Enosis (Union of Greece and Cyprus) after 1950?

This thread is inspired by a rather obscure WI I raised in another thread that proved to be surprisingly productive, and I'd like to focus more on the subject in the title, that of Enosis with a POD after 1950.

Calling in @Tanaka did nothing wrong and @Lascaris, who did the bulk of the discussion on the other thread.
Many PODs actually, after all when all are said and done the demographic facts on the ground in the island were heavily favourable to the Greek side. Quite a few of these revolve around Makarios acting by himself with a varying degree of results but more often than not without consulting with anyone, much to the exasperation of about every single Greek government after 1950...
 
Many PODs actually, after all when all are said and done the demographic facts on the ground in the island were heavily favourable to the Greek side. Quite a few of these revolve around Makarios acting by himself with a varying degree of results but more often than not without consulting with anyone, much to the exasperation of about every single Greek government after 1950...
Would a longer lasting/more successful liberal government in Athens (the 1950-52 one) help in some degree? What could Makarios do on his own?
 
Well,

As it also emerged from the other thread mentioned here, it is possible. But in my view, the latest this can happen is the mid 1960s, since it is the last time perhaps that both Greece and Turkey could reach an agreement on Cyprus that both would find acceptable; after that period, the shift of the attention of the United States in Southeast Asia and the implementation of the secret Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement regarding the missiles in Anatolia would leave the area somewhat unattended (by the United States) and this development; combined with the controversy in Turkey over the EEC potential membership (following the 1963 Ankara accords), the mounting economic problems and a rise in anti-American feelings, all of which helped the overall surge in support for the nationalist and the islamist Right in the country in the late 1960s, these would force the Turkish leaders to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy in order to maintain domestic stability, thus reducing the possibility of a lasting agreement considerably.

Thus, given this limitation, a first idea, also explored in the other thread mentioned here, could be a surviving Papandreou government reaching an agreement with Turkey according to which the latter would receive the British base at Dekeleia in exchange for the unification of the rest of the island with Greece. (unfortunately, I don't think I am an expert on this period, thus I can't propose something more :coldsweat: :coldsweat:).
 
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Would a longer lasting/more successful liberal government in Athens (the 1950-52 one) help in some degree? What could Makarios do on his own?
What could Makarios do on his own? In 1952 he publicly accused the whole Greek political leadership of selling out Cyprus after Plastiras and Venizelos told him to stop rocking the boat. In 1953-54 he blackmailed the Papagos government to bring the Cyprus issue before the United Nations or otherwise he had arrangements with the unaligned, likely Syria, to make the appeal. Never mind his later shenanigans.
 
Well,

As it also emerged from the other thread mentioned here, it is possible. But in my view, the latest this can happen is the mid 1960s, since it is the last time perhaps that both Greece and Turkey could reach an agreement on Cyprus that both would find acceptable; after that period, the shift of the attention of the United States in Southeast Asia and the implementation of the secret Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement regarding the missiles in Anatolia would leave the area somewhat unattended (by the United States) and this development; combined with the controversy in Turkey over the EEC potential membership (following the 1963 Ankara accords), the mounting economic problems and a rise in anti-American feelings, all of which helped the overall surge in support for the nationalist and the islamist Right in the country in the late 1960s, these would force the Turkish leaders to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy in order to maintain domestic stability, thus reducing the possibility of a lasting agreement considerably.

Thus, given this limitation, a first idea, also explored in the other thread mentioned here, could be a surviving Papandreou government reaching an agreement with Turkey according to which the latter would receive the British base at Dekeleia in exchange for the unification of the rest of the island with Greece. (unfortunately, I don't think I am an expert on this period, thus I can't propose something more :coldsweat: :coldsweat:).
So this area, minus the enclaves, would become part of Turkey while the rest of the island is given to Greece? Is it possible for an accomplished enosis to actually turn out pretty nicely to the Turkish Cypriot population, considering such a thing could take some wind off the sails of the Greek far-right?
 
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So I found out there was a proposal in which Greece would hand over the island of Kastellorizo in exchange for Turkey recognizing its control of Cyprus. Why did that deal fail, and was there anything that could be done to make it succeed?
 
So I found out there was a proposal in which Greece would hand over the island of Kastellorizo in exchange for Turkey recognizing its control of Cyprus. Why did that deal fail, and was there anything that could be done to make it succeed?
For the same reason with the rest, or for the matter the plans for unilateral enosis in August 1964. Makarios was uncontrollable from Athens with successive Greek governments too weak to deal with him. And Makarios was too wed to power and too confident he was the only one right and could play everyone else.
 
For the same reason with the rest, or for the matter the plans for unilateral enosis in August 1964. Makarios was uncontrollable from Athens with successive Greek governments too weak to deal with him. And Makarios was too wed to power and too confident he was the only one right and could play everyone else.
Was there any way to keep him from becoming president in 1959? Or would it be necessary to kill him off somehow, which would likely destabilize Cypriot politics even more?
 
