECIPICE - and achieved complete success. French 1st Army under Bethouart liberated Marseilles on July 4th, then pushed north at speed to take Lyons on the 14th. The same day British and Canadian spearheads reached the Seine. Kesselring ordered a general retreat, despite Hitler’s orders to the contrary, and oddly Hitler never punished him for this, but kept him in command...

Naturally de Hautecloque and 2nd Division received the honour of liberating Paris, on 20th July. Most members of the Quisling regime had fled to Germany, but a few remained and were now imprisoned to await trial. Laval was among them, and on the 21st de Hautecloque arrested him in person. Laval asked, ‘Mon general, pourquoi est-ce que vous êtes devenu Dreyfusard? Vous etiez comme nous.’ The general replied, ‘Je n’ai jamais été comme vous,’ which gave Chevalier the title of his song celebrating the liberation.

The Government had planned to move temporarily to Marseilles, but the liberation of Paris came so quickly after, that they had time to meet only once in Marseilles. At the end of July they finally returned to Paris, their policy at last vindicated. All were saddened to see so many fine buildings demolished - a final act of Nazi spite, though the greatest monuments mostly survived thanks to their sheer scale. They lacked enough explosives, and the Resistance did much to hinder their placement. De Gaulle, Mandel, Blum and Daladier walked together along the Champs d’Elysee. ‘We have made a trial of war, as we said,’ commented Daladier, ‘and now we see a favourable verdict.’ For a few blessed days, faction slept…

July then saw the launching of operation CREDIT on the Italian front, ensuring no German reinforcements could come from that theatre. British 8th Army liberated Florence on July 26th, though further territorial gains were limited. In early August the forces from Normandy and the south linked up, and not long after French 1st Army reached the Vosges, where 2nd Division now came back under French command. US forces in 12th Army Group performed brilliantly during this period: they wiped out the Mons pocket, reached the ‘Westwall’ fortifications on the western fringes of Germany, and captured bridgeheads across the Meuse…

Meanwhile 21st Army Group performed “the great swan” and reached Antwerp on August 8th, capturing the place largely intact, thanks to the heroism of the Belgian Resistance. ‘Another black day for the German army,’ wrote O’Connor, commander of British 2nd Army. They also overran many of the V-weapon launching sites, reducing the threat from this source. Even the most stubborn of Germans should have realised that their defeat was now certain. Quite apart from the superior strength the Allies had now brought to bear, the French Army now absorbed hundreds of thousands of new recruits, all longing to avenge four years of oppression.
 
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At Last! Guess even Adolph 'Not-One-Step-Back' Hitler can see the writings on the wall after the southern landing.
 
Naturally de Hautecloque and 2nd Division received the honour of liberating Paris, on 20th July. Most members of the Quisling regime had fled to Germany, but a few remained and were now imprisoned to await trial. Laval was among them, and on the 21st de Hautecloque arrested him in person. Laval asked, ‘Mon general, pourquoi est-ce que vous avez devenu Dreyfusard? Vous etiez comme nous.’ The general replied, ‘Je n’etais jamais comme vous,’ which gave Chevalier the title of his song celebrating the liberation.
For those of us who don't speak French, Google Translate gives the following:

"General, why did you become a Dreyfusard? You were like us."

"I was never like you." (Of note is that 'vous' is both the plural and formal form of 'you' in French; not which which it's meant to be in context.)
 
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