Sabotage!

  • NOTE: this capter has been edited and was formerly titled "One Tragedy in Savannah and Another in Havana" which rhymed but is no longer accurate since the changed timetable removes the hurricane from the picture. See Chapter 4 for Details.

    2. Jumping to Conclusions, From The Big apple to Havana

    The unfortunate fate of the new British-built destroyer Audaz in New York came at a particularly unfortunate time. This handsome vessel was one of the latest Spanish destroyers, a cornerstone of the navy's new strategy and one of two military technologies that Spain could claim to lead the world in, the other being the Submarine (the US was catching up however). It arrived alongside the new warship Carlos V, which Spain was proudly displaying as a symbol that it could again build world class ships in its own shipyards. Aboard the Audaz was admiral Fernando Villamil, an expert in Torpedo boat warfare and a pioneer of the destroyer. This was a friendly visit, meant to help bring about a detente in this long, drawn out conflict, though it would do precisely the opposite. On the night of May 13th (ominously, this was a Friday the 13th), while Villamil was attending a banquet ashore, the Audaz exploded without warning. The whole event occurred in am immensely tense atmosphere that turned the incident into a near crisis. The traditional narrative in Spain is that once they arrived in port, some surviving Spanish sailors reportedly said they were jeered at and taunted by angry Americans in boats in the harbor. There is no evidence that this actually happened and neither captain Villamil denied this ever happened. He did note being harassed by a handful of protestors on the shore waving signs related to Weyler and his Reconcentrados, but for the most part, he was welcomed in his say. More likely, the "suspicious boats" were nothing more than the usual maritime traffic in the harbor. Regardless, the blast was inconvenient and it alerted the Spanish to the strong possibility of war, while stirring significant passion in the nation, pent up from months of tension with the United States.

    It was also deadly; few men survived the accident and the wreck because it sank so rapidly and none witnessed the cause of the accident. It is widely believed that one of the torpedoes suffered a fault and detonated aboard the ship while being handled, as the blast appeared to come from inside the vessel. Though the navy never entertained the notion, some particularly nationalistic Spaniards initially responded with visceral outrage and absurd rumors spread throughout the country that the explosion was an act of sabotage by angry mobs of Americans and the conservative government, though it did not endorse them, was embarrassingly critical of the Americans and suggested that they had deliberately stirred up angry mobs and sabotage could have occurred as a result, possibly by Cuban Americans. They suggested that Villamil may have been the target of an assassination. Why exactly they thought somebody would blow up the whole ship and not check that their target was even on board is not clear but the Spanish circulars that spread these rumors were not in the business of fact checking. How could such a new vessel, many asked, suffer such a fate if not for foul play? Surely the skeptics said, this could be no accident. The majority of Spaniards accepted the investigation's findings but it took a to few weeks so the rumors kept spreading and the damage was done such that a time bomb, both figurative and literal, had been armed.

    Though the American government was still not actually expecting a war over the Audaz, the breakdown in trust after the incident was disconcerting and in response, it took an action that it felt would be relatively safe. The battleship Massachusetts, the second oldest but one of the most formidable in the US navy, sailed to Havana in the immediate aftermath of the incident with the intent to again provide some degree of protection to US citizens and assets during this latest crisis. Another battleship, the Maine, had done this earlier in the year and despite fears that her presence could escalate the conflict, Maine's presence was believed to have had a stabilizing effect on negotiations and reinforce the principle that the USA, while not aggressive, would still protect its citizens and their assets as it had in the past. Massachusetts, it was hoped, would have a smooth and uneventful voyage as the Maine had.

    The tragic loss of the ill-fated Battleship Massachusetts in Havana was the ultimate catalyst for the war and had come right as the mood was starting to shift such that people felt the worst was behind them. At approximately 5:45 AM on the 3rd of June 1898, a lone man slowly swam out to the battleship Massachusetts with the intention to destroy it. He carried a large, mine-like explosive charge with him to perform his deed and managed somehow to remain undetected until he was up against the ship. What happened in those few moments before the bomb detonated and whether the assailant ever intended to take his own life, we will never know, for the body was not recovered and the witnesses to the confrontation aboard the Massachusetts were killed in the blast as were the witnesses to the event who confronted him. Regardless of his plans, his deed crippled the mighty battleship and sent it to the bottom of the harbor by the morning, taking 14 American sailors with her, the death toll being relatively low thanks only to the tireless work by her crew to keep the ship afloat long enough for most men to get off. The Massachusetts remained barely afloat until finally coming to rest on the bottom of the harbor in shallow water around 9:00 AM, where it remained partially submerged for the remainder of the conflict.

    It is now generally accepted that a small group of very radical Cuban rebels obtained and detonated the large explosive charge on the battleship in an effort to draw the USA into the war. The truth over the matter was of course, covered up for months, and would shake the faith of the American people in their government as well as their press, for years to come, but for the time being, cooler heads did not prevail.

    The man believed to have masterminded the operation, oddly enough, appears to have been himself a Spanish-born political radical named Alfredo Torres* sympathetic to the Cuban cause and desperate to reignite the war. Few Cuban rebels actually approved of this action and he was nearly exposed when a colleague, upon learning of the intention to attack an American vessel, attempted to alert the colonial authorities and would have done so had Torres own allies not caught wind of his intentions and murdered the would be informant. Some first hand reports did indicate that Spain itself, or at least a rogue in the army, may indeed, as Hearst claimed, ordered the attack (some Americans still believe this) but the later American investigation would uncover, much to the horror of the investigators, that the Spanish account was quite accurate and that the attack had indeed been carried out by elements of the very Cuban revolutionaries the United States was fighting to protect.

