As one can see, the butteflies are flapping their wings pretty hard on the Americas.

On the next chapter, we will deal with president Brizola's first term, piece by piece. Stuff like education, the economy, land reform and all that. And the 1990 gubernatorial elections.

Anything implausible? Comments and ideas are always appreciated.
 
Good to see democracy recovering ground! :)

I think there's a typo, that party was centre left at that time, IIRC.
There's be a place that won't be so fortunate.

From what I've read, PRD used to be centre-left until Juan Bosch deserted it and decided to found PLD. After that, it became increasingly conservative. I could always be wrong, of course.
 
There's be a place that won't be so fortunate.

From what I've read, PRD used to be centre-left until Juan Bosch deserted it and decided to found PLD. After that, it became increasingly conservative. I could always be wrong, of course.

You and @Archangel are both right, though in difference of emphases - it wasn't until the millennium when the PRD really got into the PRSC's territory - though I'd wait 'till @Soverihn clarifies it. Otherwise, for dramatic license purposes, I think you're good.
 

Deleted member 67076

You and @Archangel are both right, though in difference of emphases - it wasn't until the millennium when the PRD really got into the PRSC's territory - though I'd wait 'till @Soverihn clarifies it. Otherwise, for dramatic license purposes, I think you're good.
The PRD was center left Social Democrats basically up until the 90s IOTL when the rise of neoliberalism and the deaths of Jacobo Majulta and Jose Francisco Peña Gomez shattered the party's left wing, and it never recovered. Its worth noting that the PRD was very much a big tent party from the get go even in Juan Bosch's presidency- part of the reason why the historical coup got away with it so easy is that there were around 4 or 5 factions (can't remember off the top of my head) of varying shades of leftist from Social Democrats, Centrists, Leninists in the Cuban style, and some fringe Maoists.

To make a long story short when Juan Bosch left the party, he went from hmm, lets say Tony Blair to Jeremy Corbyn, to use an analogy while the PRD in power was forced to moderate as it tried to placate the institutional inertia of the Balaguer era government and the fact that Balaguer controlled the opposition. But still very Social Democrat until the mid 90s.

Also I didn't know we had a timeline on 80s Brazil. Now I have to read :V
 
The PRD was center left Social Democrats basically up until the 90s IOTL when the rise of neoliberalism and the deaths of Jacobo Majulta and Jose Francisco Peña Gomez shattered the party's left wing, and it never recovered. Its worth noting that the PRD was very much a big tent party from the get go even in Juan Bosch's presidency- part of the reason why the historical coup got away with it so easy is that there were around 4 or 5 factions (can't remember off the top of my head) of varying shades of leftist from Social Democrats, Centrists, Leninists in the Cuban style, and some fringe Maoists.

To make a long story short when Juan Bosch left the party, he went from hmm, lets say Tony Blair to Jeremy Corbyn, to use an analogy while the PRD in power was forced to moderate as it tried to placate the institutional inertia of the Balaguer era government and the fact that Balaguer controlled the opposition. But still very Social Democrat until the mid 90s.

Also I didn't know we had a timeline on 80s Brazil. Now I have to read :V
I've edited the tidbit about PRD, thanks for clarifying the situation. Also, glad to see that I've got a new reader :D!
 
CHAPTER 3, Part 1: Part 1: Economy and Infrastructure
And so it begins!
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Chapter 3: Leonel Brizola's First Term

Part 1: Economy and Infrastructure

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President Brizola's official portrait.

Leonel Brizola's inauguration date, March 15 1990, was predictably the busiest day Brasília had seen in many years. Hundreds of thousands of people from all backgrounds, students, labour union members and leaders, leftists of all stripes, you name it, they were all there. The most numerous demographic by far was that of simple, ordinary people, many of them apathetic or even Collor voters, who came in from all over the country (their travels were often paid for by political parties) to witness a moment that would not be forgotten so soon in the history books. This was no simple ceremony, but the inauguration of the first democratically elected president to rule Brazil in thirty years.

The ceremony was long and exhausting. First, the new president entered the Praça dos Três Poderes (Three Powers' Plaza) aboard the traditional Rolls Royce covertible, at the head of a long procession. From there, he and the new First Lady, Neusa Goulart Brizola, smiled and waved at the crowd that cheered them on with seemingly limitless energy. After that, he entered the Chamber of Deputies, where he gave a lengthy and generic adress (Mr. President of the National Congress, Mr. Vice President, blah blah blah...) to a very big audience that included not only all of Brazil's national legislators, but several foreign leaders and representatives, such as Mexican president Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and former president of Argentina Raúl Alfonsín.

