Could have Barbarossa been beaten back?

[Sir Omega]

Presuming same conditions as IOTL:
the Red Army purge still happened
same plan of attack from the German side
same military strength for both the Soviets and the Axis
same numbers and type of tanks / airplanes
same logistic capacity
no special preparations
etc.
Could have the Red Army stopped the Wehrmacht attack, then counterattacked inside of 1941?
For the sake of the argument, either Stalin is Napoleon redivivus (or, to keep the theme, Suvorov), or he is replaced by Shaposhnikov (or whatever competent military commander) as Generalissimo and doesn't meddle in any military affairs.
The question I raise is if the Red Army had the capability to completely beat back the Barbarossa Operation independent of the weather, having the same means as IOTL. (That doesn't mean that Soviet commanders could always guess what the Germans were up to every time and position the troops just so for achieving the perfect result).

 

[Aelita]

They need at least several months of prep time. They'd need time to get reservists mobilized and fitted out, to get extant formations into a proper defensive posture, get airfields on a warfooting, get equipment to where it is needed, etc. I don't see any way to avoid disaster without at least a couple months for frontier forces to be ordered to a minimal level of military readiness.

 

[Sir Omega]

They had the Siberian Divisions in Asia preparing for a Japanese invasion. They could be brought back to increase the numbers and buy some time and breathing room, presumably. And (just speculating here) an elastic defense would do better here than a static one.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The December 1941 Moscow counter offensive. The Germans had to burn themselves out first though.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'd suggest a very close look at the effects of not alerting the Red Army to the pending invasion. Among those... War time communications codes locked away, communications under peace time-not wartime guard, reserve ammunition not distributed but concentrated in administrative depots & not distributed to war time sites, Bulk of the armies on the border in training camps or barracks & not at their war positions, artillery & AT guns concentrated in gun parks & not in battle positions, tactical & operational reserves of the border armies at training sites & not in war time assembly areas, air forces concentrated at training & maintenance centers & not dispersed to war time airfields, antiaircraft guns not manned and ammunition distributed for training & not battle. One could go on but the point here is clear. Alerting the ground and air forces a week earlier, around the 13th or 14th June would allow the field armies to deploy to battle positions, set up war communications, distribute ammunition, disperse the combat air groups, entrench the infantry and artillery, ect... ect... ect... While this all is not a pancea you can't help but feel the attackers will be taking heavier losses in the opening weeks of the campaign. The early breakthroughs will take a few days longer each, and accumulate more losses in the june - July period.

They need at least several months of prep time. They'd need time to get reservists mobilized and fitted out, to get extant formations into a proper defensive posture, get airfields on a warfooting, get equipment to where it is needed, etc. I don't see any way to avoid disaster without at least a couple months for frontier forces to be ordered to a minimal level of military readiness.

Mobilization of reserve units was going forward at a high tempo. Not yet at a war time pace but still rapidly. Increasingly larger portions of the conscription classes of 1938 & 1939 were being held on active service to fill out the standing formations. The 13th Army that started forming near Minsk in early June was composed largely of mobilized reservist units. This trend went through the entire army & the air forces. The main obstacle to the reservist mobilization was the need to keep the labor force in agriculture and industry at productive levels. The surprise in june 1941 was tactical and operational, and largely the result of Stalin & co. not allowing a war alert to be issued & war orders executed. At the strategic level there was negligible surprise. Arms production had been ramping up for several years, conscription increased since 1938, training expanded, the number of standing units expanded, new reservist units established, and mobilization of the army in general started in the autumn after France collapsed.

A couple months earlier war alert would have made a much larger difference, along with up dating the war plans, but even a weeks warning and combat deployment can make a significant tactical difference.

The December 1941 Moscow counter offensive. The Germans had to burn themselves out first though.

Once the German Mechanized formations hit 50-60% losses in tanks They started becoming vulnerable. The other vulnerability was in at hand ammunitions supplies, particularly artillery. The inability to cache forward ammunition stocks in army or lower depots, hamstrung the attacks, forcing the dependance on the maneuver units to achieve results. Those two factors started taking effect in August, but the Red Army was unable to take advantage until November - December.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I'd suggest a very close look at the effects of not alerting the Red Army to the pending invasion. Among those... War time communications codes locked away, communications under peace time-not wartime guard, reserve ammunition not distributed but concentrated in administrative depots & not distributed to war time sites, Bulk of the armies on the border in training camps or barracks & not at their war positions, artillery & AT guns concentrated in gun parks & not in battle positions, tactical & operational reserves of the border armies at training sites & not in war time assembly areas, air forces concentrated at training & maintenance centers & not dispersed to war time airfields, antiaircraft guns not manned and ammunition distributed for training & not battle. One could go on but the point here is clear. Alerting the ground and air forces a week earlier, around the 13th or 14th June would allow the field armies to deploy to battle positions, set up war communications, distribute ammunition, disperse the combat air groups, entrench the infantry and artillery, ect... ect... ect... While this all is not a pancea you can't help but feel the attackers will be taking heavier losses in the opening weeks of the campaign. The early breakthroughs will take a few days longer each, and accumulate more losses in the june - July period.

Mobilization of reserve units was going forward at a high tempo. Not yet at a war time pace but still rapidly. Increasingly larger portions of the conscription classes of 1938 & 1939 were being held on active service to fill out the standing formations. The 13th Army that started forming near Minsk in early June was composed largely of mobilized reservist units. This trend went through the entire army & the air forces. The main obstacle to the reservist mobilization was the need to keep the labor force in agriculture and industry at productive levels. The surprise in june 1941 was tactical and operational, and largely the result of Stalin & co. not allowing a war alert to be issued & war orders executed. At the strategic level there was negligible surprise. Arms production had been ramping up for several years, conscription increased since 1938, training expanded, the number of standing units expanded, new reservist units established, and mobilization of the army in general started in the autumn after France collapsed.