    In the meantime, it became clear that the blast that had rocked Havana on that fateful morning of June 3rd, 1898 signaled the start of a war and it really didn't matter whether Spain had anything to do with the bombing. For the most part, the American public would not take long to jump to the conclusion that it was a sneak attack and came to believe so largely on their own. Within a mere day, the country cried out for an invasion of Cuba to avenge the Massachusetts even before the ship herself could be raised and, hopefully, repaired. As far as they were concerned and as far as the papers said, the Spanish authorities had ordered the USS Massachusetts sunk as revenge for the loss of their own ship a few weeks prior and so, they must have hoped to pass it off as another accident or to blame the Cuban insurgents.

    It all made perfect sense to most Americans, who still believed that the Spaniards blamed the US for their own accident in New York. "It
    is in the nature of the hot blooded Latin races to react to a perceived slight in the most rash of ways..." wrote one article "...and we can see quite clearly from the outrageous opinions in his periodicals that the Spaniard, contrary to the words of his treacherous government, holds our nation and its ideals in utter disdain."

    Such claims were taken at face value and ironically, with furor over the
    Massachusetts at full volume, the American backlash to the perceived Spanish outcry was beginning to grow more aggressive in tone than the latter's own actual response. After years of being fed stories of Spanish atrocities in Cuba, the crisis had at last come to a head in the most insulting way imaginable and the resulting hysteria led to riots all along the coast in fear of Spanish warships and spies. There were even reports of mysterious dirigibles in the sky. Rumors speculated that the Spanish were planning to cooperate with the Kaiser against the USA.

    Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, Canovas’s government, convinced that this was the trigger they had been expecting for the past year, began to take every precaution available to them to either diffuse the situation or prepare for the long-feared Yankee invasion. In their last ditch attempt to avoid a showdown, the colonial authorities frantically attempted to round up the guilty parties suspected in the Massachusetts incident, investigated the incident swiftly and extremely harshly (which actually created complications of its own). They even offered monetary compensation to the US for the loss of life under their watch, as well as a willingness to assist in raising the ship so that it could be towed back to the United States and, inevitably, vendicate the colonial government’s account of the disaster. Indeed, for a brief period of time, the Spanish public, who did not have any doubts as to the party responsible for the act, was suddenly quite sympathetic to the Americans, and hoped that the event would end their love affair with the rebels. They underestimated the momentum of the American cause however, and none of their efforts to prove guilt would matter to the American people, who were well aware of the Spanish response to their accident in the US. It would not matter to McKinley either: as far as he was concerned, he could tolerate the chaos in Cuba no more and regardless of who had blown up the ship (though if it did turn out to be the Rebels, this was to be concealed), the situation in Cuba was clearly untenable because Spain could clearly not even provide the most basic security from such an attack, even when it claimed to be mopping up the last of the rebel forces (it had claimed that the war was virtually won since at least March). The United States was now prepared to end this seemingly endless crisis on its Southern frontier once and for all and Spain would pay. The United States navy under admiral William T. Sampson began preparations to enforce a blockade of Cuba and seize the island, beginning to implement the plans within 24 hours of Massachusetts' sinking. Meanwhile, and to nobody's surprise, an ultimatum was quietly prepared demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Cuba by Spain, to be delivered immediately after the investigation released it reports, regardless of what they found. "
    Avenge the Massachusetts" was the battle cry. Unofficially, and despite substantial effort to discourage such vulgarity among enlisted men, variations on the less dignified "Remember the Mass, We'll Kick Spain's Ass!" could be heard as well. By the end of July, both the Spanish and American investigations had determined that the blast was a deliberate attack, but the Americans refused to acknowledge the Spanish claims of who was responsible.

    * Placeholder name for a totally Fictional person inspired by "anarchists" of the day. I'll try to think of something clever or find a specific person in history to fill the role of the saboteur.



    USS Massachusetts.png

    The USS Massachusetts (BB-2) sinking in shallow water in Havana, June 3rd, 1898 approximately 8:30 AM, not long before it came to rest on the bottom.

    This Photo is from US Navy National Museum.

    This one shows the ship sinking near Fort Pickens in Florida after being used as Target practice. The Naval museum photo I posted was posted on atlas obscura and the wreck is a dive site; you can see pictures of it there. This is a big reason for the choice of this ship, though I may go back and change the Massachusetts to another vessel later if I decide its necessary for the story to work. BTW, try and ignore that cage mast for now.
     
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    Background: weapons
  • Since I hinted at it and I know you're curious, I want to establish the technological situation and how it differs from OTL.

