Extract from A Pilgrim to Mount Lebanon, by Marc Malik
…The higher-ups seemed to remember our existence finally. A fresh regiment from Syria took our place with the Mountain Goats for the big push, while we left the hills - so familiar to us now, and curiously dear after so many months - and marched back down to Piraeus. The men talked eagerly of the prospect of home leave.
That was not to be. The view taken by the generals was that since the metropolitan troops could not get home leave, neither should we. There were no mutinies or other disorders in the Regiment du Liban, unlike in some units, but there was plenty of grumbling. Certainly we had much sympathy with the way the wishes of the troops combined with the demands of politicians, in Algeria and elsewhere, created a truly serious moment for the Algiers Government at the very end of ‘43. The upshot was that M. Mandel became Prime Minister at last, but curiously he seemed to have less power than before. M. de Gaulle was clearly the coming man, despite - or perhaps because - the opposition of the Americans.
We celebrated Christmas on a troopship, one of the fine American ones given under Lend-Lease, anchored off Crete. We heard Mass, ate well (for most of the men it was the first time they had ever eaten ice-cream) and passed the bottle round. The next day, we got under way while it was still dark. I saw the sun rising behind the stern of the ship, and knew that our road home would be longer than we wished.
Extract from War in the Middle Sea, ch.21
…as 1943 progressed the KKE had begun to take a larger role in Greek politics. On the insistence of Mr. Cripps, the MEA finally accepted their participation, but neither Royalists nor Venizelists showed much enthusiasm for the prospect. ‘The fact is we have brought these people in ultimately because London wants to keep Moscow happy,’ complained Mr. Koryzis in private. Mr. Cripps took a different view in his messages to the Council, emphasising the effect KKE participation might have in resolving long-running labour disputes in Piraeus. Mr. Churchill showed no enthusiasm either, but accepted the result tentatively. ‘In the end, we believed that the experiment was worth a try,’ he wrote later…
The fall of Rome freed up resources for the Greek front, but only enough for a single limited thrust. ‘Clearly we cannot look to gain any distant objective in winter weather,’ commented De Gaulle. General Magrin-Vernerey, who had recently taken command in the theatre, had to choose between two plausible alternatives: an attack in the west, with the objective of taking Vlore, or in the east, with the goal of liberating Salonika. Magrin-Vernerey, backed by Algiers and London, realised that whichever option he chose would have political implications, and he insisted on the whole-hearted support of the Greek government. A sharp disagreement followed within the MEA government in Athens, which in part reflected the ongoing tensions between Royalists and Venizelists, but also reflected the increased influence of the Communists.
The Salonika option prevailed. ‘The Government,’ wrote Mr. Koryzis, ‘could in the end hardly pursue the Albanian campaign while our second city suffered under the heavy hand of the Axis.’ The British corps in the eastern sector, in the General’s opinion, lacked the strength to perform the operation itself, so he transferred Greek II Corps, freshly equipped with American armour and artillery, into the Olympus sector. The RAF received reinforcements from Italy for the operation, and the RHAF employed its latest American P-38 and B-26 aircraft.
The Germans for their part had anticipated the offensive. All their available mobile forces had gone to feed the colossal autumn battles in the Ukraine; they could therefore only adopt a static defence, albeit one much aided by the terrain. ‘The politicians look at the map and ask why we make such heavy weather of forty or fifty miles,’ complained General O’Connor. ‘They ought to appreciate that a lot of that is vertical, and the flat land is mostly marsh.’ General von Arnim, defending this terrain, employed minefields on a vast scale.
The defence had two Achilles heels, however. Von Arnim, having fewer divisions than he wanted, had deployed two Bulgarian corps, mainly in the highland sector of the line. ‘These troops were dogged in defence and no pushovers,’ wrote O’Connor, ‘but they lacked modern equipment for the most part. The Germans had given them much captured French equipment, which had been adequate in 1940, but which we now outclassed. Also the Luftwaffe dedicated its efforts to protecting itself, the German ground forces, and the Bulgarians - in that order. The Greeks therefore enjoyed air superiority in that sector.’ The Bulgarian government, moreover, did rather little in the way of logistical support for the front. ‘While the attack impended, I spent half my time in fruitless meetings in Sofia asking for more supplies,’ wrote von Arnim later. This buck-passing ensured that both von Arnim and Sofia had a scapegoat to point at, but did little for the Bulgarian forces at the front, many of whom now faced a winter battle short of food and clothing.
