Baltic Blunder: Europe at war in 1727 (the 2nd Edition)
- Thread starter Archduke
- Start date
For now, it appears that the French will keep Stanislaus out. However, it is certainly possible that another nation should find and sponsor another candidate. Should France's enemies be the ones finding another candidate then a war is still in the cards.
The Hapsburgs and Russia would most certainly not want a Poland allied to France nor anyone else. They viewed Poland as a condominium so any independent foreign policy on Poland's part would not be viewed well.
Historical trust in Augustus II was never all that high so there will always be the expectation that Augustus II might turn on them. The only thing keeping that expectation in check is the belief that France will definitely support Stanislaus. However, if word keeps out which is entirely plausible then the Hapsburgs and Russia would keep to work finding another candidate as you say.
By this time Peter II should be nearing 16 and while he does not have the most demonstrated wit, he certainly has an incredible will. If he was to decide that Russia should say out of Russia then he could force his way. A major item helping Peter II hold on to the throne is the fact that the powers that be in Russia took part in exiling Menshikov to Russia, Anna to Finland, and Elizabeth to Germany. They have all more or less tied themselves to Peter II's reign and fear being left on the outside of some other regime. Of course this is much more true for certain families like the Dolgorukovs, whose success is entirely dependent on Peter II now. However, Osterman also is very tied to Peter II as his former governor and as someone who did not bat an eye when Charles Frederick and Anne were forced out. They would stand to lose a lot if Peter II were forced from power. The other big-time family right now, the Golitsyns did also play a role in kicking out Charles Frederick and alter Menshikov, so they would be in a precarious situation with new rulers. However, as a family as important as the Golitsyns are, they can probably get away with betraying Peter II to help some new Romanov into power. Even though the Golitsyns are aristocratic in nature and look down upon several of Peter I's reforms, I can't see them accepting the idea of a hostile Poland. So if Peter II were to go super-isolationist on that issue, I could see it contributing to a desire from them to depose Peter.
Another issue to keep in mind is that Peter II's wife is pregnant currently, so there is an incentive to wait on any power change until the child is closer to birth or is born so that the child can be kidnapped and raised as Emperor while whoever backs the baby becomes the power in charge of Russia for two or so decades. This of course being in the case that a family was unhappy with Peter II and wanted to depose him. Overall, I would say that the old aristocracy is tolerable of Peter II's reign thus far. They absolutely hate and abhor his marriage to Maria Menshikova and Natalya's marriage to Ivan Dolgorukov. They also dislike Peter II's attachment to his grandfather's autocratic inclinations. As it stands, Peter II is allowing a small cadre of nobles to make decisions and a series of bureaucrats to implement government decisions. However, many restrictions on nobles and items like the single-inheritance law and conscription rules remain in place. Additionally, its just that small cadre of nobles with the most power, which means other noble families may be excluded and does dissatisfied.
However, this talk of Peter II's hold on the throne is perhaps too much too soon. There's no reason to believe that Peter II would take a stance of forbidding interference in Poland, yet. He has taken a stance of rejecting a lot of Peter I's policies but also still lets Osterman do a lot of foreign policy and Poland feels like one of those issues where Peter II would at least initially let Osterman decide. Peter II would probably be disinterested and focus on hunting unless something were to occur that would give him a reason to develop strong feelings. For example, in OTL, the Prussians were looking to get Courland. In TTL, if Prussia were to make similar moves then Peter II based on his confrontation with Friedrich Wilhelm might feel strongly enough to have Osterman reject that Prussian effort.
Finding a candidate is not necessarily problem. There are certainly countless people who could potentially be the King of Poland. The issue would be finding one that all the powers that be find tolerable and acceptable. In OTL, Russia had a preference toward a Piast (any friendly Pole). Prussia at first really didn't want a Wettin. The Hapsburgs wanted a foreign prince who whose family relations would make Poland closer to the Hapsburgs than previously. Finding a candidate that all countries are happy with could be a challenge. Realistically, Russia can make whatever choice it wants and the others would have to accept that candidate, but if Russia was just picking its own candidate like a Lubomiroski then the Hapsburgs might be resistant because they feel that Poland will become even more subservient to Russia. Technically the Hapsburgs should not be able to resist unless they are willing to do something risky. In the end though divergences over a candidate could serve as a tension point between allies. However, so long as Osterman gets to direct Russian policy on Poland then Russia will align with the Hapsburgs and Prussia will either be forced to follow suit or excluded.
The larger issue might be that Peter II's reign has left Russia in such a disorganized state that Russia reacts too slowly while the Hapsburgs do their typical dawdling. In OTL, the Russians were invading as soon as or possibly even before the election of Stanislaus and were at Warsaw weeks later to elect their candidate. That timing is critically importance because technically there is a constitutional time limit on how long the delegates can stay around until they elect a candidate. If the Russians are too slow in coming and a candidate is not popular enough to be elected on his own then Russia may have to subvert the constitution, which could stiffen resistance to the Russians. Russia should still be more than capable of overcoming Poland and forcing its will but it could be more difficult than OTL. The main reason that Russia would have to do everything is that the Hapsburgs historically are slow and cautious to act. Meanwhile, the Prussians may not be willing to act on their own especially if they aren't gaining part of Poland for their efforts.
Unless Augustus III was elected by acclamation, which is incredibly unlikely, there would be a period of months between Augustus II's death and an election. During that period it would become obvious if it was not already revealed that the French are not going to support Stanislaus.
Not that I disagree with what you wrote but my point was that a power of PII should not be overestimated. Of course, he is an absolute monarch and he is already 16 years old and stubborn but OTOH he is a 16 years old witless nincompoop with no interest in the state affairs and, AFAIK, at that time Russian position toward the PLC was something of an area of “national consensus” superseding the family rivalries. Not to mention that each of the main families has its own fieldmarshal and a little victorious war is going to strengthen its position (and in the case of the Dolgoruky family the fieldmarshal should be looking for a military glory to become equal to M. Golitsyn). The young idiot may not even find out what is going on before the Russian troops are marching into the PLC and after that he will get an explanation that this is unavoidable and that Ivan prepared a new exciting hunting for him. BTW, I’m not quite sure that PII was an ideological isolationist or would be one. We do know that he was was against spending extra money on the peace time exercises of the Baltic fleet but pretty much the same was position of at least Anne and EI: when there was a peace the fleet was rarely leaving “Marquis Puddle” (Gulf of Finland). Which, as you know, did not prevent rather aggressive foreign policy.
Now, as far as his individual importance goes, the “alternatives” are not suffering from the excessive sensibilities (look as Anne was treated and how she behaved before and after the offer of the throne) and don’t forget that in OTL the “verhovniks” picked Anne who was in Curland over Elizabeth who was right there. It seems that “everybody” was fed up with the Peter’s line and expected that Ivan’s line would be more manageable.
What PII is absolutely lacking is a physical support. CI was brought to the throne by the Guards. Anne became an absolute ruler thanks to the Guards, Elizabeth was made an empress by the Guards and so was CII. Any legitimate ruler who neglected the Guards ended up badly and the same goes for the “verhovniks”. So far PII does nothing to endear himself to the Guards so his support base is exclusively the Dolgoruky family who do not have the Guards’ support either. I’m not saying that he is necessarily going to be overthrown but if he becomes a problem, he could easily die from the “natural causes”, like PIII and Paul. The throne, thanks to Peter I, is up to the grabs.
Now, as far as the PLC is involved, both Russia and Austria have one common interest: it must not be an obstacle in the case of a war against the Ottomans. Actually, this consideration pf a serious importance to Russia only due to the geographic considerations. For Austria it is probably “anybody but the French candidate”. Personally, I don’t remember any serious Austrian candidate until the time of CII when Russia was re-oriented toward Prussia and even then Austria did nothing to support him.
My view on the power of Peter II is that it will be absolute so long as the families tolerate it and him, which is an interesting proposition. But your right if Peter II messes with national and critical issues when there is consensus like Poland he will run into trouble. Especially with the Marshals, because besides being glory seekers, they were also some of the more pragmatic individuals in Russia. So if there is a stupid policy for Poland, they will say something. You are right that it's conceivable for Peter II to not know about the Polish operations because Peter II barely attended government meetings. If he doesn't attend the one for Poland, he won't know. Regarding his foreign policy from an ideological standpoint, I recall reading something where Menshikov criticized him for not reviewing the army and Peter II said we're at peace, I don't need to waste my time but if we are at war I'll be at the head of the army. So if the sentiment pushes for war, i could see Peter II be convinced of its purpose.
The only problem with Anne relative to OTL is that she is married now. So whoever supports her has to worry about her ambitious husband, Maurice of Saxony, his military prowess, and his relationship to the Wettins. Potentially, the Russians could use Anne's third sister, who seemed absolutely ambitionless.
The Guards are definitely a problem. I'd say right now, they aren't strongly aligned with anyone in particular. The Dolgorukovs and Golitsyns managed to turn them against Menshikov through the Guards "loyalty" to the Emperor first, but realistically it was through promises of promotions to certain individuals (just as in OTL, the key Guards in the coup against Menshikov all got promoted). However, those promotions didn't bind the guards to the Dolgorukovs and Golitsyns. The Guards probably have some respect for Marshal Dolgorukov and Marshal Golitsyn but there's no firm relationship there. So right now, the Guard seem to be in a state without a particular candidate that they support. So someone could come in and make the right bribes and speeches to grab the Guard's loyalty.