    Prologue: Technological Transitions

    The Spanish-American war fell in an awkward time in terms of the technology available. Many telegraph cables ran around the world, even beneath the Atlantic, and allowed nearly instantaneous communication over vast distances. New telephone lines allowed speech to be transmitted as well. At the same time, wireless communication had scarecely left the laboratory, thus, while a telegraph in Cuba could send a message across the sea to Madrid in an instant, any ships just off shore had to still communicate with visual signals. Extensive railways and steamships allowed rapid movement of material throughout the civilized world, and many of the uncivilized parts as well but the automobile was a rare novelty. Electrification proceeded rapidly but still could not keep up with demand. The Spanish American war would even feature some of the first motion pictures and audio recordings of any war in history. All around the world the potential of the vast numbers of new innovations developed from the era were in the process of being implemented.

    So it was with weapons technology as well. The muzzleloading musket, whose fundamental design resembled the first arquebuses of old, had at last given way to a rapid firing breech loader. Even gunpowder itself, the very source of the word firearm, was fast becomming obsolete. Newer chemical propellants were several times more powerful than black powder and nearly smokeless when ignited. But of all the weapons technologies that made a name for themselves in the dreadful little war of 1898, the so-called machine gun was the most famous. In fact, most of the weapons used would not qualify as such by the modern definition for they were powered by hand cranks rather than recoil or gas-operated mechanisms.

    Nevertheless, the origins of these lethal contraptions dated all the way back to Dr. Gatling's famous revolving gun, a weapon which would emerge during the American civil war but prove its worth on the plains in the Indian wars. Here, in 1874, general George A. Custer of the 7th cavalry managed to hold off a far larger band of Sioux warriors using his Gatling guns, and though the Lakota were arguably victorious in the end, Custer himself did manage to escape and his last stand would have been nothing but a massacre without those guns. The US army was thoroughly convinced of the value of such weapons and so was the rest of the world. Orders rolled in from around the world, as Custer's story and his flamboyant personality would, ironically, lend a sort of oddly grim romanticism to a gun whose designer hoped would prove a deterrent by sheer virtue of its firepower. Britain, Russia, France, China and many others wanted to get their hands on the new weapon. Its actual usefulness was limited by its sheer mass, though later versions became far lighter and more practical than the 7th Cavalry's comparatively cumbersome machines. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of Custer's supposedly triumphant last stand, the Gatling fad was such that it would stifle innovation and adoption of other weapons for some time. Hiram Maxim, the American inventor who developed the first truly automatic weapon found that the United States military had no interest in his weapon and he would find only lukewarm support in Europe as well. The famous gun, though developed years earlier, wouldn't find significant use until about 1890.

    In the meantime, a third design was gaining traction in a few other nations: the Gardner gun. William Gardner sought to build a lighter and simpler rival to Gatling's carriage-mounted gun and conceived of a simple, twin barreled (usually) piece with a hand crank. Each turn of the crank would chamber, fire and extract two rounds from the barrels in a beautifully simple but effective mechanism. Its rate of fire was lower than Gatling's revolving weapon but the little Gardner's practicality made up for that in other ways. The gun's mechanism was reliable, sturdy, and most of all, lightweight. It was uniquely well suited to colonial campaigns but attracted essentially no interest whatsoever from the US military and was rejected by the Royal navy after testing went wrong due to a faulty prototype embarassingly jammed many times (some believe it may have been sabotaged, but the conditions at the test site and dirt getting into an unperfected mechanism are more likely to blame). Though Gardner managed to correct most of the mechanism's fundemental problems, the damage had been done and the British would find another design more to their liking. Indeed, As the Americans refined the venerable Gatling gun the British experimented with the other gun the Americans had rejected: the fully automatic Maxim. But the dijected Gardner had one last chance to prove a design that he knew was sound and he would find his vindication across the channel. From almost the moment William Gardner landed there, the French took a particular interest in his new weapon. Soon, Gardner's refined prototype gave a flawless demonstration in Paris and wowed military men. His timing was good, to be fair. After the Franco Prussian war, the French army was fascinated with the idea of a more effective successor to the famously flawed early machine gun, the Reffye Mitrailleuse. They had dabbled with the Gatling and found it impressive in its own right. The Gardner's simplicity suited quick local manufacture and its weight suited colonial campaigns and the Frencfh felt they had stumbled upon a weapon design uniquely valuable, and one they could develop on their own. Thus, by the 1890s, French and Belgian (which also took a keen interest) arsenals had produced thousands of the iconic Gardner Mitrailleuse, and had put considerable energy into refining them to the fullest possible extent, producing guns able to handle very rough conditions yet still lighter in weight. In a sense, they were perfectly tailored for colonial battles. Though the very early Gardners struggled even more than the Gatling in dusty or sandy environments, some clever French modifications largely eliminated the problem. In fact, the improved Gardner was arguably the most dependable gun until the late-model Maxim machine guns of the early 20th century.

    The Spanish army had been fighting two long colonial campaigns in Cuba and the Philippines. They had experimented with Gatling guns in the hopes of using them for a sort of shock and awe effect against Cuban and Filipino rebels but found the heavy carriages difficult to use in mountainous jungles and the pieces to be very expensive. Spanish troops often simply left the Gatlings behind and, in contrast to the British in Southern Africa, had little good to say of their utility in actual fighting. They were heavy, stuck in the mud and the models tested jammed frequently. From 1895, they had also purchased some Maxim guns,which they hoped would provide a modern, lightweight alternative. These too proved unsatisfactory, for the expensive Maxim (the earlier models were difficult to use in such conditions) seemed even more prone to jam in their service and few spare parts were forthcoming. However, the French, Italian and Belgian-built Gardners would prove far better suited to their needs. Its durability and simplicity, refined by this time, made it absolutely ideal for the environment in Cuba. The mere sound of the gun's rapid firing was rather intimidating. Though the earlier models would still often jam like the other early machine guns, it was also easier to clear these than was the case with its rivals and the newer colonial models in French service were exceptionally reliable. Its tremendous affordability was of particular benefit (as Spain's military budget had been tested by the war in Cuba). This was possible not only because the gun was simple to make and maintain but because it was available in large quantities at rock-bottom prices secondhand from the French, Italians and Belgians with some newer examples being built under license in Bilbao from 1896. By 1898, Spanish troops had begun to make frequent use of the Gardner* and had used it to good effect in several engagements with Cuban rebels. As such, they shipped over scores of these primitive machine guns in the months leading up to the war.

    Gardner.png

    Classic Victorian Firepower: The famed Gardner machine gun, this one of the water jacketed variety, common in Spanish service in the 1890s. Each revolution of the crank fires two rounds. It is said that an enthusiastic gunner could nearly match the smaller Gatling models in rate of fire. American soldiers would refer to these lethal machines as 'coffee grinders'. These iconic symbols of the Spanish-American war are exceedingly rare today. This particular example was captured in pristine condition in 1899 and is on display in Havana at the Presidential Palace.

    (Actual Image Source: usarmamentcorp.com)

    Note: the other armament is basically the same and the biggest Spanish advantages remain their new Mauser-designed rifles. Their Krupp mountain guns are also of considerable value.


    * By this time, France, Belgium, Italy and Spain had all experimented with the single barrel, twin barrel and 5-barrel versions and found the twin barrel by far the most satisfactory in combat, though some 5-barrel models were used on gunboats.
     
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    On to the Caribbean!
  • IMPORTANT UPDATE: CHANGES TO THE TIMELINE

    I warned you those dates were tentative. I’m pushing the accident and the bombing back along with the whole timeline. I need to give the two parties a chance to make an investigation into the incident but I don't want the war to drag too far into hurricane season. The US didn’t declare war IOTL without an investigation and I'm fairly sure that they wouldn’t declare it TTL either. The investigation goes forward and releases its findings in late June. You can see how it went down in the retconned post. For a TLDR, more detail in Spoiler:
    The first ship that explodes will also be changed because the new timetable removes the hurricane, so it never stops in the USA. The ship is no longer the protected cruiser, but is instead a new Spanish Destroyer on tour somewhere in the US with Villamil, who is visiting to demonstrate the vessel. Carles V is there too. In fact, OTL, IIRC when the Maine exploded Vizcaya was visiting New York. Lepanto is possibly in the Philippines. The new accident is possibly from a faulty torpedo and it happens on May 13th. The Massachusetts bombing/sinking is now June 3rd and it IS raised and investigated, but the design of these ships, specifically the odd placement of fuel bunkers, tells me that the damage from a hit like this is going to be worse than I had anticipated so she won’t see combat again. The actual war is declared on July 1st, the fleet, leaves August 12 and it arrives August 27th. This is a slightly accelerated version of the OTL sequence but both countries are going in with a bigger chip on their respective shoulders.

    With that out of the way, here's the next update.

    Opening Moves: The Race to The Caribbean


    Prime Minister Antonio Canovas del Castillo was confident in his country’s ability to wage war. Most of the country felt confident as well. Spanish politicians dismissed the Americans as a rabble of enthusiastic fools, accustomed to comfortable, peaceful life, made up of too many immigrants and likely to crumble when faced with real combat against battle-hardened Spaniards. The minister of the navy Sigismundo Bermejo, boasted of its superiority even though, in reality, most of the navy was well aware of its severe limitations and made them explicitly clear. Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, the commander of the fleet in Cadiz, was notoriously pessimistic. This was to the point that he had come to annoy some of his colleagues. He had made several proposals for remaining in home waters in anticipation of an American attack on the Canary islands and on Spain’s own weakly defended coasts. The argument had its supporters within the Navy but the rest of the government wouldn't buy it. Indeed, though this plan was probably the safest, its unpopularity within the government and the navy was completely understandable. From a purely military standpoint, the Spanish command was now increasingly confident that the USA’s current plans did not include provisions for an attack on Spain itself until the war in Cuba had been won. At that point, there would be no reason to continue fighting. Some also argued that even if Cervera’s plan went perfectly and the Spanish made perfect use of some of their innovative new weapons, the chances of winning an open engagement home weren’t much bigger than in Cuba. But the best arguments against remaining at home were political and psychological. The Spanish forces in Cuba would surely suffer a collapse in morale if they were to be informed that there was no rescue squadron forthcoming. The stakes were as high in Europe. If the country lost this war without so much as attempting to defend the colonies, there was no guarantee that civil order could be maintained at home. After all, what would the government say if it let the Yankees overrun the colonies and then let them charge into the home country's waters as well? It would make Spain appear not merely weak and irrelevant but cowardly as well. This could not be tolerated; the Spaniard of 1898 would readily admit that his country had fallen behind in the 19th century but he would never allow it to fall further without a fight. This was the hour of redemption yet it was also the hour of the quixotic last stand, for Spain's most famous literary figure was also a good metaphor for the nation's mindset that summer.

