Greek WI: Georgios Papandreou wasn't dismissed in 1965?

[Vinization]

Georgios Papandreou was an influential liberal/social democratic Greek politician who served as Prime Minister of his country for three times, the longest stint lasting from February 1964 to July 1965, when he was dismissed by king Constantine II in what was called the Apostasia. What if he had a better relationship with Constantine (or, assuming that's implausible, that king Paul lived for a few more years) and stayed as PM until, say, 1967 or, if we're stretching it, right until his death? Would a prolonged Centre Union government that was able to implement more of its policies increase or decrease the chance of a military coup like the one Papadopoulos led IOTL?

EDIT; Could having Georgios' son Andreas stay in the US instead of becoming a member of his father's government help?

 

[Vinization]

How would Papandreou or other democratically elected prime ministers deal with Cyprus? I assume the coup that deposed Makarios won't happen, but what else?

 

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

Well...

It is a bit difficult to have this happen, as too many things were against it. Having Paul live longer is, in my view, almost impossible, since he had terminal prostate cancer by that time; Constantine II was rather young and inexperienced. This leaves the Queen Mother, Frederica, at the helm of the Palace /Royal faction. Frederica was not very prone to negotiations and had already clashed with the previous Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, who was pretty much the leader of the main conservative party and rumoured to owe his assuming of the office of Prime Minister after the death of Papagos to a large extent to royal support; thus, with a more independent-minded Prime Minister, things would likely be worse.

Also, unlike almost all the surviving European monarchies, the position of the Greek royalty was uncertain: the monarchy had only been reinstated in 1935 after a rather rigged referendum, only for the royal family to be forced to leave the country 6 years later due to the German invasion and remain in exile for at least 3 years. And when they returned, their future was very unpredictable, as during the war, a parallel power player, the National Liberation Front, had consolidated its position in Greece, one of clearly leftist orientation and thus not very supportive of the monarchy and which enjoyed widespread popular support. It was only thanks to British support (initially) and later on American assistance that this threat for the monarchy had been largely eliminated, 5 years after the liberation of the country. All these made the royal family more apprehensive and also more interventionist : they wanted to govern/rule, not just reign.

This can be seen in the OTL conflict with Papandreou : the controversy over the ministry of Defence could be interpreted as the Palace's desire to control political life (usually, the Palace asked to nominate-unofficially of course - the Defence and Interior ministers, in order to control the army and the police better; sometimes, they asked the same for the Justice Ministry too, in order to be able to exert influence over the judicial system). Also, the "ASPIDA" (shield) affair was most probably an attempt to purge the army of officers potentially opposed to its potential use domestically by the monarchy or at least strengthen the latter's grip on it.

If Andreas stays in America as a professor of Economics, this would most certainly help his father, as it would remove the charge of George Papandreou attempting to cover up the ASPIDA affair in order to protect his son, which was the main argument used by Constantine to ask the former to leave the Defence Ministry. Also, if Andreas didn't return and subsequently rise quickly through the ranks of the Centre Union, the resentment of other founding members of the party (which was more of a big tent organisation) at the supposed show of nepotism, which could also threaten their prospects for the party's leadership and led many to side with the Apostasia governments wouldn't be there, at least for the time being. Thus, George Papandreou could secure the loyalty of his party more. But this doesn't remove the threat entirely: the anti-Papandreou groups could still bribe enough Centre Union members of parliament and perhaps engineer a change of leadership in the National Radical Union (NRU) in order to put a more cooperative leader in the place of Panagiotis Kanellopoulos (who wasn't willing to undermine the democratic institutions and was a more respectable and independent-minded figure than many would have liked) and thus facilitate the overthrow of George Papandreou.