Was there any way to keep him from becoming president in 1959? Or would it be necessary to kill him off somehow, which would likely destabilize Cypriot politics even more?
Potentially passing a constitution in 1947. One obvious reason for the influence of the church in Greek Cypriot politics was that the archbishop was the only Greek Cypriot who could claim to represent the entire population and on top of that had even been elected from said population. If instead you have an elected legislative body then you are getting actual elected politicians around. The church will be still pretty influential but won't be effectively the only game in town...
 
Potentially passing a constitution in 1947. One obvious reason for the influence of the church in Greek Cypriot politics was that the archbishop was the only Greek Cypriot who could claim to represent the entire population and on top of that had even been elected from said population. If instead you have an elected legislative body then you are getting actual elected politicians around. The church will be still pretty influential but won't be effectively the only game in town...
Was there any way Britain could've gotten out of Cyprus sooner? Like, in 1955 or so, before EOKA gets the ball rolling, so to speak?
 
Was there any way Britain could've gotten out of Cyprus sooner? Like, in 1955 or so?
It could had gotten out in 1945-47 when there was apparently pretty strong support by the Foreign Office for union of Cyprus with Greece. In September 1945 the Permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sir Orme Sargent was proposing as much while as late as September 1947 you had Sir Oliver Harvey the Deputy Under-Secretary of State writing that:

“Our proposed evacuation policy in Palestine and the possibility that we may propose independence for Cyrenaica, when coupled with what we have done in India and Burma, makes our continued presence in Cyprus indefensible […] We have in fact never made use of the island for military purposes and we have spent next to nothing on its material and social betterment. We have nothing to be proud of there […] It can hardly be questioned that Greece, who has long governed Crete effectively, and has now been given the Dodecanese, can equally well govern Cyprus. (There is a small Turkish minority whose rights would be secured) […] For these different reasons I would strongly advocate that consideration be given to the very early cession of Cyprus to Greece, before the Cypriot campaign is embittered by violence and before cession can be represented as yielding to force […]"

By 1955 Britain instead was dead set on keeping Cyprus, with frex the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Henry Hopkinson. stating in the Commons that, Cyprus could ‘never’ expect to be fully independent.

Source of the quotes from here
 
It could had gotten out in 1945-47 when there was apparently pretty strong support by the Foreign Office for union of Cyprus with Greece. In September 1945 the Permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sir Orme Sargent was proposing as much while as late as September 1947 you had Sir Oliver Harvey the Deputy Under-Secretary of State writing that:

“Our proposed evacuation policy in Palestine and the possibility that we may propose independence for Cyrenaica, when coupled with what we have done in India and Burma, makes our continued presence in Cyprus indefensible […] We have in fact never made use of the island for military purposes and we have spent next to nothing on its material and social betterment. We have nothing to be proud of there […] It can hardly be questioned that Greece, who has long governed Crete effectively, and has now been given the Dodecanese, can equally well govern Cyprus. (There is a small Turkish minority whose rights would be secured) […] For these different reasons I would strongly advocate that consideration be given to the very early cession of Cyprus to Greece, before the Cypriot campaign is embittered by violence and before cession can be represented as yielding to force […]"

By 1955 Britain instead was dead set on keeping Cyprus, with frex the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Henry Hopkinson. stating in the Commons that, Cyprus could ‘never’ expect to be fully independent.

Source of the quotes from here
Oh well, unfortunately that's too soon for me to work with.
 
For the same reason with the rest, or for the matter the plans for unilateral enosis in August 1964. Makarios was uncontrollable from Athens with successive Greek governments too weak to deal with him. And Makarios was too wed to power and too confident he was the only one right and could play everyone else.
One more question. Since Makarios seems to be the main obstacle with regards to achieving enosis,what about having him continuing to support it instead of renouncing it?
 
One more question. Since Makarios seems to be the main obstacle with regards to achieving enosis,what about having him continuing to support it instead of renouncing it?
Did he stop supporting it? None is really clear about it. His actions amounted to this result. Because he was against Enosis or because he wanted Enosis on his terms including himself running the show. Frex his answer to the Greek defense minister bringing him the proposal for unilaterally declaring Enosis with tacit US support was "Can I become regent?" The minister answered no and all of a sudden Makarios torpedoed the plan. Oops.
 
Did he stop supporting it? None is really clear about it. His actions amounted to this result. Because he was against Enosis or because he wanted Enosis on his terms including himself running the show. Frex his answer to the Greek defense minister bringing him the proposal for unilaterally declaring Enosis with tacit US support was "Can I become regent?" The minister answered no and all of a sudden Makarios torpedoed the plan. Oops.
Huh.
 
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