15: Bassignana
Count Claude Florimond de Mercy
As the titanic behemoths of Eugene and Villars eyed each other on the Rhine, as the rising stars of Lacy and Maurice stalked the Hanoverians in northern Germany, as Spain's foreign generals, Montemar and Verboom, sought to make their names, Victor Amadeus and Count de Mercy challenged one another in northern Italy. For most of Europe, Italy was some other theatre. For the Russo-German commanders of Brunswick-Luneburg, Italy was a place for inferior generals, smaller armies, and lesser politics; for Britain and France, Italy warranted only the slightest attention; and for Spain and the Hapsburgs, Italy was at best a secondary front. However, for Victor Amadeus and de Mercy, Italy was the one and only theatre which mattered. There among the mountains and plains of the ancient Romans, both generals felt that they could decide their careers and their country's fates. Despite the importance which the King of Sardinia and Reichsgeneralfeldmarschall placed in Italian warfare, they were both restricted by the fact that their allies and superiors felt differently. In the case of Victor Amadeus, his requests for French armies and British fleets were soundly but politely rejected. In the case of de Mercy, as a consequence of his successful campaign in 1727, the Holy Roman Emperor had stolen one-fourth of his army to reinforce the Rhenish front
[1]. Even with these limitations, Victor Amadeus and de Mercy still had a war to fight and to win.
In the eyes of de Mercy, he had been robbed of a triumphant victory in 1727 due to the cowardice of the Sardinians. In 1728, de Mercy was determined to find and secure that triumph to cap off his long and decorated career as he was nearing an age where he knew he would struggle to maintain his brilliance
[2]. In de Mercy's mind, the best way to get his victory was to go straight down the highway of Piedmont. Either the Sardinians would have to confront him or he would be outside Turin by end of the campaigning season. On the other side, Victor Amadeus and his army were left battered and humiliated by their retreat. Within the court of Turin, the discontent over and disdain towards the King's failure were palpable, and the ambitious and cold-hearted crown prince seemed to be reveling in his father's more recent fumble. With such a hostile homefront, Victor Amadeus knew that although he could afford to concede some of Piedmont's outer defenses he could not afford to lose someplace of real significance such as Cuneo or Casale. In such a case, Victor Amadeus might not just lose the war but also his throne
[3]. As a result of these two perspectives, a true showdown of the two Italian armies was destined before spring even turned into summer.
In line with de Mercy's plan, the Hapsburg campaign began in late May with a march straight towards the town of Novi near Piedmont's outer reaches. Lacking much in the means of defense, the town was overrun with ease by the Hapsburg army. From there de Mercy continued on to Tortona and its citadel. Although Victor Amadeus could have made an effort to defend Tortona he opted not to. Tortona although possessing good fortifications lacked the inherent defensibility and strategic worth to make fighting over it a smart decision. Indeed, Tortona's citadel hardly made up for the fact that the Hapsburgs outnumbered the Sardinians 30000 to 22000, almost 3 to 2. However, Victor Amadeus did elect to leave behind a few hundred soldiers just to slow down the Hapsburg advance. Due to the gigantic disparity between the size of the garrison and the size of besieging force, the town was forced to surrender after ten days of bombardment. However, once the town had fallen the Sardinian soldiers fell back into the citadel and now proved more difficult and irritating for the Hapsburgs. With strong walls and plentiful supplies, the Sardinian garrison refused to surrender and aimed to draw out the siege as long as they could, and for twenty long days, they did. Yet on the twentieth day, the bloodthirsty and impatient de Mercy decided that enough was enough and ordered a full-on assault of the citadel to forcibly put an end to this farce. With thousands of Hapsburg soldiers surging towards and up the walls of the citadel of Tortona, the Sardinian garrison had no choice but to surrender after just over an hour of fighting.
Although Tortona had annoyingly delayed de Mercy it had not changed the strategic situation before him nor his desire to show Victor Amadeus his place. For this purpose, de Mercy sought to conquer the famed fortress of Bassignana, the guard of the highway of the Po and of the city of Alessandria. If Victor Amadeus allowed de Mercy to have the fortress then Alessandria would fall and Casale would be under threat. If Victor Amadeus chose to defend it then de Mercy would have his battle. Looking at the same facts as de Mercy, Victor Amadeus made the same conclusions. In spite of the fact that de Mercy's army still significantly outnumbered his army, Victor Amadeus chose that he would in fact accept de Mercy's challenge and fight him for Bassignana. Victor Amadeus understood the risk he was taking but felt that with Bassignana's formidable fortifications and geography that victory would be attained and the Hapsburgs ejected. In light of Victor Amadeus' new-found mettle, de Mercy slowed his approach towards Bassignana and deployed a screen to prevent any Italian mischief. However, de Mercy's caution was unnecessary as Victor Amadeus was intent on waiting for de Mercy at Bassignana, there they would their showdown. Thus in early-July the Hapsburgs were permitted to reach the environs of Bassignana without any combat outside of a few skirmishes.