It was only after that that he was allowed to face the people once more. Receiving the precious green/yellow sash from the hands of soon to become former president Ulysses Guimarães, he at last adressed the massive crowd that stood before him as their leader. The Old Caudillo, famous for being a charismatic speaker, didn't disappoint his humongous audience, and spoke to them as if Brazil was stuck in the clutches of the Great Depression, a sentiment that was shared by many ordinary citizens, and how the situation would improve with hard work and toil. One American observer later quipped that the only thing that Brizola didn't rip off from Franklin Roosevelt was the "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself" part. Regardless of the speech's authenticity, it resonated throughout the country with little difficulty, since the situation seemed hopeless and the people were desperate for a heroic saviour.

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Lula and the president-elect in a rally in Rio de Janeiro, celebrating their victory.

The reality is that, despite all of the doom and gloom so eagerly spread by unscrupulous media outlets and power-hungry politicians, Brazil's economic situation was nowhere near as apocalyptic as was widely believed. The worst of the recession caused by former Finance Minister Dornelles' austerity measures had already passed by (the GDP actually grew by 1.5% in 1989) and inflation was very low, allowing him to claim that he laid the foundations of the Golden Nineties until his last days with some credibility, though the matter is still a subject of much debate among Brazilian historians. It would be a tremendous mistake to assume that the economy was in a good state, however, as one tenth of all working Brazilians were unemployed, even as growth began to pick up again (1).

Another outside factor that fell right into Brizola's hands was the creation of an inheritance tax and a tax on large fortunes, both of which were put in place by the 1988 Constitution. Both of these things, which were completely outside of his control, gave the federal government some desperately needed revenues that would be crucial to the success of the Old Caudillo's ambitious projects (2). Even if the new administration can't be credited with the entirety of Brazil's economic recovery, the president and the ministers Celso Furtado and Bresser Pereira (the brains behind the Brizola administration's economic policies) surely deserve to be praised by the fact that they took full advantage of everything around them, whether it was under their control or not.

With all of these things behind us, let's focus on the federal government's actions regarding the economy.

The most urgent problem it had to deal with was the high unemployment rate, which was directly linked with the sluggish economy and low state investments caused by the Dornelles spending cuts. Unsurprisingly, the solution proposed by Bresser and Furtado was something straight out of the developmentalist playbook: massive investments in infrastructure. Highways and roads were either paved or fixed, hydroelectric dams and the rest of Brazil's energy grid were repaired and upgraded, bridges were built, and many other important works began to be constructed. Many rightfully feared that this massive spending increase would lead to an explosion of foreign debt and excessively gigantic "pharaonic" works, but these investments were funded through the new taxes mentioned above and lucrative commodity exports (whose prices were high for now, but would later fall by the second half of the decade), rather than by giant loans taken from the IMF, like the dictatorship did back in its so called economic "miracle". Also, the PTB administration was nowhere near as corrupt, something that also helped.

Here are two of the most daring and ambitious projects of them all:

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A canal somewhere in the sertão of Paraíba.

The first and by far the most controversial of them was the Transposição do Rio São Francisco (Diversion of the São Francisco River) which consisted of the construction of several aqueducts and dams that diverted a part of the water of the Velho Chico (one of its nicknames) to smaller rivers, such as the Jaguaribe in Ceará, that often straight up vanished in the great droughts that scarred the Northeast's neglected interior, and to important water reservoirs that were more often than not on critically low levels. The supporters of this project, such as the governors Miguel Arraes (Pernambuco), Ciro Gomes (Ceará) and Waldir Pires (Bahia) argued that this project would ensure that the large cities of the Agreste and Sertão, such as Fortaleza, Mossoró and Campina Grande, would no longer have to worry about running out of water, something that would utterly destroy their economies. It is important to remember that the water would be used for urban purposes, rather than agricultural ones.

The proposal immediatly came under heavy fire from both sides of the political spectrum. The right attacked its seemingly ludicrous gigantism, pejoratively nicknaming it the "Transamazônica of the Northeast", and they argued instead for multiple smaller works, such as conventional reservoirs and small water tanks that would be installed inside people's houses. The left, and especially many famous artists and environmental activists, were concerned that the diversion of the waters of the great river would lead to an ecological disaster, despite repeated claims and assurances from its supporters that the Velho Chico's discharge would decrease by only 5%, nowhere near causing a catastrophe. This didn't prevent the more famous critics from launching judicial orders requesting the halting of the contruction of the aqueducts, something that did much to delay their completion.

In the end, despite the Brizola Administration's best efforts, the Transposição, whose construction began on December 1991, was plagued by repeated delays and several accusations of corruption lobbied against the goverment officials charged with ensuring that the project was inaugurated in time. The massive system only began to work on March 2004, five years more than initially expected and only two weeks before Brizola's death from a stroke at the age of 82 (3).

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A passenger train on the Vitória-Minas Railway, sometime in 2014.

The second project, known as the Programa Nacional de Restauração Ferroviária (National Railroad Restoration Program) was just as, hell, probably even more ambitious than the one mentioned above, and just as important. As said in the name, it consisted of a complete and desperately needed overhaul of Brazil's much neglected railway system, which ceased to be a priority in the eyes of the federal government after the administration of Juscelino Kubitschek, which focused its attention on roads and highways as its main method of transportation, a poor choice in a nation as large as Brazil. Naturally, this led to increased cargo transportation time, something that hurt Brazil's standing in the world market.

This loss of maintenance by several presidents from the 1950s onward had a very good reason to occur, however. You see, Brazil's railway system was built by private initiatives and had almost no central planning, which led turned the whole thing into a disorganized mess that had at least eight different gauges. Thus, the system became increasingly inefficient, sluggish and expensive to maintain, and many railways, such as the São Paulo-Rio Grande line (whose construction started a bloody popular uprising, the Contestado War), began to rot away from lack of maintenance. As such, the total extension of Brazil's railroads fell from 38.287 kilometers in 1960 to 30.129 kilometers in 1990 (Source) a decrease of almost a quarter, with many of the remaining railways used well below their potential. Unsurprisingly, the use of passenger trains was by then practically nonexistant, worsening Brazil's chronic traffic issues.

The PNRF, as said before, consisted of the reconstruction and reform of Brazilian railroads, specifically by uniting the whole system under a single gauge, the chosen one being metric gauge, since it was the most common of them all, something that would reduce costs. It was still astronomically expensive, and, as of 2019, yet to be completed. However, important new lines were built, such as Ferronorte, which links Cuiabá to the port of Santos, and the Transordestina, which links the ports of Fortaleza and Recife to the little town of Eliseu Martins, in the sertão of Piauí. Brazil also currenly has only three gauges and 43.558 kilometers of rails according to IBGE, the sixth largest network in the world, barely more than Germany, a country roughly the size of the state of Goiás (4).

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A map of the Transnordestina Railway (yellow) showing how it links itself with the Northeast's existing network (red).

All of these fancy new projects were a blessing for Brazil's steel and civil construction industries, and companies such as the CSN and many private ones earned a lot of money on very lucrative contracts with the federal government. This also led to economic growth and an increase in employment, and, by 1994, the last year of Brizola's first term, the Brazilian unemployment rate was at 3%, less than half of what it was in 1990. People who earn more obviously spend more, which only contributed to an increase of the government's revenues as a whole.

In the 1990s, Brazil also earned itself a new and later very controversial source of income: juicy, lucrative arms exports. Its main producer of military land vehicles, Engesa, was in dire straits during the Lost Decade, and was on the verge of bankruptcy after the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein, one of its main buyers, collapsed as as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. At the same time, another important state in the Middle East, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, announced in the mid eighties its intention to buy a series of new main battle tanks to improve its military equipment. Engesa, in one desperate final attempt to avoid bankruptcy, invested all of its remaining resources on designing a vehicle that the Saudis would be willing to purchase.

The result of this risky project, the EE-T1 Osório, surpised everyone by outperforming all of its competitors, the British Challenger 1, the French AMX-40 and the American M1 Abrams. With the final choice falling between either the Abrams or the Osório (the European tanks were deemed unworthy), the Saudis picked the latter thanks to its much lower weight, with the Osório weighing just 39 tons while the Abrams weighed 61 tons. The sale was announced on November 1990, with the sale of 315 Osórios for 3.1 billion dollars (or around 5 billion Cruzados) an event that roused much joy not only in Engesa and the federal government, but among more nationalist/patriotic Brazilians that saw a tank designed by their countrymen was somehow better than one that belonged to the most powerful country in the world (5). Shorly after this success, the United Arab Emirates announced their intention to buy a batch of these intriguing new vehicles.