    By the time of the Massachusetts incident, it had already been decided that a large squadron would sail at a moments notice, most likely from Cape Verde, as this was the most proximate place to both the Caribbean and the Spanish supply lines. From there, it could move onward to San Juan Puerto Rico within no more 14 to 15 days. The ships would sail under Cervera, who dutifully agreed despite his statements othewrwise. In fact, Cervera's pessimism is probably exaggerated; he was the man most responsible for setting the country's rotting navy on the course to becoming a reasonably functional fighting force. He was thorough, methodical and organized in a way that defied the American expectations of the Spanish navy, which they wrongly assumed would be lead by incompetent dinosaurs.

    The US navy's battleship-heavy fleet greatly overshadowed this squadron. It's strength, armor and technology were the epitome of America, a land with seemingly limitless resources. The battleships, if massed together in even a moderate force, could easily demolish the entire Spanish navy in a head one fight. Nevertheless, the Spanish squadron was actually quite formidable as it was and its large force of similarly fast and potent protected cruisers would earn admiration from Alfred Mahan in his 1899 assessment of the conflict. This Spanish squadron boasted an impressive 7 modern armored cruisers: Carlos V, Cristobol Colon, Vizcaya, Almirante Oquendo, Vizcaya, Princesa de Asturias, and Cardenal Cisneros. Trailing them was the aging but still powerful battleship Pelayo. This unique, French-built ship just barely had the range to reach the Antilles but whose armor and firepower theoretically gave even some of the American battleships a run for their money and inspired considerable concern amongst the American forces as they awaited its arrival.

    An additional force of 4 destroyers and a number of torpedo boats accompanied the fleet as well, among the best such forces in the world as well as 12 auxiliary cruisers and a number of colliers, the Spanish having experimented with seagoing resupply techniques years before anyone else (this innovation is often overlooked in naval history). The destroyer contingent was led by the legendary Admiral Fernando Villaamil, the pioneer of the torpedo Boat destroyers, expert in torpedo boat warfare and undoubtedly the most fascinating and charismatic Spanish military commander of the entire war. His tragic experience in New York, where an accident could have taken his like, did not shake his faith in the new vessels and indeed is force was to do the unthinkable: return to New York City and attack it. Doing so would divert disproportionate American attention away so far from the Caribbean that it might break the Blockade. Though it seems difficult to believe in this day and age, the American defenses of the time were terribly weak and outdated in a time when technology moved at its fastest. The torpedo boats were diminutive compared to their enemies but they were so fast that it was believed that the ships could make their raid and use their tremendous speed advantage to escape the slower, heavily armored American ships. It's role would be minor in actual impact but significant in its legacy.

    In Cuba itself, a small force of gunboats remained at anchorage in Havana, Cienfuegos and Santiago, where they waited in anticipation of the blockade. These ships were in poor condition for the most part yet managed to make a nuisance of themselves throughout the war. A single Peral type submarine was also stationed in Havana, one of 3 such vessels in the navy and the only one overseas. They were built against great odds and considerable opposition but represented an impressive leap in technology. The submarine was equipped with electric propulsion as well as a gasoline engine to recharge the batteries on the surface (though it generally just plugged into the shore at the docks). But all these ships were ultimately a side show and the Spanish armies in Cuba were aware that things were getting tense. The risk of hurricanes was growing considerable but this also meant that the Americans would adopt a more cautious approach, increasing the odds of evading detection. As expected, the Spanish squadron departed August 12, 1898, upon the declaration of war, and disappeared for 16 days, slowing down as they approached the Antilles, hoping to conserve coal, avoid stressing the engines, which could not easily be repaired. The also had to keep the Pelayo from falling too far behind, for she was among the slowest vessels. Cervera had full freedom to decide where he would emerge, thus, no one knew when or where he would appear, though the Americans were pretty sure it would probably be somewhere around Puerto Rico.

    Astonishingly, the Americans were more conflicted as to their best strategy than were the Spanish. For several years, debates raged in the navy as to the best method of fighting Spain at sea. There were probably only three things that were unanimously agreed upon: that a victory at Sea would decide the war, that Cuba would be Blockaded from the start and that as few ships as possible should be wasted on defending America’s East Coast, even though in reality, none of those things would be entirely true. Most pressing was what to do with the flying squadron. An attack on Spain itself, it was hoped, would force Cervera to return home immediately. On the other hand, attacking Puerto Rico at the outset of Hostilities could deny the Spanish the use of that vital base. In the end, the Americans were aware that the Spanish were likely to attack the coast so the squadron would instead be sent to Hampton roads to protect the US coast. This would ultimately prove to be a controversial decision because it denied Sampson access to a larger, more potent fleet as the enemy approached. It also squandered the opportunity to attack the Spanish Coast and thereby likely force the enemy to recall most of his own fleet to defend the metropol.