Once near Bassignana, de Mercy could see the fortress and its surroundings for himself. Bassignana was situated on a sideways triangle that was guarded along its northern edge by the Po River and its southern edge by the Tanaro River with their confluence forming its eastern vertex. Fortunately for the Hapsburgs, the geography of Bassignana was not unassailable as the Po and Tanaro rivers featured numerous crossings and fording points, and a plain laid to the west of Bassignana. With this geography before him, de Mercy could unravel the complexities of taking Bassignana. Quickly it became clear to de Mercy that to take Bassignana, he needed to control the western plain. There he could cut off and prevent an easy escape of the Sardinian army to Turin. Instead, the Sardinians would be forced to cross the Po or Tanaro and try to maneuver east or south, neither direction would be particularly welcoming for the Sardinians. At the same time, de Mercy recognized that the Sardinians being native defenders would also realize the necessity of the western plain and very well might leave the safety of Bassignana's tall walls to stop de Mercy from taking the plain. So long as de Mercy could effectively cross the river such a scenario could prove very favorable and become the victory that de Mercy lusts for.
On July 21st de Mercy established batteries along the southern bank of the Tanaro to cover the crossing of his army towards the plain. The Sardinians immediately recognized this for what it was and sent some cavalry and infantry to harry this process. These raiders quickly ran back when the Hapsburgs deployed in force to stop them. Meanwhile, the rest of the Sardinian army began the hard work of digging trenches and building cheval de frises for the oncoming battle
[4]. Once the Hapsburg artillery was set up, however, the bombardment soon followed and the Sardinian effort was stymied. By the end of the day, both armies had positioned themselves on opposite sides of the bank and the stage for the Battle of Bassignana was set.
On the morning of July 22nd, the two armies began to set their lines but each found itself hampered by the artillery of the other. Ultimately at 10:30 am the battle began in earnest as the Hapsburgs approached the bridge in strength and fierce exchange of gunfire began. De Mercy gradually poured more soldiers into their focal point and Victor Amadeus responded in kind. Finally, as de Mercy felt that Victor Amadeus' focus was well and truly on the bridge, he began to have elements of his left flank ford the river to the west of the bridge. In reply, Victor Amadeus redeployed soldiers from his own left flank to reinforce the attacked right flank. Steadily but bloodily, the Sardinians pushed back the Hapsburg left flank and sensing a potential victory Victor Amadeus unleashed his reserves and the Sardinians began to cross the Tanaro themselves. Now with Victor Amadeus' mind fully occupied with the combat on the bridge and to its west, de Mercy completed his battle plan. Using the fording points revealed by the attempted Sardinian raid the previous night, de Mercy sent his entire right flank and much of his cavalry straight at the weakened left of the Sardinians. In this manner, the Sardinians pushed across the river to the west of the bridge while the Hapsburgs did the same to the east. However, unlike Victor Amadeus, de Mercy still had reserves at his disposable. Ever the reckless risktaker, de Mercy did not use the reserves as most other generals would have
[5]. Rather than just deploy these reserves to stabilize his left flank, de Mercy sent all his reserves and himself to his right flank so that he might punch into the Sardinian line and break it. On his left, all de Mercy did was give his subordinate Wirich Philipp von Daun full command and his best wishes. In the succeeding sequence of actions, Daun could not reverse this western tide on his own. However, Daun did manage to hold on long enough for de Mercy's effort to the east to overwhelm and shatter the Sardinian left flank. As Victor Amadeus' right flank scattered, he realized that the battle was very much lost and ordered the retreat. However, the simple realities of the battle meant that this retreat was not close to as organized or good-fashioned as Victor Amadeus hoped for. With the left flank already broken, those Sardinian soldiers struggled to do much more than run. Meanwhile, the Sardinian right flank was caught in a terrible position as it was split between two sides of the Tanaro River and the centre was already retreating. Although the Sardinian commanders among the right flank did their best, they could not prevent the panic that overtook those soldiers fighting on the southside of the Tanaro as the army to their north began to pull back. Amid this localized panic, Daun and de Mercy were able to build upon this victory with many more enemies being captured or killed. Ultimately by 4 pm, the Sardinian army had left the vicinity of Bassignana with only a few troops left within the fortress to defend it.