Therefore, we need to avoid the conflict between Papandreou and the Palace. Perhaps have Papandreou accept the royal request for the Defence Ministry. This at least postpones the crisis. Then, perhaps have Makarios be somewhat more pro-West and avoid incidents like those in Kofinou in 1963; also have someone other than Dean Achenson take the lead in the talks about the Cypriot question and have that someone be more supportive of maintaining the status quo. If this is interpreted as being partial to Greece, then, combined with the ongoing discussions about moving closer to the EEC which proved to be fairly divisive, it could cause some instability in Turkey and perhaps strengthen the Islamists (and the nationalists) enough so that the army would have to intervene again. With Turkey busy on its domestic front, its government may not be able to push more regarding Cyprus and may accept a proposal providing for more protection for the Turkish minority in the island and the Americans providing funds for the development of the island. Thus, with a more stable situation in the island, a not - radicalised Turkish minority (thus no "pockets" policy in the 1960s) and Johnson and Papandreou not crossing swords over Cyprus, the Americans would have a better opinion of the Greek Prime Minister (Andreas could also help as a professor in the USA with a small PR campaign),while Papandreou would have scored a diplomatic victory.

All these would improve the Prime Minister's position back at home, which would make the more conservative factions more reluctant to turn on him. Furthermore, without the ASPIDA affair and the related problems, the King would have a much better relationship with Papandreou, which in turn would make him at least somewhat less receptive to the advice of his more reactionary members of his environment. If this relative tranquility wasn't completely momentary, then there is a chance of Papandreou remaining Prime Minister until mid 1966 or early 1967, as by then some problems would have most likely arisen.

 

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

How would Papandreou or other democratically elected prime ministers deal with Cyprus? I assume the coup that deposed Makarios won't happen, but what else?

A continued Papandreou government could mean that the some of the reasons that led to April 21,1967 aren't there (in fact, the coup was supposedly almost cancelled at the last moment and it was primarily the insistence of brigadier Pattakos that they proceed according to plan that led to its materialisation). Thus, if Papandreou survives for one or two more years, we can expect the colonels' coup not to happen; a Royalist junta may be imposed later on, but it wouldn't have nearly as catastrophic effects on the country's defence and foreign policy as the OTL junta, since they would be a more mainstream dictatorship.

This means that the divisions that developed inside the Cypriot army between supporters of Makarios and supporters of "Enosis" (Union with Greece), who later on were divided between supporters of Papadopoulos and Ioannides (the fire-eating guys) and inside the Greek Cypriot population between supporters of Makarios and the Enosis wouldn't be developed, partly also because Makarios wouldn't see such a need to distance himself from Athens. Therefore, with a more united Greek Cypriot community, a Turkish Cypriot community that remains integrated within the Cypriot society and continues its (imperfect, but still, better) cohabitation with the Greek Cypriots and not isolate itself in the "pockets", greater stability in the island and a better economy (as outlined previously) and a Turkey which is more occupied with domestic affairs, Cyprus could be spared much of the OTL mayhem in my view. (of course, I could be wrong)

 

[Vinization]

Well...

It is a bit difficult to have this happen, as too many things were against it. Having Paul live longer is, in my view, almost impossible, since he had terminal prostate cancer by that time; Constantine II was rather young and inexperienced. This leaves the Queen Mother, Frederica, at the helm of the Palace /Royal faction. Frederica was not very prone to negotiations and had already clashed with the previous Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, who was pretty much the leader of the main conservative party and rumoured to owe his assuming of the office of Prime Minister after the death of Papagos to a large extent to royal support; thus, with a more independent-minded Prime Minister, things would likely be worse.

Also, unlike almost all the surviving European monarchies, the position of the Greek royalty was uncertain: the monarchy had only been reinstated in 1935 after a rather rigged referendum, only for the royal family to be forced to leave the country 6 years later due to the German invasion and remain in exile for at least 3 years. And when they returned, their future was very unpredictable, as during the war, a parallel power player, the National Liberation Front, had consolidated its position in Greece, one of clearly leftist orientation and thus not very supportive of the monarchy and which enjoyed widespread popular support. It was only thanks to British support (initially) and later on American assistance that this threat for the monarchy had been largely eliminated, 5 years after the liberation of the country. All these made the royal family more apprehensive and also more interventionist : they wanted to govern/rule, not just reign.

This can be seen in the OTL conflict with Papandreou : the controversy over the ministry of Defence could be interpreted as the Palace's desire to control political life (usually, the Palace asked to nominate-unofficially of course - the Defence and Interior ministers, in order to control the army and the police better; sometimes, they asked the same for the Justice Ministry too, in order to be able to exert influence over the judicial system). Also, the "ASPIDA" (shield) affair was most probably an attempt to purge the army of officers potentially opposed to its potential use domestically by the monarchy or at least strengthen the latter's grip on it.