A couple months earlier war alert would have made a much larger difference, along with up dating the war plans, but even a weeks warning and combat deployment can make a significant tactical difference.

It also means the destruction of Soviet forces closer to the German border where they could actually make use of supply lines more effectively. Soviet forces would still be pocketed in huge numbers, but there would be less of them at the back end when the Germans were in tenuous supply situations to grind down.

Once the German Mechanized formations hit 50-60% losses in tanks They started becoming vulnerable. The other vulnerability was in at hand ammunitions supplies, particularly artillery. The inability to cache forward ammunition stocks in army or lower depots, hamstrung the attacks, forcing the dependance on the maneuver units to achieve results. Those two factors started taking effect in August, but the Red Army was unable to take advantage until November - December.

Right, which is why the massing of more Soviet troops and equipment forward at the border makes them extremely vulnerable to pocketing when you look at the layout of the central front and the general state of the Red Army courtesy of "Stumbling Colossus", which says that even with mobilization the Soviets, assuming they could have achieved it in time, they were so disorganized and unprepared to fight that they'd more likely than not get smashed anyway. In a ironic way it was actually better for the Soviets to have their reserves still left deeper for later mobilization, because the deeper they are when they engage the Germans, the weaker the Germans were due to the state of their logistics, while the further forward they engage with the mass of their strength, the greater the German ability to kill them with firepower and pocket them en masse.

 

[FBKampfer]

Not really, unless significant preparation is made. Barbarossa was the largest single military operation in human history.

Too many major formations were effectively destroyed in the first week to make any effective stand against an organized Wehrmacht.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

It also means the destruction of Soviet forces closer to the German border where they could actually make use of supply lines more effectively. Soviet forces would still be pocketed in huge numbers, but there would be less of them at the back end when the Germans were in tenuous supply situations to grind down.

Most were destroyed there OTL, at a low cost to the attackers. i.e.: The entire Soviet 10th Army ceased to exist as a combat formation in 72 hours & was mopped up in five days. Communications were lost with it almost imeadiatly, & The local front commanders & Moscow had no idea what was happening to it from the first 24 hours. That went on all across the frontier among the first battle zone force. I think your logic there is its better to have combat units take a attack from their garrison caps & training sites vs entrenched battle positions? I thought not.

Right, which is why the massing of more Soviet troops and equipment forward at the border makes them extremely vulnerable to pocketing

This seems to assume alerted forces all rush to the border and pile up in the forward battle zone. That was not the case. Tactically, operationally, and strategically the Red Army deployed in multiple echelons with substantial reserves. Stumbling Colossus & other sources refer to those echelons layered back into the USSR. i.e.: The 13th Army forming near Minsk was part of this strategic echelon.

These second echelon or zone units were the bulk of the forces that escaped the June debacle & fought the Germans in July - August. The difference with a war alert is they have that amount of time, a week, a month, whatever to shift from training/garrison to whatever combat readiness they can achieve. It also means the forward frontier echelon can actually fight for a few days and add that to German losses and time for the tactical-stratigic reserves to prepare.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Most were destroyed there OTL, at a low cost to the attackers. i.e.: The entire Soviet 10th Army ceased to exist as a combat formation in 72 hours & was mopped up in five days. Communications were lost with it almost imeadiatly, & The local front commanders & Moscow had no idea what was happening to it from the first 24 hours. That went on all across the frontier among the first battle zone force. I think your logic there is its better to have combat units take a attack from their garrison caps & training sites vs entrenched battle positions? I thought not.

Even if prepared the reliance on land line communications that were cut by saboteurs and Luftwaffe bombing would render them incommunicado like IOTL; you can't disperse telecommunications on the level they needed to avoid having them severed, so they'd just be putting more troops in the bag even if the initial breakthrough operation would be tougher and take longer due to prepared defenders. The Soviet military was so jacked up that they were not prepared to do that much better even if as mobilized as possible by June 22nd (not that full mobilization would really have been possible in time given the serious problems that existed even in planning for defensive mobilization; IOTL as many men were mobilized as there were due to it happening in waves over a long period and a lot of lack of planning other than trying to put as many men as possible in certain areas with as much equipment as could be found).

This seems to assume alerted forces all rush to the border and pile up in the forward battle zone. That was not the case. Tactically, operationally, and strategically the Red Army deployed in multiple echelons with substantial reserves. Stumbling Colossus & other sources refer to those echelons layered back into the USSR. i.e.: The 13th Army forming near Minsk was part of this strategic echelon.

These second echelon or zone units were the bulk of the forces that escaped the June debacle & fought the Germans in July - August. The difference with a war alert is they have that amount of time, a week, a month, whatever to shift from training/garrison to whatever combat readiness they can achieve. It also means the forward frontier echelon can actually fight for a few days and add that to German losses and time for the tactical-stratigic reserves to prepare.

I mean if you look at the deployments the Soviets conducted and what the plan was for DP41 they pretty much were going to mass forces as close to the border as possible and counterattack ASAP with everything they had in the first and second strategic echelons to contain the Germans as far west as possible and roll them back. They just lacked the capacity to actually pull it off and would be fighting the Germans where they were the strongest logistically, rather than deep where the less well equipped and trained 2nd, 3rd, and 4th echelons fought the Germans IOTL.

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/other/Location_June_22_41.jpg
Here is a map of the June 22nd dispositions of divisions, I can't link it because it is too big, but in Belarus you can see they are really crammed far forward and pocketing themselves.

And of course the pocket formation: