Thanks for your detailed response,
@NoMommsen. Apologies for the delayed response, Pfizer shot #3 kicked my ass and I got caught up reading through the Bundesarchiv's online holdings.
As a first notion : sry but ... Groener never wrote something titled "Das Deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen".
This is a work edited by the Reichsarchiv in Potsdam and published (this peculiar volume) in 1927. Groener is only mentioned in its intro with a polite thanks for his - rather symbolic - supervision he was entrusted with by the historic commission of the Reichsarchiv.
... therefore ...
If you could name me a/the source in which he describes the capabilities of the eastern railways system in 1914 esp. where he - Groener - identifies such a "main bottleneck" as named by you I would be truly thankful (
esp. as you seem to be keen for such minute citations by others).
... do we ... you really know ?
... because you seem to 'cheat' your calculations by completly omitting the southern double-track via Goßlershausen to Deutsch Eylau and further to Osterode-Allenstein-Lyck.
An cerebration seemingly out of the blue and at least without any reference/reverberating of any (contemporary) source known to me.
However, let's give in to your free-floating deliberation at least regarding the double-tracked crossing of the Vistula at Thorn (Torun) up to Schönsee (Kowalewo Pomorskie), 24 km with the border at one point (at Adolfshof) about 4 km away , further at any other part of this section.
There would still be the double-track crossing from Bromberg at Graudenz to Goßlershausen.
what in 1914 is simply wrong.
The two single-tracks in question here regarding crossing the Vistula at Fordon east of Bromberg (now part of Bromberg or Bydgoszcz) and Schmentau (Smetowo) were in 1914 fully operational with 20 trains a day with 60 minutes spacing up to 30 trains a day with 40 minutes spacing and even up to 36 trains ommiting the normally planned 4 hours pause a day.
A rule I never came across esp. not as "written in stone" aka unadjustable/unchangeable no matter what.
I would be grateful for the page in "Das Deutsche Feldeisenbahnwese" - or any other citation/place - where you've seen this rule.
... and again I would like to question where you've got this info for the railways
in 1914.
However, relativating your (
cheated see above) calculations I come out with
2 x 60 (
3 per hour at 20 minutes spacing, what was the 'general rule' for double tracked line, "Feldeisenbahnwese" page 10) trains a day on double tracked crossing (Dirschau/Marienburg AND at least one leading to Goßlershausen)
or
2 x 72 trains a day omitting the 4 hours pause (
"Feldeisenbahnwese" page 19)
and possibly/probably up to
2 x 100 trains if we shorten the planned for spacing of trains
now for the "unhelpfull" single-tracked crossing
2 x 20 (1 per hour) trains a day on mentioned single-tracked crossing
or
2 x 24 trains a day omitting the 4 hours pause
and up to
2 x 30/39 trains with shortening the spacing
thereby I come to 160 trains/day on almost peace conditions up to
250/260 trains/day on emergency conditions as described above compared to the meager 100 you admitt.
... and here I even follow your unproven neglect of the Thorn crossing.
Given your calculation of 20.1 days for the deployment of troops listed with double the number of trains available as I've shown you above (or even more) I would render v.Staabs calculation to be ready to rumble up to day M 15 still very ... 'conservative'.
As a side note : the railway administration was from 1913 onwards already preparing new military train schedules due to the development in capabilities of trains, locomotives, track-capabilities and simple imcrease length of available tracks (
page 10 to 11 of "Das Deutsch Feldeisenbahnwesen").
Partially these preliminary works - not fully completed in 1914 - came already into usage during the western deployments IOTL.
On the rule limiting transport to 50 trains per day except for rare exceptions:
In der Regel durften auf den zweigleisigen Strecken nicht mehr als 50 Züge täglich in jeder Richtung durch Mobilmachungs- und Kriegstransport beansprucht werden. Rur bei wesentlich schwächerer Belastung der Gegenrichtung war ausnahmsweise eine Belegung bis zu 60 Zügen zulässig.
Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen pages 18-19.
