For Hughes it was quite a very personal disaster. Hughes was a good admiral facing a near impossible situation with the loss of most of his bases, failing ground forces, and a competent enemy in a better strategic position, and he hardly deserved the fate that was meted out to him, when after the war vengeful government had him executed as a scapegoat under spurious claims of him having failed to do his utmost - replaying the fate of John Byng 30 years before, or Thomas Arthur, the French officer executed in 1766 by the French after their own lost war in India. Another victim claimed by the land of burning sun and riches.
Interesting to portray Hughes as a tragic victim of politics of the time period rather than getting villainized, as had happened to other leaders of the past.
By the end of 1782, Pondicherry had been retaken by the Mysoreans for the French, Negapatam secured, and Madras was firmly under the control of the allies, leaving Haider Ali and the French the master of the entire Karnatic. Haider Ali would not have long to enjoy the fruits of his victory: on December 7th, 1782, he perished from a cancerous tumor on his back, leaving his son, Sultan Fateh Ali Sahab Tipu, the new sultan of Mysore, an ambitious young man, both intensely competent and energetic, fresh from a major victory at Mandalore but with a streak of fanaticism about him quite different from a father more capable of seeing gray and nuance. Tipu inherited the strongest state in Southern India, stretching from the border of Portuguese Goa in the west and along the Mandalore coast, to the expanses of the Carnatic in the east - but his suzerainty would still have to wait to be confirmed by a subsequent peace treaty. 1783 only served to reinforce these trends with the British defeat in Ceylon.
I am curious to know what Asaf Jahi II will do now that Mysore and France have kicked the British out of the Carnatic region. Will he join in at the last minute to get the Northern Circars and promise of an alliance against the Maratha Empire?
For the French and Dutch, the campaign had been a miraculous resuscitation of their fortunes, with both threatened by British advance. France in particular, had reasons to adulate Suffren, who emerged as one of the greatest French naval heroes from the war, and the only one whose hard-fighting aggressive tactics endeared him with the public, unlike De Grasse - an excellent admiral strategically but much less dramatic tactically, and who suffered a painful defeat in the Battle of the Saintes. In his brief campaign Suffren had inflicted two crippling defeats on the Royal Navy, driven them from their prized port of Madras, recaptured Pondicherry, and saved France's ally’s possessions of Negapatam and the Cape Colony. For Paris, it appeared as a miraculous return of their fortunes after disaster in the Seven Years’ War.
While the Naval victories are a good morale boost, it won't fill the empty treasury of France. Although I am curious to see if Suffren will stay loyal to the Ancien Regime or will he defect to the Revolutionaries when the French Revolution comes around.
For Britain, it was a grim portrait. The campaign had seen two full British armies wiped out, catastrophically undermining British military prestige. Their once preponderant position in the Carnatic had been destroyed, Madras had fallen again just like in 1746, the Royal Navy defeated, and British trade in the Bay of Bengal was decimated by raiding French ships. The execution of the innocent admiral Hughes did nothing to assuage the British public, nor the British moneyed classes, despairing over the collapse of East India Company prices on the London stock market. Coming soon after major setbacks against the Marathas with the surrender of an entire British army at Wadgaon (although allowed to escape by the Marathas in subsequent negotiations), and the collapse of the British Empire in the Thirteen Provinces, it seemed as if the entire basis of British power had collapsed, and that the preceding twenty years had all been a dream before the nightmare of the present.
Just wondering but did sending more forces to the Indian theatre have any affects in the American Revolutionary War?
 
Cool. Would love to see where this goes in the next chapter.

The Marathas would actually be the key so to speak since on the top of my head native Indian armies had started absorbing European military tactics with Indian flavours to them quiet quickly. It's the poor leadership of the various kingdoms and empires that saw the wholesale fall of the regions to the British.
The next chapter is the peace treaty which is actually one of the more difficult parts given how hard it is to deal with Indian polities and their nested privileges, revenue sharing over territories, and the huge number of local authorities, so hopefully there will be some feedback when it gets posted about whether it somewhat matches a plausible outcome and about whether it reflects how politics might be done in India.