    At the outbreak of war, Theodore Roosevelt, though, better remembered for his participation in the battle of Santiago on land, was the secretary of the Navy under President McKinley. He, more than anyone, had been convinced of the inevitability of a war with Spain and had made many preparations and plans for just such an event, with little doubt after the incident in Havana that war would be declared immediately upon the conclusion of Sampson’s investigation; after all, even Spain admitted that the vessel had been attacked. So when the findings were released at the end of the month, the declaration of war was little more than a formality; the US had been massing its navy in Key West from almost the day of the incident. Now, the mighty US fleet, brimming with battleships, was ready to enforce a blockade of Cuba immediately and did so in short order. The Flying squadron under Winfield Scott Schey had the USS Brooklyn, Texas and a few light cruisers offering him a good combination of speed and firepower but removing it from the Caribbean. In particular, Brooklyn might have proven a valuable asset and was one of America's few armored cruisers (the nation having focused on powerful battleships and heavy coast defense ships) that could match and exceed their Spanish counterparts.

    It was of the utmost importance that the Spanish squadron be spotted as soon as possible so that it could be determined where it was going such that the navy would have a chance to bring its far superior firepower to bear. Admiral Sampson sent a large number of scouts, including Harvard and Yale, to the windward islands in anticipation of Cervera’s arrival. He left some ships guarding Key West and others in Havana as these were high value targets: if Cervera made directly for Havana, he was virtually untouchable behind its shore batteries. On the other hand, if Cervera reached the Antilles and found out that Key West, the most important naval base for the US fleet, was weakly defended, he would be sure to strike there and inflict severe damage, opening the road to potentially strike at Tampa, where the army had been assembling. Sampson would also personally oversee an attack on San Juan on August 27th, with the USS New York, the USS Iowa and the USS Indiana as well as a handful of cruisers and monitors (which had slowed him down considerably), hoping to test the forts and intercept Cervera. However, as with Manila, Santiago, Havana and Cienfuegos, the city's fortifications had been dramatically beefed up and had a variety of coast defense guns, including a handful of very large caliber Ordonez and Hontoria pieces, as well as smaller howitzers which could also reach the US ships at closer range. The harbor was also known to have been recently mined, so the Americans were wary of approaching closely and their accuracy was very poor at that range. Because of this, damage to the Spanish fortifications was minimal. Instead, the shells, fired from a great distance, would often fly into the city and a fair amount deal of damage there. In fact, civilian deaths exceeded military ones at this point and the citizens of San Juan, under the misconception that Sampson was deliberately attempting to inflict damage to the city, tended to rally around their Spanish garrison. But Sampson knew he had an opportunity to do some real damage and was concerned that he would not be able to accomplish much of anything if he continued with this excessively cautious strategy. Even as the old Castillo el Morro itself was damaged, most of the shore batteries appeared almost totally intact, almost mocking him from shore as they fired ineffectually at his ships.

    Sampson, now thoroughly unimpressed with Spanish gunnery and determined to inflict some kind of substantial damage, decided that he could confidently m,ake another bombardment attempt and brought the battleships closer, hoping he could concentrate fire on the main batteries and destroy them before leaving Puerto Rico, a decision which proved to be a miscalculation. At first, it seemed to be working. Several guns went silent and the amount of enemy fire was decreasing. The USS Indiana and Iowa could shrug off most of the fire but the armored cruiser New York was more vulnerable. Determined to knock the big gun battery out so that Cervera could not hole up in the harbor, she ventured just a little too close for a vessel of its armor, probably under 1000 yards. Sampson himself had warned his own ships not to close any further and only pressed to such extreme range when the USS Detroit, in a foolish attempt at glory-seeking, disobeyed his orders and went absurdly close. It would be not the Detroit but Sampson and his flagship who would pay the price for such stupidity. On the approach, New York somehow received a direct hit from one of the big howitzers, possibly a 305mm Ordonez, near the waterline. The shell punched a gaping hole in New York's 4 inch armor and killed 6 sailors on the spot, with a dozen and a half more injured. Water poured in and a fire raged aboard the vessel but American crews managed to seal it off and keep her in good condition. Sampson moved to the Iowa as his own flagship had been badly damaged in an encounter that he expected to be an easy preemptive strike, or at the very least, a punitive engagement.

    It was a fitting place to run into such a wall though. Throughout history, San Juan Puerto Rico's defenses have enjoyed a particularly illustrious reputation. In centuries past, its immense fortifications had repelled the mightiest fleets that the English and Dutch could muster. Now, even in the twilight of the Spanish empire, the old forts managed to live up to their reputation. Though with unlimited time Sampson would have reduced the guns of San Juan, unlimited time he did not have. He had hoped that his powerful battleships stood a chance of defeating Cevera on their own but his wily foe had still failed to appear. Sampson began to wonder if Cervera had turned back or run into a hurricane. It may well have been that he wasn't even headed for San Juan. After all, it was such an obvious target, for all Sampsoin knew, Cervera jhad anticipated this or was aware of his own force already. Furthermore, with his other cruisers too weak to actually handle the expected enemy and the monitors as slow as molasses, he was growing ever more concerned about whether his own squadron had the ability to handle the full Spanish force. With his own flagship seriously compromised, Sampson decided to pull off the Puerto Rico attack early; the harbor defenses were clearly too strong to justify continued bombardment and the idea of landing a force here was losing traction in the US military. The Puerto Ricans seemed to be unusually loyal to the mother country and the whole Puerto Rican Campaign was looking more and more difficult to justify as long as Cuba, the main target in this war, remained secure in enemy hands, which would continue unless the partial blockade could be made more effective. More urgently, Cervera's phantom squadron could still not be found and the US ships were already so scattered that there was a very real possibility that Cervera could concentrate his force and make it straight to Cuba, bypassing Puerto Rico entirely. Auxiliary cruisers would remain off the island to maintain the blockade, staying out of range of the guns. Though Sampson believed he had managed to knock some of the city's guns out, the Spanish regarded the defense of San Juan as a major victory, with the military in Puerto Rico wiring back (incorrectly) that they had repelled an attempted invasion.