Both candidates in OTL for 1733 were Hapsburg proposed candidates. The Portuguese prince was first offered up by the Hapsburgs (he was a cousin of the Emperor) and the Wettin prince was also proposed by the Hapsburgs after he threw himself at Charles VI's feet and promised he would be the subservient prince that Charles VI wanted. Of course, both princes were considered acceptable by the Russians and the Wettin prince ended up being so absent that Russia could do as it pleased in Poland.
And both of them are the members of the leading families and are going to behave accordingly. 😜
He said the same thing about the navy. The young fool simply did not want to get bothered with understanding of the issues but these boring details would be handled without him.
Completely forgot about Maurice but, IIRC, he got some useful connections in your TL and could be considered an acceptable figure, especially if there is a potential of a war on the horizon. He is still a son of his father but so far August did very little for him so he may not suffer from the excessive family loyalty.
Of course, with him on a background “the conditions” would be not as humiliating as they were for Anne in OTL but this may actually be a survival factor for the “verhovniks”.
The Guards probably could not care less for either fieldmarshal but there were two types of the coups:
1. Munnich/Elizabeth style - very few people involved in the actual coup. In the case of Elizabeth, she appealed to the broader Guards after the coup.
2. Anne/CII - a much broader participation in the coup itself (with or without an open military demonstration).
So, if a need really arises, the whole thing could be done reasonably quietly without a major appeal to the “masses”.
Agree. But if the Hapsburgs don’t produce a suitable candidate ASAP, then the Russians can pick one of their own. Speaking of which, there is a suitable candidate available just outside/within (depending upon how you are considering Courland) the borders. The Duke Maurice is pretty much everything that the Poles may want (except, perhaps for his birth): already vassal of the PLC, a brilliant general, womanizer, handsome and has both Russian and Austrian backing.
As for the spare candidate(s) to the Russian throne, there is Elizabeth (even if you managed to send her away, this is not a big deal). Praskovia died in 1731 and, thanks to you, wife of PII is pregnant with something. 😂 Not that there is an obvious need as long as her husband is busy hunting, dancing and drinking.
By act accordingly, do you mean act like power-hungry aristocrats. If so I would agree that both of the Marshals are ambitious and want lots of influence and massive estates. However, they also seemed to be smart enough to know that sometimes their families were going too far and getting too close to the sun. That’s what I mean by pragmatic, they were ambitious but they didn’t get blinded by it.
One advantage for Maurice relative to other husbands is that he was a notorious playboy and hedonist whereas Charles Frederick was a much more typically serious man, so Maurice might be viewed as more manipulatable.
That’s fair, someone could coup Peter II by imprisoning him and then confirming it later with the guess by making the necessary concessions. Peter II does seem like an individual who would be easy to imprison just based on his youth and his childhood follies.
The Russians can produce their own candidate pretty easily. In OTL they seemed to have a list of potentials from the Polish aristocracy in case the Hapsburg candidate fell through. Maurice would be an interesting candidate. It would get around people not wanting a Wettin because technically Maurice isn’t a Wettin. But at the same time, Maurice might be able to access some of the Wettin support base because he is viewed as close enough. The issues for Maurice would be that the Hapsburgs might view him as too close to the Russians and the Prussians will not like a skilled Russian general on top of Poland. Also, within Russia, he might be viewed as too close to Menshikov because of their time at war (even if actually he doesn’t care at all about Menshikov).
One change from OTL is that Praskovia’s son is not dead, so he is another candidate that someone might want to loft up.
36: The Portuguese Alternative
36: The Portuguese Alternative
Dom Manuel, Infante de Portugal
Dom Manuel, Infante de Portugal
King Augustus II of Poland had hoped that his betrayal of the Holy Roman Emperor would escape discovery from the Imperial spies that he knew populated Dresden's court and the Russian ones at Warsaw. However, this hope was always a vain one. Someone was bound to sell Saxony's secrets sooner or later and unless Augustus II could will himself to death quickly then later would arrive well before his son's election to the Polish throne. By the summer of 1731, a few months after the Franco-Saxon alliance formed, rumors of its existence and its stipulations were already circulating the courts of Europe. At this point, Augustus II decided to more or less throw off his tattered cloak of secrecy to inform Prussia of the alliance and ask if Prussia would join it and adhere to a Wettin succession in Poland. These negotiations at Muhlberg nearly succeeded in stealing away the Emperor's most powerful supporter but the escape of Prince Fritz and France's involvement in it scuttled the treaty. From there, Friedrich Wilhelm's courtiers Friedrich zu Innhausen und Knyphausen and Friedrich Wilhelm von Grumbkow informed the British and Hapsburg governments respectively of the veracity of the rumors [1].
Once Saxony's shift had become a known fact through the Holy Roman Empire, it did not take long for Franco-Wittelsbach negotiations to be revived. Even though the Wittelsbachs just like Saxony had been supporters of the Emperor in the last war, they just like Saxony were also opportunists who would willingly resell their loyalties to the highest bidder. With Saxony in France's camp, Emperor Charles VI suddenly looked much more vulnerable and an impression was produced that France was taking its anti-Hapsburg diplomacy more seriously. For these reasons, the Wittelsbach Union expected to reap considerable rewards from realigning with France and fighting alongside France and Saxony against the Emperor in the next war. However, the Wittelsbachs were also considering the possibility of using the threat of realignment with France to coerce the Emperor into giving them more, firmer concessions so that they remained part of his camp. These negotiations proceeded slowly due to the French taking a dilatory approach to them and due to Wittelsbachs still wanting significant sums of money. Thus, a Wittelsbach betrayal did not immediately succeed the Saxon betrayal. Instead, the most important result of the Saxon reversal occurred in Vienna. Even though the Hapsburgs had never been solidly behind the idea of placing Frederick Augustus on the Polish throne, they had been willing to tolerate the idea so long as Saxony remained loyal and held to the Pragmatic Sanction. Had Augustus II not switched camps then the Hapsburgs may very well have followed through on the promises of Empress Catherine's War if only because the other option, Stanislaus Leszczynski, was completely unacceptable. However, by placing his trust in France rather than the Hapsburgs, Augustus II left the Hapsburgs with no choice but to void their promise and immediately began working to identify and promote an alternative candidate to Frederick Augustus.
Count Franz Karl Wratislaw von Mitrowitz, a Bohemian diplomat, outlined the ideal candidate for the Hapsburgs to seek [2]. Firstly, Wratislaw stated that no matter what, Stanislaus Leszczynski's succession must be avoided. Leszczynski had shown his reforming and ambitious nature and those exact characteristics made him the most dangerous candidate of all. Secondly, the candidate had to be landless. It was in the best interests of the Hapsburgs that they did not exchange the Saxon-Polish-Lithuanian union for another union with some other state. It was also important that besides being landless that the candidate was insignificant in his own right. For example, James Francis Edward Stuart, husband of Maria Klementyna Sobieska, was landless, Catholic, and had a dynastic connection to Poland [3]. However, as the Jacobite claimant to Britain his candidature would have been extremely provocative and would have certainly incurred the wrath of the Hanoverians. Finally, Wratislaw said it was preferable that the candidate was not German. A German prince would always be connected to his homeland and loyal to his family, which could create issues for the Hapsburgs in the future.
Under these criteria, very few people could be considered viable candidates by the Hapsburgs. The Italian dynasties were dying out: the Farnese were gone, the Medici were on their way, and the Bourbons were to replace them. The only Italian candidate was the unmarried Gian Federico d'Este who was the second son of Duke Rinaldo d'Este of Modena and whose brother, Duke Francesco III d'Este, already had a son to succeed him [4]. Thus, Gian Federico was landless and unlikely to inherit anything, and also Modena was a small and weak enough state that as a second son, Gian Federico was an insignificant figure. Gian Federico's unmarried status was an additional bonus, which made it possible to marry him to the Emperor's sister, Maria Magdalena [5]. However, in general, Gian Federico was an unfamiliar figure to the Hapsburgs. For that reason, the Hapsburgs looked beyond Italy, to Infante Manuel of Portugal, Count of Ourem [6]. Infante Manuel like Gian Federico was a second son and like Gian Federico, his brother had already produced heirs. Thus, Infante Manuel would never succeed in Portugal. Also, just like Gian Federico, he was unmarried, which left the option of marrying him to Maria Magdalena open. Besides providing all the same benefits as Gian Federico, Infante Manuel was a cousin of Charles VI and was a familiar one at that. Infante Manuel had spent the last two decades living off his cousin in Germany and in Italy. He had also served as an Imperial soldier and was even an Imperial Marshal. Importantly, from his interactions with Charles VI and his ministers, Infante Manuel had portrayed himself as someone who was adventurous rather than ambitious. He was someone who might enjoy being a king but he did not actively seek out such honor and duty. Instead, he preferred to find some fulfillment in soldiering and entertainment in short and non-serious court romances. In almost every way, Infante Manuel was the perfect candidate for Wratislaw's criteria.
The Hapsburgs quickly came to consider Infante Manuel as their candidate and by August 1731, they communicated this sentiment to Russia. Augustus II's earlier realization that Russia was the most important and vital player in the impending Polish-Lithuanian election was correct and the Hapsburgs understood this fact. Accordingly, the Hapsburgs wrote to the Russians about their concerns with Saxony's realignment and their belief that a different candidate needed to be uplifted by the Hapsburgs, Russia, and Prussia to avoid Frederick Augustus' election or worse, Stanislaus'. The Hapsburgs considered Infante Manuel the best candidate from among Europe's princes because he would not be one to reform the Commonwealth, nor would he desire to oppose either the Hapsburgs or Russia, and nor was he competent enough to do so even if he wanted to. Finally, the Hapsburgs pointed out that Manuel was unwed and could be married to Tsarevna Natalya or even the daughter of Tsarevna Catherine Ivanovna, Elisabeth Katharina Christine, if such a marriage suited the Russians. However, Emperor Peter II refused the match for Natalya because the plans to make Manuel the next King of Poland would have taken Natalya away from Moscow and to Warsaw. To be fair, the Hapsburg proposals for Manuel and Natalya's marriage were never all that serious because of the Hapsburg concern that marriage to the Emperor of All Russia's sister would have made Manuel to subservient to Russia. Regarding Manuel's candidature in general, the Russians were uncertain of it and instead asked if there was no other more suitable candidate. The Russians preferred a "Piast", which was meant to be a native Pole of Lithuanian who would be compliant with Russian and Hapsburg wishes [7]. The Russian interest in a Piast over Manuel had more to do with the Russian lack of interest in funding an expensive election campaign or perhaps having to go to war to install a prince that Poland-Lithuania did not know or care for. It was rare for the Polish crown to be awarded to a powerless foreign prince with no connection to Poland-Lithuania and Russia was concerned that it would become responsible for making this rare phenomenon occur.
In the face of this reluctance from Russia, Emperor Charles VI decided to send the man who first recommended Infante Manuel, Count Wratislaw, to Moscow so that he could personally explain the value of Manuel's candidature to Osterman and Peter II. While Wratislaw prepared and then traveled toward Moscow, the Hapsburgs looked into gaining Prussia's accession to the scheme but were firmly rebuffed as Friedrich Wilhelm was too busy dealing with Fritz's misadventure to have any interest in a Hapsburg scheme for Poland. To add to matters, Friedrich Wilhelm's distrust and distaste for the Emperor had grown due to the Emperor's unwelcome interference in Fritz's judgment. When Wratislaw arrived in Moscow, his efforts to gain Russia's approval of Manuel were immediately confronted by the challenge of Peter II being on an extended hunting trip and not being expected to handle government or foreign affairs for weeks. In the absence of Peter II, Wratislaw had an audience with the Supreme Privy Council but discovered that it was a fractious and dysfunctional mess whose loudest member, Vasily Lukich Dolgorukov, was also its least competent one. Questions from the more competent members of the council such as Marshals Dolgorukov and Golitsyn's question of what Russia had to gain from putting the Emperor's cousin on Poland's throne were complicated by Vasily Lukich's constant interruptions and Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn's refutations of whatever ideas Vasily Lukich advanced. However, an even bigger issue than the Supreme Privy Council's broken nature was that all Wratislaw had to offer them was a compliant prince. He offered Russia no land and in fact, part of his proposal was that Russia should take no land from Poland-Lithuania. The only benefit that Wratislaw was willing to provide Russia was that he could promise Russia would be required to front none of the expenses necessary for Infante Manuel's election. Russia would only be required to provide military pressure to influence the decision of the Polish-Lithuanian magnates and if necessary, the force to deny Frederick Augustus or Stanislaus' election. This was a sorry offer and Wratislaw left the Supreme Privy Council without having gained the support of any one of its members.
Having failed to convince the Supreme Privy Council, Wratislaw briefly considered traveling to Ukraine to visit Menshikov and see if he still had any influence in court or over the young Emperor. However, the standing Imperial ambassador to Russia, Anton Ignaz Amadeus de Bussy-Rabutin, dissuaded Wratislaw from that course of action [8]. Bussy-Rabutin noted that Peter II had turned entirely against Menshikov so visiting the disgraced Generalissimo would do nothing but aggravate the Russian autocrat. Instead, Bussy-Rabutin suggested that Wratislaw privately discuss the matter with Osterman. The German diplomat was typically friendly to the interests of the Holy Roman Emperor and in private was more likely to display that friendliness. Osterman also still had some influence with Peter II and had an enormous influence over the foreign policy which Peter II approved. In line with this suggestion, Wratislaw visited Osterman's house and talked with him alone. Wratislaw made it clear that there was no other European prince that the Emperor thought better suited for the Polish crown and also that the Emperor did not have any particular interest in electing a Pole or Lithuanian. He did not trust a Pole or Lithuanian to be truly compliant with the Hapsburgs and Russians.
Osterman speedily came to agree with Wratislaw and once Peter II returned from his hunting trip, Osterman went to him to champion the cause of Infante Manuel [9]. However, Vasily Lukich had already gotten to Peter II through Ivan Dolgorukov, so Peter II's mind was already forming an opinion and that opinion was not favorable toward Infante Manuel. Still, Osterman had to at least try so he laid out the case for Russia supporting Manuel. At first, Peter II even doubted whether Russia should intervene in the first place. He pointed out the exorbitant cost of war and Saxony's previous friendship with Russia, but through reminding Peter II of Saxony's role in capturing Prince Fritz, Osterman soured Peter II's opinion of a Wettin succession. Even then, Peter II was reluctant to agree to intervention and rather taciturnly asked for what reason he should support Manuel and not choose a man of his own liking. Since there was little political reason, Osterman tried to suggest that Infante Manuel as a person was well-suited to be the next king and Osterman was sure that Peter II would think so if he met Infante Manuel. To this, Peter II offered that Infante Manuel should come to Moscow then and show that he was the right kind of person to be Poland's next king.
Peter II's invitation to Infante Manuel proved to be more than a passing comment because in the days that followed he refused to endorse or condemn the Portuguese prince until he had a chance to meet him. Without Peter II's approval, Osterman's favor toward the Hapsburg scheme and Manuel's candidature was worthless. Osterman alone would not be able to push through a war for Poland and for the moment he was definitely alone in his support for Manuel. The Dolgorukovs still considered Osterman a rival and did not want to see one of "his" schemes succeed, and the Golitsyns chose to listen to Pavel Yaguzhinsky when he said that there were plenty of native Poles who would subservient to Russia if made king. Unless the Emperor or one of these major families changed its mind on Manuel then Russia would never support Manuel, which Osterman made clear to Wratislaw. In turn, Wratislaw wrote back to Vienna of the situation and recommended that Manuel be sent to Russia. Wratislaw viewed a visit from Manuel as the only possible means of salvaging the scheme. If Manuel could win the favor of the Emperor and show that he would be just as subservient as any Pole then Wratislaw expected Russia would throw its support behind him. If Manuel failed then at least the Hapsburgs knew that they needed to move on to the next candidate. Since the boy-emperor was not a patient person, Wratislaw's message asked that Manuel be sent as quickly as possible. For the Hapsburgs, there was little hesitation in deciding to send Manuel to Russia. Russia and Peter II's approvals were vital to the success of the scheme and without them, the scheme was destined to fail. Thus, through the thick of Russian winter, Manuel was carried to Moscow under the name of Count von Setubal. This attempt to disguise Manuel's journey to Russia was easily seen through by the foreign agents in Moscow and led to the Saxon ambassador to Russia, Lefort, asking what the purpose of Manuel's trip to Russia was [10]. Osterman tried to present Manuel's trip as one of a personal matter by saying that Manuel had come to seek the hand of Elisabeth Katharina Christine, nothing more. However, Lefort did not buy this lie and suspected the true reason was tied to the Polish-Lithuanian succession. Thus, Lefort was more or less able to uncover Manuel's candidature and inform Augustus II of it. Still, if Manuel's candidature was to last any longer, he would have to win over Peter II first.
When Manuel arrived in Moscow, he did so by horse rather than carriage at the recommendation of Osterman. As Manuel rode into the city through a punishing snowfall he was met by the young emperor who had ridden out to greet his guest personally. Together, the emperor and would-be king rode through the streets of Moscow and into the Kremlin as they talked with each other. Although Manuel shivered he did not complain while the youthful Peter II seemed to revel in the cold. During their conversation, Manuel's jovial and fun demeanor matched the nature of Peter II. Even before the two of them entered the palace, Peter II had taken a liking to him [11]. At dinner, Manuel described his adventures across Europe including escaping Portugal without his brother's approval, entering the Imperial army's service, and gallivanting through Europe's courts. These stories captivated Peter II who wished he could have the same opportunity and mentioned how plans to send him on a grand tour had been derailed by Empress Catherine's War. Having been forewarned, Manuel did not mention the fact that Peter II's grandfather, Peter I, had gone on a tour of Europe even as an Emperor. Instead, Manuel said that when he was elected King of Poland that Peter II would be welcome to visit his court and have a chance to hunt in the forests of Poland. The topic of hunting was much discussed and led to Peter II asking if Manuel would be interested in a winter hunt. Of course, Manuel consented as a means of getting closer to the Emperor. Over the course of the next few weeks, Manuel would spend each day talking to and complimenting Peter II or hunting with him. By the end of January 1732, Manuel's mission achieved its goal when Peter II took him to a Supreme Privy Council meeting, the first one that Peter II had been to in months. At that meeting, Peter II announced that Russia would be supporting the candidature of Infante Manuel as the next King of Poland and he asked that Osterman hammer out the details of the treaty while Marshals Dolgorukov and Golitsyn drew up any necessary military plans.
The sudden and major decision on Russia's policy toward Poland-Lithuania rattled the Supreme Privy Council. The councilors immediately began to ask a series of questions of Peter II to extract all the details of this decision and the thinking behind it, but Peter II did not have the time for their pestering. With some heat in his voice, Peter II repeated his instructions to the council before exiting the council's chambers and taking Manuel with him. Once the emperor left, the Supreme Privy Council began to ask the questions of if this was the right policy, if Infante Manuel was the right candidate, and if a different policy needed to be instituted. Osterman as the Russian advocate for Infante Manuel, of course, argued that Infante Manuel was the right candidate for Poland and that he had all the traits that Russia needed in the next King of Poland. Osterman rattled off Wratislaw's list of all Infante Manuel's deficiencies such as his non-serious nature, lack of follow-through, appreciation for wealth, and so on. This argument proved to be enough for the Dolgorukovs who were tied to Peter II's reign and its success, at least until Natalya and Ivan produced a child. The Golitsyns and even Golovkin still questioned the strategy and especially questioned Infante Manuel's Hapsburg blood ties. However, Osterman and the Dolgorukovs for once stood side by side and ultimately convinced Golovkin that Infante Manuel was as good as any other candidate in terms of personal attributes and that his candidate would lead to the Hapsburgs fronting more of the bill. With Golovkin's acquiesce, the Supreme Privy Council approved Infante Manuel's candidature and began to do as Peter II had instructed by making Russian support for Infante Manuel a reality.
With the backing of the government, Osterman began to negotiate the details of the Polish-Lithuanian succession with Wratislaw. Since the Hapsburgs were not keen on limiting their options, Wratislaw recommended that the treaties terms regarding candidates did not explicitly and solely sponsor Infante Manuel nor exclude Frederick Augustus [12]. Instead, the treaty should only exclude Stanislaus, permit a Wettin succession if the Wettins submitted themselves to the will of the Hapsburgs and Russia, if not, then the candidate should be a "Piast", and failing that should be a suitable younger son of a king. The other terms of the treaty called for an allied armed intervention in Poland-Lithuania to ensure Manuel's election but required no funds from Russia to bribe the magnates of Poland-Lithuania. One big item was that an intervention would be made under the guise of protecting Poland-Lithuania's liberties and thus no territorial partition of Poland-Lithuania was to be considered. To Osterman, this proposal sounded fair and reasonable and the terms about the candidate did not worry Osterman because he considered them to be meaningless words meant to hide the fact that the Hapsburgs and Russia had already chosen Infante Manuel as their candidate. Peter II did not view the terms in the same way [13]. He had been put under the impression that Manuel was the Hapsburgs' candidate and he accepted him as such and now the Hapsburgs refused to even mention his name in a treaty. The thought of not mentioning Manuel was simply ridiculous to Peter II. Wratislaw claimed that to name Manuel risked revealing his candidature but Peter II refused to buy that. He was willing to not take any land from Poland-Lithuania and willing to commit Russia's army to install Manuel but he wanted Manuel to be named as the candidate that the Hapsburgs would accept. Since Wratislaw's instructions favored an ambiguous treaty over an explicit one he deferred by asserting that he would have to write back to Vienna to receive approval for the terms that Peter II sought and also that they might have to wait on terms from Prussia.
While Wratislaw delayed, he decided to get Manuel out of Russia where his presence and his friendship with Peter II could become a nuisance for Hapsburg negotiations. Wratislaw achieved Manuel's exit by convincing Manuel that it would be necessary for him to travel to Poland-Lithuania to gain some familiarity with the and its people before becoming its king. Wratislaw also suggested that Manuel meet with Maria Zofia Denhoff née Sieniawska, a hugely wealthy Polish magnate with vast tracts of land. In the meantime, Wratislaw relied on Osterman and Natalya to shift Peter II's mind toward the treaty that the Hapsburgs wanted. Wratislaw also sent word to Seckendorff of the preferred treaty and asked that he get Prussia's accession to it so that Russia's accession would be made easier. At Potsdam, the resolution of Fritz's judgment had allowed Friedrich Wilhelm to return his attention to matters of the state such as the Polish-Lithuanian scheme. He saw the Hapsburg terms and was displeased at the prospect of receiving no land from Poland, which made Friedrich Wilhelm revisit the thought of supporting the Wettin succession in return for land. However, the thought of having to align himself with the French who had just tried to steal his son from under him was disdainful to Friedrich Wilhelm. That thought alone allowed Seckendorff to keep pushing the Hapsburg scheme to place Infante Manuel on the throne. Seckendorff described Manuel as a peaceful and even dumb prince who would be no threat to Prussia. Seckendorff did say that Prussia would be required to commit funds to Manuel's election but promised that Prussia would be reimbursed by the King of Portugal who was interested in getting his brother on the throne of Poland. However, the failure to offer much else made Friedrich Wilhelm reluctant to consent to the treaty, especially when Russia had not done so already. Meanwhile, in Russia, Osterman was having no luck in changing the mind of the stubborn Peter II who made clear that he would sign nothing that did not name Manuel as the heir above anyone else. At the same time, Osterman failed to convince the Dolgorukovs or Golitsyns to support him in this manner. The Dolgorukovs chose to back Peter II on the issue and the Golitsyns refused to get involved.
Eventually, Osterman, not Peter II, caved to avoid losing his last bits of influence and favor with the Russian emperor. Thus, Osterman wrote a new treaty with the first term being that Russia, the Hapsburgs, and Prussia would all agree to support the candidature of Infante Manuel, the second term was that Stanislaus' succession would not be tolerated no matter what, and only the third suggested that if Manuel died before the election or should prove an unsuccessful candidate then would others be considered. Among those others, Frederick Augustus would be considered acceptable so long as he submitted to any demands from Russia, the Hapsburgs, and Prussia. The other terms of the treaty were the same as the Hapsburg proposal. No land would be sought from Poland-Lithuania, any funds used to elect Infante Manuel would be reimbursed by Portugal, and the allies would invade Poland-Lithuania together to ensure Infante Manuel's election. Specifically, each country was expected to contribute 12,000 men, 8,000 infantry and 4,000 horse to the invasion effort. This treaty was presented to Wratislaw and also sent to the Prussians to receive their approval. The sudden energy of Russia disturbed Friedrich Wilhelm who had been led to believe that Russia was a state in recession but suddenly it was the one dictating Poland-Lithuania's succession just as it had done so more than two decades before. Russia looked as if it was no weaker than before, at least for the moment. In the face of this resolve and strength, Friedrich Wilhelm chose to sign the treaty rather than risk being on the wrong side of the war and on the wrong side of Russian militarism. This relatively quick accession to the treaty was not matched by the Hapsburgs. Charles VI and his ministers were surprised to see the negotiations seemingly stripped right out of their hands by Russia and saw these new terms as far too limiting. Most importantly, Prince Eugene feared that signing the treaty ensured that there would be a war with France and Saxony and Prince Eugene expected the Wittelsbachs and Britain to also be on the other side of the war. The entire western half of the Empire could fall into France's camp and then France, Britain, and the Dutch Republic could fund and command a serious invasion that would punch through the Imperials fortresses on the Rhine and quickly deliver an army to Vienna's doorstep. This fear led to the Hapsburgs withholding their approval of the treaty and trying to negotiate a new deal.
The Hapsburgs efforts did not go far with Peter II who found their behavior confusing and infuriating. They had offered up Infante Manuel and now they hesitated to back him completely. If they would hesitate, Peter II would not. He was determined to champion Infante Manuel one way or another. Peter II's devotion to Manuel only grew after Manuel succeeded in gaining an engagement to Maria Zofia and returned to Moscow to celebrate the news with Peter II [14]. This same engagement gravely upset the Hapsburgs who had still planned to marry Infante Manuel to Maria Magdalena. Infante Manuel had even proposed to Maria Magdalena before he left (of course, he had proposed to countless other women before). Soon after Manuel's return to Moscow, he witnessed the birth of Peter II's daughter, Sofia, and was even named among her godparents, which was a powerful statement of Peter II's commitment to Manuel and his candidature. The Russians, specifically, Peter II would not back down and in every way possible they seemed bent on coercing the Hapsburg's accession to the treaty. But Charles VI could be just as stubborn as Peter II and he refused to bow before him. They might both share the title of emperor, but Peter II was a child who needed to learn his place. This stubbornness would prevent the final signature from being placed on the treaty in any reasonable amount of time. Thus on March 11, 1732, when the old Augustus II succumbed to his illness in Warsaw, the treaty for Infante Manuel's succession remained incomplete and unratified [15]. Nevertheless, to the spectators of European politics, it seemed clear that the only two candidates that the powers of Europe would permit in the election for the next King of Poland were Frederick Augustus and Infante Manuel. The former would be supported by France at the least and many more if French diplomacy went well. The latter would be supported by Russia and Prussia. The Hapsburgs would most probably have to throw their lot in with Infante Manuel as well unless they were willing to gamble on supporting their own candidate and challenging the Russian behemoth, the Prussian war machine, and the Franco-Saxon alliance all by themselves.
[1] Friedrich zu Innhausen und Knyphausen was a Prussian minister in the pay of Britain during this time period.
[2] Wratislaw in OTL led the Hapsburg negotiations around the Polish succession and I have kept him doing the same in TTL because he remains a top Hapsburg official.
[3] In OTL, James Francis Edward Stuart was thought of as a potential candidate for the Polish throne, so I thought I should mention that here.
[4] In OTL, Gian Federico d'Este was dead by this time. In TTL, he is still alive and seeing as he has many of the same attributes as Infante Manuel had in OTL, I think he would be considered as a possible candidate.
[5] A big part of Hapsburg planning around the Polish succession in OTL was trying to marry Archduchess Maria Magdalena to their candidate. I assume so that the Hapsburgs can increase their influence in Poland-Lithuania and combat the Russian dominance in the country. In TTL, I do not see why the Hapsburgs would not seek to do the same.
[6] Infante Manuel was the OTL Hapsburg candidate. Since he is still alive and is still the same person, the Hapsburgs end up choosing him for the same reasons as OTL.
[7] In OTL, the Russians initially had an interest in a Piast. I am not sure from who that Piast idea emerged but seeing as Osterman was part of that foreign ministry, I had kept the initial Russian preference toward a Piast.
[8] Bussy-Rabutin is still around in TTL. The significance of him still being around is just that Wratislaw has someone who knows Russia to help him during this mission.
[9] In OTL, Osterman had a high preference toward the Russo-Hapsburg alliance and often favored whatever policy was recommended by the Hapsburgs. In OTL, this preference included supporting Hapsburg strategies over the Polish succession. Given this OTL preference, I see Osterman also favoring Hapsburg ideas in TTL.
[10] In OTL, Infante Manuel tried to move through Europe incognito and no one believed this cover story. I similarly see his cover story failing in TTL.
[11] Infante Manuel seems like the exact sort of person who Peter II would like and share interests with, so during this meeting I have given them a connection.
[12] In OTL despite proposing Infante Manuel as their candidate, the Hapsburgs always were ambiguous in treaties about supporting Manuel. In OTL, this ambiguity seemed to emerge over the Hapsburg fear of ending up in a war with France by leaving themselves no room to negotiate a peaceful compromise. This fear holds in TTL so the Hapsburgs are going for ambiguous treaties in TTL.
[13] In OTL, the Russians did not care about Infante Manuel and approved the ambiguous treaty. In TTL, Manuel is a friend of the Russian emperor so the ambiguous treaty is not accepted.
[14] In OTL, Infante Manuel did not win Maria Zofia's hand but he also asked it of her after he had a failed trip to Russia. In TTL, after a successful trip to Russia, I think he might be more successful in gaining her hand.
[15] King Augustus II dies earlier because his health in TTL is worse than OTL due to the hardships he experienced campaigning during Empress Catherine's War.
Word Count: 5301
So broadly speaking, this looks like an slightly different version of the War of the Polish Succession. The only difference being that Augustus III probably won't be the next king of Poland. My odds are on the Prusso-Russian alliance right now. I mean the way that the Saxon army performed during the War of the Austrian Succession doesn't inspire much confidence. The French I would rate slightly higher given how they did against the Hapsburgs IOTL but the difficulties of projecting power into Eastern Europe have been discussed at some length before.
Intriguing update. I agree that Manuel and Peter do seem similar enough to have struck up a friendship easily enough. Is this timeline's Peter II as much of an overindulgent wastrel as the original?
Defeating and overrunning the Saxons is fully within the capabilities of the Prussian army. However, there is a question of if the Prussian army is willing to go that far. Friedrich Wilhelm was not one to put his soldiers' lives endanger without the prospect of a fair reward. If the only reward here is continued Russian friendship then Prussia would just focus on fulfilling its treaty obligations and preventing any Saxon raids into Prussia. Meanwhile, due to the threat from a potential British intervention, Prussia would also be placing soldiers on the Brunswick-Luneburg border. So we could see a war where Prussia and Saxony are on different sides but where they fight a war of maneuver in northern Saxony (Friedrich Wilhelm would not allow the war to be fought in Brandenburg) rather than a full-blown Prussian invasion of Saxony. The only way that would change is if Britain and Brunswick got involved and the Hapsburgs remained neutral, which would make this war close to a total war situation for Prussia where it has to fight for its life; if the French sent a significant army to Saxony, which would force Prussia to fight seriously or risk the French doing damage to Brandenburg; or if the Hapsburgs approve the idea of Prussia gaining parts of Saxony, which would give the Prussians something to fight for.
This timeline's Peter II is very similar to OTL. He is an overindulgent wastrel and an avid hunter. If anything this timeline has just given him more time to settle into his characteristics and thus has amplified them.
I suppose then that France can’t bribe Spain with gains in Italy? Though I guess we would have to see about that. The Hapsburgs could stay neutral. The war might be more limited to Poland then
France most definitely can and will bribe Spain with Italian gains. France and Spain’s relationship may be in the gutter after the lack of French support during the Parmese Crisis but Isabel Farnese is too greedy to not go after Naples and Sicily.
The problem for the Hapsburgs is that a significant faction of the French government wants war no matter what. They want to avenge the poor performance during Empress Catherine’s War and the general decline in French prestige. And the Hapsburgs will struggle to stay uninvolved because of their alliance to the Russians. If the Hapsburgs refused to get involved then the Russians would just break the alliance and make their already existing alliance with Prussia their main German partnership. Even if the Hapsburgs diplomatically managed to delay involvement, all the French have to do is ask the Hapsburgs if they recognize the French candidate who got elected as King. If the Hapsburgs say no then the French just claim the Hapsburgs are interfering with Poland’s right to a free election. If the Hapsburgs say yes then the Hapsburgs have definitely broken their alliance with Russia. In which case, the Hapsburgs have isolated themselves so severely that the French might just go to war for some other reason while only sending their candidate in Poland a few ships and few thousand men.
Found this timeline recently and have read through most of it, have skipped around a little. I hope you keep this going for awhile because I want to see Fritz/Frederick the Great basically completely conquer and annex Saxony in a war, earning his great nickname that way, demand that Count Friedrich August of Rutowski is in the room when he is personally there to sign the peace treaty and just stare at him the whole time smiling while he does so. That would be utterly amazing.
If I were to guess, Emperor Karl won't sacrifice his alliance with Russia. He has to go to war with France. Even if he does badly because of he's being attacked by the French and Spanish, he is in a better position. I suspect it will be harder for France to take advantage of Austria when the succession question comes up. The Russians might not be nearly as distracted (Tsar Pyotr II seems willing to toe the pro-Austrian line) and might therefore be able to support Austria and keep Prussia in line.
That is certainly what Fritz is hoping to do ultimately.
Yeah, that's actually a very important point. More so than other countries, the Hapsburgs will have to consider their future when making decisions in the present because the Hapsburgs can expect a crisis to occur upon Charles VI's death. In OTL, we saw the Hapsburgs join the Russo-Ottoman War of 1735 partially because they needed to keep the Russian alliance.
Why? Why? Why? And then again WHY? I ask, why do the Habsburgs Need to look like perfect, impenitent, unapologetic idiots in every pre-1900 TL?
Why do they always have to look incompetent, amateurish, slobby and indecisive every time?
Why do you always get that feeling that their totally intellectually disabled just waiting for history to brush them aside?
That said, excellent TL so far.
Just one note: It Is HaBsburgs, not HaPsburgs
Why do they always have to look incompetent, amateurish, slobby and indecisive every time?
Why do you always get that feeling that their totally intellectually disabled just waiting for history to brush them aside?
That said, excellent TL so far.
Just one note: It Is HaBsburgs, not HaPsburgs
Actually it's written both ways. Habsburg and Hapsburg are accurate ways of writing the name. I tend to prefer Hapsburg myself, but Habsburg is perfectly accurate as well.
It's one of the those things has a slight variation in the spelling.
To be entirely accurate, most people in my TL can come across as incompetent. Fleury, especially, Walpole even, Friedrich Wilhelm as he gets toyed with by the Habsburgs and bullied by the Russians, many of the Russian nobles, and so on.
I would not describe the Habsburgs overall as incompetent here. We see that Charles VI's stubbornness and caution have hurt the Habsburgs at times, but the biggest issue for the Habsburgs is not their own decision-making. Instead, its the fact that there finances are in disarray after spending 1683 through 1714 in basically unending conflict. That held them back on the Rhine during Empress Catherine's War, but they still came out looking better than the French. Meanwhile, in Italy, they were devastatingly victorious over the Savoyards. During the current crisis, there are some personal politics between Charles VI and Peter II that are causing some difficulties within the Russo-Habsburg alliance. However, there are also real rational reasons behind the Habsburg reluctance to fully commit to the Russian vision for Poland. The Habsburgs are still trying to conjure up some means of preventing a war altogether and falling in line with the Russian vision will guarantee war. This may seem to be in vain, but the Habsburg financial situation necessitates at least trying. The next update goes into a lot more details on the Habsburg internal strategizing as well as the French internal strategizing and better explains why the Habsburgs are moving as they do.
I have tended to use the old English academic spellings like Braunschwig over Brunswick and Hapsburg over Habsburg just because the sources I have been using follow that tradition. But I'm not at all opposed to amending spelling.
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Oh well, looking forward for the next update, then.