The Marathas and their military modernization will definitely be mentioned, although as with many things concerning the Marathas it's complicated. Shinde was the most vigorous modernizer with new style infantry and modern artillery and put this to brutal effect in his northern campaigns where he smashed apart anything in his way but bankrupted himself with the cost of the new military, Holkar if I remember was the most conservative with the traditional light cavalry, the Peshwa was somewhat in the middle with modernized artillery but without Shinde's infantry component. Since Shinde is directing his attention north like OTL we unfortunately won't have a chance to see much of the new Maratha military in action.

Unless if I find some more documents about the 1785 war: the Cambridge History of the Martahas glosses over it and no other books really mention it, hopefully I'll find some more on it to give me a better sense of what it involved. I have chapters written from the beginning of the 20th century but still not the one on the Mysorean-Maratha war...

Another nice chapter.

Love that letter. Where did you source it from?
It's from "Haidar ‘Ali and Tipu Sultan: Mysore's Eighteenth -century Rulers in Transition" by Kaveh Yazdani in the journal Itinerario. The unedited quote is this:

India since the death of Aurangzeb, has lost her rank among the empires of Asia. This fair land is parceled out into provinces which make war against the other; the people divided into a multitude of sects, have lost their love of the country. The Hindus…are little able to defend their country, which has become the prey of strangers…The greatest obstacle you have to conquer is jealousy of the Europeans. The English are today all powerful in India. It is necessary to weaken them by war. The resources of Hindustan do not suffice to expel them from the lands they have invaded. Put the nations of Europe one against the other. It is by the aid of the French that you could conquer the British armies which are better trained than the Indian. The Europeans have surer tactics; always use against them their own weapons.39
Interesting to portray Hughes as a tragic victim of politics of the time period rather than getting villainized, as had happened to other leaders of the past.

I am curious to know what Asaf Jahi II will do now that Mysore and France have kicked the British out of the Carnatic region. Will he join in at the last minute to get the Northern Circars and promise of an alliance against the Maratha Empire?

While the Naval victories are a good morale boost, it won't fill the empty treasury of France. Although I am curious to see if Suffren will stay loyal to the Ancien Regime or will he defect to the Revolutionaries when the French Revolution comes around.

Just wondering but did sending more forces to the Indian theatre have any affects in the American Revolutionary War?
I tried to emphasize throughout that Hughes was, as OTL, a competent and capable admiral. OTL that worked for him, Suffren's flaws in regards to annoying or alienating his captains and not forming a workable command meant that Suffren wasn't able to take advantage of his genuine brilliance and aggressiveness, while here he gets luckier at Porto Praya and that snowballs throughout and builds the confidence in him he needs. I think most people would be sympathetic to Hughes reading about him in such a situation, he's constantly been fighting against either superior forces or in an unanticipated scenario and manages to (mostly) pull his forces out intact, but that isn't enough in dire political straits. I don't know enough about British politics for whether having him genuinely executed is plausible as it was for poor Byng 30 years before but in any case that could always be updated later.

I had thought about having the diversion of forces to India affect things in the Americas like the Battle of the Saintes, but it isn't dramatically more - both sides were reinforced constantly anyway OTL - and it would be hideously complicated to try to alter things. Fundamentally I've taken the idea that if I don't mention it, things go on about OTL, so things in the Americas have progressed according to OTL. What's more the French and Mysoreans have had an astonishingly good run so far and it would become tiresome for it to simply be the story of them triumphing across the world. I do have serious pitfalls in store for the Mysoreans in particular.

Suffren dies historically before the French Revolution and I don't have any particular plans about keeping him alive longer than he did historically. It will have an impact on the beginning of the French Revolutionary Wars through some different tactics and mentalities but that will be for when we get there. French finances are going to be unchanged, French trade in India will be improved compared to historically but not enough to make any real difference.
 
I had thought about having the diversion of forces to India affect things in the Americas like the Battle of the Saintes, but it isn't dramatically more - both sides were reinforced constantly anyway OTL - and it would be hideously complicated to try to alter things. Fundamentally I've taken the idea that if I don't mention it, things go on about OTL, so things in the Americas have progressed according to OTL. What's more the French and Mysoreans have had an astonishingly good run so far and it would become tiresome for it to simply be the story of them triumphing across the world. I do have serious pitfalls in store for the Mysoreans in particular.
Well as long as it avoids the British taking over all of subcontinent at a later date, then I am fine. Just excited at the prospects of seeing states like Hyderabad or the Sikh Empire developing without or minimal British interference.
 