    To make matters worse, the USS Oregon, desperately needed on the other side of the continent, had made a mad dash for the Atlantic but Sampson believed that by now, it was likely to just miss the hunt for Cevera’s squadron. Had the Oregon been able to arrive just a day or two sooner, the course of the war might have been very different, that is, much shorter. It was ironic that the US had a fleet which should easily have been able to defeat Spain’s but was, in Alfred Mahan’s view, just half again too small to do so while maintaining all of its other tasks.



    Next: The Pacific. Then Cervera's Arrival and the Oregon's too.
     
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    Dewey's Plan
  • Dewey's Plan, Montojo's Defense


    Admiral George Dewey had taken his squadron to and from the Western Pacific Multiple times. The difficulties associated with this voyage were somewhat improved when the US decided to annex Hawaii earlier that year but until a Canal through the Isthmus could be constructed, Dewey was very isolated in Hong Kong. Though he would have liked more ships, he had only four cruisers, of which his flagship, Olympia, was by far the strongest. A fifth ship, the USS Monterrey, was en route to Hawaii but he did not intend to wait for it to arrive. He was confident that he had enough power to destroy his foe's fleet in Manila, which had but one decent ship, the Lepanto, and even she was not really a match for Olympia or Boston. The defenses at Manila were considerable and Dewey's main worry was that the harbor defenses would be impenetrable and that he would have to withdraw empty handed. The new coast defense guns and mines were reportedly installed but he had no way of knowing if they would be a major threat. If he could not seize Manila, the Americans were concerned that the Germans might show up and interfere with the conflict. Typhoons were another worry, as the Philippine islands were very prone to them and one such storm could cost him time coal and possibly even ships. Had he been able to get the Oregon to sail West rather than to the Atlantic, he would have had overwhelming force at his disposal and could probably have cracked even the new defenses. He did however have one secret weapon: Emilio Aguinaldo, the Philippine rebel whom the Spanish had just barely managed to defeat and who was living in exile in Hong Kong.

    Aguinaldo, in exile in Hong Kong, was eager to resume command of the rebels in the islands and Dewey was all too abliged to transport him there. With some difficulty, he had arranged for the Rebel leader to land after he had reduced Manila and decapitated the Spanish forces. If this was possible, a contingent of American soldiers could follow later, probably after the monsoon season ended in October. These forces would also prevent the Germans from intervening, as the Spanish had actively courted them throughout the year. Dewey believed that they would attempt to land in Manila and declare it a neutral. Such an act should, by any reasonable definition, constitute an entry into the war on Spain's side but as dastardly and underhanded as that would be, he wouldn't be able to challenge them if they did unless his fleet could do it job. From there, the revolution would surely reignite as coals before a bellow and Aguinaldo would, hopefully, march on the Spanish with ease, but with the German threat, he hesitated to transport him until that occurred. However, barring a typhoon of the magnitude that struck this island one year ago, he believed he could at least maintain a blockade with ease, particularly if he could sink the pesky Lepanto. If Dewey failed to take the city, he could blockade it while Aguinaldo and the American soldiers could lay siege to manila, forcing Montojo's ships out so that he could destroy them. He had gone over the plan many times and was quite confident that it would succeed if executed properly, but he still worried greatly about the mines. His previous plans had been based around the assumption that Spain had too few of them and that they were too old to be in service. Montojo had just ordered a new batch of anti-ship mines. The American commander had more experience attacking shore batteries than just about any other man in the Navy but he had much less experience with mines. Nevertheless, he believed that if he could wipe out the shore batteries, he could sail past the mines by sticking carefully to the deep water channel in the harbor, then the rest of the minefield could be cleared with gunfire and fishing boats later at his leisure.

    When the declaration of war did come, the British authorities informed Dewey that he had to vacate the harbor in 24 hours, which he was well prepared to do. He set course for the Philippine islands hoping that that the Spanish had neglected the islands so thoroughly that even their recent retrofits would make little difference. To make absolutely certain that this was the case, he would test the guns weaker guns at Subic bay, another good anchorage north of Manila, before deciding whether to attack Montojo outright. Dewey hoped that could take the islands quickly, he might deliver a crippling severe blow to the Spanish empire before its main squadron even met with Sampson's ships.


    Montojo was much more concerned. He had at last received some of what he requested. The mines and coastal defenses had been upgraded to an extent and he had one fairly good ship, but upon hearing that the vast majority of the armada had made for the Caribbean, he believed he had little hope of relief. Montojo was an older gentleman but his experience in the navy was considerable. Having fought in Spain's relatively pointless South American wars over 30 years earlier, he realized quite acutely the dangers of being stranded far from home. But he also remembered that Dewey was in a position not unlike his own in Callao. If Dewey could be repulsed, then the Philippines might not be lost. If he could not, then the empire was finished in Asia. Knowing that his smaller vessels were useless in defense, he scattered most of the ships, save for the Reina Cristina and the Lepanto, about the archipelago, figuring that they could cause more trouble for the Americans in that way than sitting in Manila, particularly that they might harass any transports, though the state of the vessels might preclude them from doing much of anything. Hopefully at least one would make it to Guam and inform the island that the war had begun. The Americans were without a base here and they could capture that island easily at any time in the war; Spain's planned defensive upgrades had never reached that remote outpost, even though construction of a new battery should have begun by now. One bit of good news did arrive though: A telegraph from Spain informed him that the Oregon would not be making for Asia and was en route to the Caribbean, where it would replace the Massachusetts and face the main Spanish fleet. He believed that his own harbor defenses might just be able to throw Dewey's own plans off, but he also knew that they had yet to be put to the test.