PS yeah, I got the thing concerning the spell/pronunciation divide
)
37: His Majesty's Honor
37: His Majesty's Honor
Marshal Claude Louis Hector de Villars
Marshal Claude Louis Hector de Villars
By March 15, 1732, just four days after the passing of Augustus II, news of the King of Poland's death arrived in Vienna from the Imperial minister in Warsaw, Count Wilczek. This news sent a shiver through the highest echelons of the Hapsburg government formed by the Geheime Conferenz (Secret Conference) and Hofkriegsrat (War Council). Both of these bodies were presided over by the most esteemed general and statesman of the Hapsburg domains, Prince Eugene of Savoy. However, at the advanced age of 68 and having overseen a war and two crises in just the past five years, the noble knight of Savoy's health was failing him [1]. At council meetings, his loud coughs were a constant interruption and his handkerchief was always discolored by phlegm and mucus. Rumors that Prince Eugene's problems extended beyond his body and to his mind even floated through the Hapsburg court. The constant attendance to Prince Eugene by his secretary, Ignaz Koch, and Prince Eugene's habit of trading whispers with Ignaz did not help these rumors dissipate [2]. Prince Eugene's physical and possibly mental infirmity meant that as uncertainty hung over the Hapsburgs and Europe and the drums of war began to echo in the distance, a younger man, Johann Christoph von Bartenstein, secretary for the Geheime Conferenz, was able to emerge as one of the leading voices within the government.
The Geheime Conferenz met immediately to discuss the matter of Augustus II's death and its obvious consequence, an impending election for Poland's next king. The issue before the Geheime Conferenz was that if they allowed the French to place Augustus II's son, Friedrich August II of Saxony, on the Polish throne then the ruler of both Saxony and Poland-Lithuania would become indebted to France. In other words, the Hapsburgs could expect Saxony and Poland-Lithuania to act in France's favor in the next war. However, if the Hapsburgs opposed Friedrich August II's election as King of Poland then the next war would be weeks away rather than years away. Furthermore, if the Hapsburgs wanted to oppose Friedrich August II's election then the Hapsburgs needed the assistance and support of Russia. The price for Russian help was clear, sponsor Infante Manuel of Portugal as the next King of Poland. Although this price had some monetary value attached to it as the Hapsburgs would be expected to front some of the bill for bribing Polish and Lithuanian magnates to vote for Infante Manuel that price was well worth the tens of thousands of Russian soldiers that it would buy. During Empress Catherine's War, the Russians had shown that their victories over Sweden during the Great Northern War were no aberration, and more importantly, the Russians showed that they could take their armies hundreds of miles into Germany and still achieve the same success. With the Russians by their side, the Hapsburgs could be confident that the war caused by denying Friedrich August II would be won.
Yet for the Hapsburgs there was a price beyond just having to help Infante Manuel and bribe the Magnates. For the Hapsburgs, choosing to elect Infante Manuel would have been an admission of the superiority of the Russians in the Russo-Hapsburg alliance. Despite the fact that the Hapsburgs had originally suggested Infante Manuel as a candidate, by March 1732, he was in every way the Russian candidate. First, Infante Manuel had gone from being an irritating guest in Vienna to being a welcome and beloved guest in Moscow. Next, Infante Manuel had gone from being the expected husband of Archduchess Maria Magdalena to being the fiancee of Maria Zofia Denhoff, a Polish magnate. Finally, Infante Manuel had gone from being the cousin of Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI to being the godfather of Tsarevna Sofia, daughter of Emperor Peter II of Russia. The Russians treated Infante Manuel like their own and they were fervently defending his candidacy as the next King of Poland. If the Hapsburgs bent then they felt that not only would they see Poland-Lithuania become even more of a Russian satellite but also that the Russians would think less of the Hapsburgs. Since Charles VI could not stand to be considered junior to the boy-emperor of Russia, he abhorred the idea of accepting the Russian conditions for cooperation in the Polish succession. This issue had prevented the Hapsburgs from acceding to the Russian treaty before Augustus II's death and even in the wake of his death, the Hapsburgs remained reluctant. However, the Hapsburgs worried the Russians would interpret a lack of cooperation as a breach of the Russo-Hapsburg alliance. Such a breach might cause the Russo-Hapsburg alliance to break entirely, and at the very least would push the Russians closer to the Prussian upstarts. Thus, the Hapsburgs felt that in the end, no matter what, they needed to come to terms with the Russians.
One other reason for the Hapsburg reluctance to champion Infante Manuel as their first and sole candidate for the Polish throne was that even after the Saxon betrayal and Franco-Saxon alliance, the Hapsburgs still believed it was possible to bring the Saxons back into the fold of the Hapsburg camp. Despite everything that had happened, the Hapsburgs thought that they still had a chance to convince Friedrich August II that his interests would be better served by submitting himself to the superiority of the Hapsburgs. As unlikely as this thought seems there were some practical and valid reasons for the Hapsburgs to hold this belief. Firstly, Friedrich August II had not been the one responsible for forming the Franco-Saxon alliance. Instead, Friedrich August II's father had been the one who had betrayed the Emperor and aligned with France. The Hapsburgs hoped that Friedrich August II would not feel obligated to follow in his father's footsteps and hold on to this alliance [3]. Considering the fact that the Prussians and Russians were currently opposed to Friedrich August II's election in Poland and considering the fact that Prussia could singlehandedly devastate Saxony while Russia swarmed Poland, the Hapsburgs thought that they could convince Friedrich August II that the French alliance was worthless. Only through submission to the Hapsburgs and their demands could Friedrich August II's candidature gain the necessary approval from the Hapsburgs, Russia, and Prussia. Or at least that was the argument that the Hapsburgs wanted to make to Friedrich August II. Although the scenario laid out above was one that the Hapsburgs had in mind they also had another one, a nightmarish one, that was stuck in their minds. The other scenario involved Britain, Brunswick-Luneburg, the Wittelsbach Union, the Dutch Republic, Denmark-Norway, and Sweden all joining in on the Franco-Saxon alliance. The combined might of those nations and their militaries would be more than enough to save Saxony from devastation before forcing the acceptance of Friedrich August II as King of Poland. If anything, this second scenario added to the desperation of the Hapsburgs to turn Friedrich August II to their side. The Hapsburgs prayed that if they stole Friedrich August II from the French camp that war would be averted. The Hapsburgs hoped that if they stole France's candidate France would simply allow the theft to occur and move on. They thought that if the theft happened suddenly then perhaps the French would not have time to rethink their strategy before the Polish election and the French would be left without cause for war.
During the first meetings of Geheime Conferenz after Augustus II's death, these thoughts and contradictions paralyzed the government as they tried to sort through them to form a single coherent strategy. The debates within the Geheime Conferenze were held mainly between Philipp Ludwig Wenzel von Sinzendorf on one side and Gundaker Thomas Starhemberg and Field Marshal Joseph Lothar von Königsegg-Rothenfels on the other. Starhemberg and Königsegg pointed out that the treasury had been practically emptied by the last war and that without Spanish subsidies, the Hapsburgs would have to take on incredible amounts of debt to sustain another war. Thus, Starhemberg and Königsegg argued that the Hapsburgs needed to convince Friedrich August II to betray France. If this betrayal was executed correctly then a war could be avoided. If not then at the very least the Hapsburgs would have Saxony's army and hopefully, Saxony's loyalty would convince others in the Empire, namely the Wittelsbach, to also remain loyal. On the opposite side, Sinzendorf was of the opinion that the Hapsburgs could not tolerate another Elector of Saxony as King of Poland. The whole reason that the Hapsburgs were currently in this mess was that Augustus II had been allowed to enjoy the liberties of being King of Poland for too long and had begun to think that turning on the Emperor was possible. If the Hapsburgs allowed another Elector of Saxony to become the King of Poland then they would only see another King of Poland turn hostile to the Hapsburgs. Sinzendorf further reminded his colleagues that Friedrich August II was married to Archduchess Maria Josepha, the eldest daughter of Emperor Joseph I, and also that Friedrich August II had never personally admitted the Pragmatic Sanction. For this reason, Sinzendorf feared that if the Hapsburgs helped Friedrich August II win the Polish throne then Friedrich August II would ultimately repay that friendship by using Poland-Lithuania to usurp Maria Theresa's right to the Hapsburg hereditary lands. At this point, Sinzendorf argued that the best path forward was to accept Infante Manuel quickly, or if his colleagues were so opposed to Infante Manuel's candidature then they needed to select one of the Piasts that the Russians had named earlier. As a reminder, Bartenstein named Prince Michał Serwacy Wiśniowiecki, Grand Marshal Franciszek Bieliński of the Crown, Prince Paweł Karol Sanguszko, Prince Antoni Benedykt Lubomirski, and Palatin Józef Potocki of Kiev as the potential Polish candidates [4]. In the end, these initial meetings failed to produce a single path forward and the debates continued to rage on. The one set of decisions that the Geheime Conferenz did agree on was for ten Hapsburg cavalry regiments to be roused from their barracks and to be prepared to ride so that when the next order came, if it came, they could be dispatched to the Polish border and or even past the border.