Looking forward to what happens to the British in Bengal and Bombay. Will Bengal be better or worse off than OTL?
My thinking is that the British will turn their focus on Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Especially since the Dutch are in a no better situation than OTL, making their colonial holdings ripe for the taking in the French Revolutionary wars.
Plus the wars between Burma and Siam can be exploited to connect Penang to the Bengal Presidency
 
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Also wondering what you will do with Nana Fadnavis of the Maratha empire since he was the first one to realise that the British were going to gobble up the subcontinent.
 
My thinking is that the British will turn their focus on Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Especially since the Dutch are in a no better situation than OTL, making their colonial holdings ripe for the taking in the French Revolutionary wars.
Plus the wars between Burma and Siam can be exploited to connect Penang to the Bengal Presidency
I was wondering more about what happens in Bengal itself but...Britsh Siam?
 
Chapter 5, Mangalore and Paris
The American Revolutionary War was both the greatest triumph of French foreign policy in the 18th century, and in its own way set the stage for the collapse of the French monarchy itself. France did not enter the American Revolutionary War merely out of an interest in humiliating Britain and seeking revenge, even if public opinion greeted it enthusiastically: it entered out of a belief that the balance of power in Europe required a weakened United Kingdom, which would be more amenable to an equal and fruitful partnership with France like in the days of Walpole, which the French foreign minister, the Count of Vergennes, looked back fondly on. The dismemberment of Poland had been a severe blow to the ancién regime’s concert of Europe, and for France to be able to keep its real allies, the small nations of Europe, protected, it had to be able to redirect its foreign policy to the continent rather than its major naval expenditures, and ensure that Britain would involve itself more in European affairs again. Thus, France went to war to save the balance of power in Europe - but it would be a war whose massive expenses, of year upon year of heavy naval campaigning and tremendous aid to the American rebels, would ultimately throw the French monarchy’s existence into peril.

But that must have been far from the thoughts of the delighted French, Spanish, and Americans, in 1783, fresh from victory against the United Kingdom. France had secured its greatest war goal - the independence of the United States - as well as ending the enforced demilitarization of Dunkirk, and taking St. Lucia and Tobago in the Caribbean, Senegal in Africa, and Madras in India. An entire raft of islands in the Caribbean were ceded back to Britain, but France had studiously postured as entering the war purely out of an interest in American independence, rather than aggrandizement at the expense of Britain. That Madras, never owned by the French before, was taken could be written down to the popular enthusiasm about Suffren’s naval victories over the British, firing French public opinion about an admiral, who fought hard and won decisive battles, so much in contrast to the generally indecisive affairs elsewhere. Even in a regime where public opinion was of little account, memories of 1748 and the sentiment of mourir pour le roi de prusse which had gripped the French people were visible to France’s leaders. France’s gains were limited for herself, but with the independence of America must have seemed that Vergennes’ goals were to be achieved, and a recalibration of the balance of power in Europe to France’s desire affected.

Spain among the European powers fared the best from the treaty, gaining back Menorca and Florida, and more clearly defining Spanish-British logging disagreements in Central America - and without the massive expenditures of the French. Certainly, the failure to reclaim Gibraltar was a disappointment for the Spanish, but the stain of 1763 had been effaced. The Netherlands could be grateful that it escaped from the war status quo ante bellum, with only Suffren’s performance in the East saving its colonies of the Cape, Negapatam, and possibly Ceylon from British invasion. The Dutch had never wished to be drawn into the war in any case, and the war drove home to Dutch policy makers the unpreparedness and decline of the Dutch Republic: Dutch colonies in Sint Eustatius had been captured almost contemptuously, and the rest of the empire only saved through French garrisons and naval forces. Vergennes would sign a treaty of defensive alliance with Holland, firmly separating the Dutch from the British sphere of influence.

In India, peace between the British and Mysoreans was separate from negotiations in Paris. This was much to the displeasure of the Mysoreans, who were quite bitter that peace negotiations were conducted in Paris without any Mysorean representation or interests being taken into account. After all, what would happen in the next war, if it was a losing one? It was clear that the French would simply cut the Mysoreans off at any peace negotiation and not treat them as a serious ally.* But with the disastrous British position in the Carnatic there was precious little that the British could do. It was its own form of humiliation for the East India Company and more broadly Indian delegates to be brought to Mangalore, the site where Tipu had won a crushing victory over a landed British army in 1768, past evident signs of Mysore’s might, batteries of guns, infantry, the royal elephants, cavalry battalions, to meet with the new Sultan Tipu. It must have felt more as a fait accompli rather than negotiations.

With the Mysoreans, French, and Dutch in possession of all of the Carnatic, as well as French ships raiding and near-blockading the British in Bengal, there was little available negotiating power for the British. In the subsequent treaty, Madras, confirming the agreements in Europe was ceded to the French, while Tipu seized Mangalore and was granted de facto suzerainty over the Carnatic, which he rapidly transformed into a series of vassals, fiefdoms, and components part of Mysore. A small northern portion was taken by Hyderabad, with squabbling over their share another seed for future conflict. Victory for the Mysoreans was crushing, and it came simultaneously with major British defeats to the Marathas at Wadgaon and Bhor Ghat, seemingly placing the entire British position in India in the deepest jeopardy. In the headiness of victory, Tipu formally declared himself sultan, putting an end to the legal fiction of the Wodeyar dynasty, and his independence from the Mughal Empire. For British observers, it must have seemed like the coming of the end, as the proud empire of 1763 collapsed in both America and India.

Of course transforming the Carnatic into vassals and fiefdoms also spoke to the problem of trying to super-impose the Mysorean model of increasingly direct government and above all else taxation and the restriction of landlord powers - the poligars. Under Hyder Ali and now under Tipu Sultan the previous models of indirect tribute were in abeyance as the Mysorean state tightened its control over the revenue producing sources in an effort to expand the resources available to the regime: in the Carnatic though, governance was still highly traditional, with a dizzying variety of nested privileges and local powers, extraordinarily capable of resisting pressure from above due to the distributed nature of power. It would take a long time for Mysore to truly transform the Carnatic into an organic part of the state.

In Britain, the peace treaty, both Paris and the one at Mangalore, was received with widespread uproar, and led to the resignation of the British prime minister Shelburne. It was here where the basic contradiction of the French diplomatic project lay: that Britain was a parliamentarian state, not an absolutist one, where public opinion played a preponderant role. France had struck Britain at its most vulnerable moment to humble Britain into accepting a weakened position in the balance of power, one of equality with France, to force the British to friendship with France. But the French war only laid the seeds of future hatred and mistrust, and meant that Vergennes’ project was futile from the beginning.

And inside France itself, the war had been catastrophically expensive, raising the national debt to further crushing levels, and derailed reform attempts to deal with it. For a while it could be papered over, with imaginary sinking funds and creative accounting of a normal budget and an extraordinary budget, but something would have to give if France’s abysmal state of finances were to be fixed, and the financial and political mechanisms of the dying years of the Ancien régime lacked the flexibility, the courage, and the vision to reform.

Peace would be built on foundations of sand, and the hurricane was on the move.

*This was historically even more marked on the Mysorean side and the Mysoreans were outraged and extremely displeased that the French left them out of the loop. Here it is merely displeasure, since the situation on the ground lets the Mysoreans achieve their objectives without needing arbitration from European capitals. They still have to face the problem however that the British are still out there, the Marathas are still hostile, Hyderabad can and indeed will flip easily, and the French are a shaky ally for any serious crisis.
 