If Andreas stays in America as a professor of Economics, this would most certainly help his father, as it would remove the charge of George Papandreou attempting to cover up the ASPIDA affair in order to protect his son, which was the main argument used by Constantine to ask the former to leave the Defence Ministry. Also, if Andreas didn't return and subsequently rise quickly through the ranks of the Centre Union, the resentment of other founding members of the party (which was more of a big tent organisation) at the supposed show of nepotism, which could also threaten their prospects for the party's leadership and led many to side with the Apostasia governments wouldn't be there, at least for the time being. Thus, George Papandreou could secure the loyalty of his party more. But this doesn't remove the threat entirely: the anti-Papandreou groups could still bribe enough Centre Union members of parliament and perhaps engineer a change of leadership in the National Radical Union (NRU) in order to put a more cooperative leader in the place of Panagiotis Kanellopoulos (who wasn't willing to undermine the democratic institutions and was a more respectable and independent-minded figure than many would have liked) and thus facilitate the overthrow of George Papandreou.

Therefore, we need to avoid the conflict between Papandreou and the Palace. Perhaps have Papandreou accept the royal request for the Defence Ministry. This at least postpones the crisis. Then, perhaps have Makarios be somewhat more pro-West and avoid incidents like those in Kofinou in 1963; also have someone other than Dean Achenson take the lead in the talks about the Cypriot question and have that someone be more supportive of maintaining the status quo. If this is interpreted as being partial to Greece, then, combined with the ongoing discussions about moving closer to the EEC which proved to be fairly divisive, it could cause some instability in Turkey and perhaps strengthen the Islamists (and the nationalists) enough so that the army would have to intervene again. With Turkey busy on its domestic front, its government may not be able to push more regarding Cyprus and may accept a proposal providing for more protection for the Turkish minority in the island and the Americans providing funds for the development of the island. Thus, with a more stable situation in the island, a not - radicalised Turkish minority (thus no "pockets" policy in the 1960s) and Johnson and Papandreou not crossing swords over Cyprus, the Americans would have a better opinion of the Greek Prime Minister (Andreas could also help as a professor in the USA with a small PR campaign),while Papandreou would have scored a diplomatic victory.

All these would improve the Prime Minister's position back at home, which would make the more conservative factions more reluctant to turn on him. Furthermore, without the ASPIDA affair and the related problems, the King would have a much better relationship with Papandreou, which in turn would make him at least somewhat less receptive to the advice of his more reactionary members of his environment. If this relative tranquility wasn't completely momentary, then there is a chance of Papandreou remaining Prime Minister until mid 1966 or early 1967, as by then some problems would have most likely arisen.

Thanks for this response, I thought the thread would've drowned like so many others that deal with relatively obscure matters. Was there anything Papandreou could've done to ensure more people enjoyed the benefits of the Greek miracle, such as social assistance programs and some of the things his son eventually enacted during his own term as PM? Or would the Palace and the military react too strongly for it?

 

[Vinization]

Was there anyway to avert the fraud that happened in the 1961 election (assuming it did happen, I don't know much about it) and have the Centre Union form a government sooner? Maybe if Karamanlis' conflict with the Palace begins earlier?

 

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

Thanks for this response, I thought the thread would've drowned like so many others that deal with relatively obscure matters. Was there anything Papandreou could've done to ensure more people enjoyed the benefits of the Greek miracle, such as social assistance programs and some of the things his son eventually enacted during his own term as PM? Or would the Palace and the military react too strongly for it?

Well, if there was a bone of contention between the Palace and Papandreou, this would be the military or the government. There wasn't considerable divergence regarding economics (although reforms in education caused some friction); and generally, there wasn't a serious threat to the existing economic model. There could be some trouble if the government opposed one or more businessmen with connections to the elite and the Palace, but that would be all, in my view.

Also, if I remember correctly, large-scale economic populism (expressed with subsidies to farmers, more generous welfare for certain groups like public housing, higher pensions etc) largely began during the Colonels' junta, which tried to gain the acceptance of the populace by "buying off" their tolerance. With a civilian and legitimate government and /or a more mainstream and brief military regime in power, the people in control wouldn't be as isolated as the colonels and thus would feel less compelled (if at all) to subordinate the economy to political considerations. Thus, I think that we wouldn't see the rise of the redistribution trends we saw IOL (or at least to the same extent), but at the same time, the Greek economy would possibly be healthier at least in the short to medium term.

