Baltic Blunder: Europe at war in 1727 (the 2nd Edition)

1: Ripperda and the outbreak of war
  • 1: Ripperda and the outbreak of war
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    Juan Guillermo de Ripperda

    The second half of the 17th century had seen the steady deterioration and diminishment of the Spanish empire. For decades, Spain found itself besieged by one opponent after another, all seeking a slice of Spain's rich and immense domains. This lust for Spain's bountiful lands ultimately obstructed the peaceful passage of Spain's empire from Carlos II to his chosen Bourbon heir, Felipe V, and provoked the long, hard War of the Spanish Succession. The war saw the Spanish monarchy attacked everywhere, from the Americas to Sicily to the Spanish Netherlands. Even Spain itself was assailed as the Catalans fought against the Bourbon heir in favor of the Hapsburg claimant, Karl von Hapsburg, as the Rock of Gibraltar was lost to an English invasion, and as Madrid traded hands seven times. Eventually, in 1713, after more than a decade of fighting, the war finally came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht. This treaty effectively ended Spain's claim to greatness and removed it from the class of heavyweight European powers that Spain had been a part of since its inception. Soon after the rest of Europe began to look past and beyond Spain: Britain took to adventuring in the Baltic, Austria resumed its campaigning against the Turk, and France attempted to inject life into its lacklustre colonies.

    However, while the rest of the Continent thought that Spain's power had been permanently curtailed, the new Spanish king believed that he could revitalize the behemoth that once was Spain. With this dream in mind, Felipe V, his queen, Isabel Farnese, and his adviser Cardinal Alberoni engaged in a series of plots and intrigues to destabilize and distract the guarantors of the Treaty of Utrecht so that Spain might steal back its lost provinces amidst the chaos. These plots included efforts to unleash the Jacobites on Britain, seize control of the government of France, and fuel conflict between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Ottoman Sultan. While Europe's powers were occupied by the consequences of these schemes, the armies of Spain swiftly conquered the islands of Sardinia and Sicily. This initial success, however, did not last. Soon the plots of Alberoni were exposed and defeated and soon after so were the soldiers of Spain. The resulting defeat only served to reconfirm the harsh reality of Utrecht: Spain had fallen. Thwarted and demoralized, King Felipe allowed his melancholy to get the best of him and abdicated in 1724. Unfortunately, the death of Felipe's successor, Luis, just months after forced Felipe to return to his miserable throne.

    When Felipe V's second reign began, it did not take long for his scheming to restore Spain's former glory to resume. Having learned from the failed war against the Quadruple Alliance, Felipe now sought to split up and befriend his enemies. Through breaking and shifting the alignments of Europe Felipe thought that he might be allowed to fight just one of his enemies rather than all of them. At first, Felipe imagined that Spain's friend would be France. However, the young French king, Louis XV, and his anti-Felipe advisers ultimately stymied that plan when they sent back the Spanish infanta meant to marry Louis XV. This act outraged the Spanish court and demonstrated that France cared more for Britain's alliance than for its family in Spain. With France having turned its back to Spain, Felipe refocused its efforts on the Holy Roman Emperor.

    The task of arranging an alliance between Spain and the Hapsburgs had fallen to the relatively minor character of Juan Guillermo de Ripperda. Ripperda was another in a long string of foreign adventurers who had come to the Spanish court to make their name and fortune. Despite not having done much or really anything to prove himself thus far, Ripperda's knowledge of foreign languages and his limited diplomatic experience were enough for King Felipe to appoint him as Spain's special envoy to the Emperor. The additional benefit of sending Ripperda over a Spaniard was that if Ripperda were to say something truly infuriating to the Emperor, Felipe could easily have Ripperda disavowed and abandoned as Spain had done with so many other adventurers.

    The proposition which Ripperda was sent to deliver to Emperor Charles VI was in simple terms outrageous. Spain expected Charles VI to allow his daughter and heiress, Maria Theresa, to wed Don Carlos of Spain who would then be named King of the Romans and be in line to gain the Hapsburg lands in Germany and Hungary. Furthermore, Charles' second daughter would marry Don Felipe of Spain who would receive Milan, Sicily, and Naples from the Emperor. Furthermore, the Southern Netherlands were to be returned to Spain and Hapsburg aid was expected in Spain's efforts to regain Sardinia, Minorca, and Gibraltar. In return, Spain would offer support to the Emperor against the Turks and opposition within the Holy Roman Empire, trade with the Spanish empire, help with the Ostend Company, and concessions regarding the Order of the Golden Fleece. Of course, Charles VI and his ministers outright rejected this imbalanced proposal. Even though this initial offer was declined, Emperor Charles did not scorn the audacious Spanish entirely since he found the idea of a Spanish alliance appropriate. Accordingly, Emperor Charles permitted Ripperda to remain in Vienna to negotiate a reasonable deal.

    The first arrangement that Ripperda and the Hapsburgs came to only amounted to a defensive alliance in return for Spain giving the Hapsburgs and their Ostend Company certain commercial rights. This agreement would have been woefully insufficient and angrily thrown out by the Spanish had it not been for Spain's recent falling out with France. Consequently, Spain accepted and even celebrated the Treaty of Vienna and the new alliance with the Hapsburgs. In spite of the limited range of this alliance, its existence still concerned the government of Britain greatly. In Britain, there was even talk of returning Gibraltar to Spain if Spain would void its treaty with the Hapsburgs. Yet this talk was quickly disregarded and in its place talk of a true military alliance with France emerged. France apparently shared Britain's concern and signed the Treaty of Hanover, which entered France into an alliance with Britain and Prussia. The hope was that this counter-alliance would suppress the willingness of the Hapsburgs to feed into the ambitions of Spain. However, the creation of this alliance only further encouraged the Hapsburgs to tie themselves to the Spanish. Within months of the Treaty of Hanover, Ripperda had signed a new treaty with the Emperor that arranged for two of the Emperor's daughters to marry Don Carlos and Don Felipe. Additionally, the Emperor would support Spain's quest to retake Gibraltar and Minorca in return for Spanish subsidies. The fact that both of these terms had been rejected in full during earlier Hapsburg-Spanish negotiations goes to show how much the Treaty of Hanover influences Hapsburg policy. The signing of this revised Treaty of Vienna began a series of negotiations between the states of Europe that left them aligned into two camps, that of Britain and France and that of Austria and Spain. The Hanoverian Alliance ultimately consisted of Britain, France, the Dutch Republic, Hanover, and Sardinia. The opposing Viennese Alliance consisted of Austria, Spain, Russia, Saxony, Bavaria, and Cologne. Prussia although one of the original signers of the Treaty of Hanover created uncertainty about its loyalties by entering into talks with the Emperor.

    With these two alliances dividing the continent it seemed like a continental war was on the horizon but first, a political misstep ended Ripperda's adventure and complicated the Hapsburg-Spanish relationship. After returning from Vienna with the improved treaty, Ripperda claimed that Charles VI wanted him to be Spain's prime minister. King Felipe V, Isabel, and the Spanish Court compiled with this demand out of fear of losing their Hapsburg benefactor. However, upon the arrival of the Hapsburg dignitary, Konigsegg, it was discovered that the Emperor was in no way inclined towards Ripperda and that his claim was entirely false. More importantly, however, was the fact that Konigsegg discovered that Spain had no money to supply the subsidies promised by Ripperda. Although the Hapsburgs still favored amity with Spain and continued to remain supportive of Spain this discovery did add to the concerns that the Hapsburgs had about their alliance with Spain. Ultimately, in spite of the Treaty of Vienna's prime orchestrater falling and being imprisoned, the alliance remained intact and soon after an optimistic Spain declared war on Perfidious Albion. However, as the Spanish went war thinking that they had the backing of the Hapsburgs, their Viennese partners were already beginning to have second thoughts about the viability and worth of the alliance [1].

    [1] So far everything is still OTL.

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    2: Spain and Britain's war
  • 2: Spain and Britain's war
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    13th Siege of Gibraltar

    Although Spain had been the one to declare war against Britain in 1727, the first act of war had actually been undertaken by Britain. In the spring of 1726, the British parliament dispatched a fleet of eleven ships-of-the-line, one frigate, two sloops, and one snow to the Caribbean under the command of Rear-Admiral Francis Hosier, a veteran of the War of the Spanish Succession. The orders given to Rear-Admiral Hosier at the time were to interdict or impede the shipment of gold from the Spanish Main to Spain. After weeks of planning and waiting at Port Royal in Jamaica, Rear-Admiral Hosier finally figured out that the best means of disrupting Spain's golden lifeline was to attack Porto Bello, one of Spain's prime treasure ports. Upon arrival, the British fleet managed to quickly and easily seize a number of Spanish ships. However, the Spanish treasure escaped capture and was safely unloaded and returned to the storehouses of the port.

    An experienced naval commander such as Rear-Admiral Hosier probably recognized the superiority of the British at that moment over the weak Porto Bello. However, perhaps due to the legal fiction that Britain and Spain were still in a state of peace, Hosier was not authorized to follow-up his successful naval action with the capture of Porto Bello. Instead, Sir Robert Walpole, the leader of the British government, ordered Hosier to blockade Porto Bello and to capture the treasure fleet if it tried to run the blockade. Beyond that, Hosier had little and no authority to act. With the Spanish several ships already they were not so brave as to contest the British blockade. Instead, the following months saw both the Spanish and British forces around Porto Bello remain idle.

    The British fleet, at sea, suffered the worst of this calm stall. At first, the British had to contend with the hardship of scurvy that emerged in any fleet too long out of port. Eventually, however, the situation got much worse for the British. Over time, the combination of the tropics and the constrained quarters of the ships culminated in an outbreak of yellow fever among the British fleet. Thousands of British sailors fell victim to the disease, many dying and others being too weak to attend to their duties. Ultimately, with his fleet completely ravaged by disease, Hosier had no option left to him but to return to Jamaica and try to replenish his numbers. Even after the British left Porto Bello, yellow fever continued to plague them, especially after Hosier put to sea again and this time tested Cartagena.

    Once Hosier and the British fleet were beaten back from Porto Bello by the hazards of the tropics, the commander of the Spanish treasure fleet, Lieutenant General Antonio de Gaztañeta, did not hesitate to set sail for Spain. With fresh supplies and fresh hulls, the Spanish fleet departed Porto Bello in January 1727. Two months later, on March 8, 1727, de Gaztañeta and the Spanish treasure arrived in Spain unharmed by either enemy or the elements. The fleet's arrival in Spain was hailed as a victory, which it doubtless was considering that Britain had invested and wasted significant resources for the sole purpose of avoiding that exact outcome. The reason for Britain's effort is made quite clear by the fact that the treasure fleet added 31 million pesos to the Spanish treasury. In light of Spain's weak financial institutions and recent monetary constraints, this gold was vital to making Spain's war effort against Britain at all viable.

    When Spain declared war on Britain, it did so with little pre-war preparation and a weak treasury. The reason Spain had been willing to make war under such poor conditions was that Spain had been promised serious material aid from the Hapsburg monarchy. The Hapsburgs, however, hesitated about fully committing themselves to the Spanish alliance in the wake of open warfare. The hesitation of Hapsburgs was amplified by the sudden friendliness of the British after months of cool and halting talks. Consequently, Spain found itself dependent solely on its own resources to find a way toward victory. For this reason, the successful delivery of the Spanish treasure in March 1727 was all the more important.

    Even in spite of the Hapsburgs pulling away at the last moment and even in spite of Spain's horrible last seven or so decades, the Spanish commanders were still confident in Spain's ability to achieve success. These commands, of course, had to call back to the memory of the Spanish empire of their grandfathers or even great-grandfathers rather than the recent actions of the Spanish military to remind their soldiers of Spain's glory. Even if several of these commanders had found some early successes in Spain's most recent conflict, the War of the Quadruple Alliance, no one could gloss over the fact that that war had ended in a humiliating defeat for Spain and its military. The only reason why Spain was not broken entirely by that war was due to diplomatic machinations.

    In this new war, the war against Britain, the main success that the Spanish hoped to achieve was the capture of Gibraltar, which remained a key symbol of Spain's oppression at the hands of other powers. In regards to accomplishing this feat, previously, the late Francisco Castillo Fajardo, Marquis de Villadarias, who had previously tried to recaptured Gibraltar had noted that the British fortress was unassailable without naval superiority. After the horrific defeat of the Spanish navy and de Gaztañeta at the Battle of Cape Passaro during the War of the Quadruple Alliance, Spain had not only lost any claim to naval superiority over the British but any right to even contest the seas with Britain. This is among the reasons why the Spanish fleet at Porto Bello was abused and why the treasure fleet had to remain motionless unlike yellow fever, not Spanish guns, tore apart the British fleet. With these facts in mind, de Villadarias probably would have deemed a capture of the Rock of Gibraltar to be impossible and advised against attempting it. However, by 1727, de Villadarias had been dead for a decade and so even if he would have wanted to object to an attack on Gibraltar, he could not.

    With de Villadarias long dead, three other men came to the forefront of Spanish planning against Gibraltar, Jorge Prospero de Verboom, Francisco Monteagut, and Diego Bordick. All three men were engineers rather than simple field generals and they were slightly more sanguine about Spanish prospects against Gibraltar than de Villadarias was. The engineers thought that if a diversionary attack was combined with a quick naval assault against the southern approach of the Rock that Spain had a slim chance of success. Even if this assessment was not as categorical as de Villadarias', King Felipe V of Spain recognized it for what it was: a veiled refutation of action against Gibraltar. For a man as melancholic as Felipe V, the engineers' perspective was simply depressing.

    Fortunately for Felipe V and Isabel, among Spain's leading commanders there was at least one would a more cheerful deposition. Cristóbal de Moscoso y Montemayor, Count de la Torres, in contrast to the legacy of de Villadarias and the recent judgments of the engineers, claimed that he could retake Gibraltar. Not only could de la Torres retake Gibraltar but he could do it in six weeks or less. This optimistic claim easily grabbed the attention of Felipe V and Isabel and drowned out any of the resistance or logic of the engineers. Consequently, de la Torres was named commander of the campaign against Gibraltar, and the engineers were made his subordinates. No attention was paid to the fact that de la Torres' own military experience was limited to a series of failed attacks against the Hapsburg forces in Valencia two decades earlier during the War of the Spanish Succession. He could promise Gibraltar in six weeks and that was enough for Felipe V and Isabel.

    The army handed to de la Torres consisted of thirty infantry battalions and six squadrons of horse complemented by an artillery train of seventy-two mortars and ninety-two cannons. In total, de le Torres was entrusted with 12,000 men, on paper at least. Among these men were four Irish battalions, which were filled primarily with Jacobite supporters who viewed this campaign as an opportunity to strike a hard blow against the evil Hanoverian empire. Opposing the Spanish army was the much smaller garrison of Gibraltar. This garrison contained only the elements of four incomplete regiments, which added up to just 1,200 men. On top of this numerical disadvantage of ten to one, both David Colyear, the Earl of Portmore, and Brigadier General Jasper Clayton, respectively, the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Gibraltar, were absent from the fortress when the Spanish army arrived across the isthmus. Consequently, the responsibility of defending the woefully outnumber Gibraltar fell to a mere colonel, Richard Kane. Although the British faced a grim disparity in land forces, Kane and his defenders could rely on the naval squadrons of Gibraltar and Menorca for their help. These squadrons and the naval superiority that they provided promised that Gibraltar should remain supplied with munitions and food throughout the siege.

    The Thirteenth Siege of Gibraltar began on February 11, 1727, when the Spanish occupied the Devil's Tower to the north of Gibraltar and began to dig siege lines opposing Gibraltar. The immediate response of the British garrison was to fire a few warning shots, however, the angle of depression made a heavy bombardment of the Spanish position difficult. Consequently, rather than rely on Gibraltar's guns to affect the Spanish, the British used their naval guns, which is fitting considering Britain's historical reliance on its navy. The so-called Wooden Wall of Britain now meant to act as a wooden wall for Gibraltar. At first, these naval attacks did take their toll on the Spanish besiegers and killed hundreds of Spaniards. However, once the Spanish constructed artillery batteries along the coast to trade back fire with the British, the British ships backed down.

    Even though the Spanish were able to stop the British naval bombardment, poor weather combined with the harassment provided by British Willis' battery hampered Spanish efforts to advance their siege lines. However, the discovery of a cave beneath Willis' battery offered the Spanish a chance to literally undermine the battery. Yet once it became obvious that completing the task would take several months or more, de la Torres abandoned the thought. Instead, de la Torres stuck to his belief and promise that he could bring down Gibraltar in just six weeks. Unfortunately, the reality of leaving Willis' battery standing meant that the Spanish army could not advance its siege lines much further without the risk of making its infantry the victims of slaughter. Thus, an assault was ruled out and the only thing left to do was for the Spaniards to hammer Gibraltar into submission with their cannons.

    The true Spanish bombardment of Gibraltar commended on March 24, 1727, and continued for ten straight days. The bombardment would have lasted longer, but the rains became too heavy and the conditions began too difficult. Still, the bombardment was not without success. The northern fortifications of Gibraltar and the Villa Vieja neighborhood had sustained a harsh punishment from the cannons. Indeed, in Villa Vieja, after the bombardment "a hundred houses were by that means laid in Rubbish" according to one British defender. However, this Spanish success was complemented by some Spanish difficulties. Besides Gibraltar remaining defiant and refusing to surrender, the Spanish army had lost numbers to both disease and desertion. Both disease and desertion were common problems in any siege as the cramped and unsanitary conditions of the siege camp facilitated the spawn and spread of disease while the prolonged idleness and the limited prospect of glory made desertion even more appealing.

    The situation for de la Torres' army grew worse when severe weather hampered the Spanish so much that the British were able to reinforce Gibraltar without molestation first on April 7 and later on May 1. These reinforcements brought the size of Gibraltar's garrison up to more than 5,000, or more than four times its original size. Also, among the reinforcements from Britain was the Earl of Portmore, an experienced general and proven leader who as Governor of Gibraltar had been specifically tasked with preparing and planning for this moment since he was first assigned the post in August 1713. Additionally, the reinforcement significantly bolstered the morale and confidence of the British defenders. The situation in Gibraltar was so much improved that shortly afterward a sortie was attempted. However, the sortie did fail due to the British artillery opening fire too early and giving the Spanish forewarning. By this point, de la Torres failed to take Gibraltar in six weeks but he still retained his typical bombastic optimism.

    On May 7, the weather finally settled down enough to allow the Spanish to resume their bombardment of Gibraltar. For eight days the Spanish rained fire and dropped thousands of cannonballs on Gibraltar. This bombardment killed a number of British defenders and harried the British batteries. On the Old Mole of Gibraltar, sixteen of twenty-four British cannon were dismounted in a single day of bombardment. At Willis' battery, the bombardment had left only two guns mounted and scared the British artillery personnel so much that they hesitated to return to their positions. This attack shook the British and their confidence so much that Portmore felt the need to raise the wages of his soldiers from eightpence a day to a full shilling a day. Across the isthmus, de la Torres seemed to recognize his success and sent Portmore this message" A Flag of Truce to the Governor With a Compliment to inform his Lordship that they have not begun the Siege, and that as yet they were only trying their ordinance, tho' they yesterday sent us, most part into the Town, 119 Bombs and near 1500 Balls and keep still a most dreadfull firing."

    In spite of those eight days of relentless bombardment, Gibraltar and Portmore did not succumb to the Spanish siege and de la Torres' taunts. This defiance proved worthwhile as after eight days of the unwavering attack, the Spanish iron cannons had broken from overuse and the Spanish brass cannons were rendered ineffective by overheating. Furthermore, the failure of the Hapsburgs to provide the promised material support meant that the Spanish supply situation had declined into a horrid state. Soon enough the British had remounted their guns and reestablished their batteries and then proceeded to once again return fire against their Spanish foes. All in all, despite the damage done by the Spanish, they were little closer to taking Gibraltar than when the siege had begun and the defenders although shaken were still stalwart. In the wake of these issues, the previous disagreements between the Spanish commanders over how to conduct a siege of Gibraltar boiled up into outright hostility. De Verboom, the engineer-in-chief of the Spanish siege was so discontented with de la Torres' conducting of the siege that he returned to Madrid to file a complaint with Felipe V. When de Verboom arrived in Madrid, however, he found that Felipe V and the entire Spanish government's focus had turned to an entirely different place from Gibraltar, the Baltic [1].

    [1] Once again, this post is entirely OTL. The next post will include the POD. This last line, obviously, hints at that POD: Shenanigans in the Baltic.

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    3: Rally and Rage
  • 3: Rally and Rage
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    Empress Catherine I of Russia

    At the same time as the British found themselves at war with the Spanish in the Caribbean and the Mediterranean, they also were in the midst of a crisis with the Russians in the Baltics. Ever since Russia's dramatic victory over Sweden in the Great Northern War, Russia had been the Baltic's premier power. Since this Russian rise coincided with the succession of the German Hanoverians to the British throne, Russia being the major Baltic power posed a grave threat to Britain's new Hanoverian attachment. Of particular concern to the Hanoverian dynasty was Russia's ardent support of the House of Holstein-Gottorp's claims against the House of Oldenburg, the monarchs of Denmark and Norway. These claims consisted of portions of the Duchy of Holstein and Duchy of Schleswig. Alone the Holstein-Gottorps had no chance of defeating the Danes and repossessing these lands. However, with Russian armies fighting in their name the Holstein--Gottorps could very well retake these lands. The reason why the Hanoverians found this possibility so worrying was that Denmark's sale of Bremen-Verden to the Hanoverians had been conditioned on the House of Hanover promising to support Denmark in its continued dispute with the Holstein-Gottorps. In the case that Denmark was to lose its parts of Holstein and Schleswig then the sale of Bremen-Verden could be considered void. Subsequently, the province could be detached from the possessions of the Hanoverians and their Electorate of Brunswick-Luneburg could be left without easy access to the valuable Bremish ports.

    As a consequence of this geopolitical situation, the Hanoverian-led Britain had spent the years between the Great Northern WWar and 1727 doing everything they could to oppose Russia and discourage it from coercively amending the Holstein-Gottorp's circumstances. This active and oppositional policy involved Britain deploying a war fleet to the Baltic in 1721 and then again in 1726. Both times, these fleets acted as shows of force meant to demonstrate Britain's resolve in opposing the Holstein-Gottorps' claims and Russia's support of them. Although the latter fleet did successfully dissuade a Russian attack on Denmark in 1726, it also turned Russia's attention and ire away from solely Denmark and Norway to Britain and Brunswick-Luneburg as well. Out of their fury for Britain's constant interference with Russian foreign policy, Empress Catherine I and her councilors placed Russia in two alliances that were opposed to Britain. The first alliance was concluded with the Hapsburgs and Spaniards. Under the conditions of this alliance, Russia agreed to join in arms against Britain and all her allies by supplying 30,000 soldiers for direct action against Brunswick-Luneburg. The second alliance was made with the exiled Jacobite claimants to the British throne. This second alliance, however, was only informal and no official treaty was signed, which perhaps reflects the landless status of the Jacobites. Altogether, the two alliances, even the informal second one, frightened Britain, even more so than the prospect of war with the hobbled Spain.

    Britain chose to act on its fear as it always did: by sending envoys and warships. In the spring of 1727, British envoys arrived in Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Cassel for the purpose of gathering allies to defend Brunswick-Luneburg from Russian aggression. In Copenhagen, the British reaffirmed their support for the Oldenburgs over the Holstein-Gottorps in the Holstein-Schleswig dispute. Additionally, the British reminded the Danes of the hazard of Russian power to Danish interests. In Stockholm, the British offered the revanchist Swedes a chance to redeem the hard defeat and restore the lost conquests of the Great Northern War. In Cassel, the British simply presented hard cash and promised more to come. In all three capitals, each government agreed to sign on to the Treaty of Hanover and thus join the Anglo-Prusso-French alliance.

    While British diplomats went around northern Europe buying Britain foreign arms to defend Brunswick-Luneburg, the British navy entered the Baltic to remind Russia who was the superior naval power. Once again, a British fleet had trespassed into Russia's sphere of influence determined to show its strength over Russia and force Russia to back down during a geopolitical spate. Yet this time was different from previous ones. In 1726, the Russians had stayed at their base of Reval and abandoned their plans when threatened by the British fleet. Rather than fight or even mildly contest the British, the Russians had been willing to effortlessly concede. In 1727, however, the Russians were in a very different state of mind. After the embarrassment experienced by the Russians in 1726 and in light of Britain's hostile diplomacy, Russia chose against allowing the British to encroach its waters and intrude in Russia's affairs. Unlike in 1726, in 1727, the Russians were determined to act. Fuelled by this sentiment of having wronged by the British, Empress Catherine I of Russia rallied with all her strength from her most recent bout of illness and commanded General Admiral Fyodor Apraskin and the Russian Baltic fleet to answer Britain's display of force with one of Russia's own. Shortly, afterward, the constant ill-health of Empress Catherine restricted to her bed once more and left violently fighting with an illness. The Russian empress would continue to struggle with her illness through the weeks of May [1].

    As Empress Catherine battled with illness, General Admiral Apraksin did just as she had ordered him and moved to challenge the British trespassers. After weeks of sailing, Apraksin located the British fleet, commanded by Admiral John Norris, on May 23, off the coast of the island of Osel. Upon sighting the British, Apraksin prepared his fleet for battle and accordingly sent orders to Osel and Moon's garrisons for help from the coast. In spite of Apraksin making these preparations, Apraksin had no desire to fight a real battle against the mighty Royal Navy. All Apraksin wished to do was to adhere to a limited application of Catherine's orders. By that, Apraksin meant to demonstrate Russian strength and fire some warning spots. Apraksin felt that this non-committal action would fulfill his orders and uphold Russian honor without exposing Russia's navy to the lethal potential of the British navy.

    Although Apraksin was content to have something that could hardly be called a skirmish or action and fearful of anything greater, Admiral Norris had no qualms about engaging the Russian fleet fully. When Norris had first heard of the Russian fleet leaving the safety of Reval, he had been surprised and concerned. This concern was not for Norris' own fleet since Norris like any other naval expert was confident that the Royal Navy could handle its less sophisticated and less trained Russian counterpart. The concern instead was for Britain itself. Previously, a Russian squadron had managed to sail as far as the Hebrides without being intercepted or halted by the Royal Navy. Considering at this point that Russia was allied with the Spaniards and linked with the Jacobites, Admiral Norris naturally was uneasy about the potential of Russians managing such a feat again. For all Norris knew the Russians planned to be at war with Britain soon just as Spain already was or perhaps the Russians were dreaming up plans of putting a Jacobite army on British soil. Britain and Russia could already be at war with how slow communications traveled during the era. Faced with these potential scenarios, Norris felt that the best course of action to respond to an aggressively moving Russian fleet was to engage and defeat it. Consequently, Norris organized his fleet for battle and sailed straight at the Russian ships [2].

    In the opening act, the superior British ships and seamanship hammered the Russian fleet hard. From their gun decks, the British blasted the Russians with cannon fire and from their fighting tops, the British mariners harassed the Russians with musket volleys. Of course, the Russians responded in kind but in a less organized and impactful manner. Although the Russians may have developed an adequate navy, the British were one of, if not the best, naval powers at the time and it showed during this opening combat. Although the Russians fought hard and did not break under the heavy pressure of the British attack, the Russians were clearly taking the worse of the fighting. Daunted by the British aggression and obvious superiority, Apraksin ordered his fleet to retreat into the Kleiner Sund.

    When the Russian ships pulled into the Kleiner Sund along Osel's coast, Norris did not hesitate to order his ships to chase after them. Norris felt may have been winning the battle already and perhaps could have even claimed victory if it sailed away at that point, but the Russian fleet still remained intact. Only one of the Russian ships had thus far been sunk and none at all had been captured. Thus, the Russian fleet still remained somewhat of a danger to Britain. More importantly for an ambitious and adventurous man like Norris there was still a chance for greater glory if he crippled the Russian fleet or even completely defeated it, which seemed perfectly within the realm of possibility given the early success of British ships and arms. Furthermore,a continued battle carried with financial incentives since Norris might capture some Russian ships to sell as prizes back in Britain.

    When the British fleet did chase after the Russian one, it struggled, significantly. Even though the British fleet was undoubtedly the better fleet overall, the British fleet was not better in every way. Throughout the 1720s, the Russian navy had gone from being a fleet filled with and commanded by foreigners to none that was decidedly Russian. As a result, the pilots, captains, and sailors were all considerably familiar with the shorelines of the Russian Empire and how to navigate them. Furthermore, the Russian fleet was a Baltic one whereas the British fleet was an Atlantic one. The small size of the Baltic Sea, its many islands, and the typical constrained quarters of its battles meant that heavy ships were not always superior as they were in the Atlantic. Having the biggest ships and most guns can win many naval battles in the open sea but the same cannot be said when fighting among the cramped shorelines of the Baltic. The Royal Navy's focus on blue water fighting rather than coastal fighting had helped them win a number of battles and wars. However, that same focus had also contributed to several English defeats to the Dutch despite superior English numbers when fighting along the complicated coastline of the Low Countries. At Osel, decades later, the British faced the punishment for having failed to learn from all their mistakes against the Dutch.

    In the tight Kleiner Sund, the British fleet effectiveness quickly and dramatically diminished. Also, the British found themselves being harassed by Russian soldiers from the coasts of Osel and Moon. Even when faced with these adversities, Norris pressed on. Norris saw these complications as hindrances to victory not barriers to victory. Additionally, these "hindrances" had already decreased the scale of Norris' earlier victory. If Norris did not continue the battle until he achieved a greater victory then he surely would be criticized for either overextending himself or not giving chase to a defeated enemy. This attitude was the result of the naval culture developed by the British Admiralty. However, when Norris pressed on, Apraksin merely fell back further. Finally, the battle found its climax when with a sudden, jarring crash, the HMS Britannica ran aground on a hidden shoal. The large size of the HMS Britannica meant that it running aground did not just take the Britannica out of battle but also impeded the ships behind it. Furthermore, the confined area of the strait and the coastal harassment meant that any British attempt to unground the ship was unlikely to succeed. In the wake of this disastrous accident, Norris had effectively lost his biggest ship and was faced with an even smaller channel to move his fleet through. As the situation stood, Norris had no choice but to give up his chase of Apraksin and to retreat back into the open waters of the Baltic. In the course of this retreat, the British evacuated the Britannica but were not afforded the time and opportunity to destroy it. In spite of the British being forced to retreat, Apraksin did not order a counter-attack and chase. Actually, the Russians were incapable of chasing after the British due to the largest amount of number and heft number of casualties sustained by the Russian fleet.

    When news of the Battle of Osel reached Saint Petersburg, it is said that Empress Catherine was so filled with an absolute white rage that she managed to instantly recover from her months-long illness, sit-up proudly, and loudly proclaim that she would destroy Hanover and crush Britain and all its allies for their grievous assault on Russia. Whatever the truth of that anecdote, Catherine did recover from her bedridden state soon after the battle and was indeed enraged by the British attack. In Catherine's eyes, Russia and Britain had been at peace when Britain attacked Russian without provocation. The Russian fleet was doing nothing more than protecting the sovereignty of Russian waters as was its right. Catherine's foreign minister, Andrei Osterman called back to the Battle of Cape Passaro when the British attacked a Spanish fleet in spite of a state of peace between Britain and Spain. The Battle of Osel was no different from Cape Passaro in that regard. There is some truth to that analogy but that analogy also ignores Catherine's aggressive orders and Russia's alliance with Spain, a country that was at war with Britain at the time. It is fairer to say that Catherine was fishing for an excuse to go to war with Britain so that she could resolve the Holstein dispute once and for all and definitively protect Russia's honor [3].

    Regarding the actual result of the Battle of Osel: the Russian fleet had lost 3 ships while the British had only lost the Britannica, and the Britannica had been lost due to running aground rather than Russian naval prowess. Furthermore, twice as many Russian ships had been severely damaged relative to the British fleet. Given these statistics, it seems evident that the Russians were tactically defeated. Also, following the battle, the British fleet was able to remain in the Baltic while the Russian fleet had to retreat to Reval for repairs. Given this strategic situation, the Russians failed to achieve their strategic goal of ending the British threat in the Baltic so there is no strategic victory to be found for either. Thus, with both a tactical and strategic defeat, by strict definition, the Battle of Osel was a Russian defeat and a British victory.

    In spite of the facts, Empress Catherine and the Russians called the Battle of Osel a victory, for them. Catherine proclaimed Apraksin a hero and called Osel the second Gangut. Britain seemed to agree with the Russian sentiment as their reaction to the battle was to consider a humiliation. To the British, low and high, in the Parliament and the Admiralty, Osel looked as if the Royal Navy had been given a bloody nose by a navy that was less than half a century old, led by Asiatic beasts, and consisting of inferior ships. Admiral Norris was completely vilified for his conduct and command during the battle and consequently recalled to Britain. The Admiralty was so strong in their criticism of Admiral Norris that they chose Admiral Charles Wager, who was leading the vital naval effort in Gibraltar, to replace him. Ultimately, Norris was court-martialled over the battle's results but he would successfully defend himself before the military tribunal. A major contributor to the Russian and British sentiments that contradicted the facts of a British victory was that the fate of the Britannica. The loss of a major warship like the Britannica was already embarrassing enough. After the battle, however, the Russians increased their embarrassment further by completing unloading the warship and successfully kedging it. After refloating the Britannica, the Russians repaired it and added it to their own navy. Of course, the name of Britannica was no longer fitting so Catherine renamed it Retribution to indicate her intent to use Britain's own great ship to punish Britain and Brunswick-Luneburg.

    Regarding that punishment, the first move Empress Catherine made was to inform her ambassador to Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI that she was invoking the terms of their alliance and calling on the Hapsburgs to help Russian retaliate against the brazen British attack in the Baltic. At the time, Emperor Charles VI was engaged in negotiations with the British to abandon Spain and reestablish relations with Britain. Considering the lack of Spanish military success and the growing strength of the Hanoverian Alliance, Charles VI had been very inclined to accept the British offer of reconciliation. After the Battle of Osel, however, the situation for Charles VI drastically changed. Even though Charles VI did not pay too much heed to the fanfare made about the heroic victory of the Russian David against the British Goliath, Charles did recognize that if he reconciled with the British now that he would not just have to betray the Spaniards but also the Russians. While the Hapsburgs very well could survive without Spain at its side the same confidence could not be maintained about giving up the alliance with Russia. Still, Charles was very wary to throw his domain into what could be a long, bloody continental war. A war in which there was no guarantee of victory. For days, Charles and his council debated the issue under constant bombardment from the diplomats of Russia, Spain, and Britain. Finally, on June 29, Charles and the Hapsburgs released their answer and it was just as the Russians and Spaniards had prayed for, war.

    The decision of the Russians and the Hapsburgs to declare war on Britain triggered the series of treaties signed between the various powers of Europe and turned what had originally been a limited war between Spain and Britain into a true continental conflict. Opposed by Russia, the Hapsburgs, and Spain, Britain requested France, Sardinia, the Dutch Republic, Denmark-Norway, Sweden, Hesse-Cassel, and Prussia come to its aid. Almost all of these states chose to fulfill their commitments to Britain and joined the war. The Dutch Republic, unsurprisingly, was quite slow in its reaction since its States-General was worried about the potential of French soldiers occupying the Austrian Netherlands, which had acted as a buffer for the Dutch since the War of the Spanish Succession.

    More significant than the Dutch delays was the reaction of Prussia. Prussia had never truly been committed to the thought of an alliance with Britain and France and was reevaluating its situation even before the Battle of Osel and the outbreak of war. In the wake of this war, Prussia's careful examination of its ties with the powers of Europe had to come to a swift conclusion. Although Prussia was a strong state in its own right, it recognized that it was weaker than the Hapsburg monarchy and far far far weaker than the Russian Empire. To fight for Britain could easily mean the complete destruction of Prussia or at least significant damaging of it by the combined arms of the Holy Roman Emperor the Russian empress. Additionally, Prussia risked alienating the final arbiter of legal disputes in the Holy Roman Empire permanently by siding with Britain. On the other hand, fighting for the Emperor and Empress offered Prussia the chance to be in the good graces of the Emperor for any territorial disputes and most importantly meant completely avoiding the likelihood of Russian hordes overwhelming Prussia and Brandenburg. With these thoughts in mind, Prussia chose to join Bavaria, Cologne, and Saxony as allies of Russia, the Hapsburgs, and Spain. All in all, the state set was a spectacle of war between nearly all of the relevant European states [4].

    [1] THIS IS THE POD. In OTL, Catherine I dies on May 16 of 1727. As a result of her death, there immediately is a (bloodless) struggle among the Russian nobility to select the next Russian ruler. As a result of this struggle, new people came into power and among their first actions was to recall the Russian Baltic fleet. Obviously, only recently having gained power the new government does not want to risk losing control or popularity due to war. TTL, Catherine does not die, the fleet is not recalled, and it ultimately ends up fighting the British.
    [2] British naval policy at this time was exceedingly aggressive and tensions with Russia were at a very high point.
    [3] Tensions were very high, all that was needed was a spark.
    [4] Alliances are all OTL and so is Prussia's ultimate loyalty to Austria and ever-lasting fear of Russia.

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    4: Hanoverian Alliance Prepares for War
  • 4: Hanoverian Alliance Prepares for War
    220px-Frederick%2C_Prince_of_Wales_%28anonymous%29.jpg

    Prince Frederick in 1720

    Shortly after war seized almost the whole of Europe in the summer of 1727, the British-led Hanoverian Alliance realized just how unprepared it was for the war, or any war for that matter. A few weeks before the Hapsburg declaration of war, Britain's king, George I, had departed Britain for Brunswick-Luneburg, which marked his sixth tour of Brunswick-Luneburg since his succession to the British crown [1]. When George I left Britain he was by all accounts in good health. Additionally, as with all of George I's excursions out of Britain, a place had never grown to appreciate, he was also in good spirits. George I's trip first took him to Osnabruck where he visited his youngest brother, Ernest Augustus, Prince-Bishop of Osnabruck, Duke of York and Albany, and representative of the House of Hanover in Brunswick-Luneburg.

    After discussing German affairs with Prince-Bishop Ernest Augustus, George I traveled to Herrenhausen Palace in Hanover where his eldest grandson, Prince Frederick Louis, resided, alone. Even though Prince Frederick or Griff as he was often called was second-in-line to the British throne, he had not been taken to Britain with the rest of his family in 1714. Nor had Griff even visited Britain as his grand-uncle, Ernest Augustus, did in 1716. Instead, Griff remained in Brunswick-Luneburg. Occasionally, Ernest Augustus visited but as Prince-Bishop of Osnabruck, he did have other affairs to attend to. George I also met with Griff each time he returned to Brunswick-Luneburg but George I was a hard man who had a hard time showing affection to any man and did not show much to Griff.

    Even though George I never showed love to Griff, he did not disdain his grandson as he disdained his son. Although to others it may have seemed as if Griff had been kept in exile in Brunswick-Luneburg as some sort of punishment that was not the case. The main reason, Griff was restricted to Brunswick-Luneburg was that the Hanoverian dynasty needed to maintain a presence in the electorate to remind the inhabitants of who their overlords were. Due to Ernest Augustus' duties as Prince-Bishop of Osnabruck and George Augustus' role as Prince of Wales, neither of them could provide that presence. Naturally, the duty then fell to Griff even when he was just an eight-year-old child in 1715. The fact that Griff was given this role and more importantly retained this role even after reaching adulthood demonstrated the respect that George I held for Griff, especially in contrast to the scorn he showed to George Augustus.

    After spending time with Griff, George I planned one more leg for his trip to the Continent. This third leg involved visiting his son-in-law, King Friedrich Wilhelm I in Prussia, so that George I could finalize and ratify negotiations for the marriage of Griff to his cousin, Princess Wilhelmine of Prussia. This marriage had been in the talks for around a decade and had growing support from all parties. Griff and Princess Wilhelmine had begun exchanging letters expressing their mutual feelings for one another. George I and Friedrich Wilhelm had viewed the marriage as the perfect way to solidify their alliance. Even George Augustus who personally hated Friedrich Wilhelm was favorable to the arrangement. The British Parliament was also found the marriage agreeable. In light of everyone rallying behind the marriage, it seemed likely that George I and Friedrich Wilhelm would be able to resolve any outstanding issues and consent to the match.

    Before George I could leave Herrenhausen for Berlin to conclude these talks, news from Saint Petersburg and Vienna arrived informing George I that some incident in the Baltic had escalated into a full-blown war that meant to destroy Brunswick-Luneburg. The terrible surprise that this news constituted shook George I and visibly made him unwell. However, George I still retained enough strength to write to Friedrich Wilhelm to confirm Prussia's obligations to Britain and seal them by marrying Griff and Princess Wilhelmine immediately. Before George I's diplomats reached Berlin, however, the messengers of the Hapsburgs and Russia did. Rather than receive any positive affirmation from Friedrich Wilhelm, George I received a declaration of war, which shocked and shook George I so severely that he suffered a stroke and died the next day [2].

    When news of George I's death arrived in Britain, George Augustus failed to believe it at first. Given George I's good health upon departure, George Augustus suspected some sort of loyalty test by his father and feared that if he did step up to take the throne that his father would try to use that act as a pretext to deny him part of all of his inheritance. Only the next day, after reading the official dispatches from Lord Charles Townshend, the Northern Secretary, did he accept the reality of his father's demise. Shortly afterward, George Augustus received Sir Robert Walpole, First Lord of the Treasury or prime minister in other words. Walpole asked George Augustus for instructions on how the king wished to proceed in regard to his father's death and the outbreak of war. Rather than propose any strategy, George Augustus bluntly replied that Walpole should go to Sir Spencer Compton, Speaker of the House of Commons, and that he would give Walpole his instructions. This statement was effectively a dismissal of the man who had led Britain for the past six years and opened a contest for the position of prime minister. Of course, this contest could not be resolved immediately since the British court first had to attend to establishing and crowning George Augustus as George II, King of Great Britain. Thus, the onset of war was met with by a leaderless British parliament and a fresh British king.

    The competition for prime minister mainly occurred between Walpole, the recently dismissed prime minister; Townshend, the Northern Secretary; and Spencer Compton, the Paymaster of Forces [3]. For the past six years, Walpole's leadership had focused heavily on keeping Britain out of conflict. The Treaty of Hanover, which Walpole blamed for escalating tensions and ultimately causing the war, had actually been negotiated entirely by Townshend without Walpole's instruction or guidance. Walpole was only informed of the treaty after it was signed. Given this background, it surprised no one that Walpole did not want to lead Britain through a major war. Nevertheless, Walpole put himself forward as a candidate for leadership since he still felt that he was the best possible leader and that only he could navigate "Townshend's mess". Regarding Townshend, he originally had little interest in pursuing the premiership, however, in the face of war, many members of parliament felt that Townshend as the Northern Secretary and negotiator of the Treaty of Hanover was the most appropriate man to guide the war effort. As a result of this pressure from below, Townshend presented himself to King George II as a potential successor to Walpole. Lastly, there was Compton. Compton was not viewed by most as a particularly adept politician and his efforts to gain influence in British politics were mostly thwarted by Walpole. In spite of these impediments, Compton had one major advantage over both Walpole and Townshend. The advantage of Compton was that he was noted as a man of great will and energy, which contrasted with Walpole's disdain for the war and Townshend's uneagerness to command. For this reason, several politicians had offered their support to Compton rather than the other two, more senior candidates. Whatever the opinion of the members of parliament, however, the decision of who would lead Britain through the war fell to King George II, not anyone else.

    Over the course of a few days, each man made known to George II their interest in being his prime minister. All of them gave speeches about their experience and their skill but the main matter of importance was, of course, their plans for the war. Walpole, out of his reluctance for war, spoke of only limited army operations to prevent the gall of Gibraltar and also defend Brunswick-Luneburg against a Russo-Prusso-Hapsburg attack. Navally, Walpole suggested that Britain should focus on protecting their interests in the Caribbean and the Baltic while also harassing Spanish and Austrian trade. Although this was certainly the most reasonable war plan, it failed to make any positive impression on George II. In spite of George II's fourteen-year-long absence from the Electorate of Brunswick-Luneburg, he was still deeply attached it and felt that Walpole's proposal fell short of ensuring its safety. Furthermore, after all the years that Walpole had spent repressing the influence and power of George II when he was just the Prince of Wales, George II did not care to give Walpole the benefit of doubt.

    The next two candidates spoke of more serious British commitments to the war. Townshend echoed Walpole's focus on Gibraltar, Brunswick-Luneburg, the Caribbean, and the Baltic but in each region advocated for the use of a larger force and the pursuit of grander goals. As the Northern Secretary, Townshend also focused heavily on his experience as a diplomat to push forth ideas to break up the Viennese Alliance and to gain further allies in the war such as Portugal. This strategy was received well by George II but George II did not wholly buy into it. Like Walpole, Townshend had served as part of George I's government and had cooperated with George I closely to design the Treaty of Hanover. This connection to George II's hated father disadvantaged Townshend and left room for Compton to steal the show with calls for massive, unrealistic military commitments to the Low Countries and Brunswick-Luneburg. Whereas George II felt nothing for Gibraltar or the Caribbean, George II strongly believed in the necessity of a powerful British army in northern Europe to win the war and prevent Brunswick-Luneburg's destruction. Compton's attention toward that line of thought and his lack of strong association with George II won him the position of prime minister over both Walpole and Townshend [4].

    Shortly after Compton's victory over Walpole and Townshend, the death of George I forced Compton to lead the Whigs through a parliamentary election against the Tories and Patriot Whigs over the course of August and October. However, this election was never in doubt even with the change of leadership. The Tories were still plagued by the taint of Jacobite-traitors and sympathizers. In fact, the Tory leaders, Henry St John, Viscount of Bolingbroke, and Sir William Wyndham had both participated in Jacobite plots in the past and been caught. Only the mercy of George I allowed St John to return to Britain from exile and Wyndham to avoid life imprisonment. Meanwhile, the Patriot Whigs were still organizing themselves as a political association and could not offer any meaningful resistance. Thus, the Whigs cruised to an easy victory and even gained seats from the Tories.

    Given the obvious outcome, Compton did not wait for the elections to occur before he made his first move as prime minister. In July, Compton approached parliament and attempted to make good on his promise to George II by requesting that parliament appropriate the funds to raise and support an army of 70,000 men, the likes of which Britain had seen since the War of the Grand Alliance. These soldiers were to fight across the Continent, defending Gibraltar, invading Galicia, campaigning in the Low Countries, and saving Brunswick-Luneburg. Immediately, the Opposition of Tories and Patriot Whigs and many of Compton's own allies fiercely attached the proposal. Some pointed to the potential for tyranny but most simply spoke about the outrageous costs. Although many in parliament were concerned about the Russo-Austro-Spanish alliance, few were concerned to the extent that they felt that 70,000 men and four distinct campaigns were necessary. Instead, after much debate and compromise, Compton and parliament compromised on a smaller but still impressive force of 46,000 men. 20,000 of these men would immediately be availed for the protection of Brunswick Luneburg, 12,000 were to be dispatched to the Netherlands to augment the Dutch army, and a final 14,000 would be raised solely to defend the British Isles against any potential Jacobite attack. Even with this army amounting to tens of thousands of soldiers abroad, some, especially Compton and George II, worried that it would not be enough.

    Across the English Channel, in France, Walpole's reluctance for war was shared by Cardinal Fleury, the leading man in Versailles. However, unlike Walpole, Fleury did not lose his position of power over that reluctance. As it stood, France had spent nearly a century in a constant state of war and it had paid the price in blood and gold for it. Although France had greatly expanded under the leadership of King Louis XIV, it had also been financially and politically exhausted. For this reason, Fleury and most of the French court were wary of plunging deep into yet another major European war. The only reason that Fleury had accepted the British call to arms was that he shared Britain's fear of a Russo-Hapsburg alliance dominating Germany and threatening France's eastern flank. Still, Fleury's lack of enthusiasm for the war was obvious and impacted how France decided to carry out its war effort. Under Fleury's guidance, France chose to raise only 100,000 men. Even though this army was more than twice as large as that of Britain's, France's population is also three times the size of Britain's. Regarding the high seas, Fleury only authorized an impressive and limited "guerre de course" or war against commerce. As Fleury saw it, the days of French naval hegemony had elapsed and there was no need to act otherwise.

    The disclination for war in Britain and France was significant but it paled in comparison to the practical hostility that the Dutch Republic viewed their commitment to the war with. The Dutch had joined the Hanoverian Alliance out of their irritation with the Hapsburg Ostend Company that was trying to usurp the commercial place of the Dutch Republic. However, the Dutch had never expected a war to actually occur. Much like Townshend and Fleury, the Dutch had believed that the Hanoverian Alliance would overawe the Hapsburgs and prevent conflict entirely. In all honesty, the alliance had managed to keep the Hapsburgs in check for half a year after Spain charged into war and even facilitated Anglo-Hapsburg negotiations. However, in the end, Russia and Britain's mutual acrimony pushed the Hapsburgs and also the Dutch into this unwanted war.

    Confronted with the reality of a continental war, the States-General of the Dutch Republic severely regretted the misfortunes that brought them to this point. Some pointed out that the Ostend Company was not a critical threat so long as the Dutch held the mouth of the Scheldt and questioned their earlier haste in acceding to the Hanoverian Alliance. Many in the Republic feared that if they fought against the Hapsburgs that they would only hurt their own interests by weakening the buffer between the Netherlands and France. Although the French were now friendly toward the Republic, the Dutch remembered a time when that had not been the case and remembered it with horror. Motivated by these second thoughts, the Dutch deliberately undermined their war effort in the hope of avoiding a French army in Brussels or a complete alienate of the Hapsburgs. For the sake of appearances, the Dutch raised the required army of 30,000 men but did nothing more.

    To the south, the Savoyard Kingdom of Sardinia was much more willing to fight this war than its Atlantic allies. King Victor Amadeus of Sardinia had spent decades attempting to turn his Italian duchy into a true European power. Savoy's role in the Anglo-Hapsburg victory in the War of the Spanish Succession marked the end of Savoy's subservience to France and the House of Savoy's ascension to a royal title, the Kings of Sicily. Within a decade, however, the Savoyards found themselves powerless to stop the Spaniards from seizing Sicily and the Quadruple Alliance from turning Sicily over to the Hapsburgs without ever broaching the topic to the Savoyards. The only compensation that the Savoyards received for the loss of the mighty kingdom of Sicily was the impoverished, poorly populated Kingdom of Sardinia. This latest war provided Victor Amadeus with another opportunity to amend his situation. By fighting the Hapsburgs alongside Britain and France, Victor Amadeus thought it was possible for him to not only recover Sicily but also to reconquer Naples and Milan. If he succeeded in all these goals then the Savoyards' powerbase would be greatly expanded and Victor Amadeus would become a truly powerful king whose rights and opinions demanded respect. For this reason, Victor Amadeus was more than happy to muster an army of 24,000 men, which was outsized relative to his limited northern Italian realm.

    While the Atlantic members of the Hanoverian Alliance hesitated at the thought of war and Sardinia lustful lunged at the opportunity to gain land and glory, the Baltic countries of Brunswick-Luneburg, Denmark-Norway, and Sweden had nothing but survival on their minds. In Brunswick-Luneburg, the very specific threat that Empress Catherine I of Russia had directed toward the electorate was acknowledged with a state of panic. The recent death of the former elector, George I, and the absence of the new elector, George II, did little to mollify this unsettled sentiment. Under these conditions, Brunswick-Luneburg needed a leader and the local officials selected the senior-head of the House of Hanover in Germany, Ernest Augustus, to fulfill that role. Reluctantly, Ernest Augustus accepted the position since his obligations as Prince-Bishop of Osnabruck had previously and frequently divided his attention.

    In recognition of possibly being distracted by Osnabruck's affairs, Ernest Augustus raised his grand-nephew, the 20-year-old Griff, now heir to the British and Brunswick thrones, to the position of his second. Although formally, Griff was subordinate to Ernest Augustus, Griff was given much more authority and power than one would expect for a man of his youth. As Ernest Augustus saw it, Griff was a respectable and well-educated man who was well-acquainted with Brunswick-Luneburg, whereas Ernest Augustus had grown somewhat estranged with his birthplace over recent years. Both the raising of Ernest Augustus and Griff to positions of leadership in Brunswick-Luneburg occurred without consulting the new elector, George II, as a consequence of the urgency of preparing for war. In spite of Ernest Augustus' diminished familiarity with Brunswick-Luneburg and Griff's inexperience, the pair made for more than adequate leadership in this time of crisis. Guided by Ernest Augustus' steady experience, Griff's youthful energy was put to use rallying the nobility of Brunswick-Luneburg and putting together an army of nearly 20,000 men.

    Word of this arrangement and these preparations for war took George II surprised the British and especially the royal family a great deal. Although the British recognized Brunswick-Luneburg as separate from Britain and viewed it as George I's realm, they were still surprised with its independent organization for war. George II was more significantly affected by the news. George II had not seen his uncle, Ernest Augustus, in twelve years and had not seen his eldest son, Griff, in fourteen years. George II also had not corresponded much to either of those men during those periods of time. Thus, George II was striking unfamiliar with either man and viewed their actions as edging toward a usurpation of his rightful role as Elector of Brunswick-Luneburg. The fact that both men were closer to George II's father, who he hated even in death did not help their cases. Only, the intervention of Compton and Queen Caroline prevented George II from taking some sort of action against Ernest Augustus and Griff as the former pair were able to convince George II that the latter pair meant no harm and that in fact, their leadership in Germany was necessary to avoid disaster. Ultimately, George II chose to purchase 15,000 Hessians to augment the defense of Brunswick-Luneburg.

    To the north, in Denmark-Norway, the Danes and Norwegians were not nearly as panicked as the Brunswickers were. For years the Danes and Norwegians had managed to avoid any real confrontation over the issue of Holstein-Schleswig due to Britain's repeated interference in Denmark-Norway's favor. The Battle of Osel and the start of the war, of course, changed that. Even though Denmark-Norway had peacefully evaded war for years they had never failed to be ready to fight one. Ever since the thorough wallop of the Danes at the very beginning of the Great Northern War, Denmark-Norway had rebuilt its army and honed it to prevent the next conflict from being anywhere near as disastrous. As a consequence, when Denmark-Norway rejoined the Great Northern War they not only blunted King Charles XII of Sweden's invasion of Norway but they slew the would-be conqueror. Now, with a new war at hand, the Danes and Norwegians were prepared to deliver a similar bloody rejection to Russian attacks on Danish territory.

    Once war broke out, Denmark-Norway immediately reinforced its garrisons in Holstein and began the process of raising more men to join those garrisons and supplement an army. Ultimately, Denmark-Norway expected to support a field army of 44,000 men, which was quite large. Given the Danish-Norwegian prowess at war, the court at Copenhagen felt reasonably comfortable that this army would be sufficient to stop the Russians. However, when news arrived that the Prussians had betrayed the Hanoverian Alliance and joined the Russians that perspective changed. Without the Prussians, Denmark-Norway began to worry that they might actually encounter difficulty in fighting and winning the war. For this reason, Denmark-Norway celebrated the quick and effective assumption of leadership in Brunswick-Luneburg by Ernest Augustus and Griff.

    In Sweden, the decision to go to war had very clearly been a hasty one. Being the closest Hanoverian Alliance member to the Battle of Osel, the Swedes heard first hand from Admiral John Norris his account of the battle. Consequently, the Swedes were still disposed to view the battle as a Russian victory and rather saw it as a British-favored draw. When the British sent orders of relief to Admiral Norris they also sent diplomats to encourage and provoke a Swedish response to Russian hostility. The unbridled British promises of material support, a British army in the Baltic, a sustained British naval presence near Stockholm and Helsingfors, subsidies, and outright bribes allowed the calls of the Holsteiner Party and other peace factions to be suppressed and Sweden to declare war.

    Soon after Sweden declared war, its politicians realized their grave miscalculation and felt immense regret. While the Swedes had eaten up the British fawning without too much thought they had failed to realize the significance of Prussia's delay in fulfilling its commitment to the Hanoverian Alliance or speaking on the manner. Once Sweden discovered that Prussia had defected to the Viennese Alliance, Sweden was seized with the same sense of panic as Brunswick-Luneburg. Every calculation that the Swedes had made when rationalizing their war effort had involved a faithful Prussia tying down tens of thousands of Russians. Instead, the Swedes were confronted with the possibility of facing an unaccosted Russia and also being besieged in Germany by a traitorous Prussia. The situation grew from bad to worse when Compton's grandiose war strategy was cut down to a more reasonable size that left Sweden feeling dangerously exposed and alone.

    In contrast to Denmark-Norway, although Sweden had won the beginning of the Great Northern War they had lost the end and lost the end very hard. After two decades of fighting, Sweden had lost almost 250,000 men, lost almost all their Baltic possessions, and had Finland and even parts of Sweden pillaged and destroyed. Whereas Denmark-Norway could comfortably raise more than 40,000 men, Sweden would need to scrap the bottom of the barrel to do the same. This weakness was in the face of Russia's innate military power that consisted of hundreds of thousands of soldiers capable of swarming Finland and Prussia's military progression that might suffocate Swedish Pomerania. This was the terrifying reality that Sweden had stumbled into. Still, for the stake of honor and out of vain hope, the Swedes did not immediately sue for peace and submit themselves to the mercy of Russia. The Swedes believed that perhaps a defensive strategy in Finland and Pomerania could hold back the Russians and Prussians long enough for Britain to rally more allies and turn back the eastern expansionists. Perhaps Sweden could even reclaim Livonia.

    Given the apparently dire straits to which the Hanoverian Alliance opens Empress Catherine's War, it is important to understand two things. First and foremost is the importance of Prussia to the Hanoverian Alliance. One of the Treaty of Hanover's original signors had been the Kingdom of Prussia and up until Prussia's betrayal, there had been little doubt among the Hanoverian Alliance members that Prussia would honor the alliance. Prussia's late switch to the Viennese camp completely ruined the strategic thinking and planning that had gone into the Hanoverian Alliance. Without Prussia, the Hanoverian Alliance was immediately deprived of a field army of 65,000 of the Continent's finer soldiers. Furthermore, with Prussia's betrayal, those 65,000 finer soldiers were not fighting against the Hanoverian Alliance. Additionally, without the support of Prussia, a major threat to the Hapsburgs in Germany was removed and instead was redirected against Brunswick-Luneburg. Accordingly, the Hapsburgs could focus elsewhere if they wanted to and the Russian march to the west would be completely unopposed. To be honest, the complete failure of the British to account for this possibility is a major failure of their foreign policy. Prussia had long been a loyalist to the Holy Roman Emperor so to expect Prussia to actually wage war on the Holy Roman Emperor was always a bit of a gamble. On top of that, the Hapsburgs and Russia's combined land presence in the region was far superior to anything the Hanoverian Alliance could produce. Thus, if Prussia opposed the Viennese Alliance then it stood a good chance of suffering severe damage or even defeat. In particular, isolated Ducal Prussia would surely be destroyed by the advancing Russian horde. Overall, Britain's failure to perceive the possibility of Prussia's betrayal gave Britain and its allies, especially Sweden, an aura of overconfidence that allowed them to led themselves into a war that they otherwise might have thought about more seriously.

    The second mistake of the Hanoverian Alliance was that outside of its core, it was very loose and vague in its obligations. Even among its core members, the formal arrangements did leave some room for interpretation. For this reason, each member of the alliance was able to overestimate their allies' strength and willingness to fight. In Britain, France, and the Dutch Republic, a severe reluctance to fight had limited the size of armies and scope of campaigns. Yet each of these countries and the other members of the alliance had not expected all three of these powers to act in that manner. Instead, they had allowed themselves to believe that their allies would contribute more men and more seriously to the war effort. For Britain, this created concerns that the French would not sufficiently subdue the Spanish and save Gibraltar. For the French, the concern was that the Hapsburgs might lead a concentrated attack on Alsace. For the Dutch, the worry was that the French rather than the English would play the leading role in the Low Countries. In Germany, the Brunswickers had been led to believe that the British, Danes, Prussians, and Hessians would create some defensive cordon. For the Danes, they had thought Britain, Brunswick-Luneburg, and Prussia would keep the Russians at bay. For the Swedes, the thought was they would get to fight a periphery campaign against a limited Russian army.

    [1] Given George I's predilection for going to Brunswick-Luneburg and his avoidance of cabinet meetings toward the end of his reign, I do not see any reason to cancel his OTL 1727 trip to Brunswick-Luneburg. Accordingly, the trip still happens with the same route and plan.
    [2] My ideology for alternate history leans toward some restricted and regulated version of chaos theory. For that reason, I do not think it would congruent to have George I die of a stroke at the same time as OTL. Instead, he lives a little longer. However, if his health was poor to allow a stroke then I think he very well still could have suffered one. Considering the shock involved with Britain suddenly being engulfed in a continental war and Brunswick-Luneburg specifically being threatened I feel that it is reasonable to say that those events could trigger a stroke or heart attack for George I.
    [3] In OTL, the primary candidates were Walpole and Compton. In TTL Townshend gets much more of a chance because of his foreign affairs leadership and experience as well as his personal hand in creating the Treaty of Hanover. Also In TTL, Walpole's candidacy is weaker due to his unfavorable opinion of war and Compton's stronger for that same reason.
    [4] OTL Walpole won the prime ministership by offering George II more money for his family without any political concessions. TTL money is not enough to win George II and Walpole's approach toward war is insufficient. Townshend loses out mainly because relative to Compton he offered less and he also was tied to George I. Thus, Compton is able to come out on top in spite of the risk that his lack of experience carries.

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    5: Viennese Alliance Mobilizes
  • 5: Viennese Alliance Mobilizes
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    King Friedrich Wilhelm I

    Among the members of the Viennese Alliance, the reaction to the war was generally more positive than it had been among the Hanoverian Alliance. In Spain, a larger war was exactly what the court had been wishing for since they had opened their siege of Gibraltar. In the midst of a more expansive and complicated conflict, Spain could expect to be overlooked and underestimated relative to other theatres and its allies. In that case, the military operations of diminished Spain would a greater chance of success. Already, the commander of the naval squadron protecting Gibraltar, Admiral Charles Wager, had been reassigned to command the British fleet the Baltic. Later, in Britain, King George II of Britain had pushed the government of Spencer Compton to focus on fighting a war in northern Europe rather than southern Europe. The consequence had been that the parliament had consented to raising and sending armies for campaigns in Brunswick-Luneburg and the Netherlands but had designed no additional allocations of soldiers to Gibraltar and Menorca. Instead, the British left just their naval squadrons of Gibraltar and Menorca and the garrison of the Earl of Portmore to avoid the loss of Gibraltar.

    Britain's northern distractions would certainly serve to help Spain's war effort in Gibraltar, however, the expansion was war not entirely in Spain's favor. Even though the British did not make much of an effort to incite Spain's traditional rival of Portugal into attacking Spain, the entry of France into the war already produced a second front for Spain to fight on. Of course, France's border with Spain was also a second front for France and France's main focus like Britain would be in the north against the Hapsburgs in the Southern Netherlands and Germany. On top of these issues, France was also more reluctant to fight this war than Spain. However, even with these impediments, France could raise an army multiple times the size of Spain and had better equipment and funding to maintain that army. As a consequence, Spain raised 20,000 men to defend against a possible French attack on either Catalonia or Navarre. This army was already larger than the army originally sent to Gibraltar. Furthermore, whereas King Felipe V and Queen Isabel of Spain was willing to allow politics and emotion to play a role in his selection of the commander of the Thirteenth Siege of Gibraltar, no such antics were at play with the northern army. Instead, the clearly most capable general in Spain, Jose Carrillo de Albornoz, the Count de Montemar, was given the post without much discussion. Still, so long as France did not commit too heavily to defeating Spain and Britain remained distracted then Spain had a good opportunity to sneak out of the war with some victories and fresh conquests. If all went well, Some Spaniards even believed that Spain could push on into France and conquer Roussillon, Cerdagne, and Navarre [1].

    In Vienna, the Hapsburgs like the British, French, and Dutch had hoped to avoid the war. In fact, they had been in negotiations with the British right up until they declared war against them. However, once the Hapsburgs had declared war, they, unlike the British, French, and Dutch, did not hold themselves back. Instead, the Hapsburgs quite willingly made all the necessary efforts and raised all the necessary arms to assure themselves of victory in the war. Part of this committed Hapsburg effort is derived from the fact that the Hapsburgs did have vague or unclear goals like the French and Dutch. Instead, Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI saw the war as an ideal opportunity to secure promises that would secure the succession of his eldest daughter, Maria Theresa, to the throne should he fail to conceive a male heir. By showing generosity to his allies and strength to his enemies, Emperor Charles VI was sure that he could convince the whole of Europe to comply with his Pragmatic Sanction to allow a woman to inherit the Hapsburg monarchy without hindrance.

    The second reason behind the Hapsburgs' resolve and dedication toward the war was the active involvement of military leaders in its government, which the British, French, and Dutch all lacked at the time. Most important among these leaders was the hero of the Hapsburg dynasty, Prince Eugene of Savoy, who had led the Hapsburgs to victory over the Ottomans at Zenta and the French at Blenheim. Given Prince Eugene's venerated status and his willingness to personally command the war effort, any opposition to the war among the other ministers of the Hapsburg realm receded in the wake of his support for it. Powered by the energetic enthusiasm of Prince Eugene and the focused intent of Charles VI, the Hapsburg council decided to muster 100,000 men for war, which for the Hapsburg realm was a significant number. These soldiers would come from the various domains of the Southern Netherlands, Milan, Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary as well as the mercenaries stocks of the princes of Germany and the dukes of Italy and would be put to use by Prince Eugene across western Europe, from as far north as the Rhineland to as far south as Italy. Altogether, after the Hapsburgs earlier hesitations, the Hapsburgs had put together a rather impressive war effort.

    In Munich, Dresden, and Cologne, a similarly resolved stance was taken by Elector Charles Albert of Bavaria, Elector Friedrich Augustus the Strong of Saxony, and Archbishop Elector Clemens August of Cologne. Both the Wittelsbach and Wettin families of Bavaria and Saxony, respectively, had recently secured important marriages with the two daughters of Charles VI's predecessor, Holy Roman Emperor Joseph I. Charles VI, of course, had forced both the Bavarian-wed Maria Amalia and the Saxon-wed Maria Josepha to renounce their places in the line of succession to the Hapsburg monarchy before these marriages, which damaged the claims that the Wittelsbach and Wettin families hoped to have upon the death of Charles VI. Rather than oppose Charles VI to reestablish those claims, Charles Albert and Augustus the Strong thought their interests would be served better by demonstrating their loyalty and goodwill toward Charles VI. In return, the two men expected to receive some form of compensation for their claims. This act of loyalty involved Bavaria and Cologne raised an army of 28,000 men and Saxony raising an army of 26,000 men to support the interests and campaigns of the Holy Roman Emperor. Although these armies were not exceedingly large in the general contest of European warfare, they constituted serious commitments for the Wittelsbachs and Wettins.

    King Friedrich Wilhelm I had been motivated by a mix of fear of Russia and loyalty to the Holy Roman Emperor into turning coat and joining the Viennese Alliance. In spite of these not entirely pure motivations for kneeling before the Holy Roman Emperor and the Empress and Autocrat of All Russia, Friedrich Wilhelm had every intention of prosecuting his war effort without reserve or delay. Whereas the other Germans rulers had tempered their expectations in this war, Friedrich Wilhelm saw a perfect opportunity to massively increase the power and prestige of Prussia with a triumph over the Hanoverian Alliance. Through his loyalty to Emperor Charles VI, Friedrich Wilhelm expected that his claims and rights to Julich and Berg would be recognized over those of other Imperial princes. Through his alliance with Russia, Friedrich Wilhelm expected to finish the work that Prussia and Russia had begun in the Great Northern War of ejecting the Swedes from Germany and gaining those Swedish-held German lands for Prussia. Finally, through his war against Britain, Friedrich Wilhelm could settle his decades-long rivalry with the incompetent fool, King George II of Britain.

    In light of these opportunities, Friedrich Wilhelm chose to mobilize the full extent of the Prussian military, which numbered more than 60,000 men. Once the first of these men were mobilized in significant numbers, Friedrich Wilhelm did not dawdle. Instead, just six weeks into the war while most of Europe was still in the process of putting together its armies or designing its war plans, Friedrich Wilhelm launched an invasion of Swedish Pomerania. This opening strike of 26,000 soldiers easily overwhelmed much of the underdefended Swedish province in only a few weeks. A contingent of Prussian soldiers even managed to cross over the Strelasund and take the island of Rugen before either the Swedish or British fleets could move to stop them. Finally, at the town of Stralsund, the rapid advance of the Prussian army came to a halt and a slow siege of the last remaining holdout of Swedish Pomerania began.

    As Friedrich Wilhelm stormed through Pomerania, he left Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau to conduct a much more muted campaign in Brunswick-Luneburg. With most of Prussia's supplies be dedicated to the Pomeranian effort, Prince Leopold from the very beginning had to constrain himself and his 29,000 troops. Otherwise, Prince Leopold might to exceed Prussia's limitations and put his army at risk. Additionally, the speedy preparations of Prince-Bishop Ernest Augustus and Prince Frederick and the swift arrival of the mercenaries from Hesse-Cassel meant that Leopold was faced with far more consequential opposition than that seen in Pomerania. Overall, by the time Friedrich Wilhelm was starting the Second Siege of Stralsund, Prince Leopold was barely dancing within the borders of Brunswick-Luneburg. For the next few weeks, this deliberate and cautious effort against Brunswick-Luneburg would continue until eventually new forces arrived in the region and the military conditions of the situation changed.

    In Saint Petersburg, the word of the Battle of Osel, as mentioned caused an outburst of righteous rage in Empress Catherine I and led her to demand vengeance against the scoundrel Britain. However, Catherine unlike her let husband, Emperor Peter I, did not rule Russia with an iron fist and almost unrestricted power. In fact, Catherine barely ruled Russia at all. Instead, for the most part, the governance of Russia was performed by her small Supreme Privy Council. This Supreme Privy Council was made up of six members, Aleksander Menshikov, Fyodor Apraksin, Gavriil Golovkin, Andrey Osterman, Pyotr Tolstoy, and Dmitry Mikhaylovich Golitsyn. Of course, Catherine was not a completely powerless figurehead on the top of Russian society. As a former wife of Peter I and mother of some of his children, Catherine did have influence over Russia's government. However, to exercise power and accomplish policies that she favored, Catherine had to work through the Supreme Privy Council or some of its members.

    Among the Supreme Privy Council, Andrey Osterman was the man who had turned Catherine's personal interest in promoting the Holstein-Gottorps, the family of the partners of her two daughters, into tangible foreign policy. As a sign of Catherine's lack of domination, Osterman had not carried out these efforts simply to curry the favor of Catherine. The favor of Catherine was merely an added bonus for Osterman. The main motive behind Osterman's pro-Holstein-Gottorp diplomacy was his desire to continue Peter I's project of developing Russia's relations with German princes. Through alliances with princes like the Holstein-Gottorps, Osterman could solidify Russia's influence and augment its power in the Baltic. Throughout this program, Russia and Osterman had been opposed by Britain at every step. In spite of diplomatic efforts to resolve issues between Britain and Russia, no progress had been made. As a consequence, Osterman was led to believe that perhaps war was necessary to force Britain to back down and give Russia the freedom to pursue its dreams of Baltic supremacy. In the wake of the Battle of Osel, Osterman finally had the necessary capital to push for that war against Britain and also a war against Denmark to aid the pro-Russian Holstein-Gottorps. However, Osterman was just one of six privy council members and he could not start a war all by himself.

    At this point in time, the informal head of the Supreme Privy Council, Catherine's favorite, and the main man in Russia was Peter I's disciple Aleksander Menshikov. Thus far Menshikov had allowed Osterman a surprising degree of autonomy in running Russia's foreign policy. To declare war, however, Osterman needed Menshikov's full approval. Fortunately, Menshikov had just the right type and amount of ambition for Osterman to gain that approval. As one of Peter I's disciples and generals, Menshikov viewed himself as a vital piece of the rise of Russia from a simple backward Tsardom to a formidable European empire. Yet Menshikov had spent much of the Great Northern War in the shadows of Peter I and Boris Sheremetev, which left him deprived of the renown that he felt due to him. Only in a war without either of those two giants would Menshikov be able to establish himself as one of the true icons of Russia's ascendance and military might. A war against the established power of Britain fought in Germany proposed by Osterman presented Menshikov with a greater opportunity than he had ever dreamed of. As a result, Menshikov was quick to accept Osterman's call and initiate the series of diplomatic events that escalated an Anglo-Spanish war and a Baltic battle into a new continental conflagration. Between Menshikov's ambition, Osterman's strategy, and Catherine's fury peace stood no stood and maybe Europe did not either.

    Once at war, Menshikov, already the most powerful man in Russia, took undisputed control over Russia's war effort. Like Prince Eugene, Menshikov was an experienced general who still had the energy and mental edge to whip a government into action and mobilize a country for war. Under Menshikov's leadership, the Supreme Privy Council decided on the first set of actions for Russia's war. At sea, General Admiral Fyodor Apraksin was to continue to defend Russia's coasts and in particular the ports of Reval and Riga. Along the northern border of Russia, Field Marshal Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn, who had led the Russian invasion of Finland during the Great Northern War, and Christoph von Münnich, Russia's newest General-in-Chief, were to organize the defense of Saint Petersburg and prepare a new invasion of Finland. To the west, Lieutenant General Peter Lacy and his army of 30,000 Russian soldiers was finally allowed to stop its languishing in Livland and ordered to promptly march on Brunswick-Luneburg to deliver the first blow of Catherine's fury.

    The Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and husband of Catherine I's eldest daughter Anna, Charles Frederick, was added to the Supreme Privy Council around this time and requested that he be given command of Lacy's army. However, Charles Frederick's familiarity with Germany, high-status, and personal connection with the campaign did not overcome Menshikov's suspicion of him as a foreigner and political rival or Menshikov's misgivings about his lack of experience in war. Still, out of respect, Menshikov did allow Charles Frederick to join Lacy's army but as a clear subordinate to Lacy. Additionally, the new husband of Catherine's second daughter Elizabeth, Charles Augustus, was also allowed to join Lacy's army [2]. Finally, Menshikov reserved for himself the prodigious task of assembly and then commanding another, field army destined for Germany, which was to be twice the size of Lacy's. With these plans settled, the stage for Russia's war was set.

    Altogether, the opening war effort of the Viennese Alliance was much more organized, significant, and formidable than that of the Hanoverian Alliance. The main reason behind this superior war effort does not have to do with the organization of the Viennese Alliance as it was just as if not weaker than the Hanoverian Alliance's organization. In fact, before the war, one of the principal members of the Viennese Alliance, the Hapsburgs, were negotiated to quite the alliance entirely. Nor did the Prussian defection to the Viennese Alliance contribute to a major shift in the opinions and resolve of the members of the Viennese Alliance. Although the Viennese Alliance was certainly happy to welcome Prussia into its arms and lay aside war plans against Prussia, none of the Viennese Alliance's members would have abstained from the war had Prussia remained on the other side. The simple reason behind the Viennese Alliance's superior war effort lays in the individual attributes of its members and their leaders. Across each of the alliance, the states and their leaders were simply more willing to throw themselves into a war than several members of the Hanoverian Alliance. The Viennese Alliance's members had clear motivations, confidence, and the will to fight. Altogether, the Viennese Alliance was much more willing to commit itself to Empress Catherine's War even if some of them originally had concerns. This general commitment and overall enthusiasm contributed to a much more organized and significant opening war effort by the Viennese Alliance relative to the Hanoverian Alliance. Across the board, members of the Viennese

    [1] This was an actual suggestion in Spain at the time despite the obvious disparity between France and Spain.
    [2] Charles Augustus (love of Empress Elisabeth's life and her fiancee in 1727) lives. In the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Osel, there is a whole lot of movement and politics and so on. As a result, Charles talks to different people, does different things, and avoids contracting smallpox.

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    6: Assembly at Hanover
  • 6: Assembly at Hanover
    220px-Peter_von_Lacy.PNG

    Peter Lacy

    Lieutenant General Peter Lacy's march to the west was a spectacle for all of Europe to witness. After taking a few weeks to ready his army and prepare his logistics, Lacy crossed the Russian border with Courland the late June, before the Hapsburgs had even resolved to go to war. The crossing of the border occurred without any notice being given to the proclaimed Duke of Courland, Maurice of Saxony, and after entering Courland, Lacy did not speed through the duchy. Instead, Lacy's army effortlessly occupied the bulk of the duchy and its capital Mitau since Maurice had offended the Russian regent of Courland, Anna Ivanovna, by rejecting her hand in marriage. This speedy, informal conquest dispelled any belief in Maurice that he could rule the Duchy of Courland or even so much as a sliver of it without the express approval of the Empress of All Russia and her Supreme Privy Council. Although Maurice would have liked to regain his duchy, he was heavily in debt and the Courlanders were unwilling to risk destruction at the hands of the Russians to help him. Even Maurice's own father, Augustus the Strong, King of Poland-Lithuania and Elector of Saxony, had never supported his Courlander ambitions and even tried to claim Courland for himself. Consequently, the moneyless and landless Maurice was left with few options. Ultimately, the option he chose was to request to join the Russian army as he had done in 1713. As a commander in the Russian army, Maurice would once again be employed, which could help with his money troubles. More importantly to Maurice, service in the Russian army might earn him the respect and favor needed from Empress Catherine and Aleksander Menshikov to finally be permitted to assume the title of Duke of Courland without hindrance. Lacy approved the request of Maurice as a means of confirming the removal of Maurice from Courland and also of adding another experienced soldier to his army. Among the army's leaders, Maurice found companions in the genial Holstein-Gottorp cousins and soon began to learn a great deal from his commander, Lacy [1].

    Even though King Friedrich Wilhelm I in Prussia already had preconceived fears of the Russian army and its threat to not just Ducal Prussia but Brandenburg as well, the fact that Lacy had occupied Courland and then swiftly entered Poland afterward, provided King Friedrich Wilhelm with a tangible representation of those fears. Doubtless, the Russian army bearing down on Germany probably influenced the speed of Friedrich Wilhelm's defection from the Hanoverian Alliance to the Viennese Alliance. With a Russian army getting closer to Ducal Prussia by the day, Friedrich Wilhelm simply did not have the time to think and consider his options, he either had to choose to fight the Russians or join them. As mentioned before, Friedrich Wilhelm made the latter choice. A consequence of the haste necessitated by Lacy's westward advance was that Friedrich Wilhelm agreed to very vague terms of alliance with the Hapsburg and Russian diplomats who had arrived in Berlin. Unlike with the earlier Hapsburg-Spanish alliance, no definite concessions were offered by the Hapsburgs or Russians to the Prussians. There was no guarantee of subsidies to fund the Prussian army nor recognition of Prussian claims or goals to reward Prussian war efforts. Even with the alliance's terms leaving room for the Hapsburgs or Russians to cheat Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm still felt that he had made the right decision.

    Lacy's continue march through Poland and then into Ducal Prussia and Royal Prussia before entering Brandenburg stood as clear proof that Friedrich Wilhelm had made the right choice. Although Prussia did have garrisons present in its eastern exclave, these garrisons were far numerically inferior to Lacy's army. Whatever thoughts that Friedrich Wilhelm may have had about those garrisons being able to hold back the Russians until reinforcements could arrive were subdued by the conduct of Lacy's army. Rather than act like the Asiatic beasts that Western Europe had long overlooked, Lacy's army looked liked tens of thousands of the finest soldiers in Europe who demonstrated good discipline and carried modern arms. Lacy's army was made up of shining examples of a new and modern Russia that needed to be feared and respected. These soldiers were not in any way significantly inferior to their Prussian counterparts and if necessary could have put their training and numbers to use to eviscerate Ducal Prussia. Lacy's army was not without troubles, however. The great distance laid out for Lacy and his soldiers to cross did hamper them and very days the Russian army was forced to rest to not exhaust itself and to not outmarch its supply train. The existence of that supply train in itself is evidence of the advancement of the Russian military beyond only a horde of marauders into an organized fighting force. Altogether, the Russians were making surprising speed, mainly due to Lacy's superb command.

    This speed and the disciplined march of the Russian army made an incredible impression on the rest of Europe and put fear into the hearts of the Hanoverian Alliance as they wondered how long before the rest of the unending Russian army was unleashed upon them. This impression was particularly strong in the thus far unaligned Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. The ruler of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Duke Karl Leopold, had previously allied with Russia in 1716 and married Grand Duchess Catherine Ivanova for the purpose of capturing the city of Wismar. Both this marriage and his attempts to capture Wismar ultimately failed. In 1722, Catherine Ivanova left Mecklenburg-Schwerin forever and returned to her native Russia, which cooled Mecklenburg-Schwerin's relations with Russia. In 1727, even though Karl Leopold had long abandoned any hope of reviving the marriage, the march of Lacy's army convinced him that at least his alliance with Russia could be restored. Through that alliance, Karl Leopold hoped to finally achieve his goal of conquering Wismar. After a flurry of diplomatic exchanges between Karl Leopold and Menshikov and Andrey Osterman, Mecklenburg-Schwerin joined the Viennese camp in August of 1727.

    Finally, after weeks of hard marching, in September the Russian army arrived in Brunswick-Luneburg. The arrival of the Russians after fourteen weeks of marching came as a huge surprise to Britain and France. The British and French had led themselves to believe that the Russian threat might not materialize until 1728, which further demonstrated how greatly they had underestimated Russia. However, even Russia's own allies had failed to expect such a decisive, deliberate, and immediate action by the Russians. The Hapsburgs and Prussians were both shocked by how quickly a significant Russian army had been transplanted from the far-away Livland to the heart of northern Germany ready to impose the will of Empress Catherine. For the Hapsburgs, the Russian march stood as evidence of the intelligence of maintaining an alliance with Russia. For the Prussians, the Russian march further supported the built-up fear and anxiety about Russia's military might.

    Having arrived in Brunswick-Luneburg, Lacy immediately linked up with the army of Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau. This linkage occurred in spite of Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp's suggesting and urging of a strike against the Dano-Norwegian army that had seized Holstein-Gottorp during the Russian march. Although Charles Frederick did have an esteemed position as a member of the Supreme Privy Council and had been made a commander among Lacy's army, his wishes did not supersede the orders of Menshikov and Empress Catherine. Since those orders called for the obliteration of Brunswick-Luneburg before the liberation of Holstein-Gottorp, Lacy politely refused Charles Frederick's advice. Instead, alongside Prince Leopold's Prussian army, Lacy could present the Electorate of Brunswick-Luneburg with the greatest threat to its existence that it had ever faced and faithfully carry out Catherine's demand for the destruction and humiliation of Brunswick-Luneburg.

    The arrival of the Russian army in Brunswick-Luneburg was soon followed by the arrival of three others. From Holstein, an army of 24,000 Dano-Norwegian soldiers, under Christian Detlev Reventlow, marched to unite with the suddenly desperately outnumbered Hanoverian-Hessian army of Ernest Augustus and Prince Frederick. A week later further reinforcements came in the form of Compton's promised 20,000 British men. This British contingent was personally commanded by Britain's new king, the battle-hungry George II. Overall, the defenders of Brunswick-Luneburg were brought up to a strength of 80,000 men: 21,000 Brunswicker soldiers and militia, 15,000 Hessian mercenaries, 24,000 Dano-Norwegian soldiers, and 20,000 British men. The official overall command of the army naturally fell to the King of Great Britain and Elector of Brunswick-Luneburg, George II since he was both the highest-ranking nobleman among the members of the army and since the electorate that this grand army was defending was in fact his electorate. However, the true command was held by John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll, the general sent by the British alongside George II. Argyll's subordinates were General Ilton of Brunswick-Luneburg and Reventlow of Denmark-Norway.

    Opposing this grand army was another, even larger one. For weeks, the Prussian army of Prince Leopold had been encroaching on the territory of Brunswick-Luneburg and making its presence felt around Dannenberg. Now, the Prussians were joined by first the Russian army of Lacy and second the Saxony army of Augustus the Strong. This force numbered 85,000 soldiers: 29,000 from Prussia, 30,000 from Russia, and 26,000 from Saxony. Quickly even that massive number was added to when 2,000 soldiers from the Principality of Brunswick-Wolfenbuffel joined the ranks of the army. August Wilhelm, the Prince of Brunswick-Wolfenbuffel had felt that a war between these two armies so close to his own army would ultimately lead to fighting within the boundaries of his principality. Rather than meekly waiting for his principality to become a collateral consequence of war, August Wilhelm chose to actively involve himself in the conflict and he chose to throw in his lot with the Viennese camp. The reason being was that his family had connections to both the Hapsburgs and Romanovs and that the war against Brunswick-Luneburg provided him the chance to unite the two halves of Brunswick-Wolfenbuffel. As a result, the Viennese Alliance had a total of 87,000 men in Brunswick-Luneburg under the joint command of Peter Lacy, Prince Leopold, and Augustus the Strong. Oddly, in spite of the previous Hapsburg assertions that they would deploy men to Brunswick-Luneburg, there was not one Hapsburg soldiers among those 87,000 men.

    To the north, a large number of Dano-Norwegian soldiers remained stationed in Holstein-Gluckstadt and Holstein-Gottorp. This army remained in the north for a few different and diverse reasons. Firstly, on a strategic level, the Danish and Norwegians did not feel comfortable leaving Holstein without a significant army. If there was no army to defend Holstein what was there to prevent the Viennese army from cutting off the Dano-Norwegian forces from their homeland and then destroying them or ravaging Denmark. On a political level, the Dano-Norwegian army had recently conquered Holstein-Gottorp and had little intention of giving that up. Finally, in terms of prestige, the Danish and Norwegians did not want to risk the Holstein-Gottorps ever setting foot in Holstein-Gluckstadt or Schleswig and raising their banner. An episode like that might lend some validity to their claims or excite some positive reaction among the populace. Rather than conduct any offensive movements, this Dano-Norwegian army focused on digging in around Altoona and to the northeast of Hamburg in preparation for any failure of the campaign in Brunswick-Luneburg or any sneaky attack against Holstein.

    The defensive focus of this northern Dano-Norwegian army meant that it was ill-prepared to react to the action of the Prusso-Mecklenburger army. After raising his forces and being joined by a large body of Prussian soldiers, Karl Leopold invaded the poorly defended Principality of Lauenburg, a possession of George II, in mid-September. This invasion overrun the small, neglected principality and allowed the Viennese Alliance to have an army establish camp close to Holstein. From this position, the Prusso-Mecklenburger army could keep close watch of the northern Dano-Norwegian army and if provide interference to an effort by the opposing army to join the army in Brunswick-Luneburg. Ultimately, both the Dano-Norwegian army of Holstein and the Prusso-Mecklenburg army in Lauenburg fell into an uneasy stalemate. Neither army dared to cross the border and exist their fortifications. Instead, both armies simply remained in their respective camps and further fortified their positions into the winter.

    In Swedish Pomerania, Friedrich Wilhelm continued his harsh siege of Stralsund. With most of the province already occupied, the Prussian king had been able to afford to send away some soldiers to aid Mecklenburg-Schwerin. This western force was further augmented by soldiers extracted from the now unnecessary garrisons of Ducal Prussia. Even though this army participated in the conquest of Lauenburg, this army's main purpose was not to enhance the territorial ambitions of Mecklenburg-Schwerin but rather to provide protection against the possibility of a Dano-Norwegian flanking attack against the Prussians in Pomerania or in Brunswick-Luneburg. While this western army completed that assignment, Friedrich Wilhelm brought up his son and heir, Friedrich or Fritz as he was affectionately called, to watch and participate in the siege of Stralsund. Friedrich Wilhelm expected Fritz to gain his first experience in war and through that gritty experience lose his displeasing liberal attitude. Through the following months, young Fritz actively played a role in the siege as he bravely stood atop the siege works to inspect the Swedish fortifications, helped dig trenches, and participated in the soldiers' mass. The last item is commonly believed to have been done by the prince solely as a means of spiting his father who was known to have troubles with religion. Overall, Fritz's courageousness and spirit made a good impression on the soldiers and even instilled his father with some hope.

    Young Fritz was not the only son with a troubled relationship with his father. Fritz's Anglo-Brunswicker counterpart, Prince Frederick of Griff, also did not have a number of pleasant experiences with his father. However, in contrast to Fritz's numerous experiences of his father's cruelty of hardness, Griff had almost no experiences at all with his father. Griff had been left behind in Brunswick-Luneburg by his family in 1714 when he was just seven-years-old. At the time, Griff's father had fought hard with his own father, George I, to have Griff brought to Britain and for the next three years that fight continued. However, once Griff's father had a second son, George William, these efforts to secure Griff's passage to Britain halted entirely. For the thirteen years, Griff was left to his own devices and did not even receive letters from his father. Rather than interact with his father, Griff's familial interactions were limited to his grandfather, George I, and great-uncle, Ernest Augustus. Consequently, Griff grew close with both of them, which only furthered the distance between himself and his father since his father actively despised George I. in fact, The estrangement between Griff and the future George II was so severe that in 1725, George II tried to have George I removed Griff from the British line of succession in favor of Griff's younger brother, George William. George I rather astutely pointed out that Griff was an adult and that his consent would be necessary for the removal to occur. Of course, when Griff was informed of the suggestion by George I he refused to give up his rights and his relationship with his father only worsened. Ultimately, only Brunswick-Luneburg was the verge of being wiped off the map by Empress Catherine's fury did George II see fit to come to Brunswick-Luneburg and see his eldest son after thirteen years of absence.

    The initial reunion between George II and Griff was surprisingly genial. With the help of Ernest Augustus, Griff was reintroduced to his father as an adult and a member of the Brunswick army. Due to Ernest Augustus' advice for reconciliation, Griff approached his father with kindness and an open heart. Clearly, Griff sought to erase the estrangement between himself and his father. Partly Griff wanted to avoid losing his place in the place of succession but even more so Griff was lonely and wanted to have a family once again. George II responded respectfully and congratulated his son on representing the interests of their family in his absence. However, this initial warmness did not last and the awkwardness of strangers crept in. Fortunately, the Duke of Argyll saved them by beginning to question Ernest Augustus on the affairs of Brunswick-Luneburg and its army. Over the next several days, George II and Griff would exchange some light conservations but mainly discussed matters of military importance informal war councils. Throughout this time, George II was surprised to see how much the Brunswicker soldiers and people looked to Griff and Ernest Augustus for leadership while treating their own Elector as a stranger. Given the fact that both Griff and Ernest Augustus had served as the resident representatives of the House of Hanover and that they had presided over all the events since the departure of George I and George II, it makes sense that George II was unfamiliar to them. Even those who had heard of George II typically had heard of him from George I who had held little respect for his son and talked ill of him often.

    Friedrich Wilhelm and Fritz and George II and Griff were not the only father and son duos among the armies of the north. Within the Prussian army, every noble family had at least one father and son in the army and for many, there were several sons. These fathers and sons in some cases were split between different regiments or battalions but in most cases, the fathers and sons stood together. For example, in Prince Leopold's army, one of Prussia's best cuirassiers, Hans Heinrich Graf von Katte, was accompanied by his son Hans Hermann. Going over to the Saxon army, Frederick Augustus, Count of Rutowsky and bastard of Augustus the Strong, also had the honor of serving under his father's command [2]. Another one of Augustus' illegitimate sons, Maurice of Saxony, was a new commander within the adjoining Russian army. Upon meeting his father again, Maurice was offered a place in the Saxon army as a gesture of goodwill but he rejected it and chose to remain a Russian soldier [3]. As Maurice saw it, greater opportunities laid ahead for him the Russian army.

    [1] In OTL, Maurice was forced out of Courland by Lacy and left for France and ultimately became a French general. In TTL, the war and the presence of a field army in Courland presents him good reason and opportunity to join the Russian army instead. Maurice had served in the Russian army previously as well.
    [2] Rutowsky was on his way to joining the Saxon army when the POD occurred so he still goes on and joins the Saxon army.
    [3] Maurice could have gone back to his father at any point in time OTL but didn't.

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    7: First Blood at Bienenbuttel
  • 7: First Blood at Bienenbuttel
    416px-Philippoteaux_Death_of_Count_Plelo_on_Westerplatte_1734.jpg

    Death of General Ilton at the Battle of Bienenbuttel

    Although the conflict north of the Elbe remained isolated to the singular Second Siege of Stralsund for the remainder of 1727, the campaigning south of the Elbe was not so limited. Once both the Hanoverian army and the Viennese army had finished assembly they did no delay until the spring to begin their true campaigns. Lieutenant General Peter Lacy, Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, and King Augustus the Strong of Poland recognized their numerical superiority and chose to march aggressively toward Dannenberg. If the Hanoverian army was bold enough to try to stop them then the Viennese generals were confident that they could make the Hanoverian rue that choice. During this Viennese advance, skirmishes between the two armies ensued as both armies thought to test each other and looked for weakness. Initially, John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll, Christian Detlev Reventlow, and General Ilton had planned on holding Dannenberg to protect the rest of the electorate from the depredations of the enemy. However, after Lauenburg was overwhelmed by the Prusso-Mecklenburger army, Dannenberg was transformed into an exposed salient. If the Hanoverian army remained at Dannenberg then it risked being cut off and enveloped by the Viennese forces. Rather than run that risk, Argyll ordered the retreat.

    Following Arygll's retreat, the Viennese army was able to complete its march to Dannenberg without issue. Upon arrival, Lacy opted to use the lingering perception of Russians as brutish savages to his advantage. Accordingly, Lacy promised the city's elders and garrison commander that if the city did not surrender within the day then he would level with its cannons as Maximilian II Emanuel had leveled Brussels and then loot its remains. Under this threat of Russian fire and fury and lacking any hope of relief, Dannenberg capitulated. This bloodless victory for the Viennese combined with the earlier conquest of Lauenburg gave the Viennese Alliance a firm foothold in eastern Brunswick-Luneburg and nearly half of the Principality of Luneburg. However, there was still time left in the campaign season and the Viennese army still retained its numerical advantage over the Hanoverian army. Rather than let these opportunities go to waste, Lacy and his colleagues chose to exploit them and continued their offensive westward.

    The next march took the Viennese army toward the city of Luneburg this time. Unlike with Dannenberg, Argyll could not abandon Luneburg easily as several of his subordinates and his King all opposed the idea. When the idea was first broached, Reventlow as the representative of Denmark-Norway's interests issued a harsh rebuke of it. Although Luneburg was not strategically critical to the defense of Brunswick-Luneburg, Luneburg did carry strategic importance for the defense of Holstein. Already, the fall of Lauenburg had removed one buffer for Holstein and placed a Prusso-Mecklenburger army to Holstein's east. The fall of Luneburg could threaten Hamburg and offer the Viennese army a southern route of attack. In his role as Denmark-Norway's top general in the theatre, Reventlow simply could not allow that. The Brunswickers also offered resistance to the proposal. The young, inexperienced Griff had been left with a bad taste in his mouth after abandoning Dannenberg without so much as firing a bullet and thought that it was honorless to do the same with Luneburg. Griff was backed in this stance by Prince-Bishop Ernest Augustus of Osnabruck. Ernest Augustus felt a need to defend Luneburg out of respect for his late brother, George I, who had loved his electorate so dearly and would have fought for every inch of it.

    Although the opinions of these Danish and German subordinates were listened to by Argyll, he still could have tried to overrule those opinions had not his own king, George II of Great Britain, thrown his support behind a defense of Luneburg. Argyll had been willing to raise the idea since Luneburg had no strategic meaning for Britain, Bremen-Verden was all that mattered since it guaranteed a route of escape for the British if everything went awry. However, beyond being King of Great Britain, George II was also the Elector of Brunswick-Luneburg. As a consequence of that latter role, George II felt the need to pay heed to his son and uncle's arguments. Furthermore, George II felt like an alien in Brunswick-Luneburg and desperately wanted to reconnect with the home of his youth. George II worried that if he did not defend Luneburg that he would lose the opportunity to gain the love and respect of the Brunswickers. Worse yet, George II worried that he would lose that love and respect to his unfamiliar son, Griff. For these reasons, George II ordered Argyll to defend Luneburg and avoid its fall to the Viennese army.

    Given that command, Argyll had no choice but to prepare Luneburg's defense. However, Argyll did not elect to keep his entire army in Luneburg. Rightly, Argyll understood that doing so would just mean allowing his army to be effortlessly surrounded by the Viennese army without room to maneuver. Additionally, the supply situation in Luneberg would be significantly more complicated if he tried to keep 80,000 men in the city. Instead of committing that folly, Argyll led the majority of his army out of the city and left only 10,000 soldiers within it to defend against the impending siege. While that large garrison held Luneburg, Argyll and his army could remain aloof and harass the Viennese army and its logistics. This was the same action that several commanders had performed during the War of the Spanish Succession.

    Soon after Argyll's exit from Luneburg, the Viennese army marched up the Elbe and placed the city under siege. Quickly, Lacy, Prince Leopold, and Augustus the Strong recognized that Argyll had already departed from the city and as avid students of war realized what the Argyll was intent on doing. For that reason, after setting up the siege of Luneburg, the Viennese commanders left just 20,000 men to perform the actual functions of besieging Luneburg while the rest of the army separated itself to act as a screening force. As a consequence, the Viennese army was able to put itself in a position to prevent Argyll from flanking the Viennese siege or interdicting its supply lines. This quick and intelligent response from the Viennese created concern for George II. Although Argyll felt that with winter's fast approach that he could outlast the Viennese and protect Lunenburg, George II pointed out that his strategy was no full-proof as it had failed before and the Russians were from the land of snow if anyone could handle the winter it was them. Instead of allowing Argyll to continue his slow-paced campaign, George II pressured him into challenging the Viennese army into battle. George II personally was confident of the Hanoverian army's odds in battle as the disposition of the Viennese army created comparable field armies. Argyll, however, was less sanguine. Nevertheless, Argyll consented to lead the Hanoverian army toward an uncertain battle.

    The forward elements of the Hanoverian army were met by Russian outriders near the village of Bienenbuttel. Over the next few hours, the two great armies of the Hanoverian Alliance and the Viennese Alliance formed up to the south of the Ilmenau River. The Viennese army established itself to the west and the Hanoverian army to the east. Over the next few hours, both sides engaged in vigorous war councils that involved discussions of tactics and affirmation of their respective decisions to fight. By 11 am, the two armies had finished making their formations and were ready for battle. Since the Prussians held Bienenbuttel and the Viennese army had its back to Luneburg, the Viennese were in a decent enough defensive position that they did feel obliged to move out of it. By 11:30 am, the Viennese refusal to move forced Argyll to order the advance of the Hanoverian army. When the two armies came together and clashed, the Prussians and Dano-Norwegians faced each other on the northern end of the battle, the Russians and British fought for the centre, and the Saxons and Brunswick-Hessians contested the south.

    As the hours progressed, the Dano-Norwegians and Prussians provided each other with a hard-fought battle for the north. Once the Dano-Norwegian men had marched well into the range of the houses of Bienenbuttel they were surprised to by Prussian soldiers harrying them from within the houses. Immediately, Reventlow ordered his men to take the village by assault but Prince Leopold backed his village soldiers with strong, disciplined lines of Prussian infantry. This Prussian infantry held strong in the face of heavy Dano-Norwegian attacks. At the northern flank of the two contingents, the Prussians and Dano-Norwegians had both placed their cavalry. Prince Leopold understood that his own cavalry was probably inferior to that of Denmark-Norway so he anchored this cavalry at the Ilmenau riverbank and backed it with some cavalry. The lack of space for maneuvering hampered the Dano-Norwegian cavalry's ability to take advantage of the Prussians. Although the Dano-Norwegian cavalry made some gains, the Prussian cavalry avoided breaking. Under these conditions, the Prussians held their position in the north.

    In the centre, Argyll's soldiers were surprised to see how well the Russians stood their ground and how harshly the Russians gave the British hell. In spite of Lacy's excellent march along the Baltic, Argyll had still thought less of the Russian army. The Russians at Bienenbuttel, however, were made up of many of the tough and hardened veterans of the Great Northern War and the Russo-Persian War. In contrast, most of the British soldiers were completely fresh and even those with some experience and the officers were only familiar with conflicts such as a punitive expedition against Spain and two poorly organized Jacobite uprisings of clansmen. The British army was out of touch with the ruthlessness and chaos of a real war and true pitched combat. Within this combat, the young Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, Charles Frederick, and his cousin Charles Augustus both heartily threw themselves into combat, perhaps too recklessly for recently wed men. On the other side, George II also distinguished himself with his bravery. All in all, the British like the Dano-Norwegians failed to move their opponents. However, unlike the Dano-Norwegians the British were actually losing ground and definitely getting the worst of the fighting. Still, the British did not lose their composure and allow themselves to be routed.

    In the south, the fighting proved to be much more decisive. Under General Ilton's command, the Germans had been slower in their advance toward the enemy [1]. This slow pace allowed the British to take heavy fire from the Saxons as they waited on Ilton's advance. Ilton's unhurried advance also allowed his Germans to endure several more volleys of Saxon cannon fire than they should have. Once the Germans finally did reach their near their enemy, a disaster occurred. Ilton's ponderous movement had meant that his cavalry had outpaced his infantry. Subsequently, his cavalry got too close to the Saxons without the necessary support and exposed itself to a counterattack by both the Saxon cavalry and unengaged Saxon infantry. Outnumbered and unaided, the German cavalry was shattered and broke entirely. As Ilton's cavalry fled from the battlefield his infantry soon became engulfed in a firestorm of Saxon musketry and melee of unopposed Saxon cavalry. In the moment, Ilton was overwhelmed and panicked so he ordered a hasty retreat, the first display of any urgency by him on that day. Within this retreat, Ilton himself was horsed by Saxon musket fire and then run down by a Saxon horseman.

    Upon Ilton's death, the already shaken German contingent began to lose its integrity. Before it did, however, Griff seized the reins of control and rode up among the ranks to rally the men. Under Griff's personal command, the German rout was stopped and the German formation was stabilized. However, the damage of Ilton's poor command had already been done. The Germans were very bloodied and in poor condition to keep fighting. A more experienced and talented commander might have been able to turn this southern fight around but Griff lacked the experience and the skills to accomplish that. Instead, after conferring with Ernest Augustus, Griff ordered a more orderly retreat of the Germans. Griff and Ernest Augustus sent word to both Argyll and Reventlow of the state of their forces and their decision to fall back. With the Germans unable to carry on the fight, both Argyll and Reventlow also ordered a retreat after gaining the permission of George II. Even though the Viennese generals recognized this retreat they chose against giving chase. They had won the field and that was enough.

    Afterward, the Battle of Bienenbuttel was blamed entirely on the late General Ilton's poor command of the German division of the Hanoverian army. However, in all likelihood, it is doubtful that the Hanoverians could have won even if Ilton was fully competent. In the north, the Dano-Norwegians had been confronted with a strong defensive formation and had shown no signs of being able to overcome it fully. In the centre, the Russians had been beating back the British and given more time may have repulsed them entirely. In the south, the Saxons were not any worse than the Brunswickers although the Hessians might have given them trouble. Furthermore, Maurice of Saxony had been in the process of leading reinforcements from the besieging force of Luneburg to refresh the Viennese army. The reinforcements were marching toward the Vierenbach and would have been in prime position to flank the Dano-Norwegian forces. Anyway, the overall cost of the battle was over 5,000 men mainly Brunswickers and Hessians for the Hanoverian Alliance compared to just a little more than 2,000 men for the Viennese army.

    In Luneburg, following the defeat at Bienenbuttel, the defenders lost their hope of being relieved. Although the chastised Hanoverian army attempted to offer some harassment to impede the progress of the siege, the Hanoverian army lacked the strength and the confidence to try the Viennese army in a pitched battle again. Still, the nuisance of the Hanoverian army did allow Luneburg to drag out its defense into November. By then, however, their defenses had been pounded away too much to make holding on to the city any longer viable. The garrison attempted to surrender under good terms that would allow it to rejoin the main Hanoverian alliance. However, General Lacy was unwilling to accept anything less than a full capitulation since he recognized that unless Argyll offered him another battle then there was no relief and if Luneburg tried to hold out its broken defenses would mean an easy assault. Even the defenders' threats to burn down Luneburg did not move Lacy since Empress Catherine had already prescribed the destruction of Brunswick-Luneburg [2]. Finally, the defenders surrender entirely on November 4th. With that, the Viennese Alliance gained complete control over the Principality of Luneburg and reduced their Hanoverian opponents to just 65,000 men, which was roughly 20,000 less than the strength of the Viennese army. Brunswick-Luneburg's doom was well and truly in progress.

    [1] OTL Ilton would later become notorious for this sort of conduct. Luckily in OTL, he got saved an even bigger error on the part of the enemy. This time he doesn't.
    [2] Burning down a city was a common threat at the time but it only works if the besieger wants to keep the city intact.

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    8: All Quiet on the Western Front
  • 8: All Quiet on the Western Front
    220px-Cardinal_de_Fleury_by_Rigaud.jpg

    Cardinal Fleury

    The Western Theatre of Empress Catherine's War geographically was much larger than the Northern German Theatre. Whereas the Northern German Theatre was fought mainly in the Lower and Upper Saxon Circles of the Holy Roman Empire, the Western Theatre involved four Imperial Circles (the Burgundian Circle, Westphalian Circle, Swabian Circle, and Austrian Circle) and two other sovereign countries, the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of France. This Western Theatre extended from the commercial city of Antwerp in the Southern Netherlands all the way the Rhenish fortress of Freiburg in Swabi. Accompanying this larger area of land was also a greater number of men relative to the Northern German Theatre. In the west, there were more than 200,000 men involved compared to the 167,000 men in Northern Germany (before the Battle of Bienenbuttel). Finally, although the commanders in Northern Germany like Augustus the Strong and the Duke of Argyll were by no means nameless nobodies, the two men who commanded the Western Theatre were Prince Eugene of Savoy and the Duc de Villars, Claude Louis Hector, the two greatest, most accomplished living generals in Europe. Yet in spite of all of these facts, the Western Theatre was quiet and almost a periphery to the Northern German Theatre.

    In fact, looking at past wars, the Western Theatre is a particularly unusual grouping of geography. In all the wars of King Louis XIV of France, there was no combined Western theatre but rather two distinct and entirely separate ones, the Low Countries Theatre and the Rhenish Theatre. The reason for this distinction was each theatre had enough battles, sieges, and excitement that historians and politicians did not even contemplate squeezing the two regions into a singular theatre. Doing so would have robbed each region of the respect due to them. This war, Empress Catherine's War, however, was decidedly different in how it conducted itself in the two regions. This difference in conduct had little to do with the titular figure of this war but rather the lack of the titular figure of the previous wars. Although Catherine I, no doubt, cared little for occurrences in the Low Countries and the Rhine Valley and would have looked kindly upon sending Russian armies there, it was the actually the lack of Louis XIV that deprived the two regions of their expected action. For decades, Louis XIV had fought for his own glorie and then later for the quest of giving France defensible borders. These goals heavily involved winning large set-piece battles and capturing major fortifications in both the Low Countries and Rhineland. Without Louis XIV, the goals of France had changed dramatically and so too did the manner in which it fought its wars. This change is what warranted scholars to push the two distinct regions into one overall theatre.

    Following Louis XIV's death in 1715, France saw several men try to replace that behemoth of a man. Among those men had been Louis XIV's illegitimate son, Louis Auguste, Duc de Maine; Louis XIV's trueborn son, Felipe V, King of Spain; Louis XIV's nephew, Philippe II, Duc de Orleans; Louis XIV's kinsman, Louis Henri, Duc de Bourbon; Cardinal Dubois; and Cardinal Fleury. For the ten years that followed Louis XIV's death, these men schemed and plotted against each other to become the most powerful man in France. This plotting including two conspiracies, four executions, one war, and a marriage. For the majority of that time, it was the Duc de Orleans who was coming out on top and maintaining himself as the power behind the throne of King Louis XV of France. By the time Empress Catherine's War broke out, however, Orleans had died and the only man left standing was the patient and calculated Cardinal André-Hercule de Fleury.

    Cardinal Fleury starkly contrasted with the Sun King, Louis XIV. Where Louis XIV was willing to resort to violent force, Fleury looked towards gentle diplomacy. Where Louis XIV was a man of grandiose ambitions, Fleury thrived on moderation and temperateness. And where Louis XIV dreamed of using France's might to create a France which Europe could never threaten, Fleury worried that all Europe would ever see in France was a threat. Thus where Louis XIV's mission had been to expand France's territories and strengthen its borders, Fleury had a much-limited goal: survival. These differences were already noticeable when Fleury guided France toward joining Britain's coalition rather than allowing France to become the target of that coalition. Now, with war at hand, these differences made themselves even more apparent. For example, while Louis XIV regularly raised 250,000 men, Fleury restricted his requests to just 100,000 for reasons of finance and diplomacy.

    Once the war began, Cardinal Fleury was slow to dispatch his armies, unlike Louis XIV who had always struck with decisive speed. This delay was not out of a lack of capability or courage in Fleury nor was it due to his disinclination toward war. Instead, Fleury postponed France's military movements for political reasons. Fleury worried that if France used its military alone that he might incite fear among his allies that France had not changed since Louis XIV's demise. For this reason, Fleury waited for both the British parliament in London and the Dutch States-General in the Hague to raise their own armies and draw up their own war plans before making an act of his own. Once the British and Dutch had readied themselves for war, Fleury consulted with both of them after the next steps of the Hanoverian Alliance. In London, the British were clearly happy to have as an ally rather than an enemy but it was obvious that underneath all the courtesies and civilities that the British were still concerned that France might use this war to its own advantage. In the Dutch Republic, the contempt and fear held toward France were too intense to hide completely. The French exchanges with both allies convinced Fleurey that his assessment of France's position vis-à-vis its allies and neighbors was correct. France was still the enemy in their eyes and it would be a hard sentiment to deconstruct. Despite how the British and Dutch saw France, Fleury was still determined to improve France's diplomatic situation and its long-term place in European affairs by working with France's allies.

    In Fleury's effort to diminish the association of belligerence and aggression with France, Fleury actively worked to approach French military campaigning in a new and nuanced wat. Toward Spain, 25,000 mem under James FitzJames, the Duke Berwtick would be dispatched not to conquer Catalonia but to occupy Navarre. The goal was to put pressure on Madrid to come to terms with the Hanoverian Alliance rather than to seek territorial gains for France. For the Low Countries, an army of 30,000 men led by Marshal Nicolas Chalon du Ble would be formed to act as no more than an army of observation. Du Ble's army was meant to dissuade the Hapsburgs from making any significant military actions not to to conduct any major French offensives. Finally, in the Rhine Valley, 55,000 men under the command of the Duc de Villars were deployed and were given the most assertive goals. Villars was instructed to seize the Duchy of Lorraine and secure the Hapsburg fortresses in the area, which would provide a threat toward the Viennese Alliance from the west. Overall, not only was Fleury intent on using fewer men than Louis XIV but we wanted to use them for less than Louis XIV had.

    Fleury's absitenence from invading the Southern Netherlanders proved to be extremely wise once the initial events of the war unfolded. As mentioned previously, the Dutch Republic remained haunted by the devastation of the Franco-Dutch War and the French transgressions that had followed. For this reason, even though the Dutch were allied to the French they felt minimal trust toward them. This lack of trust contributed to the Dutch decision to give up the Barrier Fortresses just over two months into the war. Another contributor factor was that the Barrier Fortresses were paid for by taxes from the Southern Netherlands that the Hapsburgs refused to provide while the Dutch were fighting against them. Ultimately, through negotiations with the Governor of the Southern Netherlands, Archduchess Maria Elisabeth of Austria, it was agreed that after a brief set of mock sieges that the Dutch would surrender the fortresses to the Hapsburgs. The Dutch, however, were allowed to keep their arms and retreat unhindered to the north. The Dutch retreat to north, of course, helped secure the Dutch Republic against the small possibility of a Hapsburg invasion but also avoided any coordination between Dutch and French armies. This episode demonstrated to Fleury that his assessment of France's place in European politics was correct and that the fear of France remained strong.

    The reaction to the surrender of the Barrier Fortresses in Vienna was pleasant surprise. This occasion was an undoubted coup for the Hapsburgs and Archduchess Maria Elisabeth was praised for her role in it. In spite of this congratulation for Maria Elisabeth, the Imperial council still felt that over the course of her tenure as Governor of the Southern Netherlands had been displaying a proclivity towards independent action that was considered displeased by Vienna. The outbreak of a European war provided Vienna with a good opportunity and additional motive to remove and replace Maria Elisabeth [1]. Although Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI would have liked to have Prince Eugene at the helm of the Southern Netherlands, Prince Eugene's preoccupation with the Rhine Valley made it impossible for him to manage the Southern Netherlands. Even if Prince Eugene was not otherwise occupied his previous rule of the Southern Netherlands had been a disaster. Many of the rest of Charles VI's advisers were need at home, in Vienna, to manage the war in its entirety rather than a single part ot it, in the form of the Southern Netherlands.

    Without one of his own men to fill the post of Governor of the Southern Netherlands, Charles VI looked to Charles Albert, Elector of Bavaria. In the past, Charles Albert's father, Maximilian II Emmanuel, who had done an impressive job as governor. That was, of course, until he betrayed the House Hapsburg and fought for Louis XIV in the War of the Spanish Succession. Additionally, Charles Albert's brother was the current Archbishop-Elector of Cologne and Prince-Bishop of Münster, both of which were neighbors of the Southern Netherlands and the Dutch Republic, which meant that Charles Albert had access to additional resources for the region's defense. Also, Charles Albert was married to a Hapsburg, Archduchess Maria Amalia, which meant that assigning him post would not take the Southern Netherlands out of the Hapsburg family entirely. Overall, Charles Albert was a decent candidate. More importantly, it was believed that by naming Charles Albert governor that the Hapsburgs would be able to further secure his and Bavaria's loyalty to Emperor Charles VI.

    As expected, Charles Albert was pleased to be appointed governor and sent a letter laying out his gratefulness to Charles VI for entrusting him with such a great responsibility. However, what Charles Albert failed to mention is perhaps more important than what he did mention. Firstly, Charles Albert still aspired to be elected Holy Roman Emperor if Charles VI failed to produce a male-born heir. Secondly, Charles Albert still hoped to gain a slice of the Hapsburg inheritance permanently and did not consider a governorship to fulfill that desire. If anything, Charles Albert felt that this governorship gave him even greater right to the Southern Netherlands as compensation for his claims on the Hapsburg monarchy. Even with this lurking ambitions, Charles Albert unlike his father did not think to use this post to betray the Hapsburgs. Charles Albert still felt that it was in his best interests to remain aligned with Charles VI.

    Upon arriving in Brussels, Charles Albert found that there was no more than 15,000 Hapsburg men available to defend the Southern Netherlands. Since Charles Albert did not wish to invite a Anglo-Franco-Dutch invasion and thus his humiliation through the weakness of the Southern Netherlands' garrisons, Charles Albert augmented the Hapsburg men with 15,000 soldiers from his own Bavaria and from his brother's ecclesiastical domains. This reinforcement brought up the total Viennese forces in the region to just 30,000, which although considerable still left Charles Albert wanting more. The problem for Charles Albert was that he was being stared down by du Ble and 30,000 Frenchmen from the south while to the north, an English army had arrived to produce an army of 42,000 Anglo-Dutch soldiers. The combined enemy formations outnumbered Charles Albert by more than double and Charles Albert would be hard pressed to defeat them in the case of invasion. At best, Charles Albert could attempt to hold out in Brussels or fall back to Luxembourg until Prince Eugene came to his relief.

    In spite of Charles Albert's fears, no attack ever came. As already discussed, Marshal du Ble was under strict orders not to attack the Southern Netherlands and so he did not. The main reason that Marshal du Ble's army existed was to make sure that the Viennese troops did not perceive weakness and try to retake some of the lost fortresses like Lille. Another reason for du Ble's army was that Fleury did not want to seem uncommitted to his alliance with the British and Dutch. If Fleury did not put an army in northern France to tie down the Southern Netherlands than perhaps the Viennese would invade the Dutch Republic. In that case, France might be accused of scheming with the Hapsburgs. At best, the French would be labelled incompetent or unreliable and the British favor of the alliance with France would diminish. The only way for Fleury to avoid any unnecessary drama was to maintain this army of observation that failed either threaten the security of the Southern Netherlands or give the Viennese Alliance a free hand.

    Meanwhile on the opposite side of the Southern Netherlands, the British and Dutch were both uneager to disturb Charles Albert's defense. In fact, although the Anglo-Dutch army made for a formidable army the representatrives of the parliament and States-General had already agreed that it was best not to put that army to use. The British and Dutch feared that if they did use their army that it would give the French an excuse and an opportunity to invade the Southern Netherlands and occupy Antwerp, which was impermissible for either Britain or the Dutch Republic. However, the British and Dutch had both antagnoized the Holy Roman Emperor and his allies recently and they could not be certain of his intentions. Consequently, an army was needed in case those intentions included a forcible revision of the Treaty of Westphalia and opening of the Scheldt River to the Emperor's Ostend Company [2]. Fortunately, at least as far as 1727 was concerned, the Scheldt was not on Charles VI's mind and thus the Anglo-Dutch army remained stationary and unengaged.

    All in all, despite there being a little over 100,000 soldiers in the Low Countries, not even a single musket or cannon was fired outside of drills. The political machinations and aspirations of France, Great Britain, the Dutch Republic, and the Hapsburgs had restricted three whole armies to do nothing more than sit, watch, and wait. In this fashion, the Low Countries that had once been a great seat of conflict worthy of being classified as its own theatre became nothing more a sideshow to the adjacent actions of the Rhine. However, even the Rhineland alongside the Low Countries was but a sideshow to the ongoings of Northern Germany and the Mediterranean. Low Countries had become nothing more than a place for political messages and images. It was a theatre of drama rather than of arms.

    Even if the Low Countries had been low by politics, one would have expected that the Rhine Valley would have delivered some major action or at least a grand campaign of maneuvering with the renowened Duc de Villars at the head of a French army of 55,000 men and the venerated Prince Eugene commanding 58,000 Germans. However, nothing to that effect occurred. Instead, just as the Low Countries failed to meet the expectations and precedents set by previous wars so too did the Rhine Valley. This was not a war in which the French would raze Palatinate nor would an Anglo-Hapsburg army dash through the region toward an epic triumph. No, this was Empress Catherine's War where the Rhine Valley no longer had a central role to play.

    The only real action of the Rhenish campaigns was the opening strike of Villars against the neutral Duchy of Lorraine and Bar. As a natural part of any French campaign in the Rhineland, the French overran Lorraine and occupied it without any resistance from the Hapsburgs. This had mattered numerous times before and this time was no different. What was different was the campaign that followed the occupation of Lorraine. Once Villars reached the barrier formed by the Rhine River, Villars found Prince Eugene on the other side. At this point, Villars could have attempted to outmarch and outmaneuver Eugene by invading one of the countless Imperial principalities. However, Cardinal Fleury did not seek to alarm the Imperial Diet or any of the Imperial Circles by infringing on the neutrality of Imperial states not named Lorraine. The purpose of this restriction was to assuage fears among Europe and especially the Holy Roman Empire that France remained a warmonger. Furthermore, any attack on an additional Imperial state risked giving the Hapsburgs the needed capital to declare an Imperial war against France. In which case, the war would have escalated to exceedingly worrying and complicated levels that Fleury did not find necessary. Given this restriction, Villars' maneuverability was severely hampered and his army's choice of actions was made quite predictable.

    On the other side, Prince Eugene knew that an offensive campaign, for the time being, was completely out of the question. The Hapsburgs had enough money to fight a kind of war but not the kind of war that involves campaigning beyond Imperial borders, deep inside enemy territory. Furthermore, Prince Eugene had only been entrusted with an army of 58000 men, consisting of 45,000 Hapsburg soldiers and 13,000 Bavarian soldiers. This army was barely larger than Villars'. If Prince Eugene was to invade France then supply issues, desertion, and attrition could easily wear his army down and do away with this slight numerical edge. In that scenario, Prince Eugene would cede the advantage to Villars and put Germany at the mercy of the French. Hence the Prince had little choice but to focus on doing nothing more than defending the Rhine Valley by establishing a defensive line at Ettlingen.

    With these two complementary objectives for the Duc de Villars and Prince Eugene, a slight campaign of maneuver began. Villars and French would march south and try to outpace the Germans or trick them into leaving a crossing ill-defended. Prince Eugene, however, was still in his prime and was able to match Villars march for march. In the meantime, the Germans were busy repairing and improving the Rhenish fortifications such as the Fortress of Philippsburg and the Fortress of Kehl. Since neither army was significantly larger than the other, neither could use the threat of battle to force the other to concede ground. Thus for months the two armies marched and marched to little avail. Finally, winter arrived and offered the tired soldiers of both armies a reprieve from life on the road when each army retreated to its winter quarters.

    The Rhenish portion of the Western Theatre had similarily to the Low Countries been, for the most part, uneventful. Outside of the expected loss of Lorraine, there had been no other change in territory. By the end of the campaigning season, Villars had failed to overcome the barrier that was the Rhine and Prince Eugene had not even made the French consider leaving Lorraine. Both armies although somewhat depleted by the constant marching were still equally matched and that situation looked unlikely to change as Cardinal Fleury's government did not feel the need to draw up more soldiers to the front and the Imperial Council lacked the funds to support another army. Only a stroke of genius might be able to disrupt this flow of actions, the problem was that both commanders were geniuses so neither was likely to get outwitted easily.

    Overall, the Western Theatre in 1727 failed to produce any decisive actions that could bring the war's end closer. This lack of action emerged mainly from the political disclination of Cardinal Fleury towards the thought a grand offensive campaign to dislodge the Viennese Alliance from either the Southern Netherlands or the Rhenish Valley and from the Anglo-Dutch absolute unwillingness to promote violence in the Southern Netherlands. On the other side, the Viennese Alliance's members of the Hapsburgs, Bavaria, and Cologne would have liked to have seen some successes but lacked the resources to produce a major success. Ultimately, the Viennese Alliance was willing to accept the result of nothingness that it received. Charles Albert, the new Governor of the Southern Netherlands, was simply happy to avoid losing his new position after having just gained it, and Charles VI had prayed for a fortunate victory on the Rhine but had acquiesced to Prince Eugene's calls for a simple defensive campaign. All of this is understandable, the only real question is if there was any reason for the strategic situation of the Western Theatre to change in the campaign season that was to follow.

    [1] OTL Maria Elisabeth was quite the independent governor. She independently suspended and closed the Ostend Company since it was located in the Southern Netherlands. Because the Hapsburgs gave up on the Ostend project to gain British acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction and because there were no pressing concerns in the Southern Netherlands the Hapsburgs allowed Maria Elisabeth to govern till her death. TTL the Ostend Company is still alive, there is a real war, and the Hapsburgs want to further tie Charles Albert to them which leads to Maria Elisabeth's dismissal.
    [2] The Treaty of Westphalia closed the Scheldt River to the Southern Netherlands which extremely limited its trading ability and allowed the rise of the north. If the Scheldt was opened to the Southern Netherlands it might easily outcompete the Dutch Republic.

    Word Count: 3739
     
    9: Spain's Return?
  • 9: Spain's Return?
    300px-German_print_of_the_1727_Gibraltar_Siege.jpg

    Siege of Gibraltar

    The Spaniards were overall pleased with the expansion of their war against Britain into a continental war. Within the Spanish Court, some courtiers claimed that both the Holy Roman Emperor and the Empress of All Russia would fight not just their own interests but for the interests of Spain. These courtiers hoped that even if Gibraltar and Menorca did not fall that the two Imperial despots would force Great Britain to return Spain's possessions through their victories in the north. However, others, including Queen Isabel Farnese, recognized how reluctant the Hapsburgs had been to join Spain's war. For half a year, Spain had besieged Gibraltar and yet the Hapsburgs had not sent the promised material support. Not one bullet nor one pound of grain was sent to aid Spain's army. Spain had been left alone by its supposed ally, which had forced Spain to consider the French offer of restoring a Spanish presence in Italy in exchange for Spain giving up its siege of Gibraltar. Ultimately, an incident in the Baltic gained Britain the ire of Empress Catherine I and brought the Hapsburgs into the war. However, the Spanish still remembered the cool reception they had received in Vienna for months previously and recognized that even now the Hapsburgs sent no help. Just as Spain was being overlooked by its enemies, Spain was also being overlooked by its ally.

    The concern that Spain's interests would not be honored by its allies provided strong motivation for Spain to achieve its objectives on its own rather than depend on other's success. So long as Spain did find its own victories than either its allies would have good reason to include Spain's demands in future peace talks or Spain would be able to secure a peace of its own. Given these thoughts, King Felipe V of Spain and his consort, Isabel Farnese, chose to redouble Spain's military efforts and commitment to the war. In Gibraltar, Felipe V ordered that the besieging army's strength be brought back up to 15,000. In the north, 20,000 new men were to be raised to defend against a French invasion. These actions more than doubled the number of Spaniards under arms. Furthermore, Felipe V and Isabel stopped giving credence to lesser men and gave his best generals command of both armies.

    In Madrid, Felipe V, his wife, his councilors, and everyone else were all displeased with the fact that Gibraltar was not even close to falling after four months of siege despite the Count de la Torres' promise to take Gibraltar in just six weeks. In fact, Isabel Farnese pointed out that under de la Torres' watch Gibraltar's garrison had grown from just 1,500 men to 5,000. The final nail in the coffin was provided by Jorge Prospero de Verboom when he traveled from Gibraltar to Madrid to lodge a formal complaint against the ineptitude of de la Torres. Rather than defend de la Torres, Felipe V offered to dismiss him if de Verboom assumed command of the siege. Personally, de Verboom had grown even more pessimistic about capturing the Rock of Gibraltar since the siege had begun; however, de Verboom's ardent desire to see de la Torres done away with was enough of a motive for de Verboom to accept the incredible challenge.

    Upon assuming control of the Thirteenth Siege of Gibraltar, de Verboom's first action was to adopt the plan that de la Torres had previously rejected. This plan called for digging under Willis' Battery and bringing it down with a mine so that Willis' Battery would not be able to hinder the advance of Spain's siege lines and the Spanish bombardment of Gibraltar. According to this plan, Spanish soldiers and laborers entered the cave near Willis' Battery day after day and chipped away at the rock below. The laborers regularly had to be changed to prevent exhaustion or death and almost every soldier had to take a turn in the tunnel. The only soldiers exempt from this long, laborious process of undermining Willis' Battery were the artillerymen. The Spanish artillery had its own long, laborious process as they had been ordered by de Verboom to resume and keep up a near-continuous bombardment of Gibraltar. Even when the bombardment paused, the artillerymen had to spend days cleaning, repairing, and mending their cannons for another bombardment. Altogether, the siege was an extremely difficult feat for the Spanish army but the replacement of commanders and the expansion of the war gave it some hope that its efforts would not be in vain.

    On the British side of the siege, the installation of de Verboom as commander of the Spanish army did not go unnoticed. With de Verboom at the helm of the siege, the bombardments became a more steady and regular occurrence to the displease of the Earl of Portmore and the British garrison of Gibraltar. On top of the better-managed siege effort, Portmore was informed by the British government that in light of the expansion of the war that their approach to the war had necessarily changed. As a consequence, Portmore would not get any of the reinforcements that he had been led to expect. Instead, those men were headed to Germany and the Low Countries. All that was requisitioned for Portmore was the Gibraltar and Menorca naval squadrons, which would keep Gibraltar supplied with materials and defend it against naval attacks. The rest of the defense of Gibraltar was placed on the shoulders of Portmore and his diminishing garrison.

    On the complete other side of Spain, the French were not content to play defensive against the Spanish. Previously, during the War of the Quadruple Alliance, James FitzJames, the Duke of Berwick, had embarked on an invasion of Navarre and met good success. The positive outcome of Berwick's campaign combined with the negative outcome of Spain's adventure in Sicily had ultimately led to Spain's defeat in the War of the Quadruple Alliance. Importantly, the invasion had not triggered any resentment or panic from the British since the French had made it clear that they did not intend to stay and annex Navarre. In 1727, Fleury thought that the best way to bring a quick end to Spain's war effort was to replicate the invasion of 1719, which meant authorizing Berwick to led his army of 25,000 men in another invasion of Navarre.

    In Navarre, Berwick first came across and laid siege to the border fortress of Fuenterrabia. Upon arrival, the French army surrounded the fortress and thus cut it and its garrison of 800 men off from the rest of Spain. In response, Jose Carrillo de Albornoz, the Count de Montemar, and his army of 20,000 Spanish soldiers moved with all due haste out of Catalonia into Navarre so that they could relieve the fortress and prevent further French encroachments on Spanish territory. During this march, Montemar's war was joined by Felipe V and Isabel just as it had been during its response to the 1719 French invasion. However, unlike in 1719, the Spanish army was not led by a timid fool like Principe Pio but rather by the Marquis de Lede's capable successor and lieutenant the Count de Montemar. In contrast to Principe Pio, Montemar understood the inherent strength of Fuenterrabia's fortifications and their importance as a barrier to French aggression and thus was determined not to lose it. Once Montemar's army neared Fuentebarria he sent orders to the garrison to not surrender under any terms without the express permission of Montemar and the King. Within Fuenterrabia, the news of a relief army so close at hand allowed the garrison's morale to surge and steeled the resolve of the defenders. Enthusiastically, Fuenterrabia promised Montemar that they would not give so much as one more inch of Spanish soil to the French invaders.

    The arrival of a relief army and the subsequent newfound determination of Fuenterrabia's garrison differed from the easy conquest Berwick had been led to expect based on his previous experience. Still, Berwick had his orders and he still intended to follow them by breaking into Spain and creating a direct threat to Felipe V and his government. For this reason, Berwick did not give up on taking Fuenterrabia. Berwick did, however, abandon any thoughts of taking Fuenterrabia by assault. The cost of such an assault would have been great and could be great enough to give Montemar the advantage over Berwick. Instead, Berwick focused on pounding the fortress into submission. However, at the time, Berwick lacked the heavy artillery required to bombard Fuenterrabia heavily since the French had failed to anticipate meaningful Spanish opposition. Only after a few weeks was Berwick's bombardment allowed to begin and by that time it was already September.

    For the next two months, the French bombardment of Fuenterrabia was practically relentless. Thousands of cannonballs fell down upon the fortress and its surrounding town. Similar to the Siege of Fuenterrabia in 1638, the bombardment succeeded in leveling the city but failed to destroy the fortress, which allowed the battered garrison the confidence to refuse to yield the fortress to the French. Day after day, the defenders bravely repaired their fortifications and armaments to fire back at their French besiegers. To aid the defenders, a small contingent of Spanish soldiers from Montemar's army broke through Berwick's siege lines during a night operation and reinforced Fuenterrabia. Besides bringing additional soldiers, this contingent brought needed additional supplies and a personal letter from Felipe V praising their courage and asking them to continue to hold out. Ultimately, in November as the weather grew worse and disease began to ravage the French army, Berwick was forced to break his siege of the stalwart Fuenterrabia and retreat to France.

    After Berwick was chastened and sent back to France, Felipe V and Isabel urged Montemar to launch a counteroffensive. However, Montemar doubted that such an action would have any greater success than Berwick's invasion and dissuade Felipe V and Isabel from such action, using the lateness in the year as an excuse. Instead of following Montemar in an invasion northward, Felipe V and Isabel rode into Fuenterrabia and personally thanked the fortress's defenders for preserving Spain's honor. The commander of the garrison, a minor Spanish soldier, was awarded the title Count of Fuentebarria whilst the rest of the garrison was to be publically honored in a ceremony in Madrid that winter. Afterward, Felipe V and Isabel returned to Madrid and let Montemar continue to oversee Spain's defense without royal interference. Montemar ended the year by repairing Fuenterrabia's walls and reviewing and improving the defenses of Catalonia.

    Overall, the Siege of Fuenterrabia was a decisive Spanish victory. The Spanish had succeeded in stopping a French invasion of Spain and demonstrated their military resoluteness and formidability in the process. Obviously, Fleury and Berwick had underestimated the Spanish army since they had not expected anything close to the resistance the Spanish ended up offering. In hindsight, this underestimation was not well-justified. Yes, in the War of the Quadruple Alliance the French had managed to occupy the provinces of Vizcaya, Gipuzkoa, and Alava despite the presence of a Spanish army in the region. Yet that Spanish army was nothing but scraps of the Spanish military. At the same time, the real Spanish army had taken both Sardinia and Sicily. On the latter island, the Spanish army under Marquis de Lede and Count de Montemar had also defeated the initial Hapsburg effort to retake the island. Only when the Spanish army was completely cut off by the Royal Navy and starved of war supplies was it defeated. In this war, Empress Catherine's War, the main Spanish army was not stranded in Sicily but instead was fighting in Spain at Gibraltar and Navarre. This army although not matching Spain's vaunted military during its Golden Age was still an army that should have been respected in light of its recent accomplishments and improvements. France, however, had failed to give the Spaniards that respect and paid for it with a costly failed campaign.

    Across the Atlantic Ocean, another miscalculation cost the Hanoverian Alliance dearly. Before news of the expanded war even arrived in the Caribbean, Admiral Francis Hosier had begun to patrol and harass the coast of the Spanish Main, primarily near Cartagena since another Spanish treasure fleet was being assembled. Already Admiral Hosier had let one Spanish treasure fleet slip through the Caribbean, he could not let another one. However, this new voyage found no greater success than the previous one. Once again, the Spanish treasure remained ashore and the Spanish ships did not move so long as the British threatened them. Instead, the British remained idle at sea until Yellow Fever struck again. This time, the scourge of Yellow Fever was even more severe than before and thousands of sailors contracted the illness and many, including Admiral Hosier, died. By the time Yellow Fever had run its course through the fleet, 4000 sailors and marines were dead, which amounted to more than four-fifths of the British fleet. In light of this massacre of British seamen, Hosier's replacement, Edward St. Lo returned the fleet to Jamaica and ended the British pressure on Spain.

    The deaths of so many members of the Royal Navy was devastating. In London, the Admiralty was quick to lay the blame on Hosier who could not defend himself in death. However, the Admiralty did also begin to doubt its own strategy and wondered if these Caribbean operations were a good use of Britain's naval resources. Compton, however, was too embarrassed at the cost of the Caribbean expedition to give up on it without any success. For this reason, the Admiralty did not offer any change of orders for St. Lo. Fortunately, by the time St. Lo received these dispatches, news of the war's expansion had reached the Caribbean. As a result, French ships also began to prowl the Caribbean and Atlantic for Spanish ships, which lessened the burden on the crippled British Caribbean squadron. In this state of affairs, the Spanish colonials could not safely order another treasure fleet to be sent to Spain. Instead, Spain's treasure remained in the Americas, which further mitigated the effects of St. Lo's retreat to Jamaica.

    Altogether the Spanish war effort following the expansion of the war had been successful. In the colonies, Spain had held its own while the British had been wrecked by disease. At Gibraltar, the Spanish were making progress toward a potential siege-breaking event that might deliver Gibraltar back to Spain. In Navarre, the Spanish had succeeded in repulsing the French attack. No longer did Spain's military long like the broken, decrepit thing that it had been during the late decades of Hapsburg mismanagement. Instead, Spain's military was looking like a legitimate force that could have an impact on European affairs. These three successes gave the Spanish a degree of hope that they might actually achieve their war goals of retaking Gibraltar and Menorca, restoring Spain's prestige, and gaining guarantees for Spanish rights in Italy. On the other side, the Hanoverian Alliance began to look at Spain with new eyes.

    In Great Britain and France, Compton and Fleury began to realize that the early victories of Spain in the War of the Quadruple Alliance were not a fluke but rather a foreshadowing. This unsettling thought of a militarily-competent Spain made Britain and France question if Spain needed to be the enemy. Sure, Spain wanted to retake Gibraltar and Menorca and it wanted to gain land in Italy. However, these goals were not entirely diametrically opposed to the interests of Britain and France. In fact, James Stanhope, Britain's chief minister from 1717 until his death in 1721, had been contemplating returning Gibraltar to Spain before his death and France and Great Britain had already agreed to give Spain some guarantees in Italy after the War of the Quadruple Alliance. The rising opinion in Britain and France was that Spain could be brought to terms without compromising the long-term interests of Britain and France. This opinion was so attractive to the French that Fleury's diplomats re-engaged with their Spanish counterparts shortly after Berwick's failure at Fuenterrabia. Spain, however, believed in its own strength enough to plainly tell France that its offers of Parma and Piacenza were too paltry. On the other hand, Spain's demands for all those Italian territories, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the end of Britain's commercial rights in the Spanish empire, and the return of Gibraltar and Menorca were seen as too excessive by the British and French. Thus, Spain remained an active belligerent for the Viennese Alliance. However, Spain also understood that it had an alternative exit to the war than a peace orchestrated by the Hapsburgs and Russians.

    Word Count: 2781
     
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    10: A Meaningless March in Milan
  • 10: A Meaningless March in Milan
    220px-Vittorio_Amedeo_II_in_Maest%C3%A0_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg

    King Victor Amadeus II of Sardinia

    In contrast to the war in northern Germany, the war in Italy was slow to start. Although the British had managed to buy King Victor Amadeus II of Sardinia and his army, he was not the same energetic, vain man he had been a decade ago. In 1727, Victor Amadeus was sixty-one-years old and was wondering if all the projects and wars of his youth had actually accomplished anything. Certainly, Victor Amadeus had gained himself the title of king with his possession of Sardinia. However, just before becoming King of Sardinia, Victor Amadeus had forced to give away the much richer and more developed Kingdom of Sicily to Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI. Meanwhile, Victor Amadeus' lust for Lombardian land had achieved almost nothing. No progress had been made in Victor Amadeus' quest to be named King of Lombardy and he had only received a few scraps of land that the Hapsburgs deemed fit to give up. At home, Victor Amadeus had implemented a new tax system. Although the new system proved more effective it also earned him the disdain of his people and triggered a tax revolt in 1724. Not even in his own family could Victor Amadeus find comfort for his stumbles. Even though Victor Amadeus' wife, Anne Marie d'Orleans, was a kind-hearted person, she and Victor Amadeus had never connected. Out of the six children that Victor Amadeus and Anne Marie had produced, only one remained living, Charles Emmanuel, and his relationship with Victor Amadeus veered toward coldness. All in all, Victor Amadeus was a sad old man but he had an army and some lingering dreams of winning glory and becoming a major Italian power, which meant that the Hanoverian Alliance had entrusted him to guard their interests in the Italian Theatre.

    The melancholy and lethargy of Victor Amadeus proved more powerful than Victor Amadeus' initial excitement for war and resulted in the 24,000-man Sardinian army exiting Piedmont weeks later than it could have. When Victor Amadeus did march, he did so without his son, unlike his Prussian counterpart, Friedrich Wilhelm I. Furthermore, despite being the only male from the House of Savoy left in Turin, Charles Emmanuel was not named regent in Victor Amadeus' absence. Instead, Victor Amadeus gave that responsibility to Anne Marie. This behavior by Victor Amadeus demonstrated the distance between him and his son and also highlighted the unlikelihood of a reconciliation between them. Charles Emmanuel did not take lightly to the obvious insult but he could not much to resist his father's decision. Even with the misgivings about Victor Amadeus' reign, he remained Sardinia and Piedmont's unchallenged ruler.

    Once the Sardinian army entered the Duchy of Milan it found little opposition. Emperor Charles VI's reluctance to go to war had left Milan's defense in a dismal state. Neither the fortifications nor the soldiers were sufficient enough to delay the advance of the Sardinians. Indeed, Milan's governor, Wirich Philipp von Daun, had to abandon the city of Milan upon hearing of the Sardinian invasion. From Milan, Daun evacuated to Mantua where he hoped that the heavy fortifications there might hold the Sardinians long enough for reinforcements to arrive. Once Milan fell to the Sardinians, Victor Amadeus finally began to feel more like his old self and picked up the pace of his army's march as he chased after Daun. Soon enough the Sardinian army had entered Mantua's borders and put the Hapsburg garrisons there under siege. After years of misfortune, God finally seemed to be smiled upon Victor Amadeus and his ambitions.

    The ease of Victor Amadeus' campaign did not last. By the end of September, a Hapsburg army of 40,000 men commanded by Count Claude Florimond de Mercy had been formed and it was moving directly toward the army of Victor Amadeus. the approach of de Mercy's army left Victor Amadeus with a decision to make. Either Victor Amadeus could break off his siege of Mantua and retreat or he could challenge de Mercy to a fight. In spite of Victor Amadeus' numerical inferiority, he chose the latter option. However, in recognition of de Mercy's greater numbers, Victor Amadeus wanted to resist de Mercy from within the fortress of Mantua. From within Mantua, Victor Amadeus felt that he hold de Mercy at bay until his army was wasted by attrition and desertion. Of course, Mantua was still defended by Daun, who had no intention of capitulating with de Mercy's army approaching. As a consequence, Victor Amadeus ordered his army to hit Mantua with everything it could so that Mantua would either be scared into surrendering or would be broken enough for an assault to be made. For the next three days, the Sardinians bombarded Mantua without stopping but at the end of the bombardment, Mantua's wall still stood strong and Daun still remained defiant. In light of Mantua's stalwartness, Victor Amadeus' confidence left him and he ordered a swift retreat toward Milan.

    Shortly after the Sardinians gave up their siege of Mantua, de Mercy and his army arrived and guaranteed the fortress's protection. However, saving Mantua did not remove the Sardinians from Milan, which Charles VI desperately wanted recovered. Furthermore, de Mercy was hungry for blood. Once de Mercy had secured Mantua he pivoted to chase away the Sardinians and began to drive toward Victor Amadeus' army across the rivers of Northern Italy. The speed at which de Mercy's army moved took the Sardinians by surprise as the War of the Quadruple Alliance had lulled the Sardinians into some belief that outside of Prince Eugene of Savoy the Hapsburgs had fallen to incompetence and disarray [1]. The fast approach of de Merc combined with Milan's inadequate defenses convinced the Sardinian commanders that Milan had to be abandoned for the safety of Piedmont. With immense difficulty, Victor Amadeus concurred with their assessment and gave up the fabled Milan that he had worked so hard to gain.

    When Victor Amadeus came home he did so having lost 3,000 men and not having a single inch of new soil to show for it. Consequently, the mood in Turin lacked even a modicum of excitement or joy for the war, all they felt was woe. To the east, de Mercy had succeeded in forcing the Sardinians away from Mantua and out of Milan, which had restored Hapsburg control to all their northern Italian possessions less than four months after the Sardinians had invaded. Still, de Mercy wanted to fight a battle to prove his mettle one more time. Obviously, with the onset of winter de Mercy could not dare to invade Piedmont and instead had to quarter himself in Milan. However, de Mercy had already begun to plan for a new offensive in the spring. In Vienna, Charles VI did not share de Mercy's bloodlust and was also immensely pleased with how the 1727 campaign had ended. As a result, Charles VI planned to reduce de Mercy's army to reinforce the Rhenish theatre. Altogether, it seemed that after a brief flicker of excitement that the Italian Theatre would regress into a calm lull.

    [1] In de Mercy 1733 relief of Mantua he was quite slow. De Mercy's lack of speed was attributed to a stroke he suffered early in the campaign. Right now de Mercy is 6 years younger and is still one of the Hapsburg Army's most decisive and aggressive generals.

    Word Count: 1227
     
    11: Catastrophe at Kymmenedalen
  • 11: Catastrophe at Kymmenedalen
    kZfWyQu.jpg

    The HMS Revenge during the Battle of Kymmenedalen

    Sweden, much like the rest of the Hanoverian Alliance, considered Prussia's defection to the Viennese Alliance to be detrimental to the Hanoverian war effort. For Sweden, Prussia's defection was particularly concerning since it left Russia with only one nearby threat, Sweden. Without Prussia fighting against Russia, Russia could commit far more resources toward defeating Sweden without fear of weakening its western armies. As a consequence, Russia might be able to unleash untold horrors on Sweden's eastern provinces as Russia had done during the Great Northern War. Despite this dramatic shift in the balance of the war before the war had even truly begun, Sweden did not concede the war. Even with Russia being able to launch a much more significant offensive against Sweden, Major General Karl Emil Lewenhaupt and Carl Gyllenborg still thought that Sweden could come out of the war victorious. Lewenhaupt envisioned Sweden holding the Russians back in Finland or at least bogging down their invasion for some time while the British and Sweden navies protected Stockholm and kept the Swedish army in Finland supplied. Meanwhile, Britain, Denmark-Norway, and Brunswick-Luneburg would defeat the Russians, Prussians, and Saxons in Germany. Ultimately after a Hanoverian victory was found in Germany, the British and company would join the Swedes in Finland and launch a counterattack against the Russians that would deliver Saint Petersburg, Estonia, and Livland to Sweden.

    Lewenhaupt and Gyllenborg were opposed by Arvid Horn. Horn had been the primary leader in Swedish politics since 1720 when he was elected Lantmarskalk or lord marshal of the Swedish Riksdag but had Horn played a major role in Sweden's affairs since he was first made a privy councilor in 1706. Indeed, Horn had been largely responsible for Ulrika Eleanora's elevation to Queen of Sweden in 1718 over Charles Frederick, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and later, in 1720 facilitated Ulrika Eleanora's abdication in favor of her husband, Fredrik of Hesse-Kassel. However, in 1727, Horn's previous primacy had been compromised by his recent destruction of the Holstein Party, which included the dismissal and even arrest of most pro-Holstein-Gottorp ministers. With most of the Holstein Party removed from power or sent to foreign posts, pro-war elements of Sweden's elite had been able to combine with King Fredrik I's Hessian advisers to convince him of the viability and soundness of a war against Russia. With the support of King Fredrik and Queen Ulrika Eleanora, the pro-war elements had been able to lead the Swedish Riksdag into Empress Catherine's War and so long as they retained royal support then the Swedish Riksdag would oppose a quick, embarrassing peace [1].

    The Battle of Bienenbuttel was nearly fatal for the Sweden war effort. Even though not a single Sweden soldier participate in the battle and even though the battle did not meaningfully affect Sweden's immediate situation, it severely damaged Lewenhaupt's projection of the war. Even though Lewenhaupt was quick to claim that the Hanoverian forces could still and would turn around the war in Germany, Horn countered that even a delay in the Hanoverian victory in Germany could be ruinous for Sweden's armies. This early and decisive failure of the Hanoverian Alliance was enough to convince Fredrik I of the folly of the war and remind him of the prosperity that peace had given Sweden over the last several years. Consequently, Lewenhaupt and Gyllenborg were pushed aside and Horn's leadership was restored to an unshakeable status. Back alone on top of Sweden's political structure, Horn immediately sent peace overtures to Russia. These overtures calmly asked for forgiveness and clemency for Sweden's transgressions and even offered Russia a sum of money to end the war.

    In Saint Petersburg, these pleas for peace fell on deaf ears. Empress Catherine I had no reason to feel mercy toward Sweden and felt an obligation to her late husband, Emperor Peter I, to finish the destruction of Sweden that he had initiated. More importantly, Aleksandr Menshikov saw no advantage in peace either. Menshikov had entered Russia into this war primarily for the reason of securing himself incredible military triumphs that could guarantee himself a permanent and venerated place in Russia's history. Peace with Sweden did not do much to help Menshikov achieve this goal since Prussia's alliance with Russia already relieved the most significant pressure against Russia and allowed Russia to campaign to the west with confidence. In fact, peace with Sweden actively hurt Menshikov's ability to reach his goal since it deprived him of a weak but established nemesis of Russia that could provide Menshikov with one of those military triumphs. For these reasons, Menshikov had no desire to make peace with Sweden and rejected Sweden's peace proposal.

    Despite this rejection, Sweden did not give up on peace with Russia. Horn was desperate to avoid a full-on war with Russia that could reverse much of Sweden's recovery from the Great Northern War, empower his political opponents like Lewenhaupt, and invite absolute monarchy. Thus, Sweden continued to attempt negotiations with the Russians. Sweden at first offered more money and alter even a border adjustment. Not even land tempted Menshikov since he wanted victory on the field with fire and blood not in a palace with a pen and paper. All this frenzied peace effort did, however, was further solidify Menshikov's desire to continue the war against Sweden. If Sweden was willing to surrender before even a single shot was fired then they were not ready for war and they would crumble as soon as the Russian army struck them. The only reason that Menshikov even entertained these negotiations was to delay Swedish action and give Russia more time to prepare its own campaigns.

    Once autumn ended and the mud season in Russia began to temper down, Menshikov put an end to the farce of peace talks and told Marshal Mikhail Golitsyn and his subordinate, Christoph von Munnich, to launch an invasion of Finland. Of course, as was common during the era, additional, unaccounted, logistical issues arose and the invasion got off to a delayed and slow start. As a result of these difficulties, Lewenhaupt was able to travel from Stockholm and take command of the Swedish army at Fredrikshamm long before the Russians arrived. At sea, a squadron of the Swedish navy had enough time to sail from its base of Karlskrona and join the British Baltic Fleet that had been harassing the Prussian and Russian coasts and impeding their shipping. Together, this Anglo-Swedish fleet was advised by the Swedish Riksdag and ordered the British admiralty to support Lewenhaupt's army and prevent the Russian navy from doing the same for Golitsyn's army.

    Even though the British Baltic Fleet's commander, Admiral Charles Wager complied with the orders of the British Admiralty, he did so begrudingly. In fact, just before receiving the Admiralty's dispatches, Admiral Wager had petitioned the Admiralty to allow him to return to Portsmouth so that his fleet could undergo thorough repairs and replenish its depleted ranks. By this point, the British Baltic Fleet had been at sea for nearly ten months. During those ten months, the British Baltic Fleet had conducted shows of force around the Baltic, fought the Battle of Osel, and proactively patrolled the Prussian and Russian coasts. In other words, the British fleet had not been idle. Accordingly, the British fleet had only had limited opportunities to resupply and repair its ships. As a result, a few ships still remained damaged from the Battle of Osel and numerous ships' hulls was severely fouled from extended sailing. Furthermore, the long expedition and the conditions of the Baltic meant that more than three-fifths of the British seamen had been lost to scurvy, far more than the Russians had killed or even injured at Osel [2]. Altogether, the British Baltic Fleet was in a sorry state. Wager witnessed these issues firsthand and understood that they left his fleet in a weakened state, which is why Wager requested to be allowed to return to England.

    The First Lord of the Admiralty, George Byng, Lord Torrington, had served with Wager in the past in the Mediterranean. and understood why Wager was concerned. Diminished complements and damaged ships were not conditions that any captain would ever be eager for. However, Byng and the rest of the Admiralty were under considerable pressure from the Parliament and King George Ii of Great Britain to support Sweden and avenge the defeat at Osel. Furthermore, there remained legitimate military concerns with letting the Russian navy roam the seas freely. Without the British fleet to contain the Russians, the Admiralty feared that the new army Menshikov was raising would be deposited in the rear of King George II's army and precipitate its destruction. Also, the unsettling prospect of the Russians sneaking their way to Scotland to raise a Jacobite rebellion still remained in the conciousness of the Admiralty. The Russians had done it once before. What was to say they could not do it again? Finally, for Byng as the former Flag Captain of the HMS Britannica the Russian capture of the Britannica stood as a personal slight that needed to be amened. In the end, although Byng and Admiralty adknowledged Wager's complaints they did consider the conditions severe enough to recall the British Baltic Fleet. Instead, they still believed that even a hobbled British fleet supported by the Swedes should be capable of thrashing the underdeveloped, unsophisicated, and unskilled Russian navy. Thus, Wager was commanded to sail east rather than west.

    Wager positioned the Anglo-Swedish fleet near of the coast of the Finnish-Russian border. From this location, the fleet would not be able to stop the Russian invasion as the Russians could march inland to avoid naval harassment. Indeed, the most likely route of invasion, through Villmanstrand, was already inland. However, the Anglo-British fleet could protect Fredrikshamm from a siege and resupply it easily. In the case that the Russians succeeded in bypassing Fredrikshamm, the Anglo-Swedish fleet could also support Helsingfors. Due to the threat that this fleet protected to the Russian invasion's objectives, Menshikov wanted the Anglo-Swedish fleet defeated quickly and decisively. Besides easing the invasion of Swedish eastern provinces, the defeat of the Anglo-Swedish fleet would also open up the possibility of a Russian conquest of the Aland Islands or even an attack on Stockholm. Accomplishing either of those additional goals would add to Menshikov's glory.

    In contrast to Menshikov's eagerness for a naval battle, General Admiral Fyodor Apraksin, much like Wager, had reservations about engaging the enemy fleet. Even though Apraksin had been lionized and lauded for his heroics at Osel, Apraksin himself recognized the battle for what it truly was, which was not a Russian victory. Even with the poor conditions that Apraksin presumed the British fleet to be in, he still did not lust for battle since the British had a meaningful advantage in ships-of-the-line and all of his ships-of-the-line were superior to Apraksin's save for the Retribution, which was the former HMS Britannica. Although the Russian numerical superiority in total ship numbers and in seamen mitigated that British advantage somewhat, Apraksin still considered the British fleet superior to his own. Apraksin's opinion was supported by the other members of the Russian Admiralty Board including Admiral Cornelius Cruis, Admiral Peter von Sivers, Admiral Thomas Gordon, Admiral Matija Zmajevic, Lieutenant Commander Mikhail Mikhailovitch Golitsyn, and Naum Senyavin. However, none of these men had the power and influence to resist Menshikov's strategy. Golitsyn also was under pressure from his brother, Marshal Mikhail Golitsyn, to support Menshikov's call for battle. Even Apraksin himself, a member of the Supreme Privy Council and hero of Osel, lacked the political clout to counteract Menshikov's premiership and deny his desires.

    Unable to say no to Menshikov, Apraksin and the Admiralty Board consented to engage the British fleet against their better judgment. For the next many days, the Admiralty Board met daily for hours on end to discuss in-depth their options and means of defeating the Anglo-Swedish fleet. Ultimately, the discussions steered toward unusual and alternative methods of combat. Admiral Cruis suggested fighting near a coast to allow for the heavier British ships with their deeper draught to be in danger of running aground. Admiral Zmajevic thought that the Russians should focus on fighting a battle around maneuverability, which the British would lack relative to the smaller but plentiful Russian vessels. Finally, Admiral Gordon remembering his service with the Royal Navy and the Royal Navy's storied history recommended that the Russians use one of Britain's more famed tactics against them. Gordon advocated that the Russians should disrupt and disorganize the Anglo-Swedish fleet with fireships before then pounding the fleet with Russia's ships-of-the-line and overwhelming the fleet with Russia's galleys. After still further debates, the Admiralty Board settled on combining elements of all of these tactics to overcome the Anglo-Swedish menace.

    Unlike some navies in the world, Russia's navy could not afford to build and maintain a specific class of fireships. However, when the war with Britain broke out there were a number of British merchant ships in Russian ports. These merchant ships were representative of the significant commercial relationship between Russia and Britain at the war's start. Interestingly for a war that began over a naval confrontation, this commercial relationship was built primarily around Britain's dependence on Russia for naval goods and resources. For example, a majority of Britain's hemp and flax and a considerable about of its timber and iron were imported from Russia. Although a number of other states produced timber and iron for Britain to use while at war with Russia, the same could not be said of hemp and flax. Indeed, Russia held a near monopoly of both goods, which seriously endangered a prolonged British war effort against Russia. As the war continued, Britain's stores of hemp and flax would diminish and its navy and merchant ships would struggle to replace damaged sails and rope. Knowledge of this eventuality perhaps influenced the British Admiralty's decision to be aggressive early into the war [3].

    Besides the outbreak of war disrupting that commercial relationship, the war also involved those British merchant ships in Russian ports being seized by the Russian military and requistioned for its us. Some of the larger merchant ships were outfitted as new Russian warships but most still lacked an assigned purpose when Apraksin and the Admiralty Board were preparing for their confrontation with the Anglo-Swedish fleet. Rather than reduce the complements of other Russian ships to fully man these merchant ships and add them to the horde of small Russian vessels, the Admiralty Board chose to make the remaining merchant ships the core of their fireship contingent. Accordingly, the ships were stripped down of several items and filled with flammable material. Additionally, extra support was given to the masts so that the flames of the fire would not collapse the masts before the ships reached their target. Finally, some grappling hooks were transferred on to the fireships in case any fireship got the opportunity to latch on to one of Britain's great ships. These preparations were undertaken over the course of several days and were noticed by British agents within Russia's borders. However, these agents were not aware fully aware of what the preparations were and what their purpose was. In other words, the British did not understand that these were fireships. The overall goal of the Russian fleet also eluded the British agents since the Admiralty Board hide the truth from even the captains of its navy. As a consequence, Wager was left guessing whether the Russian fleet meant to sprint for Germany or even the Danish Sound, attack his fleet, or simply support the Russian invasion. In this uncertainty, Wager had the common sense to prepare for the worst and readied his fleet for a fight. When that fight did arive, however, Wager found that he was not ready at all.

    In the deep darkness of the early morning of November 10, 1727, the Russian navy neared the anchorage of the British Baltic Fleet and its Swedish allies off the coast of Kymmenedalen. Despite the lack of sunlight, Apraksin and his admirals did not hesitate to commence operations and commanded Lieutenant Commander Golitsyn to lead the flotilla of fireships toward the Anglo-Swedish ships. Silently and without any lights, Golitsyn sailed toward the Anglo-Swedish fleet. The lack of illumination and eiree quiet of flotilla meant that the British and Swedish watchkeepers failed to spot the Russian approach. However, without the typical tools of coordination a number of Russian fireships ended up drifting away from the main formation and their targets. Shortly after seven bells, Golitsyn gave the command for his flotilla to set itself on fire and the British and Swedish seaman finally became aware of their presence. All in all, the British found themselves confronted by nineteen fireships. Amid the darkness of the night, the brightness of these fireships provided such a strong contrast that it was practically blinding but nevertheless the Anglo-Swedish fleet attempted to avoid immolation. Through the bravery of some of the Royal Navy's midshipmen and common sailors, five of these fireships were towed away by rowboats before they could get close to the Anglo-Swedish ships. The rest, however, made their way into the fleet. Some of the Anglo-Swedish ships were able to steer away from the fireships and others managed to psh the fireships off at the last moment. However, several of the less maneuverable British ships-of-the-line, particularly those still damaged from the Battle of Osel, were forced to cut their anchors to avoid an unfortunate collision with the fireships. Only two ships of the Royal Navy, the HMS Revenge and the HMS Assistance were actually directly damaged by the fireship attack. The HMS Revenge was the victim of an unlucky disaster when a fireship's mast collapsed onto the HMS Revenge and demasted it. The demasting killed several sailors and wreaked havoc on the top deck of the HMS Revenge. The HMS Assistance was the victim of a full-on collision with a fireship, which managed to set much of the HMS Assistance alight and even reached some barrels of gunpowder. In the midst of battle, both ships were too immobile and damaged to be of use and the process of abandoning them quickly began. Overall, the fireship attack seemed to have only limited success, but there was another reason why the Russians had chosen to attack so early in the mornign beside covering their fireship attack.

    After eight bells, the high tide arrived. Previously in Britain's wars against the Dutch, Britain's lack of knowledge of local tides had contributed to British defeats. In this case, the Battle of Kymmenedalen, this lack of local knowledge was also an issue but the fireship attack had made the tides an even more important factor. In the wake of the fireship attack, several Anglo-Swedish ships lacked their anchors and thus were incable of stopping themselves against the tide. Instead, they were swept toward the dangerous Finnish coast. Once again, British ships were pushed toward the rocks and shoals of a Baltic coastline. On top of lacking the traditional tool of an anchor, several of the British ships were undermanned and some had even lost their original pilots to scurvy. As a consequence of these factors, the British did not get away as lightly as they had at Osel. Instead, three ships-of-the-line ran aground. Fortunately, this time, unlike at Osel, the coast was governed by Britain's friends rather than enemies. Thus, these grounded ships avoided the harassment that the Britannica had mercilessly endured. Speaking of Britain's friends, the Swedes had lost just one ship themselves. However, the ordeal of the battle was not yet over and those ships that had avoided the coastline soon rejoined the main fleet to challenge the Russian navy.

    Unlike at Osel, the Battle of Kymmenedalen was not merely an engagement of two fleets of ships-of-the-line. In this battle, the Russians had brought their full Baltic strength to confron the Anglo-Swedish fleet. This full strength included countless galleys and lesser vessels commanded by Admiral Zmajevic. By themselves, the massive numerical superiority provided by these galleys would not have frightened Wager. The galleys were limited in guns and in range. However, in light of the morning's events and the previous months of deprivation, Wager did find the idea of managing those galleys to be more challenging. On top of that, Wager was not excited by his Swedish allies who lacked seamanship and had ships just as bad as the Russian ones. However, Wager still was a confident sailor and surely not one who was quick to admit failure. Thus, rather than wait to let the Russians try to envelop his fleet with their superior numbers, Wager commanded his ships to descend on the Russian navy and directly attack it. During this attack, Wager cautioned his fleet to keep the Russian galleys at a distance to avoid being overwhelmed and boarded. This advice was heeded and the Anglo-Swedish ships managed to hold off the bulk of the Russian galleys by blasting them away. However, the lack of seamen allowed Britain's ships-of-the-line to be rivaled by their Russian counterparts. In this match, the former HMS Britannica, rechristened as the Retribution, played a key role in trading blows with the British fleet. Still, the British were doing what they needed to survive the battle and were steadily inflicting more and more casualties on the Russians.

    Ultimately, at around 11 am the battle decisively shifted away from Wager when the tide rolled back toward the open sea. Again, the lack of anchors among some of the Anglo-Swedish ships brought about misfortune for Wager's fleet. Several ships were pulled away from the formation and into the teeth of the Russian navy by the tide. As these ships were thrown towards the Russians and the Anglo-Swedish formation was disrupted, the Russian galleys were finally able to close in and swarm the Anglo-Swedish fleet. The effort of the galleys to overwhelm the core of Wager's ships failed horribly but the same could not be said for the attacks on the anchorless drifters. A number of these drifters were completed surrounded and then overran by Russian boarding parties. In the meantime, the Russian fleet of ships-of-the-line contested and hammered Wager's diminished formation. Wager attempted to continue the battle a little longer in an effort to save those drifters. However, this effort was in vain as Wager's own formation ended up losing its struggle with the Russian ships-of-the-line. Wager had been dealt a disaster by the Russians and he knew it. Finally, around 3 pm, Wager admitted his failure and commanded his remaining ships to retreat. Apraksin did not order his navy to follow after even though Senyavin and Golitsyn urged him to do so. Instead, Apraksin accepted his victory as it was and gave the order for the Russians and their prizes to sail toward Reval. As a minor solace for Wager, the Anglo-Swedish fleet was joined by two of the British ships that had run aground earlier and had since managed to refloat themselves.

    In review, the Battle of Kymmenedalen was much bloodier and more decisive than the Battle of Osel had been. The British baltic Fleet lost six ships-of-the-line in the course of the battle. The HMS Revenge had ended up sinking during its evacuation when a piece of its mast puncutred its hull. The HMS Assistance had been burned during the fireship attack. One of the ships that had run aground could not be refloated with any success and was purposedly burned by its crew. Three ships that were carried into the arms of the Russian navy were overwhelmed and defeated, one of them sinking due to damage incurred during the battle and the other two being captured. The Swedes also lost a frigate to grounding and two brigantines and five galleys in combat. Outside of these ships being lost, most of the surviving Anglo-Swedish fleet was heavily damaged. The HMS Lion in particular had to towed due to the damage it sustained. Amidst this ruination there were some heroics to be recognized, namely the three anchorless ships that had managed to avoid smashing into the Russians through hard and brilliant piloting and the one ship that actually escaped the clutches of the Russian fleet. On the other side, the Russians had not won the battle cheaply. Two of their ships-of-the-line had been sunk in the battle. Alongside it, countless galleys and lesser vessels were sunk. Many more ships were damaged and had to be taken back to Kronstadt for immediate repairs. On top of that hundreds of Russian sailors were dead including Admiral Cruies who had served in the battle despite his poor health and advanced age.

    Even with the high toll, Kymmenedalen was still a major victory for the Russians. This time that victory was not merely a false perception but a veritable fact. The severe lost of ships for the Anglo-Swedish fleet and the fact that the Anglo-Swedish fleet had to concede its position meant that by definition, Kymmenedalen was a Russian triumph. Furthermore, the victory was not just tactical in nature but had strategic implications. Following the battle, the British Baltic fleet was too damaged and too depleted to sustain itself in the Baltic any longer. Consequently, the British, after spending most of the year in the Baltic, sailed home with their tails between their legs and their heads sunk low. Without the British Baltic Fleet on hand and with the losses suffered by the Swedes, the Swedish navy could no longer oppose the Russian invasion of Finland. This result meant that the coastal highway was open to the Russian army and that Fredrikshamm would not be guarded by a heavy naval bombardment. Altogether, the Russians had won and won large.

    In Russia, the triumph mean that Apraksin and the Admiralty Board were lauded, commended, and extolled by every member of every element of Russian society. Cruies was even given a funeral befitting a king rather than a navla officer. The living men were all handsomely awarded by Empress Catherine I and Menshikov for their roles in the victory with great estates, generous wealth, and extensive titles. The common sailors were also recognized by Catherine and were later given medals in honor of their success. In light of this excellent execution of his wishes and in recognition of the damage dealt to the Russian navy, Menshikov granted Apraksin his wish of letting the Russian navy rest. While it rested, the repairing of the Russian ships and replenishment of their crews began. Among these ships were the captured HMS Canterbury and HMS Southhampton that had been renamed Anna and Elizaveta in honor of Catherine's daughters. Only a few less-damaged ships-of-the-line and galleys were made responsible for supporting the Russian invasion of Finland.

    In Britain, the defeat was deemed a complete and total disaster. Wager much like Admiral John Norris was subjected to a tribunal upon his return over his conduct during the battle. Wager only survived the ordeal because the prosecution could not prove that he could have done better and because Wager threatened to embarrass the entire admiralty over their failure to listen to his concerns. Still, Wager's naval career was essentially ended. The government of Spencer Compton was even more endangered and damaged by the defeat than Wager. After the succession of failures in the Caribbean, Germany, and now the Baltic, King George II's monarchy received numerous petitions complaining about Compton's failure of leadership. Since George II was distracted by his war in Brunswick-Luneburg and did not desire to upset the situation in Britain, he refused to dismiss Compton. Nevertheless, the British parliament led by Sir Robert Walpole railed against Compton and his reckless and inadequate management of the war. Walpole labelled the battle the Catastrophe at Kymmenedalen when he called for Compton to resign. With the support of George II, Comtpon did manage to weather this storm. Even George II came under criticism over the defeat as some publically inquired why the king was gallivanting in Germany rather than leading the nation.

    Beside hurting the British government, the Catastrophe at Kymmenedalen contributed to a worsening of the Anglo-Danish-Norwegian relationship. Already, after the Battle of Bienenbuttel, George II had challenged the Dano-Norwegians over not fully committing their army to the Brunswick-Luneburg campaign. After Kymmenedallen, the British complained that the Dano-Norwegian fleet had been no where to be seen and had not made itself available to the Hanoverian war effort. Technically, the British were correct in both regards. The Dano-Norwegians had held back. However, from the perspective from Denmark-Norway they had held back from committing to foreign parts of Empress Catherine's War that did not pertain to Denmark-Norway's direct interest. If Denmark-Norway had acted differently then perhaps Holstein would be endangered whereas currently it remained fully occupied by the Dano-Norwegian army of Poul Vendelbo Lovenorn. The fact that Denmark-Norway allies had managed to botch their role in the war was not the faul of Denmark-Norway. this contrasting perception of the war and Denmark-Norway's role in it hurt British cooperation and friendship with Denmark-Norway.

    [1] Although this period of time was known as the Age of Liberty because the absolute monarchy of Sweden was replaced by a much more constitutional and legislature-guided Sweden, the monarches still retained a large degree of influence and even power. Although Arvid Horn was certainly the most preminent politician in Sweden and was anti-war, there was significant opposition to him on a political and personal level. For this reason, when King Fredrik I and Queen Ulrika Eleanora of Sweden show favor toward war, Sweden's Riksdag rallies around the idea despite Horn's opposition.
    [2] Scurvy was a huge problem these days. Although some navies (Spain) and officers knew of actual cures for scurvy, the British did not have a widespread effective response to scurvy. As a consequence, they often suffered extreme casualties from scurvy. Losing half of your sailors or more was considered typical. The Baltic Sea had a particular problem due to its relative lack of natural scurvy deterrents like lemons for navies to inadverently stumble upon and consume as they did in the Mediterranean. In fact, in the Baltic, even the land populations suffered from scurvy due to the relative lack of natural deterrents.
    [3] Throughout the 1700s and 1800s, Britain was heavily dependent on Russia for a number of material goods including hemp and flax. This article on JSTOR discusses Britain's hemp and flax dependence during the late 1700s (https://www.jstor.org/stable/23032800). However, this dependence started much earlier than the late 1700s and was already established by the 1720s.

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    12: Osterland Jaunt
  • 12: Osterland Jaunt
    A._Menshikov_%28Kuskovo%29.jpg

    Prince Aleksander Danilovich Menshikov

    The Battle of Kymmenedalen was the fourth major victory for Russian arms in the Empress Catherine's War. The other victories being those achieved at Osel, Bienenbuttel, and Luneburg. In spite of the impressive nature of each of these victories and of them as a set, the most important man in Russia, Prince Aleksander Danilovish Menshikov was not entirely pleased with Russia's war effort. The reason being was that he had only approved of Andrey Osterman's call for war because he had felt that a major war would offer him the chance to solidify his legacy as one of Russia's greatest leaders. Thus far, even though Menshikov had been responsible for organizing and orchestrating Russia's war effort, the glory of his labors had gone unnoticed. Instead, the courts of Europe and even the court of Saint Petersburg had spent their energy lauding others, namely, General Admiral Fyodor Apraksin and Lieutenant General Peter Lacy. Few realized that without Menshikov's orders, Apraksin never would have dared to challenge the British Baltic Fleet and thus would never have found his dramatic triumph at Kymmenedalen. A lesser man might have chosen to denigrate the successes of these commanders and make outsized claims to a role in their victories to pat his own resume and bolster his ego. Menshikov, however, was not this lesser man. Rather than resorting to base behavior to glorify himself, Menshikov chose to go off and find another victory for Russia, one that was his and none others.

    Menshikov did not go far nor wait long to find this victory. Although Menshikov had been in the process of preparing and assembling an army to join the German war for months now, Menshikov chose against using that unwieldy beast to earn his first laurels in Empress Catherine's War. Instead, Menshikov joined the army of Marshal Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn and Christoph von Munnich to the north of Saint Petersburg and proceeded to make himself supreme commander of the Osterland front. As the first man of Russia and Russia's sole living generalissimus, Menshikov was fully within his rights to name himself supreme commander. However, politically this action was much less acceptable since Osterland was recognized as Golitsyn's domain and war despite Menshikov's superior rank. As supreme commander, Menshikov ordered that the long-delayed invasion of Sweden's eastern provinces, Osterland, commence immediately. This order came over the concerns of Golitsyn who had felt as if the lateness in the season and the imperfect logistical situation were unideal for an invasion. Even though Menshikov recognized the validity of such concerns, Menshikov did not recognize them to the extent that he felt it was necessary to delay the invasion until spring as Golitsyn suggested. This difference of opinion was undoubtedly the result of Menshikov's political ambition demanding an immediate victory to prevent Apraksin's Kymmenedalen from being the sole topic of discussion at the dinners and festivities around Christmas and the New Year.

    The invasion of Swedish Osterland in November of 1727 came to the surprise of the Swedish army of Major General Karl Emil Lewenhaupt, which had confidently believed that the Russians would not escalate their actions beyond cross-border raids due to the winter. As a consequence, when the Russian invasion commenced, the Swedish army was split between its quarters at the border fortress of Villmanstrand and the coastal fortress of Fredriksman. The former held roughly 4,000 men and commanded by Major General Henrik Magnus Buddenbrock while the latter was maintained by 8,000 soldiers and General Lewenhaupt. The Russians took advantage of this division of forces to launch a two-pronged attack against the Swedes. One prong numbering close to 15,000 men and led by Menshikov took the coastal road and threatened to march on Fredrikshamn while the second prong of 10,000 men was taken by Golitsyn directly toward Villmanstrand. Even with the hostile conditions the Russians still managed to move with enough speed to cut Buddenbrock's line of communication with Lewenhaupt and threaten to surround Buddenbrock at Villmanstrand. Since Buddenbrock already had his doubts about Villmanstrand's defensive capabilities he chose not to test them against a Russian envelopment [1]. Instead, Buddenbrock abandoned Villmanstrand to the Russian army and fell back to Nyslott, which was to the northeast of Villmanstrand.

    The abandonment of Villmanstrand allowed the Russians to occupy it and the coastal road without any further hindrance from the Swedes. However, the peaceful escape of Buddenbrock did not play well into Menshikov's desire for a major, decisive victory over the Swedes. Although Menshikov could have chased after Buddenbrock and attempted to take Nyslott, Menshikov felt that Fredrikshamn and Lewenhaupt made for a more notable battle. Consequently, Menshikov returned to the coastal road and marched on Fredrikshamn. Menshikov also called upon Apraksin and his disheveled navy to support the Russian army in the venture. Since Fredrikshamn was a coastal fortress, the Russian navy would be able to apply direct pressure on the fortress and the British-built Retribution might even be able to bombard it. However, Lewenhaupt like Buddenbrock had no desire to fight the much larger Russian army even with the winter ready to abuse a Russian siege. With Buddenbrock cut off and the Swedish navy defeated, all Lewenhaupt could gamble on was the winter and that was not a good enough gamble for Lewenhaupt to make [2]. Instead, Lewenhaupt gave up Fredrikshamn and fell back to Helsingfors.

    Altogether, the November-December Osterland campaign had managed to net Russia both Villmanstrand and Fredrikshamn. Furthermore, the movement of the Russian army and the surprising timing of its invasion had succeeded in separating the Swedish armies in Osterland and then pushing them farther apart. By the end of 1727, Lewenhaupt and Buddenbrock's armies were separated by a distance of nearly 200 miles, which given Osterland's poor roads and Russia's control of the coastal road was not an easy distance to close. However, even though the captures of these two major fortifications came without fighting they were still accompanied by significant casualties for the Russians as thousands of soldiers either died or were injured by exposure to the elements during the winter campaign. Certainly, the Swedes also suffered but suffered less so due to their shorter and less complicated marches and their access to local supply depots. Significantly, for Menshikov, the lack of battles stole from him the opportunity to have an explosive and exciting triumph to celebrate. Although Menshikov did receive honors for his successful capture of Villmanstrand and Fredrikshamn, Apraksin's Kymmenedalen continued to dominate the talk among Saint Petersburg's court. To make matters worse, Menshikov's usurpation of Golitsyn's recognized place as the commander of all things Osterland, further deteriorated his relationship with the Golitsyn family and the families allied to the Golitsyns such as the Dolgorukovs. Overall, by the end of 1727, Menshikov found himself on shakier ground than expected and in even greater need of a true and absolute triumph to seal his legacy and preserve his unchallengeable atop Russian society [3].

    [1] Historically, in the Hats' War of 1741-1743, Buddenbrock felt that Villmanstrand was not that the most defensible fortress, which is why during the OTL Battle of Villmanstrand he did not rely on the fortress' fortifications and instead concentrated on the nearby hill of Myllymäki. Here, he faces even greater opposition and has less hope of reinforcement so he abandons Villmanstrand outright for Nyslott.
    [2] During the opening of the Hats' War Lewenhaupt did show some level of initiative and aggressiveness but after things began to go sideways, Lewenhaupt was much more cautious. Considering the current Swedish position in Empress Catherine's War, I think it is safe to say that things are going sideways for Sweden and that Lewenhaupt would be more likely to be cautious.
    [3] Although Menshikov was the unchallenged premier of Russia in 1727, there were still powerful factions in the Russian court that could begin to challenge Menshikov if he made too many grave mistakes or if members of these factions gained too much influence. The Golitsyn family is part of one of these factions and the Holstein-Gottorp lords in Lacy's army are part of another faction.

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    13: Parry at Thedinghausen
  • 13: Parry at Thedinghausen
    Carl_Frederick_of_Sweden_c_1722_by_David_von_Krafft.jpg

    Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp

    Just as Prince Aleksander Menshikov had expected his costly and unexciting expedition into Osterland failed to resonate strongly with the court of Saint Petersburg. Instead, Empress Catherine I and others focused their holiday toasts on Admiral General Fyodor Apraksin's great victory at Kymmenedalen. Some of Menshikov's supposed challengers even went so far as to toast Peter Lacy and Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp's efforts at Bienenbuttel despite the victory being several months past. This concentration on the laurels of others irritated Menshikov immensely. However, Menshikov did not deign to undercut the success of his subordinates and instead, cooly joined in toasting Apraksin, Lacy, and Charles Frederick. Instead of giving too much attention to the sleights conjured by his opponents at court, Menshikov directed his energy into continuing to mobilize the resources of Russia for the creation of a second major German army. This new army would provide Menshikov his first real opportunity to directly join the fray of war and earn his own distinctive laurels.

    While the Russian court was witness to minor bickering and veiled insults, the British Parliament was a scene of total pandemonium. From the very beginning of King George II's reign, the Whigs who had solidly dominated British politics since 1714 were divided and in disarray. By the time of George II's ascension, Sir Robert Walpole's control of the Whigs was already being challenged by William Pulteney who suggested that Walpole had gone astray. Walpole, however, did not have much of an opportunity to deal with this challenge as he was stripped of his position and power by George II so that Sir Spencer Compton, one of George II's long-time allies, could take the reins of government. Walpole had claimed he would loyally serve Compton and help him in any way possible but after the defeats at Bienenbuttel, Porto Bello, and Kymmenedalen Walpole was heading the outcry against Compton [1]. In the wake of these attacks on Compton's government, particularly the latter, Compton could not effectively take advantage of the unpreparedness of the Tories for the parliamentary election in the autumn of 1727 triggered by George I's death [2]. Although the Whigs ended up making some small gains due to their simple political preponderance, the Tories were not crushed as they should have been and the opposition Whigs of Pulteney grabbed a notable number of seats via election and via defection from the Whigs. This minimal electoral victory combined with Britain's foreign disasters led Compton to breakdown and offer his resignation to George II [3]. However, George II refused to accept Compton's resignation during this time of need [4]. Instead, George II commanded Compton to continue as his prime minister and told him to rely on George II's wife, Queen Caroline, to manage the war and parliament. Even though George II often publically belittled Queen Caroline's intelligence, he appreciated her wisdom and trusted her greatly [5].

    After multiple meetings between Queen Caroline and Compton, in which, Queen Caroline carefully coached and guided the First Lord of the Treasury, he regained his confidence and composure. In the subsequent session of parliament, Compton asked the Commons to approve the increase of the land tax as well as the imposition of greater excise taxes on tobacco to fund the continued military effort against the Viennese Alliance. Once again Compton was proposing a series of major military operations to combat Britain's enemies. These operations included a new expedition to the Americas, a reinforcement of the Low Countries and George II's army, and a relief of Gibraltar. The parliament quickly struck down this strategy as an exorbitant waste of resources and questioned why Britain should be burdened so heavily in this war when France had barely tapped into its resources and Denmark held back its armies. Compton's half-hearted and dull efforts to change the opinion of the parliament failed against its steadfast resolution to avoid a massively expensive war. The parliament also denied Compton's plans on account of the possibility of a Russian or Spanish supported Jacobite uprising [6]. After numerous debates, all Compton managed to extract from the parliament was the funds for 10,000 more soldiers to join George II's army in Brunswick-Luneburg, of which the majority were to be foreign mercenaries rather than British-born soldiers [7]. Altogether, the episode demonstrated the mounting frustration and confusion of Britain in regards to its participation in Empress Catherine's War.

    In contrast to Compton and Queen Caroline's notable failure to raise a major army, Menshikov cobbled together an army that almost matched the entire British troop commitment to Empress Catherine's War. By the spring of 1728, Menshikov had assembled an army of somewhat more than 50,000 men. However, even this figure did not match Menshikov's goal of 60,000 men. Among these soldiers were a number of veterans from the Great Northern War against Sweden and the Russo-Persian War in contrast to Britain's lack of considerable numbers of veterans. Still, the bulk of the army was comprised of fresh recruits due to its great size. Anyway, this new, massive army just like Britain's smaller one was destined for Germany. In Germany, Menshikov expected to find his major, decisive battles that would cement his place in Russian history and leave no question as to his right to be Russia's second generalissimus.

    The march of Menshikov's army through Russia and across Germany to Brunswick-Luneburg did not compare favorably to the previous march of Lacy. In every possible way, Menshikov's march seemed to be worse than that of Lacy's. Whereas Lacy's disciplined army had moved with deliberate speed, Menshikov's was forced to halt its advance every two to three days just to rest. Whereas Lacy had avoided stripping the surrounding farmland and countryside too harshly, Menshikov's left a scourge of destruction in its wake. Whereas Lacy's march had helped create friends for Russia, Menshikov's antagonized and perturbed Russia's allies. The fundamental issue for Menshikov laid in the size and composition of his force. Compared to Lacy's army, Menshikov was too large to purchase a large enough proportion of its supplies on the road or receive enough from its supply train. Instead, Menshikov's army had to coerce locals for food and forage heavily. Furthermore, the amount of poorly trained rabble or base characters within Menshikov's army fostered a greater degree of criminality during the march including rapes, murders, and theft. Finally, the large size of the army and the large number of recruits unaccustomed to the difficulties of deprivations of an army on the march facilitated a large amount of desertion. Once these soldiers deserted they turned to banditry in the areas behind and around the Russian march. Altogether, Menshikov's march was not the pleasant and impressive spectacle that Lacy's was.

    Even if Menshikov's march was not as organized and swift as Lacy's it still struck fear in the Hanoverian camps. Among the Hanoverian commanders, the sentiment was that the combined Hanoverian army could not oppose both Lacy and Menshikov's army, which together amounted to well over 100,000 men. The supreme commander of the Hanoverian army, John Campell, the Duke of Argyll, concurred with this sentiment. From Argyll's perspective, in light of the geography of Brunswick-Luneburg being practically surrounded by members of the Viennese Alliance (the Hapsburgs, Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Cologne, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin), the defeat at Bienenbuttel, and the approach of Menshikov that Brunswick-Luneburg was entirely indefensible. Consequently, Argyll suggested retreating to Holstein behind the Elbe and regrouping with the Dano-Norwegian army of Poul Vendelbo Lovenorn. Not even years of friendship could prevent Argyll from becoming the victim of George II's vicious wrath when he uttered this strategy [8]. George II shouted numerous obscenities at Argyll and violently threatened to physically beat him for proposing that George II abandon his home of Brunswick-Luneburg to the Russians and Germans without so much as a fight. George went so far as to place the blame for Bienenbuttel at Argyll's feet before questioning Argyll's entire military record. George II proclaimed that all Argyll had even done was run from Spain and defeat Scottish brigands [9]. Finally, George II ordered Argyll out of the war council and left himself soon afterward.

    The next day, Argyll swallowed his pride and apologized to George II and submitted to his wisdom for the design and choosing of a strategy to handle the approaching threats. George II accepted this apology and the war planning for the Hanoverian commanders resumed. In the subsequent sessions, it was made clear that Brunswick-Luneburg would not be readily abandoned and preparations of the defense of Hanover were made. Meanwhile, George II reluctantly agreed to give command of the new British army to George Hamilton, 1st Earl of Orkney. Once the army was formed, Orkney took it to Bremen to secure the Bremish ports in the unfortunate event that they might be needed for an evacuation of the Hanoverian army. At the same time, John Dalrymple, the 2nd Earl of Stair, was brought out of his retirement from the military and diplomacy to act as a royal emissary to King Frederik IV of Denmark and Norway to negotiate the deployment of Lovenorn's army to Brunswick-Luneburg.

    Concurrently with these military and diplomatic developments, the relationship of George II and his eldest son, Prince Frederick or Griff, continued to evolve. Following the Battle of Bienenbuttel, Griff was treated as a hero by the common Brunswicker soldier since he was seen as having saved them from total collapse after General Ilton's death. Although George II was proud to see his stranger son was a man of courage capable of the soldier life like himself, George II was irritated that his own subjects seemed to prefer Griff to himself [10]. For this reason, George II publically denigrated Griff for his soldiering much like denigrated Queen Caroline for her intelligence. This behavior hurt the young and lonely man but guided by his great uncle, Ernest Augustus, Griff continued to be obedient and respectful to his father. Rather than turning back the caustic acid his father doled out on a regular basis, Griff left his heart open for a reconciliation with his father [11]. Ultimately, George II took note of this dutiful behavior and relented on his maligning of his son [12]. Still, George II was suspicious of his son's popularity among the subjects of Brunswick-Luneburg. Consequently, George II transferred Griff to the British army and gave him command of a regiment [13].

    Over the course of the spring of 1728, George II continued his preparations at Hanover while the Earl of Stair negotiated with the Dano-Norwegians. Ultimately, the Earl of Stair succeeded in persuading King Frederik IV to reinforce Lovernorn's army by a further 12,000 and then command it to pass beyond the safety of the Elbe. These preparations and this shift in Dano-Norwegian strategy made George II was eager to meet the challenge presented by Lacy and Menshikov [14]. Although George II had a growing opinion of the former, he viewed the latter unfavorably and saw the latter's army as nothing more than rabble. However, George II's strategy of forcing a fight at Hanover fell apart while Menshikov's army was marching through Brandenburg. As Menshikov's army kept to the northern Brandenburger roads, the Dano-Norwegians lost their nerve and became unwilling to venture as far south as Hanover. King Frederik IV and his advisers worried that if they did so then the Prusso-Mecklenburger army of Duke Karl Leopold of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the Prussian army of King Friedrich Wilhelm I in Prussia, and the Russian army of Menshikov would overrun the Dano-Norwegian garrisons of Holstein and cut off the Hanoverian forces totally. This concern was not without validity as the sheer number of soldiers available to those Viennese armies made such an action feasible. Nevertheless, George II was infuriated by what he saw as a Dano-Norwegian betrayal. Fortunately, the Earl of Stair was able to salvage the coordination of George II and Frederik IV's interest somewhat by securing a Dano-Norwegian promise to support Hanoverian operations in Bremen-Verden, which bordered the Holstein that the Dano-Norwegians prized so dearly.

    In light of this new Dano-Norwegian promise, the position of the Hanoverian Alliance's army at Hanover became untenable. Instead, George II consented to Argyll's suggestion that the Hanoverian army withdraw to Bremen-Verden to unite with Orkney and Lovenorn's armies before counterattacking Lacy and Menshikov's forces and reclaiming Brunswick-Luneburg in its entirety. At the same time, Argyll also convinced George II that in the case of a total disaster that the Hanoverian Alliance needed to be ready to evacuate. To support both the massive movement of soldiers into Bremen-Verden and also to provide means of escape if necessary, George II commanded George Byng's admiralty to dispatch a fleet to the North Sea. With all of these plans in place, the Hanoverian army of George II and Argyll and the Dano-Norwegian army of Lovenorn began to move toward Bremen where Orkney's army remained.

    The movement of the Hanoverian forces would not occur without opposition. Once the army of George II was confirmed to exited Hanover, Peter Lacy embarked on his own march toward Bremen-Verden. Arguably, Peter Lacy could have allowed the Hanoverians to scurry into Bremen-Verden and proceeded to occupy Brunswick-Luneburg unopposed and without bloodshed. However, Peter Lacy worried about the difficulty of suppressing a combined army of George II and Argyll, Orkney, and Lovenorn even if the Viennese forces would be superior with the combination of Lacy and Menshikov alone. If Karl Leopold and Friedrich Wilhelm were also able to add their numbers to the Russian-led army then the Viennese would greatly outnumber the Hanoverians. However, that jointure could not certain and neither could victory over an entrenched enemy. Besides these concerns were the orders of Menshikov to prevent George II from reaching Bremen and possibly escaping the Continent, which would deprive Menshikov of an opportunity to capture the King of Great Britain and Ireland. With these concerns and order in mind, Lacy quickly moved to occupy Verden on the road to Bremen before George II and Argyll could do so. Soon afterward, Lacy dispersed elements of his army under the command of General Maurice of Saxony, Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, and King Augustus II "the Strong" of Poland to secure strategic points along the Weser River, which formed the highway to Bremen.

    With Lacy in Verden and encroaching into Bremen, the Hanoverian Alliance found itself in a very awkward position. Lacy's position placed him in the middle of George II and Argyll, Orkney, and Lovenorn. Those three armies together were superior in numbers to the army of Lacy. One might think that these facts would mean that the Hanoverian Alliance had an incredible advantage over Lacy and could easily encircle and destroy his smaller army. However, the Hanoverian Alliance had just as much of a chance of surrounding and defeating Lacy as it had of being defeated in detail by Lacy as he turned on any one of the three smaller armies as they tried to approach his army. In fact, the Hanoverian Alliance arguably was more at risk since Lacy's position cut through the best lines of communication between the different Hanoverian armies, which meant that either he might intercept crucial war plans or that the Hanoverian armies would have to use safer but slower means routes of communication. Additionally, Lacy's eastern escape path laid clear for the time and even could be protected by the Prusso-Mecklenburger army if necessary since the Prusso-Mecklenburger army was no longer threatened by Lovenorn.

    Due to the complex military situation and numerous risks present, the Hanoverian Alliance did not rush to encircle Lacy. Instead, in early June 1728, the main Hanoverian army of George II and Argyll began a series of maneuvers and marches aimed at tricking and bypassing Lacy. The British army of Orkney was incapable of performing these maneuvers as it would have left Bremen undefended and the Dano-Norwegian army of Lovenorn was unwilling to perform these maneuvers as it would have drawn it too far south and exposed Holstein to greater danger. At first, these marches attempted to draw Lacy away from Verden so that the easiest road to Bremen would be opened. However, these maneuvers failed to leave Verden undefended and with Menshikov closing in, the Hanoverians had to resort to trying other paths. First, George II and Argyll attempted the safer route of bypassing Lacy to the northeast with a couple of night marches. However, at Kirchlinteln, the Hanoverians found Augustus the Strong and his Saxon army in a formidable position ready to block them from going any further.

    With the northeast denied to them, George II and Argyll chose to go south of Verden and the Weser River. Again, the Hanoverian army utilized forced night marches to try to gain distance on Lacy's forces and also achieve some secrecy. Despite Lacy's experience and competence, he failed to discover that the Hanoverian army had crossed the Aller River to Verden's south until it was too late. Quickly, Lacy tried to dispatch Prussian troops to Blender, which lay behind the curve of the Weser River that the Hanoverian army would next have to cross. However, the advance guard of the Hanoverian army crossed the Weser before the Prussians could arrive at Blender. Once the Prussians did reach Blender they were immediately contested by the Hanoverian advance guard and defeated in a quick skirmish. Even with this success, the Hanoverian army was not yet safe. When the Hanoverian army reached the bridge of Langwedel and also of Achim it found Viennese troops across the Weser waiting to oppose its crossing. Given these obstacles and the exhaustion of the recent marches, George II and Argyll regrouped their army at Blender and rested it ahead of figuring out their next maneuver.

    The next morning, the Hanoverian army made its next maneuver known. Rather than fruitlessly try to bypass the Viennese army any longer, the Hanoverian army had chosen to confront it head-on at Langwedel. As far as the Hanoverian army was away, the Saxon elements of the Viennese army were still separated from Lacy's army, which left gave the Hanoverian army close parity to the Viennese army and made battle viable. Of course, this was not an even battle in an open plain as Lacy did not have to and did not want to offer that to the Hanoverians. Instead, the Viennese were on one side of the Weser and the Hanoverians were on the other and if the Hanoverians wanted to get past the Viennese then they would have to wrestle control of Langwedel's bridge from them and push the Viennese away from the northern bank of the Weser. None of these required actions were easy and the cost of battle would definitely be high for the Hanoverians. Nevertheless, the Hanoverian army had its orders to attack and it meant to follow them. Thus, the morning of June 13, 1728, opened with a salvo of Hanoverian cannon fire and a courageous Hanoverian charge against Langwedel Bridge. Even though Lacy had not expected George II and Argyll to decide upon such risky and bloody action he had still prepared for the occasion. As a consequence, the Hanoverian cannon fire was traded back by the Viennese artillery and the Hanoverian charge was matched with musket fire from along the northern bank and at the other end of the bridge. Soon enough this first assault was broken by the stalwart Viennese defense and a second assault had to be ordered only for it too to fail.

    What Lacy failed to realize as the Hanoverians began their attack at Langwedel Bridge was that Langwedel Bridge was not their primary target. Neither was the nearby Achim Bridge where Lacy had posted General Maurice to oppose that possibility. In contrast to what Lacy had been led to believe, George II and Argyll had no desire to challenge Lacy directly to cross the Weser. Instead, they had reasoned it would be safer to cross the Weser farther to the west and closer to Bremen. Thus, the attack on Langwedel Bridge was nothing more than a diversion to occupy and distract Lacy while the rest of the Hanoverian army slipped away to the west beyond the Eiter, across the Weser, and to Bremen. For this purpose, the bulk of the Hanoverian army had awakened early in the morning of June 13, while the sky was still dark and the sun not yet risen, and begun to quietly creep west and away from Lacy's army [15].

    Even though Lacy had not foreseen this maneuver or at least had not expected for this maneuver to occur without notice, General Maurice had been more been imagined the possibility and prepared accordingly. Although General Maurice and the majority of his soldiers remained at Achim, General Maurice had sent Charles Frederick and a few thousand men to guard the Eiter River's crossing at Thedinghausen. In Charles Frederick's pride over this independent command he had enthusiastically prepared the defenses of Thedinghausen in the case that he might have to deter the retreat of the Hanoverian army or deal with a flanking maneuver by one of its wings. Never in a thousand years had Charles Frederick imagined that he would be met by the bulk of the Hanoverian army. Even if Charles Frederick had not developed a fortress he still commanded a strong position. The mere presence of Charles Frederick left George II and Argyll uneasy as they had hoped to evade any detection or resistance and the fact that Charles Frederick had entrenched himself was even more displeasing. Still, Argyll recognized that Charles Frederick did not command an army and he alone could not stop the Hanoverian army. Furthermore, Argyll suspected that soon enough Lacy would discover or be informed of the deception, so the Hanoverian army could not slowly attempt to outmaneuver Charles Frederick. Instead, the Hanoverian army needed to push through Charles Frederick and do so quickly.

    With George II's consent, Argyll quickly organized a few formations of British infantry and ordered an assault against Thedinghausen. As the British soldiers advanced they were peppered with musket fire and hit hard by Russian artillery. Given their exhaustion from the early morning march, this resistance was enough to break up the assault and send its members running back toward the rest of the Hanoverian army. Despite the quick and unmitigated failure of the first assault, a second assault was subsequently organized since the military realities were unchanged. If the Eiter was not crossed then the Hanoverian army's passage to Bremen would be blocked and it would soon be exposed to the reprisal of Lacy's army. The second assault made of sterner British soldiers did not collapse as speedily as the first. Instead, the second assault managed to cross a good length of the bridge under heavy fire until the Russian defenders on the western end of the bridge pulled apart to reveal a cannon that proceeded to blast apart the formation of British soldiers. Again, soldiers came running back to the Hanoverian army but Argyll did not give up.

    Seeing as Charles Frederick apparently would not be moved easily, Argyll decided to take more and more troops of his army out of marching formation to develop a more complete attack against Thedinghausen. For this third assault, Argyll created three formations of infantry. One, of course, was meant to take the bridge, the other two were positioned to the left and right of the bridge to provide covering fire for the assault. With this greater degree of firepower, the British assault was able to reach the Russian defense intact and begin to exchange volleys of musket fire. Although the Russians suffered a great toll in this exchange they held their ground and forced the British infantry back. Finally, George II had had enough and instructed Argyll to bring up some Brunswicker infantrymen, who George II said were superior to the English soldier. Once these Brunswicker soldiers were brought up from their place in the marching column their king commanded them fix bayonets and charge the Russians. Obediently, the Brunswicker did as commanded and began a fierce melee with the Russians. Although the Russians were pushed back somewhat, they maintained formation and wore away at the Brunswickers until they too were rebuffed.

    The continued failure of the Hanoverian army to overcome what should have been a simple hurdle served only to increase George II's frustration. Finally, George II gave the command for a full-on assault of the bridge rather than the limited actions that had thus far been offered. Accordingly, full regiments were brought out of marching order and organized for battle. Additionally, cannons were drawn up from the rear to exchange fire with the Russian artillery. Once these movements were completed, the Anglo-Brunswicker soldiers crowded on to the bridge and jumped into the Eiter to ford it. This powerful attack, however, ran into difficulty. On the bridge, the Anglo-Brunswicker soldiers could make little use of their numbers especially as the dead and wounded occupied more and more space. Meanwhile, the fording attempt went awry immediately when the wading soldiers were welcomed by submerged caltrops and wooden spikes. Furiously, George II sent further soldiers into the fray and through sheer numbers managed to push the Russians back from the bridge and reach the other side of the bank. However, just as George II was celebrating his victory, a hideous thunder roared through the air and stones and planks flew up into the sky and sprayed jagged rocks and splinters everywhere. Charles Frederick had rigged the bridge with explosives and set it off.

    Even after the bridge's destruction, there still were some Anglo-Brunswicker soldiers on the other bank to contest Thedinghausen with the Russians. Desperately, George II hoped that those soldiers could hold or even win their contest while reinforcements were prepared to ford the river. Although Charles Frederick's demolition of the bridge meant that a crossing of the Eiter River by the entire Hanoverian army was a formidable task, the feat was not impossible. Surely, the Hanoverian army would have to abandon a great deal of baggage but it still could escape and regroup with Orkney and Lovenorn's armies to fight another day. These hopes, however, were dashed as reinforcements from General Maurice arrived on the other side of the Eiter. Made up of cavalry, these reinforcements immediately charged into the battle and combined with Charles Frederick's remaining soldiers to overmatch the Anglo-Brunswicker attackers. In the wake of their arrival and the impending arrival of more of General Maurice's army the thought of the Hanoverian army making it across the bridgeless Eiter in good order took flight from George II's mind. Reluctantly, George II acceded to Argyll's recommendation that the Hanoverian army give up its efforts to cross the Eiter and retreat back toward Blender.

    The Hanoverian decision to give up at Thedinghausen did not end the day's perils for the Hanoverians. At Langwedel, Lacy had realized that the army before him was not in fact the entire Hanoverian army before General Maurice's messenger arrived [16]. Once he had that revelation, Lacy quickly switched from a defensive to an offensive approach to the engagement at hand and acted to overwhelm the Hanoverian forces before him. At first, this assault met with just as bloodshed and pain as the Hanoverian ones at Langwedel and Thedinghausen. However, when Augustus the Strong's troops arrived behind the Hanoverian soldiers at Langwedel they were rapidly overwhelmed and soon capitulated. Rather than resort to the more cautious strategy of having Augustus the Strong reinforce him at Langwedel, Lacy had instructed Augustus the Strong to cross the Weser and circle around the force that he had thought was the main Hanoverian army so that he could encircle it and win a great victory. Although Lacy was wrong in regard to what army he was facing, his earlier instruction still came of use and still resulted in good success.

    The misfortune for the Hanoverians continued beyond its defeats at Thedinghausen and Langwedel. The Hanoverian army failed to realize that Blender had been taken over by the Viennese forces. Consequently, the vanguard of the Hanoverian army was dealt a bloody nose when it stumbled into Blender unprepared for enemy fire. Although the Hanoverians were quick to turn south and away from Blender, they found themselves harassed and chased for several days by the Russian and Saxon cavalry. These attacks more so than Thedinghausen or Langwedel reduced and punished the Hanoverian army. By the time the Hanoverian army had recrossed the Aller, it had lost nearly 10,000 men to the fighting at Thedinghausen, Langwedel, and so on, desertion, abandonment of wounded, and delaying actions. In contrast, the Viennese army had lost just 4,000 from Thedinghausen and Langwedel and less than 2,000 in the succeeding chase. These statistics were just a bonus for the Viennese army as their existing numerical advantage could have afforded them much higher casualties.

    Overall, the Bremish march was an abject failure for the Hanoverian Alliance. Despite the best efforts of the Hanoverian Alliance, it had still failed to properly and effectively work together to resist or challenge the Viennese Alliance. Even though the Dano-Norwegians had been drawn south of the Elbe, they were still very wary of abandoning their prize of Holstein completely, which hurt the ability of the Hanoverian forces to maneuver together in a coordinated and coherent fashion. Thedinghausen and Langwedel were seen by the British as just another episode in the failure of their alliance with Denmark-Norway and insults were traded between the two allies. The Earl of Stair could little to bridge these differences since he was called away from Copenhagen by George II. The reason being was that George II had dismissed Argyll outright after the latest set of failures and now sought a new British commander. Orkney was skipped over due to George II's personal inclination toward Argyll. Previously, George II had supported Argyll's bid to become the Master-General of the Ordnance. But then George II was still only Prince of Wales and George I chose the Earl of Cadogan instead. In 1728, Argyll was both the Master-General of the Ordnance and still a friend of George II whereas Orkney was neither. Compounding the failure of the Hanoverian Alliance was that without George II reaching Bremen, the deployment of a British fleet to the region became pointless. Instead of this fleet being used to defend commercial interests in the Caribbean or to protect military interests in the Mediterranean, it had been wasted in the North Sea. Finally, the chase of George II's army by Lacy had meant that Orkney and Lovenorn were free to join their armies without issue but had also meant that George II's army was separated by an even distance from the other Hanoverian forces.

    On the opposing side, the Bremish fighting had resulted in numerous boons for the Viennese Alliance. Whereas the Hanoverian Alliance was seeing rising divisiveness and hostility, the Viennese victories allowed the Viennese allies to gain more trust and respect for each other. The previously uncertain q of quality Charles Frederick was revealed to be a strong, brave, and honorable soldier who any man can respect. Augustus the Strong, past his prime, had proven himself quite willing to coordinate with the Russians for his betterment, perhaps recalling his failures to do so in the Great Northern War with great shame. Finally, Lacy had demonstrated that even when his opponents get an edge on him that edge does not last long, which further solidified his position as the informal supreme commander of the combined Viennese army. In terms of strategic success, the outcome of Thedinghausen had kept the Hanoverians divided while Menshikov was able to bring his army closer to the Viennese army. Soon enough Lacy could coordinate directly with Menshikov to overpower the entire Hanoverian Alliance in Brunswick-Luneburg to fulfill Empress Catherine's wish of destroying the despicable electorate.

    [1] In OTL Walpole said that he would serve Compton if George II made Compton prime minister over Walpole. TTL, Walpole made a similar statement but did not hold true to it.
    [2] A parliamentary is supposed to occur within six months of the death of a monarch.
    [3] In OTL when Compton got close to becoming prime minister he suffered a breakdown and asked Walpole to take over. Considering the disasters, I think a Compton breakdown is safe to assume.
    [4] In OTL when Walpole tried to resign during a time of need, George II rejected the resignation. Here George II acts similarly and refused Compton's resignation.
    [5] In OTL George II publically minimized Caroline of Ansbach's knowledge but privately relied on her and made her regent in his absence. Here, George II did not fully make Caroline his regent but set up a council akin to what his father, George I, did. This is mainly because George II has barely established his own rule and does not want to make any one person look like the main ruler. However, now in this crisis, he is relying more heavily on Caroline.
    [6] Jacobite uprisings and invasions remained a major fear of the English and British throughout the first half of the 18th century.
    [7] In contrast, the first set of armies raised by the British parliament for this war were primarily British.
    [8] Argyll and George II were friends in OTL but George II was known to be short of temper and deeply attached to Brunswick-Luneburg. Hence, when Argyll suggests abandoning it, George II burst out in anger.
    [9] Argyll's record is primarily his evacuation of the Army of Spain in 1713 and his defeat of the Jacobites at the Battle of Sherrifmuir. The reason that he has command of this army is that he is a friend of George II whereas the other most senior British general, the Earl of Orkney is not. Furthermore, other English commanders like the Earl of Stair and Viscount Cobham are currently more focused on politics than the military while Viscount Shannon is in charge of Ireland's defense and George Wade is in charge of Scotland's defense.
    [10] George II much like his father displayed jealously and suspicion of his eldest son throughout his lifetime and here it is no different.
    [11] OTL when Griff first arrived in Britain he approached his parents with open arms whereas they treated him as an unwelcome stranger. Here, Griff again is the one who more earnestly attempts to earn the other's goodwill.
    [12] OTL George II did periodically forgive his son for perceived transgressions and does so here.
    [13] OTL Griff asked George II if he could lead a regiment during the War of the Polish Succession. George II denied him on account of Griff's inexperience. Here, Griff has experience so it seems apt that George II would give him command of a regiment.
    [14] OTL George II would end up becoming a more cautious military commander but as late as OTL 1729 he oversaw a dangerous and provocative march against Prussia during a crisis in Mecklenburg and even challenged King Frederick William I of Prussia to a duel. So I feel that at this point he should still have some of the audacity and brashness of his youth despite his increasing age.
    [15] Similar to before Dettingen, George II tries to escape the clutches of a superior enemy army with an early morning escape while leaving behind a rearguard.
    [16] Similar to the Battle of Villmanstrand, Lacy is not perfect and can be confused by what army he is facing. However, once Lacy realizes that he is fighting a weaker force, he does not hesitate to commit fully to overpowering it.

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    14: Masterpiece at Munster
  • 14: Masterpiece at Munster
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    Russian cavalry at Munster

    Following the Battle of Thedinghausen, King George II of Great Britain was convinced by his newest commander, John Dalrymple, the 2nd Earl of Stair, that Brunswick-Luneburg had to abandoned. As the military situation stood, the Hanoverian army was increasingly isolated and at risk of being surrounded and obliterated. Whereas the recently combined Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army of George Hamilton, 1st Earl of Orkney, and Poul Vendelbo Lovenorn could cross the Elbe River to the safety of Holstein at a moment's notice, the main Hanoverian army had no such luxury. Across the Hanoverian army's northern horizon lay a slew of hostile armies all eager to catch the battered force. To the northwest, in Verden, the primary Viennese army and its commander, Peter Lacy, had demonstrated that no escape through Bremen would be possible. To the north, the Russian garrison of Luneburg and the Prusso-Mecklenburger army in Lauenburg hampered any easy march to Hamburg. Even if those armies alone were incapable of halting a Hanoverian army, the nearby Peter Lacy or even the Prussian army of King Friedrich Wilhelm I in Prussia could amend the numerical disparity in the Viennese Alliance's favor. To the east, Menshikov's approaching army made Brandenburg unwelcoming. The south simply was the wrong direction to march in and would have only seen the Hanoverian army wind up in the hostile Wolfenbuttel or Saxony.

    In light of the unpleasant sights offered by the north, east, and south, the Hanoverian army looked to the west. Just like every other direction, the west did not offer the Hanoverian army a means of completely unimpeded escape. Indeed, if the Hanoverian army marched west then it would have to march through the Archbishopric-Electorate of Munster, which was held by the hostile House of Wittelsbach. Munster itself could easily overrun in a short time but there was some potential for the nearby army of the Governor of the Southern Netherlands, Elector Charles Albert of Bavaria, to fortify Munster ahead of the Hanoverian march. Charles Albert's army was too weak to permanently block the Hanoverian army but could significantly delay the Hanoverian army's march. The thought of delay disturbed George II and Stair since they understood how close both Lacy's Viennese army and Prince Eugene of Savoy's Imperial army were to Munster. Should the Hanoverian army be delayed too long then both Lacy and Prince Eugene could close in and completely destroy the Hanoverian army. However, through discussions with the Hanoverian army's officers and negotiations with Britain's allies, Stair designed a strategy that he believed would provide safe passage for the Hanoverian army out of the doomed Brunswick-Luneburg.

    According to Stair's plan, the French armies of Marshal Nicolas Chalon du Ble and Duc Claude Louis Hector de Villars would both escalate their campaigns against their respective enemies, Charles Albert's army in the Southern Netherlands and Prince Eugene's Imperial army on the Rhine. Although the French would not be required to fight a pitched battle against their opponents, Stair did wish that the French could entangle the German forces for the course of the remaining summer. Through this means, Charles Albert would be prevented from concentrating in Munster and Prince Eugene would be prevented from redeploying to Munster. Next, the Dutch army should shift some resources to the east to occupy some strategic points to the west of Munster to ease the Hanoverian passage. Finally, the British fleet of Vice Admiral John Jennings would take elements of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army of Orkney and Lovenorn from Bremen toward Munster where they could join the Hanoverian army and provide it the strength to rebuff Lacy if he chose to purpose the Hanoverian army without the support of Prince Eugene. Given that Menshikov's army was still a distance away, this army was not accounted for in this plan. To the happy surprise of George II, his allies for once had shown themselves readily agreeable to British leadership and war planning as each of them promised to fulfill their part of the plan.

    The soundness of Stair's plan was no indicator of its ultimate success. The complex military realities and geography of northern Europe had forced Stair to develop a plan that fit together perfectly. Had each step and part of the plan gone well then the overall objective of allowing the Hanoverian army to escape Brunswick-Luneburg probably would have succeeded. Unfortunately for the Hanoverian army, parts of the plan went awry and once they did the plan fell apart entirely. Specifically, the French found themselves unable to definitively tie-down Charles Albert and Prince Eugene's armies, which left the Hanoverian army's westward march vulnerable to German intervention. Furthermore, the French failure to tie down Charles Albert left the Dutch Republic frightened that Charles Albert would invade if the Republic shifted forces to the east. Consequently, the Dutch Republic broke its promise to provide help. Finally, the French inability to hold Prince Eugene left the Dano-Norwegians worried that Lacy would not have to commit himself fully to chasing the Hanoverians into Munster. In which case, whatever troops Lacy left behind could unite with Menshikov's approaching army and overrun Holstein. Once the Dano-Norwegians conjured that image they too abandoned the plan.

    After the western plan had fallen through George II and Stair were forced to revisit their options. Now, they considered the west off-limits. They reminded themselves that going south was futile and realized that going east, head-on into Menshikov's army, was suicidal. Ultimately, after Stair confirmed that given the current disposition of armies and inclination of Britain's allies that Brunswick-Luneburg was impossible to maintain, George II and Stair decided that the north was the only route of escape. Over the course of the next week, the Hanoverian army desperately gathered as many supplies as possible so that it might sprint towards Holstein and be joined by the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army soon afterward. As they did so, Menshikov finally made his entrance into Brunswick-Luneburg and gave the Viennese Alliance a massive advantage over the Hanoverian Alliance even with thousand of Menshikov's soldiers being lost to desertion and attrition. With Menshikov's army's arrival, the Viennese Alliance had more than 120,000 men within the boundaries of the electorate whereas the Hanoverian Alliance had barely more than 80,000. The Hanoverian army was running out of time to escape Brunswick-Luneburg but it still had a chance and so George II gave the order for it to abandon Celle and drive north. As it did so, George II dangerously authorized dispatches to the Orkney and Lovenorn requesting the aid of their army.

    Once the Hanoverian army exited Celle, Lacy and Menshikov were quick to react. From Verden in the west and from Uelzen in the east, the two Russian generals closed in on the road to Hamburg that the Hanoverian army was sprinting up. Through sheer determination and desperation more than discipline or skill, the Hanoverian army managed to beat both Lacy and Menshikov to the town of Soltau, which was directly south of the Luneburg Heath. This event was a serious success for the Hanoverian army as it left Lacy and Menshikov split by the Luneburg Heath. Even divided, however, the two Viennese armies were threats to the Hanoverians. Simply put the Hanoverian army had little chance of defeating Lacy's force, which was almost twice the size of the Hanoverian army. Meanwhile, Menshikov's army although smaller than the Hanoverian army was not greatly so and could probably hold long enough for Lacy to come to its rescue if need be. Nevertheless, the Hanoverian army still wanted to escape Brunswick-Luneburg and it would have to go through one of the two Viennese armies.

    To the good fortune of George II and Stair, their messenger managed to make his way to Orkney and Lovenorn without being captured by the roaming Cossacks and Saxon cavalry. To the even greater fortune of George II and Stair, Orkney and Lovenorn managed to get a messenger back to George II and Stair. The messenger informed them that the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army would indeed come to the main Hanoverian army's assistance. The plan of assistance suggested by Orkney and Lovenorn was that the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army would march through Hamburg to descend on Menshikov's army to the east of the Luneburg Heath in conjunction with the Hanoverian army. Faced with two opposing armies, Menshikov would be forced to either retreat to Luneburg or would be defeated. In either case, the road to Hamburg for the Hanoverian army would be opened and its escape would be made.

    Over the next several days, George II and Stair let the Hanoverian army remain at Soltau with the only activity of the army being its fortification of the town. Through this limited activity, George II and Stair meant to leave Lacy and Menshikov uncertain as to what the intent of the Hanoverian army was. Since the Hanoverian army did not place emphasis on testing Lacy's army at Neuenkirchen or Menshikov's at Bispingen, the Viennese armies were in fact left guessing as to what road the Hanoverian army intended to use. In light of this uncertainty, Lacy and Menshikov began to cut through the Luneburg Heath from their respective sides with the intent of opening a clear route for either army to march through in the case that one was attacked. Ultimately, when Orkney and Lovenorn led their army through Hamburg and east of the Luneburg Heath it became evident that the Hanoverians meant to converge on Menshikov's army. Following that realization, the Viennese forces ramped up their efforts to build a road between the two armies that did not go through Soltau. Additionally, in the knowledge that his army would not have to fight two enemies, Lacy carefully advanced his army toward Soltau.

    The advance of Lacy's army unsettled the Hanoverian Alliance. Rightly, the Hanoverian generals recognized that as Lacy got closer to Soltau he also got closer to Menshikov and the closer Lacy was to Menshikov the greater risk there was that Lacy would come to save Menshikov in battle. With this rising possibility, George II and Stair decided that it would be ill-advised and ill-fated if they continued to wait for the perfect timing so that they might attack Menshikov in conjunction with Orkney and Lovenorn. Instead, George II and Stair recognized that their army was superior to that of Menshikov and decided with that superiority alone that they could defeat Menshikov. Of course, once George II and Stair did move against Menshikov they would immediately send messengers to Orkney and Lovenorn to ask that they move with great haste to join the main Hanoverian army. If Orkney and Lovenorn managed to do so then George II and Stair were confident in a swift victory. To avoid Lacy inferring with this action, Stair proposed leaving behind a strong rearguard to block the Soltau road and beginning their march against Menshikov during the darkness of the early morning. Even though this final element resembled the failed Bremish march, George II still approved it and the Hanoverian army prepared to put the plan into action.

    Long before the sun rose on July 28, 1728, the Hanoverian army was awoken and the bulk of it readied to march out of Soltau to confront Menshikov. Shortly after 4 am, the Hanoverian army began its march. Since George II and Stair expected that the main road to Bispingen would be heavily defended and well-monitored, they elected to take a secondary road to Bispingen that passed near the outskirts of the village of Munster. Through the use of this road, George II and Stair expected to avoid the strongest of Menshikov's defenses and also hoped to gain some element of surprise. As planned, a strong rearguard of several thousand soldiers, mainly Hessians and British soldiers, was left in Soltau to occupy Lacy once he discovered the Hanoverian flight. Finally, riders were sent north through the Luneburg Heath to ask Orkney and Lovenorn to rush toward Bispingen and confront Menshikov alongside the Hanoverian army.

    More than four hours later, the Hanoverian army reached and the outskirts of Munster where to their surprise they found Menshikov's entire army. Apparently, Lacy had not been the only one to advance toward Soltau, Menshikov too had been closing in on the Hanoverian position. Similar to Thedinghausen, the Russians had positioned themselves on a riverbank and sought to use that riverbank to hold back or even throwback a Hanoverian escape attempt. However, Munster had some noticeable differences from Thedinghausen. First, this time the Hanoverians were fighting an army, not just an element of one. However, that difference also meant that the Hanoverians were not just going to throw themselves at the Russians but instead would fight in an organized and coherent manner. Second, the Wietze River was not as wide nor as deep as the Eiter River, which made fording it a much easier task for either army.

    Over the course of the next few hours, the Hanoverian army and its Russian opponent drew themselves into battlelines and readied for a bloody confrontation. The two armies arranged themselves into lines that run northwest to southeast along the Wietze River. For the Hanoverian Alliance, George II and Stair had placed the British regiments on the left, chosen the Germans to make up the centre, and given control of the right to the Dano-Norwegians. Naturally, Stair commanded the British on the left, George II commanded the Germans in the centre, and Christian Detlev Reventlow commanded the Dano-Norwegians on the right. On the opposite side, Menshikov had similarly arranged his army into three wings, all of which were Russian. Menshikov had interspersed his veteran formations with his newer ones to mitigate the lack of experience and inclination toward disorder that the raw soldiers might have. Both armies had placed their artillery wear they could as no suitable elevation presented itself as a natural spot for batteries. Notably, Menshikov had also dug some shallow trenches behind the riverbank, and his flanks were both covered by bends of the river.

    At 12:15 pm, the Battle of Munster commenced as the Hanoverians had finally pieced together their army and were ready to launch their attack. The proceeding attack saw the Hanoverians march forward and expose themselves to the volley fire of the Russians. The Hanoverians, however, held strong in the face of this punishment and traded back volleys of their own. Along both the Hanoverian flanks, the bending of the river prevented an easy flank for the British and Dano-Norwegian forces. Instead, the Hanoverian forces contented themselves with fighting in enfilade. This content proved damaging as the numerical superiority of the Hanoverian army was canceled out by the Russian ability to remain in defilade. After two hours of this brutal firefight, the Russians had shown few signs of weakening or breaking. Across the Russian lines, the veterans of Peter the Great's wars particularly the officers helped to steel the nerves of the younger soldiers. Even Menshikov was riding up and down his lines to rally soldiers and inspire bravery by demonstrating no fear as bullets and cannonballs whizzed past him. To be fair, the Hanoverian ranks were also demonstrating a more resilient temperament than they had as Thedinghausen as the British had seemed to settle into the idea of war. This newfound strength of the British was in part brought about by the presence of Griff, who the British called the Prince of Wales despite him not formally having been granted the title yet.

    Sometime after 2 pm, George II and Stair received news that Lacy had attacked the rearguard at Soltau. Even though George II and Stair had known it was possible or even probable that Lacy would discover the departure of the Hanoverian army quickly they had still vainly hoped that they might deceive Lacy for at least a day. The news made George II and the other Hanoverian commanders anxious about how long the battle had gone on without any real progress. The Hanoverians worried that their rearguard would not keep Lacy away long enough for them to defeat Menshikov. Furthermore, the location of their fight with Menshikov at Munster meant that the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army was even further away from the battlefield and thus less likely to be of help. In light of these concerns, a sense of desperation began to overtake the Hanoverian army. Rather than allow that desperation to fester into fear, George II and the Hanoverian generals chose to directly assault the Russians and force a speedy resolution of the battle for better or worse.

    Under the orders of George II, contingents of each division of the Hanoverian army attached their bayonets to their muskets and prepared to engage the Russians in a melee. Lacking any significant bridge, the Hanoverians resorted to fording through the waters of the Weitze and its bogs. As the soldiers trudged through these waters many were shot and killed or injured. The Hanoverians traded fire as they could but while wading through the water some soldiers got their powder wet and became no better than pikemen. Nevertheless, commanded by their captains, the Hanoverians pushed forward and made their way to the opposite bank of the Weitze. On that opposite bank, the Hanoverians quickly climbed past the limited wooden stakes only to be met with a heavy rain of fire. As dead corpses and injured bodies began to crowd the river the Hanoverian soldiers found its shallow waters harder to navigate. At this point, some soldiers were turned back and others even broke after only brief struggles with the Russians on the other side.

    At the sight of the slackening morale of the Hanoverian army, George II threw his caution aside and personally joined in the assault out of the hope that his royal presence could inspire a more passionate attack. Even if George II was not the King of Denmark and Norway or the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel and had shown ill-regard for his British soldiers, this display of personal bravery did serve a rallying point for the embattled Hanoverian army. Across the line, Hanoverian formations struggled forward and charged the Russian brutes in a meaningful fashion. Proceeding from this attack was a harsh melee between the ragged and disheveled Hanoverian soldiers and their tired Russian forces. On the Hanoverian left, the British and Russian infantry found themselves in a fierce contest with the destined winner uncertain. Surprisingly, George II's personal leadership did not prevent the Germans from failing to make much ground against the Russian centre. However, on the Hanoverian right, the Dano-Norwegian division was making progress and managing to overpower the Russians. In this heavy and bloody heavy, the Hanoverians seemed as if they might finally win a battle in Empress Catherine's War.

    Come 4 pm, the hopes of the Hanoverian Alliance, however, were dashed. From the western horizon, thousands of Russian, Prussian, and Saxon cavalry emerged and charged toward the British flank. The arrival of these Viennese reinforcements came to the severe shock of the Hanoverian army and it had only recently received word of the rearguard's impending defeat. Despite Lacy's army supposedly being at or near Soltau, thousands of his men were now at Munster. The Hanoverian army was not afforded the opportunity to truly consider how this situation had emerged. Instead, the Hanoverians had to find some way to react and react quickly or they would quickly be overrun. Given George II's decision to join the fray of battle, he could provide no leadership for the army overall. Instead, Stair and George II's uncle, Ernest Augustus tried to respond as they could. Unfortunately, most of the Hanoverian reserves had already been committed to the assault, which left little to bolster the British flank as the Viennese cavalry surged forward. What reserves were left were quickly dispatched and all the Hanoverians could really do was pray that they would be enough.

    With the British already fully engaged with Russian soldiers in the front and with the British split between two banks of the Weitze River, the British were in a horrible position when the Viennese reinforcements arrived. Even with the quick deployment of the remaining reserves to the British flank, the flank could not withstand the initial shock of the Viennese cavalry. Immediately, some Hanoverian units broke as their numbers were literally cut down by Viennese horsemen and their morale plummeted. Other Hanoverian units tried to hold their ground and react more effectively. Among these units was the regiment of Griff who like his father displayed personal courage as he rode toward the fight rather than away from it. Griff's example managed to rally some of the British soldiers and allow them to regroup and fight back against the Viennese cavalry. However, this moment of stability did not last long. Shortly after the Viennese cavalry struck, the Viennese infantry made their appearance and began laying down fire where they could and joining in the melee where their cavalry was engaged. Outnumbered and in the process of being enveloped, the British flank became the victim of a massacre. Being cut down by Saxon cavalry, gunned down by Prussian musketeers, and run through by Russian footmen, the British were shattered.

    The collapse of the British flank precipitated the collapse of the Hanoverian army. Without a coherent British division to the left of the German centre, the Germans wavered. In that moment of weakness, Menshikov launched a counterattack and thousands of Russian soldiers streamed forth. In the wake of this counterattack and the pressing forward of the Viennese reinforcements, the Germans were exposed to heavy fire from almost every side. Unable to maintain composure in this difficult situation, the Germans were routed and George II was forced to flee the battlefield. As the Germans fled they were butchered by the Viennese cavalry and infantry until they managed to join ranks with the Dano-Norwegian troops who had maintained discipline through all this cautious. Together, the remaining German and Dano-Norwegian soldiers made their escape from Munster to the east, away from the Viennese reinforcements. This escape was dogged by the Viennese cavalry.

    As the Hanoverians would later discover, their rearguard had failed them and fallen so quickly as to let Lacy reinforce Menshikov. Instead, the doom of the Hanoverian army had begun well before Lacy had even engaged the rearguard. After John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll, had pulled that nighttime march trick on Lacy near Bremen, Lacy had become much more cognizant of the ability of the Hanoverian army. As a consequence, he had posted scouts and sentries specifically to notice another nighttime march of the Hanoverian army and these scouts had done just that. Thus, the Hanoverian army not only failed to deceive Lacy for a day but failed to deceive him for an hour. Despite Lacy's knowledge of the Hanoverian movement, he could not simply send his whole army around Soltau to reinforce Menshikov without fighting the rearguard. Lacy's army was too big and cumbersome for such a maneuver. Instead, Lacy gave General Maurice of Saxony and Frederick Augustus Rutowsky the bulk of his cavalry as well as some infantry and sent them along the partially cleared path through the Luneburg Heath. This army rather than Lacy's was the one to arrive at Munster and bring about the defeat of the Hanoverian army.

    While General Maurice and Frederick Augustus performed that maneuver to Munster, Lacy moved against Soltau. Given Lacy's knowledge that Soltau was garrisoned by no more than a rearguard, he commanded an immediate and all-out assault against Soltau. In this manner, Lacy hoped to quickly resolve the battle so that he could be on his way to help Menshikov. Despite Lacy's superior numbers, the rearguard proved surprisingly stalwart and took thousands of Viennese soldiers with it before being utterly destroyed. The key figure in this struggle ended up being Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp as his troops were the ones who managed to break through the Hanoverian defenses and bring the Battle of Soltau to its conclusion.

    In hindsight, the Battle of Munster may very well have been saved by Maurice and Frederick Augustus. As the two Saxons had joined the fight, Lacy had only recently overcome the Hanoverian rearguard and still a ways away from Munster. Had Maurice and Frederick Augustus stayed with Lacy then this victory at Soltau would not have been significantly faster, which is important since at the moment of their arrival the Hanoverians were doing well against Menshikov's army. On the right, the Dano-Norwegians were definitively winning while on the left the British at the very least were going equal with the Russians. Within an hour or two, the Dano-Norwegians might have done enough damage to win the battle on their own or the British might have defeated Menshikov's other flank. Instead, reinforcements arrived and dealt the Hanoverians a crushing defeat. Even if one sides with the disciples and supporters of Menshikov who claim that he would held or even won by himself, the battle would not have been nearly so disastrous for the Hanoverian Alliance.

    In regard to costs, the Battles of Munster and Soltau were some of the most remarkable since the wars of the early 1700s. The casualties suffered by the Hanoverian army were devasting. Nearly 10,000 Hanoverians were killed and more than 15,000 were captured in the battles and their immediate aftermath. Among the prisoners was Griff who was captured by the young Prussian cuirassier Hans Hermann von Katte. Of course, the Viennese Alliance had not escaped the battle unscathed as their dead and wounded numbered almost 20,000. This high toll is the consequence of both the bloody fighting at Munster and the rushed assault against Soltau. However, it should be noted that the Viennese Alliance had many more men to spare and that their casualties formed a significantly lower proportion of their army than the Hanoverian casualties formed of their army.

    Altogether, the Battles of Munster and Soltau were a decisive victory for the Viennese Alliance and Menshikov was right to treat them as an extreme triumph. Despite the casualties, the Viennese forces had maintained the field at Munster and taken it at Soltau. Even with the casualties, the mathematics of proportion would define the battles as a Viennese victory. Importantly, the Viennese forces had practically crippled the Hanoverian army and sent it fleeing from Munster. Furthermore, the victories allowing Menshikov to avoiding become the victim of a pincer attack and permitted Lacy and Menshikov to finally join their armies. On a tactical, strategic, and symbolic level, the Viennese Alliance had struck a great blow against the Hanoverian Alliance. For these reasons, Munster and Soltau were precisely the victories that Menshikov had been longing to be at the head of and immediately earned a place alongside Poltava as one of Russia's great victories.

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    15: Road to Bispingen
  • 15: Road to Bispingen
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    Russian bombardment of Bispingen

    When the Hanoverian army of King George II of Great Britain and John Dalrymple, the 2nd Earl of Stair, set out from Soltau on the morning of July 28 it sent messengers to the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army of George Hamilton, 1st Earl of Orkney, and Poul Vendelbo Lovenorn to ask that the latter army to rush to Bispingen to join a battle against Prince Aleksander Menshikov's force. Despite the roaming Cossack riders, these messengers succeeded in reaching the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army's camp at Egestorf while Orkney and Lovenorn were still eating breakfast. Given the urgency of George II and Stair's request for help, Orkney and Lovenorn ended their breakfast early and began to bellow out commands for the army to hastily make toward Bispingen. Accordingly, the baggage and the artillery of the army were sent to the rear so that the roads would be clear for the infantry and cavalry to hurry to George II and Stair's assistance.

    The hustle of Orkney and Lovenorn managed to bring the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army to Bispingen by the late afternoon of July 28. Contrary to the expectations of the army, however, they did not arrive at the site of a battle or even the aftermath of one. Instead, they found Bispingen peacefully held by a small Russian garrison with George II and Stair and Menshikov's armies nowhere in sight. From this scene, Orkney and Lovenorn rightly presumed the battle had occurred somewhere to Bispingen's south. Despite this educated guess, Orkney and Lovenorn could not just rush past Bispingen and its Russian garrison since they controlled the primary road south. Consequently, Orkney and Lovenorn organized a quick but considerable assault against Bispingen that managed to overrun the Russian position in just an hour. Afterward, the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army continued to venture south for a couple of miles but upon finding no signs of battle and with the sun in decline, they returned to Bispingen to rest and await news.

    The news of the Battle of Munster failed to arrive at the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army. First, when the Hanoverian army discovered the Russian army at Munster, George II and Stair dispatched another set of messengers to inform the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army of the change in venue for the battle. These messengers, however, were caught before they reach the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army by the outriders of General Maurice of Saxony's army on its way to Munster. Further messengers were either captured or forced to turn back by the prevalence of enemy men. Finally, when the Hanoverian army was defeated, the positioning of Menshikov and Maurice's troops forced the Hanoverian army to retreat to the east rather than the north. As a consequence, the Hanoverian army and its stragglers did not encounter the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army or its scouts during its retreat. The heavy cavalry pursuit of the Hanoverian army also inhibited communication between the Hanoverian army and the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army. Thus, Orkney and Lovenorn remained unaware of the horrific fate of George II and Stair.

    In contrast to the ignorance of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army, the combined Viennese army of Menshikov and Peter Lacy was fully knowledgeable of both the whereabouts of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army and the Hanoverian army. Information on the former was provided by survivors of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian capture of Bispingen who had been picked up by Maurice's army, and information on the latter continued to flow in from the still active pursuit of the Hanoverian army. The awareness of the poor state of the Hanoverian army and its location meant that if the Viennese could catch up with the fleeing army then a complete victory could be achieved. At the same time, the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army had left itself dangerously too close to the Viennese army and could be an easy victim of its overwhelming numbers. In both cases, the Viennese commanders expected to be victorious against whichever army they chased but felt that the other army would escape out of reach in the meantime.

    The expectations of victory regardless of which army the Viennese pursued left the Viennese commanders divided during their war council on the night of July 28 just hours after the conclusion of the Battles of Munster and Soltau. Since the Hanoverian army was marching into lands that Prussia and Saxony sought to claim, Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau and King Augustus the Strong of Poland both favored chasing it. They were also supported by Maurice who felt that the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army could always be defeated at another time. On the other side, the Holstein-Gottorps, Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp and Prince Charles Augustus of Eutin, favored defeating the primarily Dano-Norwegian army at Bispingen to inflict a major defeat on their familial nemesis and to open the road toward Holstein. Ultimately, the decision fell to Menshikov as the recognized supreme commander of the entire Viennese army and surprisingly he sided with his political opponents, the Holstein-Gottorps. The reason being was that Menshikov considered a victory over the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army to be more prestigious and also because he expected to be able to defeat the broken Hanoverian army at a later date.

    On July 29, 1728, after only a night's rest from the exploits of Munster and Soltau, the Viennese army marched toward Bispingen. As the Viennese advanced toward Bispingen, Orkney and Lovenorn were finally informed of the battle's result and the Hanoverian army's easterly retreat by a trooper of Sir Robert Rich’s Dragoons. Shortly afterward, the scouts of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army discovered the approach of the Viennese. At this point, Orkney and Lovenorn considered abandoning Bispingen and retreating to Hamburg. However, Orkney and Lovenorn realized a myriad of issues with taking that action. First, the road to the north was currently clogged with the baggage of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army. Second, the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army was at the moment dispersed for the purpose of foraging for food as Bispingen's food stores had been inadequate to feed the army. Third, the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army was fatigued from rushing to Bispingen on the previous day. Obviously, the road could be cleared, the army regrouped, and the soldiers forced to march. However, these issues made for dangerous delays, which might complicate the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army's escape and expose more than just a rearguard to an attack.

    Beyond the potential for delay, other factors encouraged Orkney and Lovenorn to stand their ground rather than fallback in the face of a superior enemy. First, the Viennese army had just fought a pair of battles was presumably still rattled and battered from the experience. In contrast, although tired the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army was not damaged. To amplify these differences between the two armies, the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army held Bispingen and Menshikov's former fortifications at the town, which provided the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army with cover. Furthermore, the Viennese army was the one with the burden of attacking so the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army would not have to abandon those defenses or tire itself out with complicated maneuvers. As a consequence of these conditions, Orkney and Lovenorn felt that their army could hold up against the Viennese army and either stall out a battle into a draw or even defeat an overhasty Viennese assault. Thus, despite being gravely outnumbered by the Viennese army by a ratio of more than two to one, Orkney and Lovenorn decided to stay at Bispingen and meet the Viennese challenge.

    Shortly after midday, the Viennese army reached Bispingen and quickly began to establish artillery batteries outside the town while infantry formed up out of the range of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian cannons. Once the Viennese batteries were set up, Johann Gunther, chief-general of artillery for the Russian military, commenced a heavy and sustained bombardment of the cramped and crowded Anglo-Dano-Norwegian position. Resolutely, the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army withstood this bombardment in the expectation that the Viennese army would assault Bispingen soon. However, through the afternoon and then into the night, the Viennese infantry remained motionless while its artillery hammered the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army for hours. Despite Lovenorn's previous assignment as an assistant to Menshikov in the Russian army, he had failed to account for the possibility that Menshikov would show restraint and instead had concurred with Orkney that the Viennese would treat Bispingen as a battle rather than a siege. After enduring this brutal bombardment for hours, Orkney and Lovenorn finally chose to evacuate Bispingen under the cover of darkness. Out of caution, Orkney and Lovenorn decided to abandon their cannons and baggage entirely rather than risk them slowing down any element of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian escape. On the same note, those who were too sick or wounded to walk were ordered to remain at Bispingen and manage its defenses to hopefully create the illusion that the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army had not left the town. After hours of preparation and some much-needed rest, the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army departed from Bispingen early on July 30.

    The Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army was not the only army to utilize the cover of darkness to maneuver unbeknownst to the enemy. Although Menshikov did not attempt to surround Bispingen during the day of July 29 due to the distance his army had already marched, that night Menshikov sent two wings of the Viennese army under Maurice and Lacy to encircle the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army from the west and the east. The wide circles made by these two wings and the night's darkness allowed these two forces to evade detection and make their way to the northwest and northeast of Bispingen. Once they reached their objectives, the two wings established bivouacs and planned to rest until the morning when they would close in on Bispingen and force the capitulation of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army. Instead, after little more than an hour's nap, the Viennese troops were roused when their picket sentries spotted the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian column marching toward Hamburg.

    Once aware of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian escape attempt, Lacy and Maurice combined their two armies to establish a block on the road to Hamburg. Additionally, word was sent to Menshikov to make him aware of the events underway. Lacy hoped to maintain the element of surprise all the way until the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army unhappily stumbled into his force. However, Orkney and Lovenorn were not so unwise as to march without outriders and scouts and became aware of Lacy's presence ahead of encountering it. Unfortunately, this knowledge still came too late since Lacy had already occupied the northern road to Hamburg. The only other road to Hamburg lied far to the east and across the Luhe River. An attempt to reach that road would likely result in the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army being caught in between Lacy and Menshikov's two armies and mercilessly crushed. The only option left to Orkney and Lovenorn was to confront the enemy ahead and try to breakthrough before Menshikov's arrival.

    As the sun rose on July 30, the second phase of the Battle of Bispingen began when the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army of Orkney and Lovenorn and the Viennese army of Lacy began to exchange musket fire with one another. The battle did not remain limited to musketry for long as the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army was eager to open the road toward Hamburg. From the southeast, the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian cavalry launched an all-out attack on the Viennese left flank, which fell under the command of Frederick Augustus Rutowsky. Despite the strength and determination of this assault, it failed to break the Viennese left flank and was sent back toward the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian lines. As this attack transpired, Lacy and Maurice, in the Viennese centre and on the right respectively, had managed to weather the storm of the initial aggression from the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian attack.

    With the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian attack deterred, Lacy ordered his army to counterattack and put considerable pressure on the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian centre by bringing some of his reserves to join his own centre. This pressure resulted in considerable damage to the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian centre and forcibly shoved it back. The Anglo-Dano-Norwegian centre's growing weakness resulted in elements of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian left coming to the aid of the centre. Consequently, the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian left slackened in strength and permitted Maurice's Viennese soldiers to begin to overpower the enemy. At this moment, Lacy sensed the possibility of victory and committed his reserves and cavalry to support his centre and right. In the meantime, Lacy's own left failed to make much progress against the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian right due to the damage that the Viennese left had sustained earlier in the battle.

    Lacy's commitment to the centre and his right resulted in them outmatching the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian centre and left, respectively. Steadily, the left side of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army was pushed and turned backward. Surprisingly, Orkney and Lovenorn did not attempt to save the left side by using their reserves and cavalry to reinforce it. Instead, Orkney and Lovenorn resumed their attack on Lacy's own left flank by throwing almost all their reserves and cavalry at it. The considerable attack overwhelmed and even broke the Viennese left while the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian left although hemorrhaging numbers, remained intact. As a consequence, it was the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army that ended up turning the Viennese flank rather than vice versa. However, this state of the battle did not last for long as Maurice's relentless pressure on the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian left flank finally broke it and allowed the Viennese to turn the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian flank. Thus, the two armies were turned away from their initial west-east lines and now had their axes drawn from north to south with the Viennese army to the west and the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army to the east.

    With both armies having turned the flank of the other and thousands of casualties having been inflicted upon each army, the battle hung in the balance with the victor uncertain. Who would have won between Lacy and Orkney and Lovenorn if the battle had continued like this cannot be known for while the battle was still a chaotic, undecided mess, Menshikov's army arrived from the south. The arrival of Menshikov vanquished any possibility of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army winning the battle as his numbers could overrun the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army if it tried to stay. Fortunately for Orkney and Lovenorn, the manner in which the battle had played out had opened the road to Hamburg, which Orkney and Lovenorn chose to retreat up. In response, Menshikov ordered his advance guard and his cavalry to fall upon the remnants of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian left and centre, which made the rearguard of the retreat. Having taken a beating all day long, the remnants of the left were shattered and a large portion of the centre was mauled. However, Menshikov's hopes of fully chasing and completely destroying the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army were made impossible by the disordered state of Lacy's troops.

    In the end, the Battle of Bispingen was a costly and deadly battle for both sides. The first phase of the battle, Johann Gunther's bombardment of Bispingen, had gone entirely in the favor of the Viennese Alliance and resulted in hundreds of casualties for the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army but minimal casualties for the Viennese. In contrast, the second phase, the battle on the plains north of Bispingen, was a much closer affair that cost both sides thousands of lives. Between the two phases, the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army had lost 4,000 souls and had another 5,000 men wounded and captured. In contrast, the Viennese Alliance had suffered 3,000 dead and another 3,000 wounded. Given these casualties and the fact that the Viennese army captured all of the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army's baggage, Menshikov was right to regard Bispingen as a victory and write of it to Empress Catherine I as such. At the same time, the Hanoverian Alliance was not wrong to celebrate Bispingen either. Although the Hanoverians certainly would not call Bispingen a victory, they did rejoice at the fact that the Anglo-Dano-Norwegian army had escaped intact. Additionally, due to the Viennese focus on Bispingen, George II and Stair's Hanoverian army were also able to reach Hamburg. Although both armies, particularly the latter, were hampered by Viennese cavalry during their retreats that cost the Hanoverian Alliance a large number of men, the two armies lived to fight another day. After the uninterrupted series of defeats suffered by the Hanoverian Alliance, survival in itself was a success.

    On a political level, the outcome of Munster, Soltau, and Bispingen served many interests. For the Hanoverians, the large and prominent Dano-Norwegian participation in the campaign beyond just Christian Detlev Reventlow's troops served to reconcile the fractious Anglo-Dano-Norwegian relationship. Even though the campaign had ended in ignominious defeat for the Hanoverian Alliance and George II, he could not and did not blame the Kingdom of Denmark and Norway. He did, however, fault his leading minister, Sir Spencer Compton, for not managing the British House of Commons better and leaving the Hanoverian Alliance underpowered against the Viennese menace. Although George II did not yet dismiss Compton due to the crisis of war, it became obvious that Compton would not survive beyond that crisis. As a consequence, Sir Robert Walpole was confident that he would return to the top of British politics upon the war's end.

    For the Viennese Alliance, the victories at Munster, Soltau, and Bispingen only further reinforced the mutual respect that the allies held for each other as everyone had played their role and played it well. Within the Russian camp, the series of victories was particularly important. A number of Russian officers had distinguished themselves. Lacy, obviously, as Menshikov's first subordinate had proven himself as one of Russia's top generals and earned himself an unimpeachable position at the head of Russia's armies. Next, Maurice had made more of a name for himself than being a profligate illegitimate son of Augustus the Strong, which could allow his claim to Courland to be revisited by a favorable Russian court. Charles Frederick and Charles Augustus had similarly gained the respect of Menshikov but not his favor as he still considered them political opponents. Finally, Johann Gunther no longer had to worry about Christoph von Munnich's efforts to usurp his position as chief-general of artillery since Menshikov praised Gunther's bombardment of Bispingen. Finally, in regard to Menshikov himself, he had done much to add to his prestige and grow his legacy by holding at Munster and saving Lacy and Maurice at Bispingen. No one could question any longer, Menshikov's promotion to generalissimus of the Russian Empire. Menshikov had gained the glory necessary to etch his name into Russian history for all of posterity to notice. However, now that Menshikov had a taste of great triumph, he was eager for more of it.

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    16: Blenheim! Bellheim?
  • 16: Blenheim! Bellheim?
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    Prince Eugene of Savoy
    Cardinal Fleury had never asked for a war and certainly did not want the one he found himself in. Although some accused Fleury of loving peace and referencing over France's sometimes martial needs. However, Fleury was no blind-adherent to the Christian ideal of not hurting one's neighbors. Instead, Fleury saw what few other French nobility and generals could. What recognized was that France had lost the final two wars of the Sun King's reign. Certainly, France had fought against impossible odds, a grand alliance in fact, and had acquitted itself well in that regard. Nevertheless, France had been defeated and had been brutalized by the two wars. Tens of thousands of French soldiers had died and many more civilians from the burdens of war, Millions of livres had been spent for no meaningful return and France's economy had practically been shattered. This was the truth that Fleury saw when he looked upon his beloved France whereas everyone else seemed to still think France had the invincible strength of Louis XIV's height. At the same time, France's rivals, Great Britain and particularly the Hapsburgs had grown greatly in strength. The former possessed the most powerful navy in Europe. The latter had conquered Hungary, Milan, Naples, Sicily, and the Southern Netherlands while also securing dominance over the Holy Roman Empire despite France's best efforts. Thus, while others lusted to rush into war and make a hegemon out of France, Fleury had wished to rebuild France and its relationships before ever getting so bold. Ironically, that desire for allies is what brought France into Empress Catherine's War when France was forced to come to Britain's aid or risk losing its most important ally.

    Fleury's lack of enthusiasm for the war and his pecuniary worries had resulted in a very constrained strategy for France's military. In Spain, Fleury sent one of his more timid commanders, the Duke of Berwick, James FitzJames, to accomplish the simple task of occupying Navarre. However, Berwick was perhaps too timid was repulsed on the border at Fuenterrabia. Meanwhile, in northern France, Marshal Nicolas Chalon du Ble was allowed to act as no more than an army of observation. Finally, on the Rhine, Fleury had assigned France's greatest living general, the Duc de Villars, Claude Louis Hector, with matching Prince Eugene of Savoy's Imperial army. However, Fleury refused to let Villars put his natural aggression and decisiveness to use. Instead, Villars was practically tied to the right bank of the Rhine by his orders. This altogether uninspired pair of opening French campaigns resulted in criticism of Fleury from the French court. Even men who Fleury had sponsored to positions of power, the Secretary of State, Germain Louis Chauvelin, and the newly promoted Lieutenant General Charles Louis Auguste Fouquet, duc de Belle-Isle, felt as if France had humiliated itself and that some of the blame laid with Fleury. Furthermore, both Marshal du Ble and the Duc de Villars returned to Versailles to complain about the orders that they had been given. In the wake of this criticism, Fleury was forced to adopt a new approach to the war [1]. Even though Fleury was the most powerful man in France besides the king, he was not politically invincible [2]. Fleury had seen his fair share of politicians rising and falling and he had no desire to witness his own fall so soon after he had risen to the very top.

    Regarding Spain, Fleury's new strategy was actually one that he had attempted before the war: peace and reconciliation [3]. Since the Treaty of Utrecht, France and Spain's relationship never seemed as if they could find the right footing. Constantly, Spain had acted as nothing more than a pest to France with Felipe V even trying to undermine Louis XV's monarchy. Meanwhile, the effort to reconcile the two countries had failed when Louis XV broke his engagement with Mariana Victoria of Spain at the recommendation of Duc Louis Henri de Bourbon and embarrassed Spain in the process. However, a hostile, broken relationship between the two Bourbon monarchies of Europe was unnatural to Fleury. Furthermore, in light of Spain's revitalized strength, Fleury felt that Spain could be a friendly counterbalance to Britain in the Americas and the Hapsburgs in the Mediterranean. Accordingly, Fleury seriously engaged the Spanish in peace talks but they came to no avail despite how generous Fleury felt he had been. Even though Spain was, in Fleury's eyes, still an inferior power, it continued to demand half of Italy, Gibraltar, and Menorca for its exit from the war. Rather than accept these outsized demands, Fleury decided that Spain, Felipe V, and Isabel Farnese needed to be brought back down to earth before a reasonable peace could be found. As a consequence, Fleury authorized the reinforcement of the Duke of Berwick's army back to a strength of 30,000 men for the purpose of invading Spain a second time. Rather than return to the scene of its previous defeat, Navarre, the replenished army planned to invade the less geographically hostile Catalonia and go the Spanish gem of Barcelona.

    Besides putting forth a better effort on the Spanish front, Fleury and Louis XV wanted France's army to have a more active approach and noticeable effect when campaigning in the Low Countries and the Rhineland. Fleury still believed that a French invasion of Flanders would be needlessly alarming for France's allies, Britain and the Dutch Republic, but Fleury thought that a French conquest of Trarbach, a possession of the Elector Palatine's brother, would be tolerable. The capture of Trarbach would not set the stage for a French conquest of Antwerp but still could put pressure on the Southern Netherlands. For that reason, Fleury decided to augment Marshal Nicolas Chalon du Ble's army with another 10,000 men ahead of the summer's campaign. To the east, in the Rhineland, Fleury still worried that aggression would provoke an Imperial war against France. However, he also did not think that he could keep Villars muzzled for another year. Furthermore, given the defeats suffered by the Hanoverian Alliance in Brunswick-Luneburg, Fleury worried that another campaign of relaxed maneuvering could damage France's alliance with Britain. For this reason, Fleury raised 10,000 men for Villars' army and gave him permission to test Prince Eugene's lines at Ettlingen. No longer held back by commands for passivity, Villars energetically returned to the front in Alsace and rapidly began putting his army in order during March and April of 1728. Marshal du Ble did the same in Champagne shortly after. By the end of April, both French armies were ready to act.

    On the other side, the Viennese Alliance approached the Western Theatre very differently. Similarly to France, the Hapsburgs' treasury was in a sorry state and could ill-afford a large war. Already, the Hapsburg treasury was under extreme strain from the cost of supporting two field armies in the Rhineland and Italy. Surprisingly, the Hapsburgs found themselves dependent on Spanish subsidies to maintain their war effort [4]. Additionally, despite the fact that the bulk of electors were engaged in the war in support of the Holy Roman Emperor, the majority of smaller princes were less favorable to the conflict. As far as they were concerned, the Holy Roman Empire faced no existential threat as it had during the wars of Louis XIV. Consequently, the Imperial Diet was unwilling to declare an Imperial war and thereafter offer up soldiers or money to the Imperial army. Due to these difficulties, Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI and Prince Eugene allowed themselves to be lulled into believing that after the quiet, calm nature of the campaign in 1727 that the same type of campaign could be expected in 1728. For this reason, while the French were ready to act in April, the Hapsburgs and Bavarians were far from it and had thin lines precariously stretched from Breisach to Ypres. All that the Hapsburgs were able to manage was arranging the redeployment of fewer than 10,000 men from Italy to the Rhineland. However, these soldiers were still hundreds of miles away when the French struck in 1728.

    The army of Marshal du Ble opened hostilities in the Western Theatre on April 29, 1728, when a large portion of it commanded by Francois de Franquetot de Coigny arrived outside the fort of Trarbach and quickly attempted an assault against its small garrison. Despite the garrison numbering no more than 500 men, Trarbach withstood this unprepared attack and Coigny was forced to begin the process of besieging Trarbach by digging trenches and establishing batteries. Over the course of the next two weeks, Trarbach was hit by more than 5,000 cannonballs until its commander finally capitulated. This capitulation was not followed by the internment of the garrison as the sieges in Brunswick-Luneburg. Instead, in accordance with the western codes of conduct for war, Coigny permitted the garrison's retreat to Coblenz unharassed. Afterward, Coigny repaired Trarbach's defenses so that his army could posture against either Trier or Coblenz. At the same time, the rest of du Ble's army had repositioned closer to Luxembourg. However, du Ble's request to be allowed to then subdue Luxembourg or capture Trier was rejected by Fleury as the former request involved invading the Low Countries and the latter might trigger an Imperial war.

    Villars was not far behind du Ble in launching his offensive. On May 1, 1728, Villars opened his campaign with a series of quick marches by different elements of his army in practically all directions. One contingent under the Duc de Belle-Isle, marched toward Coblenz, another under Emmanuel-Francois-Joseph Count of Bavaria, threatened Mannheim, a final one under Adrien Maurice, duc de Noailles, showed itself at Kehl. Collectively, these movements left the recently returned Prince Eugene confused as to what the intentions of the French were. As a consequence, when Villars finally crossed the Rhine near Iffezheim in force, Prince Eugene was unsure if this was another feint or not. In this cloud of uncertainty, Prince Eugene failed to react immediately and instead waited for further information, which allowed thousands of Villars soldiers to cross the Rhine freely and begin marching against the Ettlingen Lines. Once Prince Eugene realized the reality of the French attack he immediately ordered his dispersed troops to concentrate as they could at Ettlingen.

    Since many Hapsburg contingents were too far to be of immediate help, Villars pressed on despite the swelling of Prince Eugene's army. Although one might have expected for a climactic and dramatic clash to follow with the French army of Villars charging straight at the Imperial army of Prince Eugene, control of Ettlingen was decided by far smaller forces and less prestigious names. Once the two armies came into proximity near one another, Francois-Marie, duc de Broglie, and the left-wing of the French army pushed past Rastatt and scouted the mountains to the north. That night, a small body of hussars under Louis Charles Armand Fouquet, the Chevalier de Belle-Isle, had navigated through a narrow defile to find an undefended plain. By the morning of May 6, that plain was filled with French soldiers who encountered the flank of Prince Eugene's army by 10 am. Despite being outnumbered, the Chevalier de Belle-Isle displayed great bravery and ordered his soldiers to attack. The passionate and spirited attack threw the surprised Hapsburgs off balance and resulted in them being driven back after only an hour of fierce fighting [5].

    By the night of May 6, thousands of French soldiers had maneuvered through the defile to create a strong formation on Prince Eugene's flank. Additionally, the Count of Bavaria had defeated the contingent of soldiers guarding the crossing at Mannheim, which had been temporarily diminished in Prince Eugene's rush to defend Ettlingen. The Count of Bavaria had then been reinforced by the Duc de Belle-Isle to create an army in Prince Eugene's rear. These two events put Prince Eugene's army at grave danger of being caught in a pincer and after Prince Eugene's personal inspection of his defenses revealed numerous weaknesses, Prince Eugene's position was entirely untenable. As a result, Prince Eugene had no choice but to abandon the Ettlingen Lines entirely, which practically ceded a large area of maneuver to the French. This action would create panic in Vienna and elicit a concerned response from Emperor Charles VI to which Prince Eugene responded, "the greater the danger, the greater attention I can give it." However, this confidence hid Prince Eugene's fear that Villars would overrun the still somewhat-dispersed Imperial army. Elements of the Imperial army were still scattered to the north and south of Prince Eugene's retreating column and the Italian reinforcements were still a distance away. As much as Villars would have liked to seize this incredible opportunity, Fleury strictly forbade Villars from chasing Prince Eugene into Germany. Instead, Villars simply secured some Rhine crossings and the Ettlingen Lines.

    In this manner, with two solid successes but no follow-ups, Fleury intended to end France's campaigns in the Rhineland and Low Countries for 1728. However, to Fleury's surprise, the rest of the Hanoverian Alliance found fault with France's newfound restraint. Due to the obstinance, pride, and German-birth of King George II and the inadequacy of John Campell, the Duke of Argyll, the Hanoverian army in Brunswick-Luneburg was in danger of being smashed to pieces or forced to capitulate completely. To avoid these possible futures, John Dalrymple, the 2nd Earl of Stair, had designed an escape for the Hanoverian army through Munster. However, this escape route was vulnerable to interference from both the army of Charles Albert in the Low Countries and the army of Prince Eugene in the Rhineland. To secure this route, the Earl of Stair asked that the two French opponents to Charles Albert and Prince Eugene engage and distract them until the Hanoverian army could make its escape.

    Upon receiving this entreaty from his ally, Fleury felt that the only correct decision was to comply. If Fleury failed to answer his ally's' call for help then he most certainly would lose the alliance of Britain. Also, if France sat back in its ally's greatest time of need then Fleury would find it difficult to find new allies for France. Finally, the sheer uproar Fleury would face at court for keeping his military leashed even when Britain begged for it to act would be hard to suppress. Thus, Fleury agreed to Stair's request to elevate France's level of action. Even then Fleury still felt a need to err on the side of caution and avoid any action that would be too dramatic such as invading Hesse-Kassel as the Duc de Belle-Isle suggested. Instead, Fleury authorized Du Ble and Villars to conquer the Imperial fortresses of Luxembourg and Philippsburg respectively. Control over those fortresses would give France a large degree of control over the Moselle and Rhine valleys, which would not be ceded by the Holy Roman Emperor willingly.

    Without hesitation, both Du Ble and Villars reorganized their armies in accordance with their new orders. By mid-June, both Du Ble and Villars had regrouped their armies around their respective targets to dig parallels and open bombardments. These sieges subsequently drew the armies of Charles Albert and Prince Eugene to Luxembourg and Philippsburg respectively, which was exactly in line with Stair's plan. Both Du Ble and Villars responded to their counterpart's arrival by building the requisite contravallation. Villars also had to build a number of pontoon bridges to connect the French formations across the numerous waterways that surrounded Philippsburg [6]. Due to the smaller sizes of both Charles Albert and Prince Eugene's armies neither was particularly eager to break the siege before them. Instead, both Charles Albert and Prince Eugene needed to carefully test the enemy's fortifications before being so brave as to attack them honestly in a great battle. Even once the Italian reinforcements joined the Imperial army and cut into the disparity it faced against the French army, Prince Eugene continued to remain patient.

    The standoff between Villars and Prince Eugene ultimately came to end before such a battle occurred. Instead, an act of God brought about the conclusion of the Siege of Philippsburg and awarded Prince Eugene's patience. At the beginning of July, the summer rains began to pour so heavily at Philippsburg that the Rhine rose several feet and rushed with greater speed. These rising and gushing waters soon enough carried away several French pontoon bridges and began to unravel the French defenses. With this force of nature breaking apart the French army and threatening to isolate and expose elements of the French army to the menace of the Imperial army, Villars recognized that his position was unsustainable. After further assessing the situation and inspecting his siege lines, Villars further realized that a siege itself was unsustainable. Subsequently, amidst these harsh summer rains, the French army broke off its siege of Philippsburg and begin to withdraw. Had it not been for the fact that the Imperials were just as bothered by the torrents of water, Prince Eugene would have tried to take advantage of the difficult French exit. Instead, the French army was allowed to retreat across the Rhine unhindered. Or at least that was true for the most part.

    As part of the French rearguard was retiring across a pontoon bridge, the sentries reported that Imperial outriders were in the distance. After receiving this news the young, inexperienced colonel in charge of completing the withdrawal allowed his emotions to overtake his senses. With a look of fright on his face, the colonel ordered that the retreat pick up the pace considerably and overruled his engineer when he claimed that such action would endanger the integrity of the bridge and thus the safety of the men. As could be expected the man who got his rank through hard work and endless studying was right and the man who only got his rank due to his blood was wrong. Within half an hour the overtaxed and creaking bridge finally gave way and broke apart. Before the engineers could even contemplate a quick repair, the river swept the rest of the bridge away. In this instant, many men died, a number of horses were lost, and a few cannon sunk with them. Worse yet 700 men were now stranded on the opposite from the rest of their army and on the same bank as tens of thousands of Imperial soldiers.

    Presented with this new dilemma, the French colonel surprisingly did not panic a second time. Instead, after establishing that the river was uncrossable at this point, the colonel commanded that his remaining troops abandon all their heavy equipment and march towards the next pontoon bridge with all haste. However, by the time they reached this crossing their fellow Frenchmen had already completed their evacuation and destroyed the bridge afterward to cover their escape. Even though it was obvious at this point that the most likely event was that they would be captured, the colonel told his men to persevere and search for some means of escape. None, however, was to be found and by the end of the day, a troop of German cavalry and regiment of Imperial infantry had caught up to the French. Perhaps due to the shame, he felt at having caused this calamity the colonel asked his soldiers to stand with him and make a heroic stand for their country and for their king, and perhaps due to some ill-guided hope that there was still a possibility of escape these French soldiers agreed to follow their commander into battle. The following engagement saw the French soldiers bravely charge at their Imperial counterparts. Outnumbered, however, the Frenchmen stood little chance. As soon as they were solidly engaged with the opposing infantry, the Imperial cavalry rode forth and thrashed the French flanks. Within an hour and after 100 French soldiers had lost their lives including the colonel, the French surrendered and this mini-odyssey came to an end.

    This minor skirmish at Hordt should have been nothing more than an embarrassing footnote in history for the French and a forgotten one for the Imperials. Indeed, both commanding generals of the French and German armies felt that way and treated the skirmish as such in their reports. Villars wrote to Fleury about having successfully withdrawn from Philippsburg after inclement weather made the siege impossible to continue but regretted the loss of a few hundred men who had been stranded by a pontoon bridge breaking. In Prince Eugene's report, it read that the commander of Philippsburg had bravely withstood the French siege until the French were forced back by summer rain. Prince Eugene then explained his failure to interrupt the French flight due to issues among his own army caused by the rain but noted that a few unfortunate Frenchmen had been caught out after their bridge collapsed. Overall, both Villars and Prince Eugene thought little of the small skirmish. The capture of a few hundred Frenchmen did not substantially weaken the French army nor did affect Villars' movement. The only reason why the French had to abandon the left bank of the Rhine was that their supply situation had deteriorated significantly over the course of the siege. The Imperials themselves did not take the opportunity to launch an invasion of France as Prince Eugene lacked that sort of confidence in his men.

    However, as is often true, reality is more than just reality. In Vienna, the Holy Roman Emperor had spent the year of 1727 watching his Prussian and Saxon vassals participate in the excellent Battle of Bienbuttel, an overrunning of Lauenburg, the Siege of Stralsund, and the capture of Luneburg. Meanwhile, Emperor Charles VI's armies failed to provide excitement. Flanders was motionless, the Rhine was nothing but maneuvers, and although Milan was saved it was done without even the slightest bloodshed. The year of 1728 seemed as if it would only see more of the same as the Lacy and Menshikov's armies seemed destined to dominate the north. Already they had won a strong victory at Thedinghausen and at the time they threatened to encircle the Hanoverian army. Meanwhile, the Imperial army had lost the Ettlingen Lines temporarily and almost lost Philippsburg with little hope for any greater destiny. Under these conditions, Charles VI felt that his pride and glory were under threat but more so he worried that he would find his place the peace tables minimized. Already people were calling the war Empress Catherine's War, Charles could not let it also be Empress Catherine's peace.

    Due to this sentiment, when Charles VI heard of the clash at Hordt he did not care how minor it was, it was a victory. Right away, the Emperor began to illustrate Hordt as something much more than it was. In fact, rather than publish accounts of the skirmish as the Battle of Hordt, the Emperor renamed the engagement after the nearby Bellheim. Renaming Hordt to Bellheim was not just done to make the name roll off the tongue more easily. In doing this, Charles hoped to draw comparisons between this scuffle and the epic and beloved Battle of Blenheim. However, Charles did not just let people figure out this connection on their own. Instead, Charles actively drew the brawl as a battle of as great of a significance as Blenheim had been. The Holy Roman Emperor wrote and spoke of how at Bellheim, the Prince of Savoy had chased off the French army's attempt to conquer Philippsburg and unleash itself upon the whole of Germany. Soon accounts of a battle of several thousand men began to circulate and songs of another great Hapsburg victory were written. Even in France, this sensationalism of Hordt exploded. Many members of French society called the battle a debacle and bemoaned about the failure to break through the Imperial defenses. The public sentiment of the battle was so poor that Cardinal Fleury was embarrassed and failed to give Villars the credit which was due to him for his well-managed retreat. Ultimately, a fight that initially had been inconsequential became much more as politicians and monarchs distorted and contorted the reports of the combat.

    Although Bellheim in itself was actually without significance, what Bellheim represented did indeed matter. The actual capture of some French troops did not affect the Rhenish campaign at all, however, the retreat from Philippsburg had repercussions that extended into Brunswick-Luneburg. Since the French had been unable to sustain a prolonged siege of Philippsburg they were incapable of ensuring the Imperial army remained in the Rhineland. Indeed, Prince Eugene marched to Coblenz in the wake of Bellheim and Philippsburg, which put him in a position to move toward either Luxembourg or Munster. Due to Prince Eugene's ability to move to the former, Charles Albert's army was given more flexibility in its movement and he even sent some cavalry toward Munster to prove the fact. Prince Eugene's ability to move toward the latter, deprived George II and Stair of the necessary confidence to attempt to dash through Munster. Instead, the Hanoverian army ended up trying to escape Brunswick-Luneburg by marching north and found itself caught and obliterated at Munster. This was the true importance of the Rhenish campaign of 1728, and when word of the Battle of Munster arrived in Vienna and Paris it only further fueled the distortion of Bellheim as a major war-defining battle. Thus despite the Western Theatre once again remaining relatively quiet it did, in fact, had a marked effect on the greater war that it was a part of.

    [1] In OTL, both Du Ble and Villars were career soldiers and able politicians who were very pro-war.
    [2] My interpretation of Arthur Wilson's work on Fleury's reign is that Fleury was the preeminent force but he did have to manage the interests and influence of other politicians to stay in power.
    [3] In OTL, Fleury was open to reconciliation with Spain, he just had a hard time convincing Isabel Farnese of his reliability.
    [4] This Hapsburg reliance on Spanish subsidies is OTL.
    [5] This is very similar to how the French forced the Ettlingen Lines in OTL 1734. I feel like with a more aggressive commander, Villars, that the French can still find this defile and exploit it.
    [6] During the 1734 siege, d'Asfeld similarly used pontoons to reposition his army and protect his rear. Here, TTL, Villars makes a similar action.

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    17: Merciless at Bassignana
  • 17: Merciless at Bassignana
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    Count Claude Florimond de Mercy

    As the titanic behemoths of Prince Eugene of Savoy and the Duc de Villars eyed each other across the Rhine, as the rising stars of Peter Lacy and Maurice of Saxony stalked the wizened veterans of the Duke of Argyll and Earl of Stair through Brunswick-Luneburg, as Spain's foreign commanders, the Count of Montemar and the Marquis of Verboom, sought to restore Spain's long expired glory, King Victor Amadeus II of Sardinia and Count Claude Florimond de Mercy challenged one another for control of Northern Italy. For most of Europe, Italy was some other theatre that was often ignored or overlooked in favor of a different front. For the Russian and German rulers commanding the northern German war, Italy was a place for inferior powers, smaller armies, and lesser politics. For Britain and France, Italy warranted just slight attention. Only for Spain and the Hapsburgs could Northern Italy even be considered a secondary theatre. In contrast, Northern Italy was the one and only theatre of any importance to King Victor Amadeus II and Count de Mercy. For the two men, the battle for Northern Italy would determine their legacies and both of them understood that fact.

    Victor Amadeus II recognized that ever since he had lost the Kingdom of Sicily that his House of Savoy had been waning in power and influence. If Victor Amadeus II's eldest son was still alive then perhaps Victor Amadeus II would have had hope for the future. However, his eldest son's death in 1715 had left as heir to the House of Savoy the sickly Charles Emmanuel, who Victor Amadeus II had no love for and no trust in. Due to this lack of hope in his heir, Victor Amadeus II had blindly rushed into Empress Catherine's War and charged into Lombardy. In this manner, Victor Amadeus II had hoped to steal away Milan and Mantua from the distracted Hapsburgs. However, this bold dash had failed dramatically and by the end of the year, Victor Amadeus II had been chased all the way back to Piedmont by de Mercy's massive army. Despite this major reverse, Victor Amadeus II had not given up on the hope of victory in Northern Italy. For that reason, Victor Amadeus II remained loyal to the Hanoverian Alliance. This loyalty, however, was ill-rewarded. When Victor Amadeus II asked for France to send him an army or even half of one, Cardinal Fleury soundly but politely refused him. Meanwhile, the British were of no greater aid. Since the British Admiralty had stretched itself thin operating in the North Sea, the Caribbean Sea, the Strait of Gibraltar, and the Balearic Sea, it refused to harass the Hapsburgs by bombarding the Neapolitan or Sicilian coasts. Furthermore, Sir Spencer Compton's promises of subsidies for the Sardinian army did not materialize because Compton's own inadequacy could not overcome the growing distaste of the British parliament for the war and its expenses. As a consequence, despite Victor Amadeus II's loyalty, he was left to fend for himself by his allies.

    Count de Mercy's reason for valuing combat in Northern Italy unlike Victor Amadeus II's had little to do with familial pride or desire for conquest. Instead, de Mercy recognized that Empress Catherine's War was probably the last he would see and that his command of the Hapsburg Italian army was probably the last he would hold. Although de mercy had led a brilliant military career including honors at Cremona, Friedlingen, Petrovaradin, and Belgrade, de Mercy still lusted one final crowning triumph to cement himself in the annals of military history. That lust for blood was what had fueled de Mercy's mad chase after the Sardinian army in the autumn of 1727. However, the cowardice of the Sardinians had deprived de Mercy of any opportunity for battle. Unfortunately for de Mercy, his quick recovery of Milan 1727 was so convincing that Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI and the Hofkriegsrat felt comfortable stripping de Mercy of nearly ten thousand soldiers in the spring of 1728 when French pressure on the Rhine required the reassignment of Hapsburgs soldiers. Thus just like Victor Amadeus II, de Mercy's ambitions were under threat of being sidelined by the demands of other theatres and interests. Unlike Victor Amadeus II, however, de Mercy did not allow his superiors' disinterest in an active and aggressive Northern Italian theatre to stifle his dreams. Instead, de Mercy took advantage of the weight attached to his name and to his rank of Reichsgeneralfeldmarschall to propose a daring invasion of Piedmont. De Mercy's confidence even after the loss of a fourth of his army to the Rhineland surprisingly won over the often wary Emperor Charles VI and the Hofkriegsrat as they approved the plan.

    Given approval, de Mercy began regrouping his army and gathering supplies through the course of May and June. By mid-June, de Mercy was ready to launch his invasion of Piedmont but a lack of siege cannons postponed the invasion until early July. At that point, de Mercy led his army straight toward the eastern gateway to Piedmont, Bassignana, in line with his plan. According to this plan, the Sardinians would either move to stop his siege of Bassignana or allow it to fall and thus forfeit control of the Po-Tanaro Valley as well as the highway to Turin. In the case of the former scenario, de Mercy would get his decisive engagement. In the case of the latter, de Mercy had already committed to and received permission for marching directly on Turin and laying siege to the capital of the Savoyard realm. A conquest of Turin would be just as glorious as any battle, especially since just two decades prior Turin had defied the Duc de Orleans, Vauban, and more than fifty thousand French soldiers. Ultimately, it was memories of the devastation wreaked that 1706 Siege of Turin that convinced Victor Amadeus II that he was better off risking defeat at Bassignana than consenting to another brutalization of his capital.

    The Hapsburg army reached Bassignana on July 25, 1728. The Piedmontese citadel was situated on a triangle that was guarded along its northern edge by the Po River and its southern edge by the Tanaro River with their confluence forming the triangle's eastern vertex. However, unlike in other parts of northern Italy, at Bassignana the Po and Tanaro had gentle, sloping riverbanks and milder currents that created a number of fording points for any army. Additionally, to the west of Bassignana laid a wide, open plain, which de Mercy realized was the ideal place to establish siege batteries and dig trenches to besiege Bassignana from. Additionally, by holding the western plain, a besieged could deny an easy westward retreat by Bassignana's garrison and instead force the garrison to retreat to the east or south, neither direction would be particularly welcoming for the Sardinians. Of course, the native garrison of Bassignana and the overall Sardinian army would not be blind to the importance of this plain, which made taking control an urgent priority for the Hapsburg army.

    By the morning of July 27, de Mercy had established batteries along the southern bank of the Tanaro to cover the crossing of his army towards the plain and began making that crossing that very day. This crossing elicited a series of raids against the Hapsburg forces as they crossed by the Sardinian army. However, the Hapsburg army stayed close enough to the riverbank that their artillery could help them repel this harassment. As a result, the Hapsburg army was able to cross the Tanaro River fully intact by the early morning of July 28 [1]. Had Victor Amadeus II been willing to boldly throw his entire army at the Hapsburgs as they crossed then he might very well have shattered the Hapsburgs during their period of vulnerability. However, Victor Amadeus II had lacked the confidence to engage in such aggressive, offensive action. Instead, the bulk of the Sardinian army spent July 27 digging trenches and building cheval de frises for the oncoming battle.

    The Battle of Bassignana began at dawn on July 27, when against the advice of his subordinates, Wirich Philipp von Daun and Dominik von Konigsegg-Rothenfels, de Mercy ordered an immediate assault on the entrenched Sardinian army [2]. Upon reaching the Sardinian trenches, the Hapsburg soldiers only exchanged a few volleys of musket fire before being commanded by de Mercy into a bayonet charge. This brash attack by the elderly de Mercy caught the Sardinian army very off-guard. Victor Amadeus II unlike de Mercy had tempered his aggression with age not grown it and had expected the Hapsburgs to be so wildly aggressive. The surprise of the Sardinian army was severe and the Sardinian army was fortunate to even rouse itself in time for the battle. However, much like in battles against the French, the Sardinians found themselves in a state of panic upon just seeing the Hapsburgs attack with what seemed like complete confidence. Very nearly, the Sardinian army shattered upon contact with the Hapsburg army. Only the rushing of the Sardinian reserves to the frontlines avoided the quick rout of the Sardinian army. After more than an hour of struggle, this initial Hapsburg assault were driven back.

    The defeat of this Hapsburg assault failed to deter de Mercy. If anything, the reverse only further excited the Imperial field marshal. Again, de Mercy ordered an assault and again his subordinates tried to advise him against one. However, de Mercy was in undisputed command of the army and he would not be denied [3]. This time de Mercy himself joined the assault and personally rode at its head [4]. Inspired by de Mercy's reckless courage, the Hapsburgs stormed the Sardinian trenches once again and fired at point-blank range at Sardinian soldiers or ran them through with bayonets. Slowly but surely, the Hapsburgs overpowered and outmuscled the Sardinians in the bloody melee for the trenches. After two hours of bloodletting, the Hapsburgs finally secured the trenches and sent the Sardinians streaming northward in retreat.

    At this point, de Mercy could have stopped the battle and accepted his bloody victory over Victor Amadeus II. However, de Mercy's bloodlust remained unsated and he still saw the potential to win a greater victory at Bassignana. For this reason, de Mercy ordered the trenches filled with fascines or even the bodies of fallen soldiers both Sardinian and Hapsburg so that his army could move across the trenches quickly and give chase to the Sardinians. Once the trenches were filled, de Mercy's cavalry sprinted after the Sardinians and was able to cut down a number of stragglers before the Sardinian cavalry responded and managed to hold the Hapsburg cavalry. This hold allowed Victor Amadeus II the time to fully regroup his army to meet de Mercy's chase head-on. This organized front created trouble for the Hapsburgs were they caught up to the Sardinians and for a brief spell even sent them reeling backward. However, once de Mercy caught up with the front of his army his relentless and wild leadership allowed for a renewed and unending Hapsburg attack on the Sardinians. Despite the Sardinians' best efforts, their stalwartness failed to push back the Hapsburgs permanently. Ultimately, the Sardinians were outlasted by the Hapsburgs and crumbled. Once the Sardinian army lost its definition, the Hapsburg army filled in the gaps and butchered the Sardinians left and right. Finally, the Sardinians broke entirely just for the butchery to continue as de Mercy ruthlessly pursued them. In the process, thousands more Sardinians were killed or captured.

    In review, the Battle of Bassignana was not the best organized or planned battle for the Hapsburg army. Indeed, at numerous points, the Hapsburg army was worn thin and nearly dealt a severe defeat. De Mercy's daring and temerarious nature although having won battles in the past inherently made for risky behavior. At Bassignana, de Mercy was nearly punished for taking those risks but his relentlessness plowed over mistakes and faltering by his army and pushed his army to the next stage of the battle. In hindsight, had de Mercy not had an advantage of around five thousand soldiers then he might very well have run his army headfirst into defeat. However, de Mercy's army did have the advantage and did exploit it to deal a crushing defeat to the Sardinians. In the end, de Mercy had lost almost 3,000 soldiers to death or serious injury. However, he had killed or injured 4,000 of the opposite army and captured a further 5,000. Although de Mercy's casualties amounted to almost a tenth of his army, which was not a proportion to shrug off losing, Victor Amadeus II's casualties amounted to well over a third of his army.

    Given the sheer size of Victor Amadeus II's casualties, the defeat at Bassignana almost spelled the end of the House of Savoy. In the wake of his victory, de Mercy already started to draft plans for a siege of Turin and was writing for permission to undertake such a feat. However, as de Mercy did so he suffered a stroke perhaps caused by the hard exertions of the day [5]. De Mercy had personally led his soldiers in battle on a hot summer day. The stroke immediately delayed de Mercy's plans to attack Turin as he was incapable of writing to Vienna for permission and his subordinates refused to do so. As de Mercy's health deteriorated further due to the consequences of the stroke, de Mercy was sent back to Milan to recover and Konigsegg took command of the Hapsburg army. Konigsegg failed to act with the same vigor and reckless abandon as de Mercy and contented himself with the capture of Bassignana and then the seizure of Alessandria rather than Turin.

    In spite of how good de Mercy's victory at Bassignana ended up being, it was not celebrated with the same spirit as Bellheim was. The first problem emerged with de Mercy's stroke. As discussed de Mercy's stroke prevented the full exploitation of the victory at Bassignana and resulted in just the capture of some eastern Piedmontese citadels rather than the capital of Turin. Additionally, due to de Mercy's conflicts with subordinates, his subordinates downplayed the extent of the victory in their reports of Bassignana and de Mercy's stroke prevented him from countering these false reports until weeks later. Finally, Bassignana had the serious misfortune of occurring around the same time at the Battles of Munster, Soltau, and Bispingen. That series of three battles that resulted in the practical annihilation of the much larger Hanoverian armies in northern Germany overshadowed Bassignana severely. Still, Emperor Charles VI was proud of Bassignana. Charles VI did praise the victory at court and did award de Mercy with titles and revenues for it. Furthermore, Charles VI did use the victory to draw greater attention to the Hapsburg role in the war in communication with other European courts. However, compared to what Charles VI made out of Bellheim, his response to Bassignana seemed insufficient.

    [1] This is similar to the strategy used in the OTL Battle of Bassignana.
    [2] During the OTL Battle of San Pietro in 1735, de Mercy wanted to conduct a dawn assault without reconnaissance, so I think it is plausible for him to do so here.
    [3] During de Mercy's OTL last command in the War of the Polish Succession, de Mercy already had his series of strokes which left his supreme command of the army in doubt. TTL he is yet to have his first stroke and thus does not have the same problem.
    [4] OTL at San Pietro, de Mercy personally led his soldiers and got killed doing so.
    [5] De Mercy's first stroke is not far off and I imagine that a lot of hard work for a man as old as him could bring on a stroke. Also, remember that he is on little sleep due to him managing the crossing the previous night.

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    18: Kaboom or How Spain Took Back the Rock
  • 18: Kaboom or How Spain Took Back the Rock
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    King Felipe V of Spain at Gibraltar

    Upon King Felipe V and Queen Isabel Farnese of Spain's return to their neglected capital of Madrid, they were met by both courtier and commoner alike with jubilation and boundless excitement. This welcome was not the mere result of the standard, organized pageantry reserved for honoring a state's monarchs. Although Felipe V and Isabel's first minister, Jose Patino, did play some role in lining the streets of Madrid with people, for the most part, this passionate reception was natural. For years, the nobility and people of Spain had watched in dismay as their beloved empire slowly ebbed with provinces being slowly stripped away. Under Felipe V and Isabel, Spain had been tantalized with the prospect of recovering its empire and cloaking itself in glory once again by Cardinal Giulio Alberoni's bold schemes and that glimmer of victory in the War of the Quadruple Alliance. However, that glimmer was cast into the shadows once the great powers of Europe decided to act with force. Britain wiped out Spain's fleet, France liberated Navarre, and the Hapsburgs recovered Sicily. Spanish hopes of recovery were briefly revived by Juan Guillermo de Ripperda but his disgrace and downfall left the Spaniards uneasy. That uneasiness seemed to be valid when the Hapsburgs wavered in their support of Spain.

    Even once the war expanded, Spanish dreams remained in jeopardy when Spain's erstwhile conqueror, James FitzJames, Duke of Berwick, bore down on Navarre with a true army. For months, the Spaniards had waited with bated breath as the Siege of Fuenterrabia dragged on under the watchful eyes of Spain's King and Queen. Finally, in November of 1727, poor weather and logistics forced Berwick to abandon his siege and leave Spain. Although perfectly expectable from a military standpoint, for the untrained minds of most Spaniards this triumph over the famous Berwick and the French army came as a glorious surprise. Instantly, the nation and particularly the capital was swept with great pride and a sense of rejuvenation. Once more, Spain stood defiant to the whims of other nations, free to carry out its own policies and rebuild its ambitions. Who was to thank for this glorious achievement, none other than Spain's rulers, Felipe V and Isabel, particularly the latter, who through all the mishaps and misdeeds of her reign had maintained the tenacity and perseverance to bring Spain back to glory. This respect and gratefulness rather than organized ceremony was responsible for the exultant welcome given to Felipe V and Isabel [1].

    Despite this reaction from his subjects, Felipe V's predeposition toward melancholy allowed fears of disaster and defeat to slink into his mind. Felipe V worried that just like the early successes of the War of the Quadruple Alliance, this early victory over Berwick would be overshadowed by later, more concerted efforts by Spain's enemies. Felipe V failed to recognize that Berwick's invasion was already a concerted effort. This type of pessimism might have been enough to convince Felipe V to accept the Franco-British peace offers of inheritance to the Duchies of Parma and of Piacenza for his son, Infante Carlos. However, Felipe V was not alone in his rulership of Spain. Instead, Isabel Farnese, his beloved wife and strong queen, took a great part and oftentimes a greater part in leading Spanish governance and policy [2]. In this case, Isabel used her influence over her husband to persuade him to decline Cardinal Fleury and William Stanhope's overtures of peace and continue the war. Naturally, this course of action won Isabel the praise of many Spaniards who were still clamoring for the return of Gibraltar and Menorca and reluctant to accept any peace that failed to include that article. However, Isabel cared little for Gibraltar and Menorca and they played no role in her decision. Instead, she refused to accept the Franco-British offer because it only granted to her eldest son, Carlos, Parma and Piacenza but Isabel also coveted Tuscany for her son. Nothing less than establishing Carlos as a practical king in northern Italy would suit Queen Isabel.

    Since Felipe V and Isabel had chosen to continue Spain's fight within Empress Catherine's War, it became necessary for Spain to consider how best to continue that fight. The previous year had seen Spain bring its army up to a strength of around 35,000 men who were subsequently split between besieging Gibraltar and defending against the French invasion. Following the victory at Fuenterrabia, Spain's blustering confidence led some Spanish nobility to suggest an invasion of France in 1728 to reconquer Roussillon and Cerdagne. However, Spain's primary general, Jose Carrillo de Albornoz, Count de Montemar, doubted the ability of Spanish arms to manage an offensive against France and Spain's prime minister, Jose Patino, doubted the ability of Spain's treasury to finance such an operation. As a consequence, Felipe V and Isabel were persuaded to leave Spain's military strategy unchanged. Once again, Spain would focus on besieging Gibraltar and defending against a French invasion. Despite this unchanged strategy, the Spanish monarchs still found it necessary to organize a reinforcement of both armies and took advantage of the upswell in patriotism among the Spanish people to make recruit and train a significant number of new soldiers. Since the Marquis de Verboom's reports of the Siege of Gibraltar spoke of good progress, his army was bolstered to just 14,000 men. More importantly, Verboom's requests for more supplies and munitions were met. The Count of Montemar's army, on the other hand, gained 10,000 new souls to ensure that Spain's resistance to French trespassing at Fuenterrabia proved to be a departure from rather than an anomaly in France's recent history of successful invasions of Spain.

    In northern Spain, Montemar smartly reasoned that although Berwick's past two invasions of Spain had taken place in Navarre that Berwick's recent embarrassment at Fuenterrabia could make Berwick more interested in testing Catalonia, which was also a region that Berwick had previously invaded and conquered. As a consequence, Montemar would have to defend two possible routes of invasion adequately or risk conceding significant ground to the French invasion. Ultimately, Montemar decided to concentrate his army in Catalonia and sent roughly a fourth of his troops, 7,000 men to defend Navarre. To command this army, Montemar selected a native of Fuenterrabia and a veteran of all of Spain's recent wars, General Gabriel Jose de Zuloaga y Moyua. To the east, Montemar personally took charge of the defense of Catalonia, which involved just over 20,000 soldiers. The reasons for Montemar's decision to preference Catalonia's garrisoning over that of Navarre were that he felt Navarre to more defensible and loyal than Catalonia. Already, Fuenterrabia had proven itself to be a powerful block to French invasion if well-supported and during the 1727 Siege of Fuenterrabia, the Basques had not shown any favor toward the French. In contrast, Catalonia was less fortified than Navarre and had less restrictive geography. Importantly, Catalonia's biggest prize, Barcelona, could easily be pummeled by the superior French navy as it had been by the English during the War of the Spanish Succession. Finally, the Catalans were no good friends of the current Spanish government that had seen fit to strip them of their traditional rights by Felipe V after they had fought against him for the Austracistas.

    As expected, France had not been deterred by its lack of success at Fuenterrabia and prepared to invade Spain once again in 1728. However, contrary to fears of Felipe V, Cardinal Fleury had turned the Duke of Berwick's army into an endless horde of Frenchmen. Even though Cardinal Fleury had wished to punish Spain for his insolent refusal to compromise, he still saw Spain as an inferior power possessing an inferior military. Indeed, Fleury did not think that it was Spain's strength that needed to be curbed but rather Spain's ego. As a result, Fleury had refrained from evoking the heights of French militarism to besiege Spain in 1728. Instead, Fleury replenished Berwick's army to just 30,000 men, which was barely more than the Spanish forces in Navarre and Catalonia. Furthermore, Spanish anxiety over the possibility of a French naval bombardment of Barcelona proved unnecessary since Fleury elected to keep France's Mediterranean fleet at port. The cost of organizing and deploying the fleet seemed to be an unnecessary expense to Fleury. Surely, Berwick would be able to overpower the weak Spaniards when they did not hide behind a great fortress's walls, Fleury believed. The contrast between Spanish vigor and French foot-dragging was reflective of the overall difference in energy and commitment between the Viennese camp and the Hanoverian camp, and just as that difference cost the Hanoverian Alliance in northern Germany, on the Rhine, and in Northern Italy, it would do so again in Spain.

    In spite of the less animated French war effort, Berwick's army was able to cross the Franco-Spanish border into Catalonia without much incidence or resistance. Although Montemar had understood Catalonia as the most likely victim of Berwick's invasion, the simple disparity in numbers between his Catalonian army and that of Berwick made it impossible to hold the border. For the same reason, Berwick's army was able to capture the towns of Camprodon and Figueres after only token resistance. However, Berwick's cautious and meticulous nature cost the French their initiative as he turned to take the port of Rosas rather than marching on Girona [3]. In the meantime, Montemar only further developed the defenses he had been building at Girona and Torroella since the spring of the year. Once Berwick reached these defenses he paid dearly for his delay and lost a couple of hundred men testing the strength of Montemar's fortifications. This early demonstration of Spain's resoluteness and reminder of the poor quality of French troops sapped much of the confidence and daring Berwick had left in him. Indeed, when one of his subordinates, Jean-Baptiste Francois des Marets, Marquis de Maillebois, suggested a bold flanking maneuver, Berwick reprimanded him on account of the approach of Zuloaga's army from the west endangering any flanking maneuver [4]. Although Berwick would try to force some of the forces and bridges of the Ter River in the following weeks, he did so with little success. Ultimately, the French army ended up settled into camps on the left bank of the Ter River to the north of Girona and Torroella while trading cannon fire with the Spanish.

    Importantly, during the French invasion of Catalonia, the Catalan population came out decidedly in support of the Spaniards rather than the French, which came as a considerable shock for the French but had a clear explanation. Although Felipe V had taken away the rights of the Catalans and earned their disdain for it, it was actually the Duke of Berwick at the head of a French army who had brutally conquered the Catalans during the War of the Spanish Succession. Berwick's role in the suppression of the Catalans created a personal distrust towards the general. However, the Catalans also had a strong distrust in the French that had been generated by France's fostering of a Catalan revolt in 1687 only to never bother supporting that revolt and ultimately to abandon that revolt to Spanish reprisal. This distrust toward Berwick and France was further increased due to their actions during the War of the Quadruple Alliance. In that war, Berwick had ejected the Spanish military presence entirely from the Basque countries with the help of the locals. However, when the Basque people offered to make themselves an autonomous part of France they were rejected and eventually abandoned by the French in the Treaty of the Hague. For these reasons, when Fleury and Berwick spoke mildly about protecting the liberties of Catalonia, the Catalans responded coldly. When the French subsequently lodged their troops in Catalan homes and demanded monetary and food contributions from the Catalans to support the French army, the Catalans were enraged [5]. By the time Berwick reached Girona and Toroella, Montemar's army had swelled in number with miqueletes, which lessened advantage over Montemar. Of even greater importance were those miqueletes who conducted raids against the French army and those Catalans who denied French supplies. The Catalans crucially kept Montemar informed of Berwick's troop movements, which prevented any successful trickery by Berwick. Ultimately, the aid of Catalans is responsible for permanently stalling the French invasion of Spain.

    Since Montemar and the Catalans succeeded in containing Berwick's army before Zuloaga could arrive to reinforce Montemar, a question arose over what to do with Zuloaga's army. At first, some members of the Spanish court suggested having Zuloaga join his army to Montemar's so that they could drive the French out of Catalonia. If counterattack proved successful enough then the Spanish army might even be able to snatch Cerdagne and Roussillon from the French. However, Montemar himself disliked the idea. Thus far, Montemar had managed to halt the French invasion and he did not wish to risk throwing away that small victory in a chancy battle. The other main ideas raised involved sending Zuloaga to Gibraltar or Menorca. If the Spanish navy could distract or deceive the British then perhaps they could open up one of the two British bases to attack. Finally, as an afterthought, someone recommended taking the opportunity of an unencumbered army and a continental war to seize some Italian land for Italy. All three of these proposals involved a naval expedition. Accordingly, Zuloaga's army was ordered to march to Valencia until Felipe V and Isabel could sort out, which target they preferred.

    To the south, at Gibraltar, the Marquis de Verboom continued his siege while Montemar and Zuloaga attended to the French invasion. Verboom was happy to see his army somewhat replenished in the first half of 1728 as the Siege of Gibraltar had been harsh and costly for the Spaniards. Still, under Verboom's command, the Spanish had seen greater success than under the Count de la Torres. The Spanish siege efforts had become more organized and concentrated, which had resulted in increasing damage being dealt to Gibraltar's fortifications and casualties among its defenders. However, the integrity of the fortress remained intact and although the garrison was battered it was not beaten. These two facts provided the Governor of Gibraltar, the Earl of Portmore, with some solace as the siege of Gibraltar continued through 1728. Such solace was crucial since Portmore felt as if the needs of Gibraltar were being extremely neglected by the British government. Already, in the latter half of 1727, Portmore had been forced to accept that Britain would not be reinforcing his garrison in any timely fashion due to its focus on Northern European fighting. Next, in 1728, Portmore was incredulous when he heard of how little priority his desperate plea for supplies was being given. Instead of relieving the haphazard logistics of Gibraltar, the British Admiralty had focused its naval resources on Germany. As a consequence of this focus on Germany, the lingering damage of the Baltic mission, and the French naval nothingness, the Royal Navy could not supply Gibraltar as quickly or effectively as Portmore wanted. Additionally, the presence of King George II of Great Britain's army in Brunswick-Luneburg brought many of wartime merchants to the North Sea rather than to Gibraltar. All in all, Gibraltar fell victim to a subpar supply situation that facilitated a serious breakout of scurvy among the garrison. With their teeth falling out and their wounds healing slowly, the garrison of Gibraltar's morale fell. However, as stated earlier, the defenses remained strong enough that Portmore and the British soldiers carried on. On the Spanish side, there was also a problem of rampant disease and poor logistics. Yet the progress Verboom was making above ground was promising and kept the Spaniards' spirits high. Additionally, King Felipe V and Isabel decided to visit Verboom's siege camp to encourage the soldiers to continue their siege until the prized Rock of Gibraltar was once again Spanish. Most importantly, Verboom's effort to mine under Willis' Battery was proceeding at a reasonable pace and gave Verboom hope that he actually could win the Siege of Gibraltar.

    In late June, Felipe V and Isabel finally decided how to make use of Zuloaga's army idling in Valencia. Rather than come to the aid of Verboom or make a daring attempt on Menorca, Zuloaga was to sail to Italy. Obviously, this command was the result of the Italian queen's influence. However, Zuloaga's army was not destined for the Italian Peninsula to secure Infante Carlos' rights to Parma, Piacenza, or Tuscany, which had been the center of Isabel's Italian ambitions for her son. Instead, Zuloaga was told to conquer the Savoyard-held island of Sardinia. Although Isabel had no connection to Sardinia as she did to Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany, she realized that a Spanish presence in Sardinia necessarily increased Spanish influence in and projection into Italy. Thus through the conquest of Sardinia, she imagined that Spain was taking a firm step toward establishing Carlos on his rightful northern and central Italian thrones. However, the Spanish were very careful to keep the word of this decision from slipping out. Even though the Royal Navy had been stretched thin by its current operations, the British still maintained superiority over the Spanish in the Mediterranean Sea. As a consequence, if the British were allowed the concentrate the naval squadrons of Gibraltar and Port Mahon then they might be able to repeat their complete devastation of the Spanish at Cape Passaro and smash Spain's Italian ambitions in the process. By maintaining secrecy over the intended target of Zuloaga's army, the Spaniards avoided this fate. So long as the British believed that Gibraltar or Port Mahon was at risk, the Royal Navy had to maintain squadrons at each base or risk an unopposed Spanish landing. The success of the Spanish in keeping this secret can be attributed to very few individuals being made aware of Zuloaga's aim as well as a serious disinformation campaign by Patino that included starting a rumor that the Spanish meant to attack Scotland. For this reason, when the Spanish put to the sea, the British remained uncertain about their destination and remained in their defensive postures at Gibraltar and Menorca.

    Three weeks later, the Spanish fleet arrived at Sardinia on August 3, 1728. This time similarly to the 1717 invasion of Sardinia, the Spanish landed unopposed due to their naval and military edge over the island's defenders and the element of surprise. However, since the Savoyards were already embroiled in a defense of their mainland territories and had a worse military and economic situation than that of the Austrians who held Sardinia in 1717, the island's defense was even weaker than it had been during the last invasion. Lacking practically any opposition, the Spanish captured most of the island within just a few weeks. By the third week of August, all that was left in Savoyard hands were the forts of Alghero and Castellaragonese and the city of Cagliari. These places held out a little longer not because of Savoyard stalwartness but because the Spanish relaxed after having realized that the island was surely theirs. These final sieges ended in an amicable and honorable fashion when the final Savoyard garrisons surrendered under the condition that they could return to Piedmont unmolested to reinforce the Savoyard army broken by Bassignana. The ease of this conquest was heavily facilitated by the continued favorable Sardinian opinion of Spain as well as the lack of an established loyalty toward the government of Turin.

    A few days after the Spanish army landed on Sardinia, the Siege of Gibraltar erupted into an explosion, quite literally. On August 7, 1728, after over a year of hard work scrapping away at the limestone underneath the Rock, Verboom and his engineers were finally able to dig under the troublesome Willis' Battery and set off a bomb. With a loud, thunderous blast, the slope on which Willis' Battery stood shook and suddenly collapsed. Amidst the quake of the earth, the magazine behind Willis' Battery was lit by flying sparks as Willis' Battery had been firing at the time of the bomb went off. The subsequent explosion of the magazine created a bright, blinding light that accompanied a terrifying sound. Besides making a spectacle of fire and raining rocks, two explosions accounted for the deaths or serious injury of all the soldiers and artillerymen who had been stationed at the battery. The gravity and immenseness of this event crushed the weakened spirit of the Earl of Portmore who proclaimed that "All in lost, the Rock has fallen!" Portmore's exacerbation combined with the lack of knowledge about Zuloaga's destination was almost enough to provoke the surrender of Gibraltar. Fortunately, in this moment of crisis, Gibraltar's Lieutenant Governor, Jasper Clayton, supplied the needed resoluteness to steel Portmore's nerves. Once calmed down, Portmore rejected Verboom's demand for surrender. Still, the loss of Willis' Battery was acutely felt as the Spanish siege lines were able to advance over the next weeks so that Spanish cannons could inflict more direct and severe damage to Gibraltar's defenses and defenders. This advance pushed Portmore and Clayton closer and closer toward surrendering until Richard Kane was able to send some supplies and even soldiers from Menorca to temporarily boost Gibraltar's spirits. Nevertheless, the situation looked grim.

    For the tragedies of Munster and Bispingen to be followed in succession by the Spanish landing at Sardinia and the explosion at Gibraltar was lethal to the British war effort. Even in the Americas, the British did not find success as Rear-Admiral Richard St. Lo and Vice Admiral Edward Hopson had both died of tropical maladies trying to renew their blockade of Porto Bello, which left the British Caribbean fleet and Jamaica Station commanded by a mere commodore, William Smith [6]. Of course, the deaths of these admirals were also accompanied by reports of even more sailors of Royal Navy being wiped out by the same diseases, which left the British Caribbean fleet in a state of total impairment. At the same time, the French naval units in the Caribbean fared no better. Across the Channel, Berwick's failure to accomplish anything of note could easily be called another Spanish victory. Overall, somehow, someway, ruinous Spain had managed to not only defend itself against the actions of two of Europe's great powers but had also managed to take offensives of its own and find success with them. Although Spain's victories did not match its wildest dreams, they certainly exceeded the wildest expectations that the rest of Europe had held for its former hegemon. Spain's return? had become Spain's return!

    In France, the French failures on the Rhine and in Catalonia had left Cardinal Fleury certain of the foolishness of Empress Catherine's War and France's part in it. Although Fleury did not yet know how to extricate itself from its struggle with the Holy Roman Emperor, Fleury found a willing partner in Britain when it came to finding peace with Spain. In fact, Britain was even more desperate for peace with Spain than France. In Britain, Sir Spencer Compton's government had been a faltering sham from the very beginning and its latest string of disasters unleashed an unfiltered, vicious, and violent assault on the government. This attack was even more severe than that experienced by Compton after Kymmenedalen. For Gibraltar to be under real threat, for the Royal Navy to be bamboozled, and for the Caribbean to be nothing but a tropical hellhole was utterly unacceptable to the British parliament. Barraged by insults and accusations, Compton broke down in tears and fled from parliament [7]. In fact, Compton broke down in tears in front of parliament as he was barraged by insults and accusations. The only reasons Compton stayed in power were that George II remained abroad unable and unwilling to manage the parliament and that Robert Walpole furtively worked to keep Compton in the power. The reason for Walpole's surprising aid toward Compton was that Walpole understood he was the natural successor to Compton's hideous administration, and Walpole had no desire to be the one to sign the humiliating peace treaties with Spain and Russia that Britain's current situation warranted. In fact, Walpole was almost certain that if he did sign those treaties then there would be nothing he could do to prevent being dismissed by George II afterward. Consequently, Compton remained the figurehead of the British parliament when negotiations with Spain began.

    Due to Compton's lack of political tact and lack of much of a mandate to rule, the peace talks between Britain and France and Spain were led by Cardinal Fleury's men rather than British ambassador in Spain, William Stanhope. In vain, Cardinal Fleury hoped that the Spanish would misunderstand the strength of their position and the poor mood of Britain and France and thus be timid in their demands. The Spanish were not. The Spanish demanded the cession of Gibraltar, of Menorca, of Sardinia, an end to all British commercial rights in the Spanish empire, and strong guarantees to be backed by British and French arms if necessary for the rights of Don Carlos to the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. This excessive string of demands was, of course, rejected by France and Britain but so was Cardinal Fleury's offer of rights to Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany. Continued discussions failed to advance far since Isabel considered Cardinal Fleury's France was a weak, unwarlike nation and Britain to be on the verge of collapse [8].

    Ultimately, William Stanhope would prove to be the most important player in the peace talks despite Compton's lack of authority. Stanhope from his years of experience with Spain realized the futility of resisting Spain and the value of turning Spain into an ally, which Stanhope's cousin, James Stanhope had attempted when he was leader of the British government. Rather than communicate this sentiment to Compton, Stanhope wrote to Walpole and Lord Charles Townshend, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, since Stanhope understood that any peace that did not have their approval would be bound to fail in the Commons. Walpole and particularly Townshend agreed with Stanhope's assessment. Walpole and Townshend both wanted to wean Spain off of the Holy Roman Emperor to end Spain's vital support of the Ostend Company of subsidization of Hapsburg policy. Townshend specifically felt as if the Hapsburgs were the greatest threat to British policy [9]. In the proceeding discussions, Stanhope, Walpole, and Townshend agreed to make major concessions to Spain in return for breaking it away from the Hapsburgs. Once Walpole and Townshend signaled their support of this deal to Fleury he consented to the peace arrangement out of a desire to maintain an alliance with the probable next British government. The result peace was the Treaty of Madrid by which Gibraltar and Sardinia were returned to Spain and Infante Carlos' succession to the thrones of Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany was recognized. Furthermore, Britain and France agreed to support Infante Carlos' succession by the means of arms if necessary. In return, Spain reaffirmed Britain's possession of Menorca, accepted Britain's commercial rights in Spain's colonies, removed Infante Carlos from the Spanish line of succession, ended their subsidies to the Hapsburgs, and broke the betrothals between Infantes Carlos and Felipe and Archduchesses Maria Theresa and Maria Amalia. Soon after France and Britain forced the rest of its relevant allies, particularly Savoy, to accept the treaty. Thus ended Spain's role in Empress Catherine's War.

    [1] Spain's people were very much invested in their empire and its glory. For example, in OTL when Spanish armies reached Piacenza the soldiers honored the retired and exiled Giulio Alberoni for his efforts to reestablish Spain.
    [2] Contrary to popular belief, although Felipe V was heavily influenced by his wife, Isabel Farnese, she was not the sole and completely dominant actor in Spanish governance. Felipe V did make decisions contrary to her, at times. This is just meant to serve as a reminder of that fact.
    [3] Berwick's cautious nature especially later on in life was well-noted during the OTL War of the Polish Succession and was why he was selected to command the politically treacherous Rhine campaign over Villars.
    [4] Berwick notably strongly rejected similar plans from his subordinates during the OTL War of the Polish Succession to upset the Imperial positions in the Rhineland.
    [5] This constitutes the typical behavior of an army in occupied territory during this age but is also of particular aggravation to the Catalans who fought two wars over these issues.
    [6] Much like OTL, the British fleet is wiped out by tropical disease and a commodore ends up in charge of the fleet.
    [7] Compton's lack of fortitude under pressure is recorded in OTL.
    [8] This is Isabel Farnese's historical opinion of France until the War of the Polish Succession.
    [9] This is Townshend's historical foreign policy stance.

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    19: A Final Push
  • 19: A Final Push
    581px-Unbekannt%2C_Maison_de_Plaisir_d%27Herrenhausen%2C_c1708..jpg

    Herrenhausen Palace

    In the wake of the calamitous series of defeats suffered by the Hanoverian Alliance at Munster, Soltau, and Bispingen, the Hanoverian armies of northern Germany were in complete disarray. Both the army of King George II of Great and the Earl of Stair and the army of Poul Vendelbo Lovenorn and the Earl of Orkney had barely escaped total annihilation. In the process, the Hanoverians were forced to abandon practically all of their baggage, artillery, and supplies. The Hanoverians fled only with what they carry in their own two hands and on their backs. To add to these troubles, despite weeks of campaigning with the purpose of uniting the two Hanoverian armies, they remained apart. Under these dreadful conditions, the Hanoverians no possibility of resisting the Viennese conquest of Brunswick-Luneburg any longer. Instead, the two Hanoverian armies did the only thing they could and ran toward the Dano-Norwegian-occupied Holstein as fast as they could. As they raced northward, the Hanoverians were beset by Russian Cossacks and Saxon cuirassiers from Generalissimus Aleksander Menshikov's grand army. The Russian garrison of Luneburg joined in this harassment by making attacks of its own on the retreating columns of Hanoverians. Only a series of well-organized delaying actions and difficult night marches allowed the two Hanoverian armies to avoid capture and destruction. However, the delaying actions required the sacrifice of hundreds of soldiers and the night marches afford thousands of scared, broken men the opportunity to desert. By the time the two Hanoverian armies arrived in Hamburg, their number barely exceeded 50,000, which was less than half of the number the Hanoverians sent into Brunswick-Luneburg.

    After chasing the Hanoverians out of Brunswick-Luneburg, Generalissimus Menshikov wished to pursue them into Holstein much to the pleasure of Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp. Although Menshikov did not care about Holstein or Charles Frederick's claims to it, Menshikov still wanted to add to his personal glory by finding another triumphant victory over the Hanoverian forces. Furthermore, Menshikov recognized that Empress Catherine cared for her daughters Anna and Elisabeth dearly and thus cared for their husbands, Charles Frederick and Charles Augustus of Holstein-Gottorp. Conquering Holstein could only increase Catherine's favor of Menshikov, so if the feat was within reach then Menshikov was willing to undertake it. However, when Menshikov voiced his plan to march into Holstein the Viennese army showed its first cracks. Like Menshikov, King Augustus II the Strong of Poland-Lithuania had no attachment to Holstein. Unlike Menshikov, Augustus the Strong had no other reason to make invading Holstein sensible. Indeed, Augustus the Strong's were much better served by occupying the southern portions of the Electorate of Brunswick-Luneburg to ensure that they ended up as part of his domains when the war ended. As a consequence, Augustus the Strong announced his intention to separate from the Viennese army to accomplish this task. Menshikov attempted to convince Augustus the Strong otherwise but Augustus the Strong was not moved by Menshikov's carousing or threats. In turn, Menshikov refused to grant Augustus the Strong his wish of Russian support for the nomination of Augustus the Strong's son as the next King of Poland-Lithuania, which Menshikov understood as being too great of a concession and possibly contrary to Russian interests [1]. Only through the mediation of Maurice of Saxony was it agreed that beyond occupying the south portions of Brunswick-Luneburg that the Saxon army would pacify the whole of Brunswick-Luneburg and thus allow the Russian garrisons of the electorate to return to the field army. The Prince of Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel, Augustus Wilhelm, joined the Saxons in this operation out a desire to avoid the Saxons taking all of Brunswick-Luneburg for themselves.

    Despite the loss of the Saxon and Brunswicker-Wolfenbuttel armies, Menshikov's determination to invade Holstein and fight the Hanoverians did not change. Even without the Saxons and Brunswickers, the remaining Viennese army was still considerably larger than the regrouped Hanoverian army. Also, the Prusso-Mecklenburger army had just received the capitulation of Wismar after months of starving the Swedish exclave. Afterward, King Friedrich Wilhelm I in Prussia and Duke Karl Leopold of Mecklenburg-Schwerin decided to offer the services of the Prusso-Mecklenburger army to Menshikov since it was in their best interests to continue cooperating with the Russians. Friedrich Wilhelm I felt that ensuring Viennese pressure on the Hanoverians was critical until Stralsund had fallen. Otherwise, the Hanoverians might decide to interfere with Prussia's efforts in an attempt to finally find at least one victory in Germany. Karl Leopold's position was much more desperate. Although Karl Leopold's Reichsexekution had been lifted by Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI and Karl Leopold had managed to capture Lauenburg and Wismar for himself, all of these rewards could easily be stripped away from Mecklenburg by its much stronger allies. Only if Mecklenburg continued to fight and demonstrate loyalty to the almighty Russians and the Emperor did Karl Leopold feel that he could expect his ambitions to be honored.

    Faced with both the army of Menshikov and the Prusso-Mecklenburger army, the Hanoverian army in Holstein was severely outnumbered, at risk of being flanked, and needed to defend a long boundary lacking heavy fortification. Worse yet the earlier haphazard Hanoverian escape from Brunswick-Luneburg left the Hanoverian army with a woeful amount of cannons and ammunition. The Viennese army with commanders such as Menshikov, Peter Lacy, Maurice of Saxony, Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, and even Charles Frederick had proven that it was fully capable of exploiting these advantages. Nevertheless, George II and the Hanoverian commanders decided that they would attempt to resist the invasion of Holstein. Boldly, the Hanoverians spread themselves along the Elbe and the eastern border with Lauenburg to catch and repel the Viennese. The northern reaches of the Elbe were even guarded by the Royal Navy. Menshikov likewise spread out his army to match the Hanoverian positions but in every place was stronger due to the greater numbers of his army.

    Once the divisions of the Viennese army were in place, Menshikov began to move these divisions around to pull the Hanoverians from one place to another to answer his movements until finally, Maurice of Saxony's contingent saw an opening near Gluckstadt. Without hesitation, Maurice began to cross the Elbe during the night of August 14, 1728, and by morning had assembled 3,000 soldiers on the other side. As the Hanoverians grouped to respond to this intrusion in force they left other portions of the Elbe underdefended, which invited a series of attacks against the Hanoverian positions. Some were driven back but others were successful. More importantly, all of these attacks created points of pressure that confused the Hanoverian defense of Holstein and left them struggling to react. In this manner, the Viennese managed to get thousands of soldiers into Holstein without fighting anything more than skirmishes. At this point, George II realized the impossibility of stopping the Viennese with any degree of success and ordered the retreat. Although this retreat initially was meant to fall back to Eutin, Karl Leopold and the Prusso-Mecklenburger army arrived there first and prevented the Hanoverians were establishing a new defensive position there. Instead, George II was forced to retreat from Holstein altogether, crossing the Eider into Schleswig on August, 24.

    Menshikov refused to attack his strategic coup of conquering Holstein with limited bloodshed. Instead, Menshikov still lusted for a large, set-piece battle to cover himself in more glory. For this reason, Menshikov compiled with the urgings of Charles Frederick to continue chasing after the Hanoverians into Schleswig, which Charles Frederick also claimed as his rightful land. Soon enough Menshikov caught up to the Hanoverian army but when he did so it was at the fortified line of Danevirke. This fortified line was in itself not very imposing as it was outdated and small, which made it ill-matched for a bombardment from the cannons of the age. However, in preparation for a potential showdown at Danevirke, the Dano-Norwegian militias commanded by King Frederick IV of Denmark and Norway himself had already dug a series of trenches and earthworks to provide more meaningful cover for the Hanoverian army. These defenses were further developed upon the Hanoverian army's arrival. Furthermore, the Royal Navy had transported some of its cannons to augment the Hanoverian defenses. Overcoming and clearing out this defensive line would be a costly endeavor and by no means was guaranteed to be successful. Also, unlike in Holstein, Menshikov did have the opportunity of flanking Danevirke. To the west of Danevirke, a set of swamps complicated any advance. Before those swamps, the old coastal fortresses of Tonning had been demolished a decade earlier. However, the Royal Navy ensured that any attempted crossing at Tonning would end in disaster. To the east of Danevirke, the Schlei Inlet was filled with Dano-Norwegian warships. The only path forward was straight through the narrow defenses of Danevirke [2]. Presented with this challenge, Menshikov hesitated for the first time in this war and was obliged to be cautious. Thus Menshikov opened a bombardment of Danevirke with the intention of exploiting his greater number of cannons to slowly beat down and break the Hanoverian defenses.

    While the Viennese forces under Menshikov conquered Holstein and then invaded Schleswig, the Prussians under Friedrich Wilhelm I had continued their siege of Stralsund. For over a year, the hardened fortress of Stralsund had managed to survive the dedicated effort of a Prussian army several times the size of the Swedish garrison. In fact, Stralsund showed few signs of falling due to the Prussian inability to cut off Stralsund's access to the sea with which Stralsund was repeatedly resupplied by Dano-Norwegian or Swedish ships. Even with these difficulties, Friedrich Wilhelm I was unwilling to give up his siege of Stralsund as it was the key to northern Pomerania. Without Stralsund, the Prussian domination of Pomerania could not be secured and would always be under threat. Friedrich Wilhelm I had hoped that a Viennese victory over the Hanoverian army in either Holstein or Schleswig would free up the Russians to assist him. However, the defensive line at Danevirke denied that possibility and placed pressure on the Prussians to take Stralsund on their own. If they failed to, Friedrich Wilhelm I worried that Russia or the Holy Roman Emperor would not champion Prussian possession of Stralsund in eventual peace talks.

    Due to this pressure, Friedrich Wilhelm I aggressively advanced his siege lines even as it endangered his soldiers and artillery. During this episode, Friedrich Wilhelm I's heir, the young Fritz, continued to demonstrate his bravery by putting himself in harm's way. Eventually, this behavior brought Fritz too far into harm's way as a cannonball ripped through a nearby breastwork and sent splinters flying. Several of these splinters hit Fritz and injured him. Fortunately, although these injuries necessitated the heir of Prussia being sent away to recover in Brunswick-Luneburg, the injuries were not fatal. Other Prussian soldiers and officers were not so fortunate as hundreds died in Friedrich Wilhelm I's effort to bully Stralsund into submission. By September, the casualties had risen so high that Friedrich Wilhelm I felt it necessary to withdraw the bulk of his forces from the main Viennese army. Subsequently, thousands of Prussians were redeployed from Schleswig to Stralsund. Without these soldiers in Schleswig, Menshikov found the thought of attacking Danevirke too daunting and laid aside the idea for the time being. Although the bombardment of Danevirke continued, it was at a less intense level as the remaining Russo-Mecklenburger army retreated into winter quarters.

    At Stralsund, the arrival of Prince Leopold and many thousands of Prussians provided Friedrich Wilhelm I with both the bodies and the confidence to finally make his attack on Stralsund. On the evening of November 9, 1728, the Prussians emerged from their trenches to scale the outer defenses of Stralsund with ladders and ropes. Restless after months in a diseased and cramped siege camp, the Prussians shrugged off being hit by cannon shot after cannon shot and musket volley after musket volley. Once the Prussians reached Stralsund's wall they fearlessly climbed it under heavy fire. Even with this disciplined, gritty assault, the Prussians were still thrown back from Stralsund's wall. However, the fearless Lieutenant General Kurt Christoph von Schwerin rallied the Prussians and led them in a charge back toward the wall twice more until the Prussians wrangled control of the wall from the Swedes. From there on despite repeated Swedish counterattacks the Prussians held on to the walls and allowed further Prussian soldiers to flood into the outer defenses of Stralsund. Following this success, the Swedish garrison admitted the impossibility of defending Stralsund any longer and surrendered its citadel [3]. Thus, Stralsund became Prussia's.

    With the stalemate at Danevirke and the capture of Stralsund, the German campaigns of 1728 came to a close. At their closing, the Viennese Alliance had undoubtedly won the German seat of conflict. Brunswick-Luneburg and all its dependencies were occupied, Pomerania was captured, and Holstein was possessed. Furthermore, the main Hanoverian army was destroyed and the crown prince of Great Britain and Brunswick-Luneburg had been captured. However, the indefatigable Viennese Alliance had begun to strain. The Germans had been willing to fight alongside the Russians so long as they had to, and with their victories seemingly secure they abandoned Russia to fight its own war. This shift in the strategic situation gave the Hanoverians the necessary reprieve to stop the endless string of defeats and losses of land. However, this shift did not put the Hanoverians in a position to turn the war around. The Russo-Mecklenburger army remained superior to the Hanoverian army and was well-placed to block any Hanoverian effort to reach Holstein or Brunswick-Luneburg. Although the Hanoverians still possessed Oldenburg that a result of Viennese nonchalance rather than inability. If the Hanoverians did look like they would use Oldenburg as a base to reclaim Brunswick-Luneburg then Augustus the Strong and his Saxon army would surely move to stop them. Thus although the Viennese did not look as if they could push their advantages any further, the Hanoverians had little hope of reversing the tides of war.

    Interestingly, following the conclusion of active campaigning in northern Germany, the occupied Herrenhausen Palace became a center of social activity for a number of Europe's most important and interesting characters [4]. Among those figures to enjoy balls and festivities at Herrenhausen during the winter of 1728-1729 were Augustus the Strong; his heir, Frederick Augustus, his bastards, Frederick Augustus, Count Rutowsky, and Anna Karolina, Countess Orzelska; Menshikov; his generals, Peter Lacy, Maurice of Saxony, and Johann Gunther; Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp; Prince Charles Augustus of Eutin and several of his siblings; Friedrich Wilhelm I; his wife, Sophia Dorothea of Hanover; his son, Fritz; his daughter, Wilhelmine; his generals, Prince Leopold, Kurt Christoph von Schwerin, and Friedrich Wilhelm von Grumbkow; Karl Leopold of Mecklenburg-Schwerin; his daughter, Elisabeth Katharina Christine; Frederick Albert II of Brunwsick-Wolfenbuttel and his children; Imperial representative, Friedrich Heinrich von Seckendorff; and ironically, the captured, Prince Frederick or Griff. This assembly of people made for some entertaining events including the purported seduction of both Fritz and Griff by Anna Karolina Orzelska and Charles Frederick out drinking his Russian comrades.

    The most significant episode of the winter at Herrenhausen was the interaction of the Hohenzollern family with Griff, the capture prince of Hanover. For years, Queen Sophia Dorothea of Prussia had been campaigning for the marriage of Griff and her eldest daughter Wilhelmine as well as a marriage for Fritz and one of Griff's sisters. Right before Empress Catherine's War broke out, King George I of Great Britain on been on his way to Prussia to finalize discussions about these matches with his son-in-law and daughter, the King in and Queen of Prussia. However, George I's death and the subsequent outbreak of war between Britain and Prussia suspended this effort. Even in the midst of war, however, Sophia Dorothea remained passionately committed to these proposed matches and decided to travel to Herrenhausen in Hanover so that she and her daughter, Wilhelmine, could meet the prospective husband. Although Friedrich Wilhelm I lacked Sophia Dorothea's enthusiasm he had never opposed the idea of marrying his daughter to a Hanoverian [5]. Indeed, in 1728, he had come to see the match as a potential route of reconciliation between the House of Hohenzollern and the House of Hanover. Additionally, the reports of Griff's bravery in battle were well appreciated by Friedrich Wilhelm I. Upon meeting Griff, the Prussian king's favor toward the match grew as the boy was respectful and honest [6]. Sophia Dorothea and Wilhelmine's meeting with Griff was similarly successful. Sophia Dorothea was thrilled with the man her nephew had become and felt he was the most suitable husband for her daughter. Wilhelmine although not enthralled by the immature Griff felt he was someone acceptable [7]. On the other side, Griff was positively thrilled by the idea of marrying Wilhelmine and acted as if the two were already engaged [8]. Of course, any negotiation of this marriage would have to wait until after the war's conclusion but as it stood, the Hohenzollerns were all favorable to match. Importantly, the Imperial agent, Seckendroff took note of these proceedings and reported them to his master, Emperor Charles VI [9].

    [1] In OTL, the Russians were not initially supportive of Augustus the Strong's desire to place his son on the throne of Poland-Lithuania as they preferred a weaker, more manipulatable candidate. I think, Menshikov would have the same stance.
    [2] Danevirke is not an imposing, formidable defense in 1728. However, Danevirke is still chokepoint and the natural geography favors the defender.
    [3] Whenever a siege of Stralsund looked unwinnable, the Swedes surrendered. Here they do the same.
    [4] Herrenhausen Palace was actually one of Europe's finer palaces, so occupying forces taking advantage of the palace seems perfectly plausible. Once a few people of importance are there, others will follow.
    [5] Friedrich Wilhelm I was never the problem when it came to the proposed marriage between Frederick of Wales and Wilhelmine.
    [6] Bravery, respectfulness, and honesty are among the traits that Frederick of Wales was said to hold by his friends. Importantly, in OTL when Frederick first encountered his family after more than a decade of isolation, he treated his father with the utmost respect. I imagine he would treat Friedrich Wilhelm I the same way upon first encounter. This type of behavior would appeal to Friedrich Wilhelm I.
    [7] Wilhelmine in OTL never met Frederick but also was never that large of a fan of the match. I am not sure that meeting an immature Frederick in his twenties will be particularly exciting for Wilhelmine.
    [8] This is how Frederick acted in OTL without even meeting Wilhelmine. Reportedly was attractive so I imagine he will respond positively to her.
    [9] Just like OTL the idea of a Prussian-British match is alarming to the Hapsburgs.

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