Looking back at the battle, although de Mercy's skill and daring had seen the Sardinian left flank obliterated the real reason the Hapsburgs had claimed victory was simple mathematics. With a numerical advantage of nearly 8000 men, the Hapsburg army's sections were all considerably stronger than their opposite number. Even though Victor Amadeus had reinforced his right flank and deployed his reserves to his right flank, the Sardinians did not gain the massive advantage one would expect simply because of their initial inferiority. This fact mitigated the pressure Daun was under and allowed him to survive the relentless Sardinian attack. Furthermore, Daun was able to depend on supporting fire from the Hapsburg centre since they outmatched the Sardinian centre and could afford to do so. Without these numbers, de Mercy's reckless and bloodthirsty nature might have been punished and repulsed. However, blame needs to be placed on Victor Amadeus. All Victor Amadeus needed to do was defend Bassignana. By launching a counterattack across the Tanaro, he was going beyond what was necessary and putting his army at risk when it did not need to be so. Additionally, the retreat of the Sardinian army was poorly managed mainly as a result of Victor Amadeus being overly frightened by de Mercy's success in the east. Although the battle was certainly lost at that point had Victor Amadeus been willing to stand his ground for some time then his right flank's escape could have been performed properly. In the end, the Hapsburgs secured a good although bloody victory. For the cost of 2800 men, they had taken 7000 of their foes
[6]. In other words, the Hapsburgs had lost under a tenth of their army to take nearly a third of the Sardinian army. On top of the numbers within the battle, the battle also afforded the Hapsburgs a number of gains after the fact. Within a week of the battle, the great fortress fell and Piedmont opened itself up to the Hapsburgs like a flower. By the end of November, Alessandria, Casale, and Asti were all in Hapsburg hands. As a consequence, the Hapsburgs were now in control of a third of Piedmont and in position to threaten either Turin or Cuneo in the following year.
In spite of how good this victory at Bassignana was, going back to the initial point of this chapter it was not celebrated as it should have been. Bassignana had the misfortune of quickly following Munster and Soltau and then being followed by the Spanish landing at Sardinia. The sister battles of Munster and Soltau were obviously grander in scale, significance, and in the minds of Europe's courts. Meanwhile, the Spanish landing at Sardinia was more daring and shocking. This poor timing combined with the natural disclination of European courts towards Italian combat led to de Mercy's victory at Bassignana being lessened and diminished. In contrast to Hordt or Bellhiem which turned nothing into everything. Indeed, in Vienna, although Emperor Joseph was proud to have another victory for the Hapsburg Realm, he did not celebrate it with the same energy and luster as he did with Bellheim. Bellheim was the first Hapsburg victory of the war, was against the ancient Hapsburg enemy in France, and against the acclaimed Villars. Bassignana even though it was bigger, realer, and led to actual territorial gains did receive the same treatment. Overall, Bassignana was just too normal of a battle relative to the rest of the war. Thus even though Eugene of Savoy was writing extreme compliments to de Mercy for his victory, the rest of Europe was not so exciting
[7].
[1] In the Italian update, a Meaningless March to Milan, the campaign ended with de Mercy's army being reduced from 40000 men to 30000 men.
[2] Within half a decade de Mercy was almost blind so I imagine he is already having some issues with eyesight and other physical difficulties.
[3] OTL Victor Amadeus abdicated a few years from now and when he tried to return to power he was imprisoned by his son and no one batted an eye. Here there is more discontent and its more obvious which makes Victor Amadeus more cognizant of the fragility of his position.
[4] In this case the cheval de frises are the long bars of wood with wooden stakes attached in the form of x's.
[5] De Mercy's character is that of a risky, reckless, and headfirst general who seeks confrontation and battle.
[6] Much of these Sardinian casualties are from the mop-up of the retreating forces.
[7] To be clear, Bassignana is recognized as a major battle and as a major victory. In Vienna, Joseph loves another victory but he does not treat it like his baby of Bellheim. He celebrates it and calls it another example of Austrian excellence but he does not publicize it as much nor push its narrative as hard as he did Bellheim. In other countries they are obviously more concerned with their own victories or defeats. Spain of course has Sardinia; Russia, Prussia, Britain, and Denmark have Munster; and France sees it as a sign of Savoyard incompetence and looks on with disgust.
Word Count: 2703