 

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

Was there anyway to avert the fraud that happened in the 1961 election (assuming it did happen, I don't know much about it) and have the Centre Union form a government sooner? Maybe if Karamanlis' conflict with the Palace begins earlier?

The fraud in the 1961 elections (the Perikles plan) was probably unavoidable. You would have to prevent the United Democratic Left from becoming the main opposition party in 1958 or even a significant political party, which is fairly difficult, as, even with the robust anticommunism of the state and the civil war being still a somewhat recent memory, it got almost 25% of the popular vote, which was the highest a party of the left had ever scored before the crisis broke out. You would have to do something to decrease support of the Left; perhaps an earlier foundation of the Centre Union could help, as it could absorb all those moderates who didn't support the Right but possibly also considered voting for the many centrist parties futile and thus voted for the Left largely by default, as well as the moderate leftists who are uncomfortable or unsure about the influence the banned Communist Party exerts on the new political organisation. (and there were many of both of these people, since Greece was - and still is-mostly a country of lower middle class people who tended (and still do, to a large extent) to be fairly centrist politically. The Centre Union was largely created as a way to stop the shift to the Left, which happened when there was more radicalisation and a bipartisan system of clearly leftist and a clearly right-wing party that facilitated such a development).

 

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

Thanks for this response, I thought the thread would've drowned like so many others that deal with relatively obscure matters. Was there anything Papandreou could've done to ensure more people enjoyed the benefits of the Greek miracle, such as social assistance programs and some of the things his son eventually enacted during his own term as PM? Or would the Palace and the military react too strongly for it?

You are welcome! I am very happy too that threads such as this exist, since they enable us to explore and discover very interesting details and rather obscure facts

 

[Vinization]

The fraud in the 1961 elections (the Perikles plan) was probably unavoidable. You would have to prevent the United Democratic Left from becoming the main opposition party in 1958 or even a significant political party, which is fairly difficult, as, even with the robust anticommunism of the state and the civil war being still a somewhat recent memory, it got almost 25% of the popular vote, which was the highest a party of the left had ever scored before the crisis broke out. You would have to do something to decrease support of the Left; perhaps an earlier foundation of the Centre Union could help, as it could absorb all those moderates who didn't support the Right but possibly also considered voting for the many centrist parties futile and thus voted for the Left largely by default, as well as the moderate leftists who are uncomfortable or unsure about the influence the banned Communist Party exerts on the new political organisation. (and there were many of both of these people, since Greece was - and still is-mostly a country of lower middle class people who tended (and still do, to a large extent) to be fairly centrist politically. The Centre Union was largely created as a way to stop the shift to the Left, which happened when there was more radicalisation and a bipartisan system of clearly leftist and a clearly right-wing party that facilitated such a development).

Would it be plausible for Papandreou to wrest leadership of the Liberal Party from Sofoklis Venizelos before 1958? Could that at least swap the vote/seat amounts the EDA and the Liberals got?

 

[Welshroyalhistory]

Well...

It is a bit difficult to have this happen, as too many things were against it. Having Paul live longer is, in my view, almost impossible, since he had terminal prostate cancer by that time; Constantine II was rather young and inexperienced. This leaves the Queen Mother, Frederica, at the helm of the Palace /Royal faction. Frederica was not very prone to negotiations and had already clashed with the previous Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, who was pretty much the leader of the main conservative party and rumoured to owe his assuming of the office of Prime Minister after the death of Papagos to a large extent to royal support; thus, with a more independent-minded Prime Minister, things would likely be worse.

Also, unlike almost all the surviving European monarchies, the position of the Greek royalty was uncertain: the monarchy had only been reinstated in 1935 after a rather rigged referendum, only for the royal family to be forced to leave the country 6 years later due to the German invasion and remain in exile for at least 3 years. And when they returned, their future was very unpredictable, as during the war, a parallel power player, the National Liberation Front, had consolidated its position in Greece, one of clearly leftist orientation and thus not very supportive of the monarchy and which enjoyed widespread popular support. It was only thanks to British support (initially) and later on American assistance that this threat for the monarchy had been largely eliminated, 5 years after the liberation of the country. All these made the royal family more apprehensive and also more interventionist : they wanted to govern/rule, not just reign.