With the Mysoreans, French, and Dutch in possession of all of the Carnatic, as well as French ships raiding and near-blockading the British in Bengal, there was little available negotiating power for the British. In the subsequent treaty, Madras, confirming the agreements in Europe was ceded to the French, while Tipu seized Mangalore and was granted de facto suzerainty over the Carnatic, which he rapidly transformed into a series of vassals, fiefdoms, and components part of Mysore. A small northern portion was taken by Hyderabad, with squabbling over their share another seed for future conflict. Victory for the Mysoreans was crushing, and it came simultaneously with major British defeats to the Marathas at Wadgaon and Bhor Ghat, seemingly placing the entire British position in India in the deepest jeopardy. In the headiness of victory, Tipu formally declared himself sultan, putting an end to the legal fiction of the Wodeyar dynasty, and his independence from the Mughal Empire. For British observers, it must have seemed like the coming of the end, as the proud empire of 1763 collapsed in both America and India.
I am excited for where you will take British Colonial policy after this. Because I can see it being focused around protecting the colonials holdings in India from hostile neighbors like the Maratha's or the Konbuang Dynasty of Burma.
So Arthur Phillip setting up New South Wales in Western Australia, while the Bengal Governor General will pours resources into Penang as a means of spreading their influence throughout the Malay Peninsula and Southeast Asia.
 
Looking forward to what happens to the British in Bengal and Bombay. Will Bengal be better or worse off than OTL?
In the short term no, probably not as far as living standards go for the average people. In the long run, Bengal being on its own is going to generate some significant ideological differences for how the British treat them and their positionality vis-a-vis the rest of India.
If the French Revolution still breaks out, they can’t help Mysore or their possessions in India.
Which is true and is part of why this timeline so far has been a chain of Mysorean successes, as plausible as they can be: they're going to need a remarkably solid base to survive the upcoming struggle.
I am excited for where you will take British Colonial policy after this. Because I can see it being focused around protecting the colonials holdings in India from hostile neighbors like the Maratha's or the Konbuang Dynasty of Burma.
So Arthur Phillip setting up New South Wales in Western Australia, while the Bengal Governor General will pours resources into Penang as a means of spreading their influence throughout the Malay Peninsula and Southeast Asia.
My hopes are to play off two different interests and two different strategies which OTL worked relatively well together and here are going to be displaying their limitations and weaknesses: the mercantilist and east-bound (especially to China) direction and the expansionist and west-bound direction, and the EEC and the British government. I'll get a chapter devoted to it in particular sometime in the next decade before the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars.

My thinking is that the British will turn their focus on Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Especially since the Dutch are in a no better situation than OTL, making their colonial holdings ripe for the taking in the French Revolutionary wars.
Plus the wars between Burma and Siam can be exploited to connect Penang to the Bengal Presidency
Burma's going to play a very important role in Indian developments eventually and it's going to be a platform for exploring some of the alternate ideologies and political structures that pop up in the timeline.
Fantastic timeline. Really great to see a new timeline focused on India and on Mysore in particular.

Can't wait to read more.
Thanks for the support!
 
My hopes are to play off two different interests and two different strategies which OTL worked relatively well together and here are going to be displaying their limitations and weaknesses: the mercantilist and east-bound (especially to China) direction and the expansionist and west-bound direction, and the EEC and the British government. I'll get a chapter devoted to it in particular sometime in the next decade before the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars.
Burma's going to play a very important role in Indian developments eventually and it's going to be a platform for exploring some of the alternate ideologies and political structures that pop up in the timeline.

I look forward to seeing how it turns out.
 
Chapter 6, The New Sultan: Tipu, Power, Politics, and Diplomacy
When the young, still barely 32 years old, Tipu Sultan rose to power in Mysore following the death of his father at the end of 1782, he was probably the most powerful single man in all of India, backed by the formidable Mysorean army, freshly victorious from the Second Anglo-Mysore War, and with ambitious plans for naval and territorial expansion. He was also, unlike his father, the formal king of Mysore, having assumed the Persian title of padisha and sidelined the the Mysorean raja, Chamaraja Wodeyar IX, the boy-king of Mysore, who remained raja but without the fiction of continuing to be in charge. Unlike Hyder Ali, who owed his rise to the Mysorean rajas and carefully respected them, Tipu was not so restrained.