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An Osório in the vast Arabian Desert.

Despite the inital euphoria, it later became clear that this was certainly the worst part of Brizola's legacy. By authorising these sales, he allowed Brazil to become an eager supplier of weapons and military equipment in general to several brutal dictatorships, even as he fought for justice and human rights at home and in Latin America, something that continued under his successors. By the time the Arab Spring began in 2011, many of these governments would deploy Osórios to crush the popular uprisings and demonstrations that shook their kleptocracies to the core.

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Notes:

(1) IOTL, Collor inherited from Sarney a country whose economy was wrecked by hyperinflation, but had a low uneployment rate and a growing economy (which is worthless when your currency is almost literally worth sh**). He attempted to tackle inflation by seizing people's savings, and the rest is history.

(2) The Citizen's Constituion has an article about the need of a tax on large fortunes, but it unfortunately doesn't exactly define what a "large fortune" is. ITTL, with a lot more progressives taking part in its design, that issue doesn't happen and the federal government has a large and virtually untapped source of revenue.

(3) IOTL, the construction of the Transposição do Rio São Francisco began in 2005, under president Lula's first administration. It is yet to be finished. Sure, there are bits of it that are working, I think, but still.

(4) IOTL, the Transnordestina began to be built in 2006. It is also yet to be finished. Also, IOTL we currently have only 30.000 kilometers of railways, a humiliatingly small number, and Germany has around 43.000 kilometers. Oh, and we still have like a billion different gauges. Fantastic.

(5) IOTL, the Osório showed very promising results, but the Saudis purchased the Abrams thanks to their alliance with the United States and their massive success in the Gulf War, and Engesa went bankrupt in 1993. With the US ITTL reeling from Irangate, its prestige in Riyadh is much lower, and the Gulf War has been butterflied away thanks to the Rape of Basra and the execution of Saddam Hussein in 1987.
 
That last bit goes to show that nobody's a saint, no matter how well-intentioned. Still, another superb update! :)
Indeed.

Next update will deal with land reform. And thank you for your praise! :D

EDIT: Also, I really want to thank whoever made the superb picture where Brizola is wearing the presidential sash. I found it by chance on the Internet.
 

To keep you guys entertained while I'm busy writing the next update, here's a video on the Osório. Unfortunately, it's all in Portuguese.
 
It was twice occupied by American troops, first from 1916 to 1924 and later from 1965 to 1966, when they invaded the country to prevent the restoration of Juan Bosch

The brazilian army (or at least some factions inside it) did some very horrible things inside Brazil, but the worst stain in the army history was taking part of the american interference there.
the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) with the goal of serving as a peacekeeping formation in the Dominican Republic. IAPF consisted of 1,748 Brazilian, Paraguayan, Nicaraguan, Costa Rican, Salvadoran and Honduran troops; it was headed by Brazilian general Hugo Panasco Alvim, with U.S. Army General Bruce Palmer serving as his deputy commander.
 
The brazilian army (or at least some factions inside it) did some very horrible things inside Brazil, but the worst stain in the army history was taking part of the american interference there.
Holy shit I did not know that. Still, considering that we were a dictatorship back then and that we have troops stationed in Haiti since 2004 as part of MINUSTAH (what are we even supposed to do there, anyway? Prevent a new coup from happening?) I can't say that I'm surprised.

Also: I'm sorry, but there is a real possibility that this TL might be put in indefinite hiatus for the time being. It won't die so easily, you can be assured of that, especially now that we're getting into the good stuff. But still, UFF is beginning to take its toll on me again.
 
Holy shit I did not know that. Still, considering that we were a dictatorship back then and that we have troops stationed in Haiti since 2004 as part of MINUSTAH (what are we even supposed to do there, anyway? Prevent a new coup from happening?) I can't say that I'm surprised.

Also: I'm sorry, but there is a real possibility that this TL might be put in indefinite hiatus for the time being. It won't die so easily, you can be assured of that, especially now that we're getting into the good stuff. But still, UFF is beginning to take its toll on me again.

Haiti is not really bad since it is a humanitarian mission authorized by the United Nations.