This can be seen in the OTL conflict with Papandreou : the controversy over the ministry of Defence could be interpreted as the Palace's desire to control political life (usually, the Palace asked to nominate-unofficially of course - the Defence and Interior ministers, in order to control the army and the police better; sometimes, they asked the same for the Justice Ministry too, in order to be able to exert influence over the judicial system). Also, the "ASPIDA" (shield) affair was most probably an attempt to purge the army of officers potentially opposed to its potential use domestically by the monarchy or at least strengthen the latter's grip on it.

If Andreas stays in America as a professor of Economics, this would most certainly help his father, as it would remove the charge of George Papandreou attempting to cover up the ASPIDA affair in order to protect his son, which was the main argument used by Constantine to ask the former to leave the Defence Ministry. Also, if Andreas didn't return and subsequently rise quickly through the ranks of the Centre Union, the resentment of other founding members of the party (which was more of a big tent organisation) at the supposed show of nepotism, which could also threaten their prospects for the party's leadership and led many to side with the Apostasia governments wouldn't be there, at least for the time being. Thus, George Papandreou could secure the loyalty of his party more. But this doesn't remove the threat entirely: the anti-Papandreou groups could still bribe enough Centre Union members of parliament and perhaps engineer a change of leadership in the National Radical Union (NRU) in order to put a more cooperative leader in the place of Panagiotis Kanellopoulos (who wasn't willing to undermine the democratic institutions and was a more respectable and independent-minded figure than many would have liked) and thus facilitate the overthrow of George Papandreou.

Therefore, we need to avoid the conflict between Papandreou and the Palace. Perhaps have Papandreou accept the royal request for the Defence Ministry. This at least postpones the crisis. Then, perhaps have Makarios be somewhat more pro-West and avoid incidents like those in Kofinou in 1963; also have someone other than Dean Achenson take the lead in the talks about the Cypriot question and have that someone be more supportive of maintaining the status quo. If this is interpreted as being partial to Greece, then, combined with the ongoing discussions about moving closer to the EEC which proved to be fairly divisive, it could cause some instability in Turkey and perhaps strengthen the Islamists (and the nationalists) enough so that the army would have to intervene again. With Turkey busy on its domestic front, its government may not be able to push more regarding Cyprus and may accept a proposal providing for more protection for the Turkish minority in the island and the Americans providing funds for the development of the island. Thus, with a more stable situation in the island, a not - radicalised Turkish minority (thus no "pockets" policy in the 1960s) and Johnson and Papandreou not crossing swords over Cyprus, the Americans would have a better opinion of the Greek Prime Minister (Andreas could also help as a professor in the USA with a small PR campaign),while Papandreou would have scored a diplomatic victory.

All these would improve the Prime Minister's position back at home, which would make the more conservative factions more reluctant to turn on him. Furthermore, without the ASPIDA affair and the related problems, the King would have a much better relationship with Papandreou, which in turn would make him at least somewhat less receptive to the advice of his more reactionary members of his environment. If this relative tranquility wasn't completely momentary, then there is a chance of Papandreou remaining Prime Minister until mid 1966 or early 1967, as by then some problems would have most likely arisen.

I read a quote about Queen Frederica from one of her own family members that she was a great Queen, just born a 100 years too late.

 

[Lascaris]

Vis a vis Cyprus by mid 1964 Dean Rusk and George Ball were actually pursuing... union of Cyprus with Greece with or without Turkish consent and Acheson in August was even proposing that Greek forces in the island should overthrow Makarios with US protection against possible Soviet or Turkish intervention. The State Depertment papers from the Lyndon Johnson presidential library like the one here from August 1964 for example makes for interesting reading:

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d144

Now the lack of Andreas TTL is arguably particularly important. It removes at a single stroke both a perceived leftist influence on Papandreou senior, increases the influence of the far more pragmatic Mitsotakis within the government, without Andreas he is for every practical reason heir apparent of the Centre Union and removes the most influential supporter of Makarios within the Athenian establishment and the man who apparently forced Papandreou's hand to refuse the Acheson plan. So likely a fair chance of actual Enosis under US auspices in the summer-fall 1964 or if that fails Greece and Turkey reaching a deal for "compensated Enosis" over the next few years.