Trying to determine the character of Tipu Sultan is a difficult endeavor, since he was inherently a difficult man to pin down. To start with, European sources on Tipu Sultan could disagree enormously: some insisted that he worked sparsely, devoting much of his day to studying religion, others speak of him working almost constantly, up to 16 hours a day. Beyond these obvious disagreements, there were also obvious tensions in his character, a man who was by all accounts deeply religious and highly Islamic, with his library possessing no fewer than 44 Korans - but also intensely educated in modern science and technology, with the same library also boasting no fewer than 19 books on arts and sciences, 7 on mathematics including a translation of Euclid's Elements, 20 books on astronomy (although given the focus on astrology in the era, there was no contradiction between an interest in astronomy and religion), 62 on physics, 45 on philology, 95 jurisprudence books, 118 on history, in addition to a significant number on ethics, sufism, and theology. His father Hyder Ali having been illiterate, he put great stress upon his son receiving a proper education, and this lust for learning and knowledge never left Tipu.

And so too, although engaged in near-constant war or hostility with the British, he also engaged British mercenaries and used British prisoners of war to translate large numbers of British books into his languages - of which he spoke Persian, Kannada, Arabic, Hindi/Urdu, Tamil, and various other Indian languages. He was an autocrat, but praised the American revolution. He embraced Islamic tradition, but also was intensely curious about European gadgets and machinery, delighted with microscopes, telescopes, and glasses, and wanted to learn about all of the newest European devices.

This was also reflected in his diplomatic interests abroad, within the first few years of him gaining the throne, with outreach to the Ottomans, the French, and the British, all of whom either received or were supposed to receive embassies. His relative degree of friendship was obvious: the embassy to the Ottomans spoke of the unity of Muslims against the infidels, adopted fraternal and adoring tones, and sought closer commercial ties, up to and including a mutual transfer of port concessions with Basra being leased to the Mysoreans and paid for, while the Ottomans would receive their own chosen port in India.

As it turned out, the embassy was something of a disaster: with four ships (the Fakhru'l Marakib, Nabi Bakhsh, Fat'h Shahi Mu'izzi and the galliot, Surati) dispatched and the better part of a thousand men, multiple ships burned down or sank, supply problems led to starvation and all of the elephants died en route, a Mysorean soldiery detachment supposed to demonstrate their martial prowess was refused access by the Ottomans unwilling to accept so many armed men in Istanbul, the trade of ports was rejected point blank, and with the Ottomans anxious for British support against the Russians, the proposed friendship was brushed aside. Tipu also had hoped to import coal, showing his interest in new science, and was under the impression it was common in Arabia, which it was… not. Furthermore attempts at importing Turkish craftsmen and machines ran into the problems that the Turks themselves were dependent upon the Europeans for many of them.

Although less grandiose, the embassy to France was more successful. Some of its plans, such as for a major French army to be sent to Mysore and paid for and commanded by the Mysoreans, were rejected in the context of the impending bankruptcy and outbreak of revolution, as well as inherent command, logistics, and political problems, but the Mysoreans made a good impression, especially with their gift giving of robes and fine Indian clothing to many high members of the French court. Furthermore, the object of importing French craftsmen, especially shipwrights, was genuinely taken positively and resulted in the dispatch of both French arms and skilled advisers. The Mysorean delegation greatly enjoyed their stay in Paris, fascinated by new French technologies, amazed by balloons that were taking to the sky of Paris in demonstrations of the Montgolfier brothers’ inventions, and found ice skating in the fields of La Glacière enchanting, almost ethereal, in what was otherwise a thoroughly horrific winter for the poor men of southern India.

The mission to England was given briefs castigating the British for their anti-Mysorean politics, calling them infidels, tyrants, traitorous, etc. and it’s probably for the best that it never made its way to Britain’s shores.

While Tipu was definitively an autocrat, factions and divergent factions within Mysore of course existed. In addition to the regular petty officials scheming for power and influence, a key element was the royalist faction aiming for a restoration of the Wodeyar dynasty, and led by Maharani Lakshmammanni, dowager queen. Although her formal power in the machinery of the state was minimal, she had started tentative negotiations with the British from as early as 1760, which escalated to a new scale when she sent her pradhan, or chief minister, Tirumala Rao, in 1776 to attempt negotiations with the British following Hyder Ali’s overruling of her preferences to choose his own choice, Chamaraja Wodeyar IX as raja. For such a dangerous mission, especially in Mysore where the paranoid Hyder Ali had an extensive network of informers and spies who gave rise to the line that even the walls and doors had ears, nomadic women playing the dolu drum were recruited as state informers (and occasionally to look out for comely women for Haidar’s harem) and where the Bechina Chavadi department was quite blithely charged with both postage and espionage, she promised him that upon restoration of the legitimate dynasty he would receive the post of diwan or prime minister, and a magnificent salary of a tenth of state revenue. Tirumala Rao functioned effectively as the representative of the Mysorean royal family with the British, although he was forced to flee the Carnatic, where he had previously been in residence at Tanjore, following the defeat of the British and their protected states. She also had contacts with other potential factions that might help with restoring the Wodeyars, particularly the Nizam and the Marathas.