The thing about the Dominican republic has to do with the US influence, here a simplified explanation:

From the 1930 revolution until the end of the new state dictatorship we had Oswaldo Aranha as the main guide of our diplomacy, and he with Vargas formulated the policy of "pragmatic equidistance", the idea was to keep Brazil always on a equal distance from two main competing powers to profit as much from it, like on WWII. This policy was refined by Jânio Quadros into the PEI, independent foreign policy that Brazil would not only try to be neutral from the stimulus coming from the outside but also spread its influence to all sides... And then the day of the jackboots came with the 1964 coup. The geopolitical mind behund the coup was Golbery Couto e Silva and as a ardent americanophile he made his own subservient foreign policy that had the USA as the center of the world and Brazil as a tool to keep the USA influence and cave its own subsphere of influence under the USA, or to simplify even more, Brazil should be the American jagunço in South America. That is why when the dominical Republic fell into.civil war we sent troops there, that is why also the dictator Costa e Silva offered to send Brazilians to fight on the Vietnam even tough we had absolutely NOTHING to win fighting there, that is why the dictatorship sabotaged decades of diplomatic relationships with the Eastern bloc for nothing in return.

I think that this can be explored in your TL, because Lula revived the independent foreign policy with our diplomatic mastermind Celso Amorim, maybe Brizola can revive the policy earlier
 
Also: I'm sorry, but there is a real possibility that this TL might be put in indefinite hiatus for the time being. It won't die so easily, you can be assured of that, especially now that we're getting into the good stuff. But still, UFF is beginning to take its toll on me again.

Having been back to college myself, I get it. Take whatever time you need for your studies.
 
Excellent news, everyone!

I am finally free from my duties (how does one spell "férias" in English?) in UFF. Thus, I can finally go back to writing this TL, something that I missed for so long!
 
Part 2: Social Programs and Land Reform
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Part 2: Social Programs and Land Reform

As expected of a man who made friendships with people such as Mário Soares, François Mitterrand and Willy Brandt during his long exile, Brizola made it one of his main priorities to combat the grotesquely high wealth inequality that led to so few notable people having more money than they knew what to do with and so many anonymous others who had absolutely nothing. Like any good social democrat, he believed that the way to solve or at least minimize this problem was through actions of the state. One of the easiest ways to do such a thing was to impose a policy of gradual systematic minimum wage increases that were also tied to inflation, ensuring that they didn't lose any real value (in US dollars) in case the Cruzado was suddenly devaluated. This policy was happily enforced by Minister of Labour Carlos Alberto Caó, and the minimum wage rose from US$ 58,00 in 1990 to US$ 142,00 in 1994 (1).

New social programs were created to help the poor, the most famous of them by far being the Bolsa-Escola, which consisted of a monthly concession of money (Cz$ 200,00 on average) to poor families as long as they sent their children to school, something that went hand in hand with Darcy Ribeiro's mass production of CIEPs all over Brazil and his other educational reforms. This program became the public face of the administration's war against poverty, and, while not as famous as, say, PRONASOL in Mexico, also won some international praise. While the monetary aid didn't look like much to, say, a middle-class family in Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo, too wealthy to qualify for it, it was a blessing for millions of people who lived below the poverty line all over Brazil, especially in the Northeast, and practically transformed the Old Caudillo into a deity in many places (2).

Many of the social advances desired by the Brizola administration depended on the construction and renovation of several infrastructure works, such as hospitals, sewage systems, electric grids (especially in the Northeast, where many houses had no electricity at all) amongst other things, something that went hand in hand with the Finance Ministry's developmentalist views and led to the creation of several jobs, which was a welcome bonus.

There are two important things to remember, however:

The first is that, no matter how good the federal government's intentions were, its aims would have never been reached were it not for the much needed support that was given by allied governors and mayors, the bulk of which were elected or reelected in 1990 and 1992, respectively.

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The controvertially named Ernesto Che Guevara Municipal Hospital, located in Maricá, was built thanks to a partnership between the mayoralty and Brasília. It was inaugurated in 1995, just in time for Fidel Castro to take a good look at it during one of his many visits to Brazil (3).

The second is that many of the programs unveiled during the 1990s were guaranteed to do so thanks to the fact the Citizen's Constitution effectively guaranteed that they would be created in some shape or form. The Sistema Único de Saúde, or just SUS (Single Healthcare System) was born from the article which stated that every citizen deserved decent healthcare, and that the state as a whole was bound to fulfill that duty. Same thing goes for education, since it was very explicitly stated that the government had to provide it to every Brazilian man, woman and child (4). The Brizola administration can be credited with enforcing articles such as the ones already mentioned to the bitter end, and in the best, most effective way possible.