 

[Lascaris]

I read a quote about Queen Frederica from one of her own family members that she was a great Queen, just born a 100 years too late.

Centre Union republicans like my family had coined Friki as a nickname... all nice and well till you remember that it actually translates as horror.

 

[Lascaris]

Would it be plausible for Papandreou to wrest leadership of the Liberal Party from Sofoklis Venizelos before 1958? Could that at least swap the vote/seat amounts the EDA and the Liberals got?

He was accepted as head of the Liberals actually. But perhaps keeping Sofoklis around for 3-5 more years might have been far better. Sofoklis was both a much needed balancing factor and ironically given his lineage had excellent connections to the palace.

 

[Welshroyalhistory]

Centre Union republicans like my family had coined Friki as a nickname... all nice and well till you remember that it actually translates as horror.

Ha! She was very much an acquired taste I believe, even amongst her own extended family.
I have read that Queen Ena of Spain, (Frederika's senior by several decades) had to remind Frederika that she was also a Queen when Frederika was rudely castigating her over something to do with the wedding of Frederika's daughter to Ena's grandson, the future Juan Carlos and Sofia of Spain.
Such a shame, I wonder had she left Greece either by choice of by force (or died) if things would have been different.
When you see clips of King Constantine's wedding to Princess Anne Marie of Denmark, its quite evident that the monarchy was still capable of drawing huge crowds in support, its hard to believe the monarchy would only last 3 more years.

 

[Vinization]

Vis a vis Cyprus by mid 1964 Dean Rusk and George Ball were actually pursuing... union of Cyprus with Greece with or without Turkish consent and Acheson in August was even proposing that Greek forces in the island should overthrow Makarios with US protection against possible Soviet or Turkish intervention. The State Depertment papers from the Lyndon Johnson presidential library like the one here from August 1964 for example makes for interesting reading:

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d144

Now the lack of Andreas TTL is arguably particularly important. It removes at a single stroke both a perceived leftist influence on Papandreou senior, increases the influence of the far more pragmatic Mitsotakis within the government, without Andreas he is for every practical reason heir apparent of the Centre Union and removes the most influential supporter of Makarios within the Athenian establishment and the man who apparently forced Papandreou's hand to refuse the Acheson plan. So likely a fair chance of actual Enosis under US auspices in the summer-fall 1964 or if that fails Greece and Turkey reaching a deal for "compensated Enosis" over the next few years.

What would keep Turkey from invading the island as soon as Enosis seems inevitable? Sure, a democratic Greece wouldn't put someone like Nikos fucking Sampson in charge of things, but the Turkish minority would become even more of a, well, minority.

 

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

Vis a vis Cyprus by mid 1964 Dean Rusk and George Ball were actually pursuing... union of Cyprus with Greece with or without Turkish consent and Acheson in August was even proposing that Greek forces in the island should overthrow Makarios with US protection against possible Soviet or Turkish intervention. The State Depertment papers from the Lyndon Johnson presidential library like the one here from August 1964 for example makes for interesting reading:

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d144

Now the lack of Andreas TTL is arguably particularly important. It removes at a single stroke both a perceived leftist influence on Papandreou senior, increases the influence of the far more pragmatic Mitsotakis within the government, without Andreas he is for every practical reason heir apparent of the Centre Union and removes the most influential supporter of Makarios within the Athenian establishment and the man who apparently forced Papandreou's hand to refuse the Acheson plan. So likely a fair chance of actual Enosis under US auspices in the summer-fall 1964 or if that fails Greece and Turkey reaching a deal for "compensated Enosis" over the next few years.