Close to a week after the Hapsburgs heard of Augustus II's death, the French were made aware of it on March 21, 1732. Just like the Hapsburgs, the French treated Augustus II's death as the precipitator of a crisis and most likely war. Accordingly, the highest council of the French government, Conseil d'État (Council of State) met on the same day as news of Augustus II's death reached Versailles. At this council, Germain-Louis Chauvelin, Marquis de Grosbois, the foreign minister of France, spoke first. In this speech, he reminded his colleagues of France's obligation by treaty to support Friedrich August II in his election to the Polish throne [5]. In line with this obligation, Chauvelin suggested that France send the funds and instructions to the French ambassador in Warsaw, Marquis Antoine-Félix de Monti, to provide for the election of Friedrich August II. Furthermore, Chauvelin recommended that France should publically proclaim its intent to protect Poland-Lithuania's right to a "free election". Should France's "eastern rivals" display an intent to violate this "free election" then France must prepare for war to protect Poland-Lithuania and fulfill its obligations to Saxony. This speech, especially its ending, elicited a response from France's leading minister, Cardinal André-Hercule de Fleury. Despite Cardinal Fleury having approved the formation of the Franco-Saxon alliance just a year earlier, in the face of a serious crisis and a real possibility of war he balked at the thought of following through. At his core, Cardinal Fleury was a fearful man and he worried that if France did as Chauvelin asked that it would find itself in another France, another losing war. Due to these fears, Cardinal Fleury asked if France was truly obligated to go to war for Saxony or if France even needed to support Friedrich August II's candidature [6]. The cardinal hoped that the treaty's terms would be loose even to free him from its obligations. The answer that Fleury received from Chauvelin was that the language of the treaty combined with some of Saxony's actions over the past year could allow France to legally void its commitment to Saxony.
Fleury might have hoped to use Chauvelin's answer as a springboard for arguing against involvement in Poland-Lithuania, but before he got the chance to follow up on Chauvelin's answer, one of Fleury's opponents, Marshal Claude Louis Hector de Villars, leader of the war party and successor to Marshal Nicolas Chalon du Ble, rose to speak. Marshal Villars pointed out that France and its honor had been ill-served by the past two decades. Europe viewed the War of the Spanish Succession as a defeat for France, then forgot how easily France trounced the Spaniards in the War of the Quadruple Alliance, just to remember the struggles of the French military during Empress Catherine's War. Europe viewed France as a power that had declined since the times of Louis XIV. Britain was treating France as a junior ally by criticizing France when it failed to adhere to British policy and abstaining from taking any actions to support French policy. Spain once more claimed to be a friend of France but it made demands of France as if Spain was somehow superior. Finally, the German princes all marched in step with the Emperor with only the occasional hesitation. They no longer believed that France could protect their liberties as France had promised to do in 1648. Europe looked down on France and in a way, they were right to. If France wanted to rectify this situation then it first had to rectify the mesalliance of the King with Marie Leszczyńska by restoring her father to his place as King of Poland. If France could amend Louis XV's marriage from being to the daughter of a displaced and exiled nobleman to being to the daughter of King, and better yet if France could make that amendment with a force of arms then France would once more be viewed and treated with the respect due to it [7].
Villars' speech was applauded by the other members of the Conseil d'État including Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, Count de Maurepas; Nicolas Prosper Bauyn, seigneur d’Angervilliers; and Louis III Phélypeaux, Count de Saint-Florentin. These men had all once served under Louis XIV and they remembered those days with fondness and pride. They yearned to regain those days and their glory and they viewed Villars' vision as a means of doing just that. For Fleury, Stanislaus Leszczyński's candidature was even more displeasing than Friedrich August II's. Whereas Fleury expected France's support of Friedrich August II to lead to a war, he still thought it might be possible to avoid one even with France supporting him. The same could not be said if France supported Stanislaus Leszczyński. Stanislaus had been forcibly removed from power by the Russians because of his support for the warmongering Charles XII of Sweden. The Russians had branded him a criminal and even with a new emperor who seemed to reject every part of his grandfather's legacy, Fleury was certain that Russia had not changed its opinion of Stanislaus. In other words, Fleury believed that supporting Stanislaus guaranteed a war, a war with a Russian army that had just shown its ability to march into the heart of Germany. What was to prevent that same Russian army from marching to the Rhine and beyond it? Terrified by that prospect, Fleury quickly asked if Stanislaus was even eligible [8]. Had not Stanislaus abdicated his throne in 1709? The answer delivered to Fleury hastily by four different men was no, Stanislaus had not abdicated. Yes, Stanislaus was eligible.
With Fleury's effort to disrupt the calls for Stanislaus so easily overwhelmed, the war party began to discuss the concept in greater detail [9]. Even though they were talking out of order and over one another, they did so out of excitement rather than disagreement. Eventually, Villars was calling for Stanislaus to immediately be dispatched to Poland by sea and for instructions to be delivered to the Marquis de Monti that he should promise money to the magnates if they would elect Stanislaus quickly. With specific policies being advocated, Fleury and Chauvelin both stepped in to argue for caution and patience. Chauvelin went further to ask if it was really the correct idea to abandon the alliance with Saxony and its 30,000-man army. Chauvelin reminded Villars of the damage that the Saxon army had done to the British and suggested that even in its isolation the Saxon army was still a capable fighting force. The Saxon army could hold and would hold long enough for Villars to relieve it. This suggestion that Villars would relieve the Saxon army was a deliberate and not-all-too-well-hidden effort to buy Villars' adherence to the Saxon candidacy with a high and glorious military command. Chauvelin also suggested that maintaining the Saxon alliance was necessary for gaining the trust and allegiance of the Wittelsbach Union. Whereas Saxony by itself was not a particularly strong ally, the Wittelsbach Union effectively dominated all of western Germany and could play a pivotal role in any war. Finally, Chauvelin argued that the British had no love for Stanislaus and thus, France needed to avoid Stanislaus to avoid losing Britain's alliance. Although the other councilors made some counterarguments, Chauvelin's argument for Friedrich August II narrowly held out in the end and France remained committed to the Saxon alliance [10].
For the time being the Conseil d'État remained loyal to Saxony and although the rest of the world suspected as much they could not be certain. For many, the Franco-Saxon alliance was still a murky topic that had never been fully revealed and the general opinion of France left many wondering if France would turn its back on Saxony. The withdrawal of the Saxon courtiers from Warsaw back to Dresden less than three weeks after Augustus II's passing made some believe the Saxons were retreating because they had lost France's support. However, the Saxon withdrawal was just as easily explained by the need of the Saxons to regroup safely within their own borders ahead of a potential war with Prussia, the Hapsburgs, and Russians. Further confusion arose in April 1732 when Louis XV sent a statement to all the courts of Europe in which France bound itself to the protection of a "free election" in Poland [11]. For some, the term "free election" did in fact mean a free election unencumbered by foreign military threats or bribes. In which case, the obvious candidate was Stanislaus who as a native Pole and freedom fighter remained popular among the Polish and Lithuanian magnates. For others, this declaration was simply a precursor to France waging war if anyone tried to stop the French candidate, Friedrich August II, from ascending his throne after French bribes successfully purchased it for him. In the past, French bribes had won the election of 1697 only for Saxon arms to prevent the French candidate, François Louis, Prince of Conti, from becoming King of Poland.
Throughout this time period, the French had done their best to hide their intentions and plans, which involved leaving even their British allies in the dark. This failure to clue in Britain was the result of increasing mistrust between the two allies. Even though the alliance between France and Britain remained in name, in substance the alliance had been rocked by miscoordination during Empress Catherine's War and the Parmese Crisis. The strained nature of the alliance meant that the French did not feel it would be wise to rely on the British in the prospective war with the Hapsburgs and thus did not feel it was necessary to inform the British of their Polish policy. Even though the French did not expect the British to suddenly realign with the Hapsburgs, the French did not need to risk any of their diplomatic or military secrets leaking out to their enemies through an indiscreet British Parliament or ministry. Besides the French belief that Britain would not help in a war, there was also a sentiment in France that if Britain went to war then Britain would collapse. This sentiment is surprising given Britain had not experienced any real political turmoil since the failed Jacobite uprising of 1715. However, the discontent over George II's misrule and perceived corruption within the government was real. The British political elite was upset over Britain's defeats during Empress Catherine's War while the merchants felt that Spanish commercial concessions were not enough. On top of everything, there was a public clamor of the "Prince of Wales" who had been turned into a veritable hero by Tory writers and playwrights. One playwright, Eliza Haywood released a play in February 1732, titled Frederick, Duke of Brunswick-Lunenburgh to commemorate the birthday of the Prince of Wales. This play adapted the tragic life of Prince Frederick of Brunswick-Luneburg's ancestor who had been murdered after he was elected King of the Romans. Although the play was not formally a protest against the government, Haywood's previous anti-Walpolean writings combined with the play's subject matter made it seen as a protest. Accordingly, the play failed to get royal patronage but did receive patronage from various Tories and Opposition Whigs [12]. These types of incidents were construed. or better yet misconstrued, by the French as signs that Sir Robert Walpole and George II's government would fall to revolution if Britain went to war [13].