The other weakness was the need to guard the long and complex coastline of the Chalkidike. The embarrassing fall of Samothrace, along with the evident Allied skill in amphibious operations, rendered the Germans nervous for this area, an anxiety which British deception operations sought to accentuate, successfully. ‘We estimate that the Germans have kept no fewer than four divisions in the region,’ wrote O’Connor to Magrin-Vernerey. ‘Without this factor, we could hardly expect success.’
…even with all these advantages, the Allies initially struggled. The offensive was postponed repeatedly due to poor weather, and two days after it began, a sudden storm turned the rivers to torrents and halted all flying. General O’Connor, dismayed by heavy casualties, suggested cancelling the operation altogether. Magrin-Vernerey, however, was less daunted by the poor weather. ‘We had it worse in Narvik,’ he said, and insisted on pressing on. His determination was rewarded on December 15th. Clear weather returned, and with heavy air support the Greek II Corps broke through the Bulgarian line in the north-west, causing the Germans to pull back their right. The Hoplites followed this with a heavy blow in the centre, which threatened the German supply line to the north. For von Arnim, this was enough, and just before Christmas he skilfully pulled his forces back north and east to avoid encirclement. Renewed snow prevented the Allies from cutting off this retreat, but did not stop their steady advance. ‘Much has been written,’ commented Magrin-Vernerey after the war, ‘about my supposed failure to annihilate German 16th Army. I only invite such commentators to consider the map, the weather, and the ability of the Germans in conducting fighting retreats.’
General O’Connor did briefly consider halting the Hoplites, in order to allow Greek II Corps to reach Salonika first, but decided not to: ‘many of these men have fought and suffered on this front for two and a half years,’ he wrote to Magrin-Vernerey, ‘and many of their friends will never leave this country. I have held Salonika before their eyes for too long to deny it to them.’ Both Magrin-Vernerey and Mr. Koryzis expressed their complete approval. Thus 2nd Armoured Division completed its Greek odyssey; not long after, the men of the formation returned to Britain, handing over its much-scarred but beloved Churchill tanks to the Greek army.
The liberation of Salonika, despite the cost, came as further welcome news to the Allies, coming as it did soon after the recapture of Kiev and the fall of Rome. It also had repercussions closer by. Tsar Boris of Bulgaria had died a few months earlier, and the country was now in the hands of a regency council. ‘After Salonika, we thought only of how to extract ourselves from the Axis,’ wrote Prince Kiril. ‘The only question was how.’
…The higher-ups seemed to remember our existence finally. A fresh regiment from Syria took our place with the Mountain Goats for the big push, while we left the hills - so familiar to us now, and curiously dear after so many months - and marched back down to Piraeus. The men talked eagerly of the prospect of home leave.
That was not to be. The view taken by the generals was that since the metropolitan troops could not get home leave, neither should we. There were no mutinies or other disorders in the Regiment du Liban, unlike in some units, but there was plenty of grumbling. Certainly we had much sympathy with the way the wishes of the troops combined with the demands of politicians, in Algeria and elsewhere, created a truly serious moment for the Algiers Government at the very end of ‘43. The upshot was that M. Mandel became Prime Minister at last, but curiously he seemed to have less power than before. M. de Gaulle was clearly the coming man, despite - or perhaps because - the opposition of the Americans.
We celebrated Christmas on a troopship, one of the fine American ones given under Lend-Lease, anchored off Crete. We heard Mass, ate well (for most of the men it was the first time they had ever eaten ice-cream) and passed the bottle round. The next day, we got under way while it was still dark. I saw the sun rising behind the stern of the ship, and knew that our road home would be longer than we wished.
*
Extract from War in the Middle Sea, ch.21
…as 1943 progressed the KKE had begun to take a larger role in Greek politics. On the insistence of Mr. Cripps, the MEA finally accepted their participation, but neither Royalists nor Venizelists showed much enthusiasm for the prospect. ‘The fact is we have brought these people in ultimately because London wants to keep Moscow happy,’ complained Mr. Koryzis in private. Mr. Cripps took a different view in his messages to the Council, emphasising the effect KKE participation might have in resolving long-running labour disputes in Piraeus. Mr. Churchill showed no enthusiasm either, but accepted the result tentatively. ‘In the end, we believed that the experiment was worth a try,’ he wrote later…
The fall of Rome freed up resources for the Greek front, but only enough for a single limited thrust. ‘Clearly we cannot look to gain any distant objective in winter weather,’ commented De Gaulle. General Magrin-Vernerey, who had recently taken command in the theatre, had to choose between two plausible alternatives: an attack in the west, with the objective of taking Vlore, or in the east, with the goal of liberating Salonika. Magrin-Vernerey, backed by Algiers and London, realised that whichever option he chose would have political implications, and he insisted on the whole-hearted support of the Greek government. A sharp disagreement followed within the MEA government in Athens, which in part reflected the ongoing tensions between Royalists and Venizelists, but also reflected the increased influence of the Communists.