Compensation would be out of the question, in my view, regardless of whether it would involve a Greek island or part of Cyprus (most probably the Karpasia peninsula). The public in Greece would react negatively to such a trade and the prospect of union between Cyprus and Greece wouldn't be seen as enough to balance out the concession of territory to Turkey. All these would destabilise the country (and potentially his government) and would give ammunition to his opposition in the Right for their attacks on him. The same goes for Cyprus, I think, as Makarios wouldn't want to offer a potential bridgehead to Turkey: if something similar to the 1963 in Kofinou happened ITTL too, perhaps later on, Turkey could use it as a pretext to intervene and a bridgehead /base on the island would make this easier. Also, he wouldn't likely want to further dismember the island and create another potential source of trouble and destabilisation, as a permanent Turkish presence on the island could embolden those members of the Turkish Cypriot community that sought a more radical solution (a state of their own, largely autonomous or even completely independent) and would push more from the Greek Cypriot community to the likes of the extremists (Sampson et co.); union with Greece wouldn't be seen as enough compensation. Again, these are my views, I may be wrong.

 

[Lascaris]

What would keep Turkey from invading the island as soon as Enosis seems inevitable? Sure, a democratic Greece wouldn't put someone like Nikos fucking Sampson in charge of things, but the Turkish minority would become even more of a, well, minority.

In 1964? Leaving aside the apparent American invonvement (the American diplomats read as actually... more extreme than their Greek counterparts at the time) and a likely compromise, Turkey is going to invade with what exactly? The TDK had zero amphibious capacity in 1964, when IMS Demirel ordered a procurement program in reaction to the 1964 crisis, that led to creation of the fleet used in July 1974. Similar situation with airborne forces, unless much mistaken the 2 battalion sized para brigade was again established after 1964. On the other hand the Greeks are actually having much stronger forces on the island ELDYK-M alone was likely superior in fighting power to the Greek Cypriot National Guard in July 1974 and unlike 1974 also offered a division sized intervention force to hit any landing.

The TDK order of battle in 1965

World navies yesterday - Turkey 01.01.1965

 

[Vinization]

In 1964? Leaving aside the apparent American invonvement (the American diplomats read as actually... more extreme than their Greek counterparts at the time) and a likely compromise, Turkey is going to invade with what exactly? The TDK had zero amphibious capacity in 1964, when IMS Demirel ordered a procurement program in reaction to the 1964 crisis, that led to creation of the fleet used in July 1974. Similar situation with airborne forces, unless much mistaken the 2 battalion sized para brigade was again established after 1964. On the other hand the Greeks are actually having much stronger forces on the island ELDYK-M alone was likely superior in fighting power to the Greek Cypriot National Guard in July 1974 and unlike 1974 also offered a division sized intervention force to hit any landing.

The TDK order of battle in 1965

World navies yesterday - Turkey 01.01.1965

Oh. Maybe Enosis finally being achieved could take some wind off the sails of the far-right?

 

[Lascaris]

Compensation would be out of the question, in my view, regardless of whether it would involve a Greek island or part of Cyprus (most probably the Karpasia peninsula). The public in Greece would react negatively to such a trade and the prospect of union between Cyprus and Greece wouldn't be seen as enough to balance out the concession of territory to Turkey. All these would destabilise the country (and potentially his government) and would give ammunition to his opposition in the Right for their attacks on him. The same goes for Cyprus, I think, as Makarios wouldn't want to offer a potential bridgehead to Turkey: if something similar to the 1963 in Kofinou happened ITTL too, perhaps later on, Turkey could use it as a pretext to intervene and a bridgehead /base on the island would make this easier. Also, he wouldn't likely want to further dismember the island and create another potential source of trouble and destabilisation, as a permanent Turkish presence on the island could embolden those members of the Turkish Cypriot community that sought a more radical solution (a state of their own, largely autonomous or even completely independent) and would push more from the Greek Cypriot community to the likes of the extremists (Sampson et co.); union with Greece wouldn't be seen as enough compensation. Again, these are my views, I may be wrong.

I don't necessarily disagree. On the other hand the published papers from US archives like the one I've linked, seem to indicate that the US was willing to support unilateral enosis with Greece entering negotiations with Turkey for some short of compensation AFTER the fait accompli had been established. Now I may be a cynic but Greek-Turkish negotiations for compensation to Turkey after union has already taken place, and the island is sovereign territory of a NATO member (and choke full in Greek troops) is another way of saying "never gonna happen". The Greeks can offer autonomy as proposed by Acheson, they had already accepted it after all, while negotiations for anything beyond that go on indefinately