As the French withheld their intentions, the British and their foreign minister, Lord Townshend, were initially willing to engage with the French politely and gingerly over the topic of the Polish succession. Lord Townshend occasionally asked the French ambassador to Britain, Anne-Théodore Chevignard, Chevalier de Chavigny, if France had determined a policy for the Polish succession yet. Each time, Chavigny offered a noncommital nonanswer as instructed by Chauvelin who wanted no "demarche" given to the British. In response each time, Townshend moved on to other topics of interest such as trade, American affairs, Spain, and so on. However, when Chavigny read Louis XV's declaration of protection for Poland's liberties to Townshend, the British lord could continue this polite and subtle prodding no longer. Instead, he directly asked if this declaration could be considered a precursor to further French action and if that action might be of an offensive nature. Naturally, Chavigny tried to brush aside this question but this time Townshend let the topic pass unanswered [14]. Instead, Townshend reminded Chavigny of the Anglo-French alliance and the cooperation it entailed. Chavigny continued to try to dance around the subject by claiming that the alliance did not include a joint approach to Poland-Lithuania only for Townshend to remind Chavigny that Britain had specifically indicated a willingness to support Stanislaus Leszczyński's candidature alongside France and to even provide funds for his election [15]. This statement put Chavigny noticeably off balance and left him struggling to come up with an adequate answer. As Chavigny had this momentary lapse, Townshend pounced on him and asked if Britain should draw the necessary funds from its banks and instruct its ambassador in Warsaw to begin laying the groundwork for Stanislaus' election. As Chavigny tried to say that Britain need not rush, Townshend suggested that speed was necessary to ensure a favorable outcome for the allies. Townshend pushed on by asking if France could provide a list of which magnates it had already offered so that Britain did not pay the same man twice. Finally, Chavigny felt he could withstand Townshend's inquiries no more and simply stated that he needed to consult with his superiors before making any firm commitments.
In the end, Townshend left his meeting with Chavigny having felt as if he had accomplished nothing but unsettling the French ambassador. Townshend had hoped that by bringing up Britain's previous statements of support for Stanislaus that Chavigny would either confirm French support for Friedrich August II, support for Stanislaus, or reveal that France was still undecided on a candidate. In the former two cases, Townshend would have been able to bring the matter to George II to learn his opinion on the French candidate and determine whether it would be in Townshend's favor to support or oppose the French endeavor. In the final case, Townshend would have been able to open the door to Britain and France selecting a candidate together who could be supported by British money and French arms. In the end, Chavigny, even in his flustered state, revealed nothing. He did not reveal whether French armies would be used to support a French candidate nor did he even reveal if there was a French candidate to be had. Based on the correspondences of Friedrich zu Innhausen und Knyphausen, Townshend was supposed to believe that France had every intention of supporting Friedrich August II. However, Horatio Walpole, former British ambassador to France had already revealed to Townshend that Chauvelin was "the most treacherous, false and ambitious spirit". Townshend's opinion of Fleury was not much better after the last few years. Thus, Townshend was left worrying that that French might betray their Saxon alliance and the flurry of activity coming out of Alsace where Stanislaus was residing did nothing to assuage that concern. Besides all of that, the British foreign ministry was split between thinking whether the bellicose Chauvelin or Fleury was dominant in France and which of the two of them had been responsible for the Saxon alliance in the first place. With all this uncertainty being bounced around, Townshend thought his meeting with Chavigny was a failure that had done nothing to advance British knowledge or policy.
Townshend could not have been more incorrect in believing that his meeting with Chavigny was unimportant. Although Chavigny had revealed nothing to the British, Townshend had revealed one important detail to the French: Britain still remembered its indications of support for Stanislaus' candidature from more than a decade earlier. When this information reached the Conseil d'État, Villars and the rest of the secondary ministers all took that recollection to be a sign of Britain's preference for Stanislaus over any other candidate. Villars argued that if France supported Friedrich August II as it was planning to do that it would lose the friendship of Britain. Already, Britain had told France it wanted Stanislaus as king and if France spat in the face of that then it spat in the face of the Anglo-French Alliance. Villars also reminded his colleagues that Saxony had stolen Grubenhagen from George II's homeland of Brunswick-Luneburg and it was beyond unlikely that the King of Great Britain had forgotten that crime. George II had nearly gone to war with Prussia over stealing an acre of farmland so how could anyone believe that George II would support a Saxon succession in Poland when Saxony had carved a whole principality away from Brunswick-Luneburg? After Villars identified and laid out all the arguments for why Britain wanted Stanislaus rather than Friedrich August II he begun to discuss the military necessity for maintaining Britain's alliance and support. Villars suggested that British support could facilitate an attack on the Southern Netherlands, open the door for naval expeditions into the Baltic and Adriatic against the Russians and Hapsburgs, and would allow the passage of troops from France or Spain into Naples and Sicily.
Desperately, Chauvelin tried to mount a defense of the Saxon alliance and the plan for crowning Friedrich August II but he could not resist the reinvigorated energy of the pro-Stanislaus party. Worse yet, even Fleury was falling in line with the Stanislaus plan as he was caught up in the thought of losing the British alliance entirely after yet another miscoordination. That thought shook Fleury to his bones as it would have guaranteed that France was left isolated in Europe as almost all of France's allies were in truth the allies of Britain. Britain was the one responsible for paying wartime subsidies to the Baltic powers, protecting the Italian ambitions of Spain, and securing the sovereignty of the Dutch Republic. Within Germany, the Wittelsbachs still shied away from committing to a French alliance while the Saxons were far away and supposed by hostile powers. Thus, in the end, Chauvelin, Fleury, and France abandoned the Wettin succession and instead pivoted to raise Stanislaus to the Polish throne to restore the familial honor of the Bourbon dynasty, maintain the British alliance, and most importantly, inflict grave damage against the Hapsburg monarchy [16].
[1] In OTL, Prince Eugene's health was faltering heavily by 1733. I expect that falter started before 1733 so I think it is reasonable to have him encountering the same health issues a year earlier in 1732 in TTL. Additionally, unlike in OTL, Eugene's last five years have been far more stressful and involved him leading a military campaign so he should definitely be experiencing some health issues.
[2] In OTL, there were rumors that Koch was doing some or much of the thinking for Eugene.
[3] Despite Friedrich August II being a fully grown adult with multiple children at this point, he is still a relatively unknown actor at this point. In OTL, there was still uncertainty about his character when the Polish succession crisis began.
[4] These individuals were the OTL Piast candidates. I imagine that they were picked in OTL for their connections to Russia and those connections should be relatively unaltered by the TL so far so I have retained these candidates.
[5] In OTL, Chauvelin remained an advocate of the Saxon alliance during early meetings about the Polish succession. In TTL, he does so as well. Since Chauvelin was not known for his principles but instead for his pragmatic manner, I expect that he had practical reasons for supporting the Saxons. Those practical reasons would be even more emphasized in this TL where Saxony's military prowess has been put on show during Empress Catherine's War.
[6] In OTL, Fleury tried to push France off the course of war by poking holes in the legal reasoning that was used to justify France's drive toward war. Here, Fleury does the same.
[7] In OTL, there was a major interest among the high French officials to enthrone Stanislaus for the simple dynastic reason of making King Louis XV's father-in-law a reigning king.
[8] This is another one of Fleury's efforts to stop the war.
[9] In OTL, Fleury lost out in all his prewar machinations. The reasons for his defeats are unsure. Some have argued that he was amenable to humbling France, others that Chauvelin was simply in the ascendancy at the time and Fleury could not stop him, and some that at this point Louis XV had not yet adopted his pacifistic attitude and was pushing for a war to crown his father-in-law. Any of these viable explanations and from the sources it seems that Fleury only made weak, half-hearted efforts to stop the war, so here he does the same and fails to stop the push toward war.
[10] In OTL, the Saxon policy lost to the Stanislaus policy during these early debates. In TTL, the Saxon victories during Empress Catherine's War make Saxony a more desirable ally and the united German front against France during Empress Catherine's War makes having a German ally more desirable for France. The result is a narrow victory for the Saxon policy in TTL.
[11] In OTL, Louis XV made this declaration or more realistically this declaration was drawn up for him and signed by him. The purpose of this declaration in both OTL and in TTL is to give the French the legal justification to go to war over Poland's election. Basically, if anyone does anything dubious in Poland, France can use that as an excuse to initiate a conflict.
[12] In OTL, this play was produced when Frederick of Wales came to Britain and was meant to be a celebration of his return. In TTL, Frederick has not returned and does not look like he will. This absence combined with Frederick's heroics during the war make him a more popular figure in Britain, especially because he has not been in Britain to hurt his image at all. As a consequence, there is a demand for a play about him despite him being away. In OTL, the play was made seeking royal patronage. In TTL, the greater anti-George II sentiment means that Haywood remains on the anti-Walpolean side of drama and seeks Tory and Opposition patronage instead.
[13] In OTL, the French for some reason expected Britain to fall into a revolution if it went into war. The French brought into parliamentary volatility far too much. In TTL, there has been even more volatility. Even if that does not make a revolution any more likely than it was in OTL, it certainly makes the French belief in a revolution stronger.
[14] In OTL, Chavigny tried to intimidate the British foreign minister, Lord Harrington. In TTL, Townshend is still the foreign minister and I do not see Chavigny taking the same approach. Chavigny has been British ambassador previously during 1724 when Townshend was the foreign minister so he is familiar with him and knows that Townshend is not someone who can be intimidated. Instead, of intimating Townshend, Chavigny decides to play defense.
[15] Britain agreed to support Stanislaus while before the Polish election. In OTL, Britain's rift with France was much larger during the crisis so Britain did not bother following up on this promise and France did not bother asking. In TTL, Britain's rift is smaller. Still, the reason Britain even brought up the promise is for diplomatic fencing rather than actually proposing a course of action.
[16] The earlier decision to support the Saxon plan was only narrowly made. With the idea that Britain is more favorable to Stanislaus, the French pivot quickly toward Stanislaus.
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