The Salonika option prevailed. ‘The Government,’ wrote Mr. Koryzis, ‘could in the end hardly pursue the Albanian campaign while our second city suffered under the heavy hand of the Axis.’ The British corps in the eastern sector, in the General’s opinion, lacked the strength to perform the operation itself, so he transferred Greek II Corps, freshly equipped with American armour and artillery, into the Olympus sector. The RAF received reinforcements from Italy for the operation, and the RHAF employed its latest American P-38 and B-26 aircraft.
The Germans for their part had anticipated the offensive. All their available mobile forces had gone to feed the colossal autumn battles in the Ukraine; they could therefore only adopt a static defence, albeit one much aided by the terrain. ‘The politicians look at the map and ask why we make such heavy weather of forty or fifty miles,’ complained General O’Connor. ‘They ought to appreciate that a lot of that is vertical, and the flat land is mostly marsh.’ General von Arnim, defending this terrain, employed minefields on a vast scale.
The defence had two Achilles heels, however. Von Arnim, having fewer divisions than he wanted, had deployed two Bulgarian corps, mainly in the highland sector of the line. ‘These troops were dogged in defence and no pushovers,’ wrote O’Connor, ‘but they lacked modern equipment for the most part. The Germans had given them much captured French equipment, which had been adequate in 1940, but which we now outclassed. Also the Luftwaffe dedicated its efforts to protecting itself, the German ground forces, and the Bulgarians - in that order. The Greeks therefore enjoyed air superiority in that sector.’ The Bulgarian government, moreover, did rather little in the way of logistical support for the front. ‘While the attack impended, I spent half my time in fruitless meetings in Sofia asking for more supplies,’ wrote von Arnim later. This buck-passing ensured that both von Arnim and Sofia had a scapegoat to point at, but did little for the Bulgarian forces at the front, many of whom now faced a winter battle short of food and clothing.
The other weakness was the need to guard the long and complex coastline of the Chalkidike. The embarrassing fall of Samothrace, along with the evident Allied skill in amphibious operations, rendered the Germans nervous for this area, an anxiety which British deception operations sought to accentuate, successfully. ‘We estimate that the Germans have kept no fewer than four divisions in the region,’ wrote O’Connor to Magrin-Vernerey. ‘Without this factor, we could hardly expect success.’
…even with all these advantages, the Allies initially struggled. The offensive was postponed repeatedly due to poor weather, and two days after it began, a sudden storm turned the rivers to torrents and halted all flying. General O’Connor, dismayed by heavy casualties, suggested cancelling the operation altogether. Magrin-Vernerey, however, was less daunted by the poor weather. ‘We had it worse in Narvik,’ he said, and insisted on pressing on. His determination was rewarded on December 15th. Clear weather returned, and with heavy air support the Greek II Corps broke through the Bulgarian line in the north-west, causing the Germans to pull back their right. The Hoplites followed this with a heavy blow in the centre, which threatened the German supply line to the north. For von Arnim, this was enough, and just before Christmas he skilfully pulled his forces back north and east to avoid encirclement. Renewed snow prevented the Allies from cutting off this retreat, but did not stop their steady advance. ‘Much has been written,’ commented Magrin-Vernerey after the war, ‘about my supposed failure to annihilate German 16th Army. I only invite such commentators to consider the map, the weather, and the ability of the Germans in conducting fighting retreats.’
General O’Connor did briefly consider halting the Hoplites, in order to allow Greek II Corps to reach Salonika first, but decided not to: ‘many of these men have fought and suffered on this front for two and a half years,’ he wrote to Magrin-Vernerey, ‘and many of their friends will never leave this country. I have held Salonika before their eyes for too long to deny it to them.’ Both Magrin-Vernerey and Mr. Koryzis expressed their complete approval. Thus 2nd Armoured Division completed its Greek odyssey; not long after, the men of the formation returned to Britain, handing over its much-scarred but beloved Churchill tanks to the Greek army.
The liberation of Salonika, despite the cost, came as further welcome news to the Allies, coming as it did soon after the recapture of Kiev and the fall of Rome. It also had repercussions closer by. Tsar Boris of Bulgaria had died a few months earlier, and the country was now in the hands of a regency council. ‘After Salonika, we thought only of how to extract ourselves from the Axis,’ wrote Prince Kiril. ‘The only question was how.’