Speaking of, education always received special attention from Brasília, thanks to the fact that it was Brizola's biggest mark in both of his gubernatorial tenures (in Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro, respectively) and the administration was absolutely filled to the brim with extremely competent people eager to reform Brazil's schools and universities, not only physically, but in the very way they and their classes were administrated. These universalist desires were handsomely reward legislatively through the Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação (Law of Basic Educational Guidelines), which, among several things, standardized educational practices and specified who was supposed to fund what (federal government funds universities, state government funds, municipal government funds the maintenance of primary schools, with salaries being paid by the state (5)).

All of this was accomplished thanks to the tireless work of many teachers and other intellectuals who would remain mostly anonymous, save a for a few glaring exceptions such as Paulo Freire and Darcy Ribeiro, legislators, activists, and many others.

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What could have been.


Land redistribution was another one of the Brizola administration's many great ambitions to fulfill. This would be far from easy: for centuries, most of Brazil's agricultural lands were controlled by large, powerful landowners, and although these latifundiários could no longer hope to overthrow the Old Caudillo through a military coup like the one enacted against his brother-in-law more than two decades ago, they were still extremely wealthy and, most importantly, had enough allies in both houses of Congress, combined with their lobbying organization UCR, to provide a significant base of opposition to the federal government. Their main line of attack was that any attempt to address the country's long standing inequality would lead to an economic disaster, and that the administration's plans would infringe their right to hold private property. Naturally, leading reformists such as Francisco Julião, João Pedro Stédile and Chico Mendes disagreed with them quite fervently, and it seemed that the whole situation would result in an unbreakable stalemate.

Once again, the Citizen's Constitution comes in for the rescue.

Thanks to an article that very specifically allowed the government to expropriate lands that were deemed unproductive -- one of the left's most important victories in the Constituent Assembly -- the new administration could embark on its land reform program almost from day one. Under the supervision of minister Aldo Pinto, appointed specifically to help oversee and coordinate the efforts on this front, 1.200.000 families were settled on around 7.320.000 hectares of land between 1990 and 1993, and the families in question were given subsidies and low interest loans to ensure that they actually stayed in and developed their new properties (6). Beyond giving millions of people new jobs and easier lives, this policy also increased the production of basic foodstuffs such as various fruits, beans, lettuce, carrots, corn, potatoes, among many others, since these mall landholders didn't have the necessary capital to grow cash crops, but were perfectly capable of growing food for themselves and others, something that decreased the price of many staples over the years.


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Predictably, these policies made the Brizola administration extremely popular, and many politicians, not just the president, had their careers reach new heights thanks to them.

However, few would become as powerful, famous or popular as the Crown Prince.

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(1) Here's a table showing the evolution of the minimum wage in Brazil, in case the growth shown in this update seems unreasonable.

(2) This program is OTL, with all of its effects, the only difference being that it's called Bolsa Família instead.

(3) This hospital actually exists, but its construction began in 2014/2015, if I recall, under the municipal administration of Washington Quaquá. Here, the fact that Brazil is run by a personal friend of Fidel Castro and Guevara results in it being built much earlier.

(4) Just as OTL. Doesn't mean the federal government cares about enforcing it though.

(5) This is a substantial difference from OTL, where the municipalities have to pay for the maintenance and salaries of those who work in the schools. Natutally, this puts poorer towns in quite a bind.

(6) The Fernando Henrique administration did exactly this in the period between 1995 to 1998, but I doubt the resettled families were given proper support, since PFL (nowadays called DEM, but still as backward as ever) was a very important part of FHC's governing coalition. His vice-president, Marco Maciel, belonged to said party, for example.
 
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Part 3: Foreign Policy
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Part 3: Foreign Policy

On the foreign front, the Brizola administration found itself in a very favourable scenario: with the Pink Tide at its height, the president found himself surrounded by heads of state who overall had very similar views to the ones he held, which obviously made friendly relations much easier to achieve. Not that Brazil had particularly bad relations with anyone other than, say, apartheid South Africa.

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Nelson Mandela with Abdias do Nascimento in a diplomatic visit in Rio de Janeiro.