She was not the only legitimist faction in Mysorean territory: there were also the the exiled Nawab of the Carnatic, Muhammad Ali Khan Wallahjah, who had been forced to flee as Mysorean troops approached Madras during the ending stages of the Second Anglo-Maratha War. Setting up court, alongside his family, in Calcutta, he waited in the wings for the possibility to reclaim his rightful kingdom from the Mysoreans as well as the Nizam.

More broadly, although linked to this, was the Sri Vaishnavas, more commonly known as the Mysorean Pradhans, the particular branch of Hinduism which had enjoyed patronage and support by the Wodeyars and which had helped make the Mysorean capital into an important center of learning and culture. Occupying significant parts of the administration, their loyalty to the regime was dubious, but they were indispensable to the smooth functioning of the state. In 1784 however, fresh from a wildly victorious war and with the spoils of the Carnatic to appoint, and any potential opposition to the regime silenced and military opposition crushed, Tipu was secure indeed upon his throne.

If there is one thing that can be agreed upon, it was that Tipu was proud, firm, and capable of decisive swings of opinion, with a fiery and powerful temper. In war, this firmness and force could serve him well: one of his greatest victories came during the First Anglo-Mysore War, when at the Battle of Mangalore in 1768, he had smashed the British army at Mangalore under General Smith, advancing so quickly that the British were completely unaware of his attack, routed the guards, drove the British fleeing before him, and entered Mangalore with the fleeing refugees and captured the entire British army. This had taken the British general, 46 European officers, 680 European soldiers, and 6,000 sepoys. There’s no doubt that Tipu was a dashing cavalry commander and a brilliant leader of men, widely respected by his troops, and he was at his best when he had the chance to actually fight as a battlefield commander and marshal his martial traits.

What marred this image was a streak of fanaticism in him, in terms of character and to some extent religion. This was not complete: his prime minister for example, was Hindu. He also participated in the Hindu festivities of his subjects, and even favored certain Hindu temples, most importantly the Ranganathaswamy temple in Seringapatam. But he routinely forced rebellious subjects to convert to Islam, tore down other temples, and could be a harsh and brutal man. This was duly exaggerated in British propaganda, but there is no doubt that he was utterly intolerant of any dissent, that he could torture foreign prisoners of war (British prisoners of war in the Second Anglo-Mysore War were routinely treated abysmally) and artisans and torture and assassinate dissidents.

If a comparison could be made to any figure, it might be to Louis XIV - a grand, a great man, but whose intolerance and bigotry drove away many of his subjects who would otherwise have been an important pillar of the state, who waged war after costly war, and who maintained the grandeur of the state on an unparalleled scale. As with Tipu this was married with a real love and affection for his troops, with schemes to support veterans and cripples, although Tipu also added when he could generosity for them in pay. If there was no Mysorean Hôtel des Invalides, it was not for want of good intentions.

Tipu was no modern man: there was no interest in education of the masses, there was no tolerance in him, no pluralism. But he was an educated man, highly intelligent, and as an autocrat, he meant to do what was best for his people - as he saw it. And this was combined with a determination to brook no rivals, and an unbreakable will that intended to carry out his plans. Mysore was to have a strong leader, and her history was to be one of grandeur et misère.
 
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Pretty fascinating exploration on the politics on the Mysorean sultanate. Although I am curious if Tipu Sultan will find more success in forming diplomatic relations with the Omani Empire. Especially as they had a history of being rivals and eventual partners with the British Empire, so it stands to reason that the Mysore Sultanate could fill that role as being a provide wood and food stuffs.
 
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