We can see that even on the intensely used Western Front, where speed was of the utmost importance, this rule was only ignored in one case:
Bridge at Wesel by IX. Army corps with 20 trains a day;
Bridge at Hamborn by II Army Corps with 30 trains a day;
Bridge near Duisburg by VII Army Corps, III. and VII. Reserve corps with 40 trains per day;
Rordbrücke near Düsseldorf by X Army Corps with 20 trains per day;
Südbrücke near Düsseldorf by III. and IV. Army Corps with 40 trains per day;
North bridge near Cologne by Guard Corps, VX. Reserve Corps and Heavy Artillery for 2nd Army with 40 trains perday;
South bridge near Cologne by XI. Army Corps, Guard Reserve Corps and 1/2 X. Reserve corps with 60 trains per day;
Bridge at Koblenz by XII. and XIX. Army Corps and XII. Reserve corps with 40 trains per day;
North bridge near Mainz by XVIII. Army Corps and XVIII. Reserve corps with 40 trains per day;
South bridge near Mainz by the 5th Army Corps and the Mainz garrison with 40 trains per day;
Bridge at Worms by VI. Army Corps, garrisons of Metz and Strasbourg with 40 trains per day;
Bridge near Ludwigshafen by II. Bavarian Army Corps, V. Reserve Corps and garrison of Germersheim with 40 trains per day;
Bridge at Germersheim by XIII. Army Corps, VI. Reserve Corps and I. Bavarian Reserve Corps with 50 trains per day;
Bridge at Röschwoog by III. Bavarian army corps with 20 trains per day;
Bridge near Strasbourg by I. Bavarian Army Corps and garrison of Strasbourg with 30 trains per day.
Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, page 36.
Plans for adjustments to the military timetable to operate at higher speeds were being worked on for the
1915-1916 deployment, as you correctly note:
Schon in den letzten Friedensjahren wurde erkannt, daß der bestehende Militärfahrplan die Leistungsfähigkeit der Strecken nicht in dem Maße ausnutzte, wie es der Stand des hoch entwickelten deutschen Eisenbahnwesens gestattete. Nachdem festgestellt war, daß für den Fall der Steigerung der Geschwindigkeit ausreichend starke Lokomotiven für Bewältigung der im Kriege geforderten Transportleistungen zur Verfügung standen, wurde auf Anregung des letzten Chefs der Cisenbahnabteilung, Oberstleutnants Groener, im Jahre 1913 mit den Vorarbeiten zur Aufstellung eines neuen Militärfahrplans begonnen. Für die Haupttransportstraßen wurde die Grundgeschwindigkeit auf 40 km in der Stunde erhöht. In Verbindung mit dem gleichzeitig in Aussicht genommenen, großzügigen strategischen Ausbau des Vahnnetzes sollte hierdurch eine wesentliche Beschleunigung der Operationsbereitschaft des heeres erreicht werden. Die in vollem Gange befindlichen Arbeiten zur Neuaufstellung des Fahrplans mit seinen rund 3000 Einzelstrecken fanden durch den Ausbruch des Krieges eine vorzeitige Unterbrechung.
Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, pages 10-11.
To get a sense of these plans, we can turn to the Bundesarchiv holdings for the GGS Railway Department. PH 3/901 holds 135 pages from the first half of 1914 of the railway department's plans for the new mobilization timetable. We have the preparatory materials for the April conference in Metz which began the planning process from the Railway Department and individual
Linienkommission, the conference summary, and follow-up materials sent to the Railway Department in April-June 1914 by the
Linienkommission about the estimated maximum capacity of the lines under their purview for the new schedule.
What do these files tell us?
1. The new mobilization schedule was still in the early stages of planning and was not applied in the actual mobilization which took place in July 1914. Even for the Western railways' most developed
Linienkommission, the schedule estimated for the new plan ran consistently faster than what was implemented IOTL:
There's no evidence, therefore, to believe that excessively faster speeds with radical adjustments to the schedule could or would be adopted. If it wasn't done for the Western deployment IOTL, it's not going to be done for an ad-hoc Eastern deployment.