One of the most intriguing things about Brazil's foreign policy from the 60s onwards was that it was, even during the dictatorship, not completely submissive to the whims of the United States, with Brasília, with the exception of during Juracy Magalhães' tenure as Minister of Foreign Relations (1966-1967 (1)) enjoying good relations with countries such as fellow lusophone nations Angola and Mozambique, which were Soviet-aligned, and Communist China. It also enjoyed friendly relations with its own neighbors, such as Argentina and Paraguay, which had horrific consequences for a great many people, since they were all brutal dictatorships that cooperated with one another to eliminate political opponents, a cruel international effort that was known as Operation Condor.

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Alfredo Stroessner having a friendly meeting with fellow dictator Ernesto Geisel.

After the transition to democracy and the rise of Ulysses Guimarães to the presidency, foreign affairs were dominated by the economic crisis that plagued Brazil and pretty much all of its neighbors, which led at first to the Iguaçu Declaration, signed by Ulysses and Argentine president Raúl Alfonsín, which sought to create stronger trade links between the two largest countries in South America. The most important diplomatic development of the five years of PMDB rule was, by far, the normalization of diplomatic relations with Cuba, which were nonexistant since 1964, and, on a related note, Guimarães became the first president of Brazil to make an official visit to the Soviet Union, something that was done in 1988.

Brazil was steadily moving the focus of its diplomacy away from the US and Europe and towards its fellow nations in the Third World and the Southern Hemisphere. One needed only to take a look at the people who were invited to Brizola's inauguration to realize that the new president intended to take this trend and crank it up to eleven.

Some of the figures that took part in the event were very unsurprising. The likes of Raúl Alfonsín, Ricardo Lagos, Daniel Ortega, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, and other Latin American leaders, were expected, for they were all from the same continent and were roughly on the same side of the political spectrum, with the exception of the former Argentine president. The presence of Fidel Castro was very controversial, but still expected since he and the Brizola were very good friends since the Cuban Revolution and neither of them really tried to hide that. No, the big surprises of that day were the likes of Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara (2), presidents of Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso respectively, two people with very decent achievements under their belts, especially Sankara, but very... noticeable skeletons in their closets, particularly Mugabe.

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Good revolutionaries, or murderous dictators? Depends on who you ask.

While talking with them cordially wouldn't be so scandalous (diplomacy is diplomacy, even when it involves murderous autocrats), the fact that a president who made a big deal out of human rights during his electoral campaign had no problem inviting two leaders who were sharply criticized by Amnesty International (and, in the case of Mugabe, directly responsible for the deaths of around 30.000 people, as many as the Argentine dictatorship) was an impressive show of hipocrisy. Later in the same year, the Brazilian government authorized the sale of Osório tanks to Saudi Arabia, and soon the two dictators mentioned above became eager buyers of Brazilian arms and military vehicles. Nothing like some good ideological solidarity.

However, there were certain aspects of the Brizola administration's foreign policy that were far less controversial. For example, the growing commercial integration with its Latin American brethren, a trend that had begun under Ulysses with the Iguaçu Declaration, was brought to a whole new level with the signing of the Treaty of Asunción in March 26, 1991, which announced the creation of the Southern Common Market (Mercosul or Mercosur for short) which included Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina and desired to eventually create something like a South American equivalent of the European Union. Trade relations with countries such as Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela, which didn't belong to Mercosul, were strengthened through other means, mostly through the Latin American Integration Association, better known as ALADI (3).

Relations with other countries were mostly normal, restricted to cordial visits and what not, with the exception of France during the what was left of the cancer-stricken François Mitterrand's 14 year tenure as president, for he and Brizola were very good friends ever since they met during the Old Caudillo's exile, but they never really went beyond that. A similar case took place in Portugal, where the incumbent president was Mário Soares, also a good friend of his.

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Mário Soares and Brizola while the latter was still governor of Rio de Janeiro.

China, meanwhile, was opening itself to the rest of the world through the policies that became known as the Five Modernizations, and presented itself as a great potential market for cheap low effort exports such as iron ore, orange juice and, most important of all, soy. A very profitable relationship was about to begin.

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(1) This is the guy who came up with the infamous quote "What is good for the US is good for Brazil".

(2) IOTL, Thomas Sankara was assassinated in a coup d'état in 1987 by one of his closest lieutenants, Blaise Compaoré, who proceeded to rule Burkina Faso as an "ordinary" dictator and reversed his predecessor's policies. Spoiler warning, I guess, but Sankara will be seen by this universe in a much less favourable light.

(3) IOTL, this sort of commercial contact between Mexico and Brazil was prevented by NAFTA, which doesn't exist ITTL.
 
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