2. Even if we assume the new deployment timetable could be adopted with no preparation, the three
Linienkommission operating on the Vistula/East Prussia (N, R, and V) show that there were substantial capacity issues even running at their maximum estimated speed:
We can see that from Elbing to Intersburg capacity couldn't exceed 40 trains per day even under the new schedule. From Thorn to Schonsee capacity was 25 trains, while from Laskowitz to Graudenz it was 32, to Graudenz to Goßlershausen it was 36, and from Osterode to Korschen it was 30! The Fordon and Marienwerder lines weren't even considered for use in the new deployment plan. From the same materials for
Linienkommission N (East Prussia), we can see recommendation against using numerous smaller routes:
Es werden demnach für die Bedarfszüge wie bisher die I und II Richtungen des Friedensfahrplans gewählt werden, da ein Durcheinanderwerfen der Richtungen zur Vermeidung von Jrrtümern bei dem Stations-und Streckenpersonal mieden werden muß.
So while you are correct that two double-track lines run into Goßlershausen, only one double track line leaves Goßlershausen and therefore its capacity is limited to that of a single double track. It's a bottleneck which sharply limits the deployment opportunities via this route. Further, the Schönsee—Thorn line wouldn't be fully used owing to its proximity to the border and capacity issues. Once again, the sources are quite clear that the lines running East-West from the Vistula were equal at most to
two double-track lines:
Nicht so günstig war die Leistungsfähigkeit des östlichen Netzes. Abgesehen von den gut entwickelten Bahnen Oberschlesiens, das mit drei leistungsfähigen Transportstraßen ausgestattet war, konnte bei dem vorwiegend landwirtschaftlichen Gepräge des Ostens und seinem im Frieden geringen Verkehrsbedürfnis ein dichtes Netz leistungsfähiger Bahnen nicht entstehen. In den schmalen Grenzstreifen östlich der Weichsel führten nur zwei durchgehende, doppelgleisige Transportstraßen, Marienburg—Königsberg—Insterburg und Goßlershausen—Allenstein—Korschen. Letztere verlief auf langen Strecken in nicht allzu weiter Entfernung von der russischen Grenze und war hierdurch feindlichen Störungen leicht ausgesetzt. Aus dem gleichen Grunde kam die in unmittelbarer Nähe der Landesgrenze gelegene Bahn über Schönsee—Strasburg (Westpr.)—Soldau—Ortelsburg für den Aufmarsch nicht in Betracht. Sie war überdies, wie die Mehrzahl der ost-
preußischen Bahnen, eingleisig und wenig leistungsfähig. Trotz dieser Mängel gewährte das ostpreußische Netz bei der geringen Stärke der anfangs im Osten eingesetzten Kräfte ausreichende operative Beweglichkeit. Erst bei der im weiteren Verlaufe des Krieges notwendig gewordenen stärkeren Beanspruchung der Eisenbahnen Ostpreußens erwies sich deren beschränkte Leistungsfähigkeit recht nachteilig.
Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, page 5. The construction plans for a full third track East of the Vistula are discussed here:
Im Osten sollte eine dritte Transportstraße in das Land östlich bet Weichsel endlich verwirklicht werden, eine Forderung, die seit langem teils aus außenpolitischen, teils aus finanziellen Erwägungen zurückgestellt war.
Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, page4.
From the same page, particular emphasis on this point regarding single track lines:
Sie war überdies, wie die Mehrzahl der ostpreußischen Bahnen, eingleisig und wenig leistungsfähig.
The inadequacy of the rail network, particularly single-track lines, is elaborated further by Zimmerman in his recent book on the Tannenberg Battle (Pages 27-28):
Denn ebenso ungenügend sah der Zustand der für den vorgesehenen Bewegungskrieg so wesentlichen Eisenbahn aus: Obwohl Moltke im März 1914 zum wiederholten Male den Ausbau des Eisenbahnnetzes gefordert hatte, floss der Großteil der überhaupt bewilligten Gelder auch hier in den Ausbau im Westen.35 Schon den Zeitgenossen ist also klar gewesen, dass der nächste Krieg »militärisch und wirtschaftlich, ressourcenpolitisch und symbolisch auch ein Eisenbahnkrieg«36 sein würde. Trotzdem blieb das ostpreußische Netz militärisch betrachtet derart mangelhaft, dass man schon aus diesem Grund 1913 von einem Großen Ostaufmarsch hätte Abstand nehmen müssen.37 Es existierten lediglich zwei leistungsfähige doppelgleisige Strecken, eine von Marienburg über Königsberg nach Insterburg, die andere von Gosslarshausen über Allenstein nach Korschen; Letztere lag so nahe an der deutsch-russländischen Grenze, dass sie bereits kurz nach Kriegsbeginn vom Gegner bedroht werden konnte.38 Die weni gen anderen Strecken waren eingleisig und wurden, wenigstens teilweise, erst im Krieg ausgebaut, doch die Bahnstationen erwiesen sich als unzulänglich, selbst in den größeren Städten:
»Der Bahnhof Königsberg spottete jeder Beschreibung. Es hat Zeiten im Kriege gegeben, in denen sich dank seiner Unvollkommenheit die Züge bis Elbing rückwärts stauten. Die Nebenbahnen [...] waren ohne militärische Rücksicht angelegt.«
39 Diese Zustände überraschen umso mehr, als die deutsche militärische Führung die wachsende militärische Macht des Zarenreiches angesichts dessen Reform bemühungen seit dem Desaster im Krieg gegen Japan 1905 sehr genau und durch aus mit wachsender Sorgewahrnahm.40
As Stevenson adds in his overview essay on railway construction before the war, Moltke had urged greater investment into East Prussia to increase its military preparedness and increase the number of East-West double-track lines in East Prussia leaving the Vistula from 2 to 3. But this was only planned to be ready by Spring 1918. Further, Germany also had to accept limited detraining ramps for actually delivering troops - just 1 for every 8 kilometers in the East, versus 1 for every 2 in the West. This from Stevenson, "War by Timetable? The Railway Race before 1914", 187-188.
Because of all this, your below assertion is sharply contradicted by all our available primary and secondary material:
The two single-tracks in question here regarding crossing the Vistula at Fordon east of Bromberg (now part of Bromberg or Bydgoszcz) and Schmentau (Smetowo) were in 1914 fully operational with 20 trains a day with 60 minutes spacing up to 30 trains a day with 40 minutes spacing and even up to 36 trains ommiting the normally planned 4 hours pause a day.
And the calculation you've drawn up below, which I believe you're getting from Staabs' recommendations in his book, are far beyond what is possible:
However, relativating your (cheated see above) calculations I come out with
2 x 60 (3 per hour at 20 minutes spacing, what was the 'general rule' for double tracked line, "Feldeisenbahnwese" page 10) trains a day on double tracked crossing (Dirschau/Marienburg AND at least one leading to Goßlershausen)
or
2 x 72 trains a day omitting the 4 hours pause ("Feldeisenbahnwese" page 19)
and possibly/probably up to
2 x 100 trains if we shorten the planned for spacing of trains
now for the "unhelpfull" single-tracked crossing
2 x 20 (1 per hour) trains a day on mentioned single-tracked crossing
or
2 x 24 trains a day omitting the 4 hours pause
and up to
2 x 30/39 trains with shortening the spacing
Perhaps, with the benefit of hindsight, Staab's recommendations might have been implemented for an Eastern deployment were they possible. But they were not even used for the Western deployment, when as we know time was of the essence. To apply such radical adjustments to an ad-hoc Eastern deployment on railway lines with limited capacity and documented poor quality seems to go beyond what is justifiable and plausible.
Al due respect ... that's nothing to be expected to be delivered in a from the beginned as an overview only planned publication. As there no such deployment IOTL planned there ofc were nowhere as minutely elaborated deployment plans.
Nevertheless he actually adressed these questions ... and advised what I've shown and calculated for you above (omitting the daily pause of operation, shortening spacing and using the now in contrast to 1019/11 available capabilities of the rails (number of waggons, speed) together with somewhat locally "fine tuned" early diembarkations of troops with (rather short) additional footmarching (more in the range of 10 to 30 km than 100+ as Zuber had read out of his source).
This is exactly my criticism of Staabs here - without the data and sources to back up his arguments, he's making a "proof of concept" at best and writing a polemic at worse. Staabs is doing what every other postwar general did. He takes advantage of the unlimited power and capabilities which hindsight grants to implement a plan which contemporary sources show is implausible both for objective reasons (Capacity limits on the main lines, low quality of Eastern railways and the ) and subjective ones (Unwillingness of the Railway Department to make substantial adjustments to their SOPs during mobilization even on well-developed lines).
... again I wonder what writing of Groener you refer to ...
His memoirs discuss the issue on page 86, if I recall right.
Let me counter with :
page 76 :
"Is was assumed that the Njemen-(Wilna) Army at the time of 6th to 8th day of mobilisation, the Warsaw (Narew-) Army at the time of 3rd to 5th be ready to march."
page 80 :
"The russian deployment was execute in the year 1914 in general as we had suppoesed.
The by us assumed marching readiness of the army was not fully accomplished. At that point we had made for the russians too favorable assumptions."
(
translations by me as I assume most of you are not too familiar with german fonts of this time (Fraktur))
... I truly miss any M+20 or even longer (as stated by someone else in thread) ...
M+20 comes from the 1912-13 intelligence assessment for Russian mobilization. Obviously you're correct that by 1914 intelligence assessments, which Moltke was well aware of, had moved up the speed of Russian mobilization even further. Which makes it no surprise that, knowing how slow a planned Eastern deployment would be, he argued against sending a large force East.
... as baseless that he was fully< educated of the possibilities of an eastern employment in 1913/1914.
Moltke the Minor simply wasn't interested in an eastwards campaign (aside his IMHO debatable abilities as a commander of campaign at all).
I think it's far more plausible that the Chief of the GGS had a broad understanding of the deployment possibilities for both East and West, including his repeated appeals for greater investment in the Eastern railways in order to improve capacity (In March 1914, no less!). His understanding of the technical specifics was inferior, but Moltke was aware that an Eastern deployment would be slower, more logistically challenging, and less likely to achieve a decisive result.
By'n large you rely here on the renarration of a reduced compilation of documents for plans completly outdate already at the beginning of 1914. As I tried to make clear :
anything regarding "Aufmarsch Ost" for the period of 1912 to 1913 was recycling paper the day it lost validity on 1st April 1913.
You've reiterated this point several times, but haven't indicated why the plans for 1912-1913 were outdated by Spring 1914 re: deployment problems. The East Prussian railways didn't radically improve in quality or capacity from 1912-1914. Their deficiencies were just as great in 1914 as when Aufmarsch II Ost planned deployment around substantial delays and an inadequate railway network. Primary sources from 1914 itself back up this assertion. If the railway network was inadequate in both 1912 and in 1914, it follows that the deployment plans must work around the same inadequacies in 1914 it had to in 1912.
To sum up, Germany faces 3 fundamental delays in an Eastern deployment:
1. Administrative delays. A new transportation plan must be crafted from scratch to carry out the new deployment over the course of several days.
2. Operational delays. Reorienting men and material, preparing transport, etc. takes time, as it did IOTL when transport didn't get underway until up to 3-5 days after mobilization was declared.
3. Capacity delays. As has been repeatedly noted, the East Prussian railway network was inadequate for the swift deployment of corps on the scale Staabs, much less Moltke, had conceived. These bottlenecks, combined with the rushed nature of the planning, will make an Eastern deployment a messy and drawn out process.
That all being said, this is not to dismiss the fundamental premise that an Eastern deployment could be done without facing disaster in the deployment phase. But there are clear tradeoffs which were known IOTL which made an Eastern deployment an unappealing prospect to Moltke, the main one being that Germany will face a spoiling attack by 1st, 2nd, and 4th Army before it has finished deploying. This will be a messy, violent, and confused struggle which Germany could still turn into a big victory - but it's no glorious march on Warsaw as you and
@Helmuth48 conceive.
I'll respond to others as time allows!