    Meanwhile, Kaiser Wilhelm, increasingly angered by the American actions and concerned about that country's reach, ordered his own Asiatic squadron, which far outclassed Dewey's, to shadow the Americans like vultures. This, in many ways, was more concerning to the Americans than were the Spanish. They were right to mistrust the Kaiser but other, more immediate worries would soon surface, though "surface" may be a poor choice of words.

    BTW, let's get this out in the open: there was at least one typhoon in the Philippines in Autumn 1898. A storm passed near Northeast Luzon on October 1st and a ship there read about 961 mbar. This suggests low cat 3 with ~110 mph sustained winds. It is not currently intended to play any significant part in the story but I don't want to forget it's there later.
     
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    Oregon's Last Stand


  • The Tragic Voyage of the USS Oregon

    There is perhaps no event more unnecessary or more directly tied to the USA's eagerness to fight a quick, decisive war than the loss of the Oregon.

    The whole incident actually occurred almost entirely because of Cevera's unexpected choice of ports. The cautious admiral had bypassed Puerto Rico, fearing an ambush and thus made for French Martinique instead, where he could reasonably make for a number of ports depending on the location of the American forces. As he finally approached Martinique on the night of August 27 the people of the island, those who were still awake at least, marveled as dozens of Spanish warships, belching black smoke and bristling with guns, slipped into the harbor under the bright nearly full moon, a sight nobody on this normally quiet tropical island would ever have expected to see. Cervera himself did not realize how impeccable his timing was; Sampson had left his blockade of San Juan that very day with a sizable fleet and was now en route to Cuba. Cervera however, had assumed that the Americans would be awaiting him in San Juan and had planned on making a dash for Santiago directly, which was likely to be as yet unguarded. Learning that his foe had just departed San Juan and that the flying squadron remained far away in Hampton roads, where it anticipatEd an attack in the coast, he was tempted to make for San Juan once again. On the other hand, he realized that he could indeed run under their noses to Cuba. Doing so could mean calling off the planned raid on New York by Villaamil but it would be worth it if he could avoid the enemy because it would place him within striking distance of Havana itself. Then again, it now seemed that San Juan, with its mighty defenses, was open to his fleet and Puerto Rico was likely a safer refuge than Santiago, where remnants of the rebel armies still held out in the countryside. As Cevera diligently poured over the latest information in his cables, he noticed another remarkable opportunity, albeit a very risky one.

    The USS Oregon, the USA's second mightiest battleship after the Iowa, had been sailing East from California, where she was built, to join the fleet in the Atlatnic. She had made impressive time on this epic journey, having kept a good schedule even in the face of Tierra Del Fuego's foul weather. Oregon had left Bahia Brazil not long before the Spanish squadron's arrival in the Caribbean and Cervera was quite certain that she would make port in British Barbados soon (a conjecture which would prove to be correct). Once there, she would promply join the main fleet and add her considerable firepower to its already overwhelming advantage. Still, he reasoned that if he could ambush the battleship and and send his ships in like picadors against a bull. These ships could hopefully deal a finishing blow to the beast with their self-propelled torpedoes.

    There is little doubt that a degree of luck factored into this timing but Cevera's judgement allowed him to take advantage of it. He decided, after great deliberation, that he would try to sink the American ship. By now, the Americans were well aware of his position and it was time to act, so he sailed light on the evening of the 28th to intercept Oregon just as she arrived in Barbados. He had initially sailed West, making for Dutch Curacao but in reality, this was something of a feint, for he soon changed course and headed Southeast to engage Oregon, just 100 or so miles away. The Oregon, on its own, would have made mincemeat of any of his ships, perhaps even Pelayo. But together, he reasoned, they might just have enough firepower to take her down.

    As Captain Charles Clark arrived in Barbados, he found the British authorities more than cooperative, and they offered plenty of coal for him to reach any reasonable US port. At the same time, he felt a sense of dread come over him. The Spanish fleet had arrived so very soon and for whatever reason, had arrived far closer to his chosen port than he had ever suspected. "Why weren't they at Puerto Rico", he wondered? Clark had heard that his enemy was steaming Westward from Martinique and hoped that this was an attempt to head for Cuba but he was concerned that this would not be the case. Unfortunately, he had but 24 hours in this neutral port, after which, he had to hope that his foe would make haste and ignore his ship. As he readied the Oregon to sail Northwards, he heard a horrifying piece of news: the Spanish had indeed looped backward and were headed straight for his location with the intent to engage Oregon at sea. With only a few hours before the British expelled his ship from port, Clark decided to make a run for it and leave as soon as he could. Leaving now would at least give him some chance to give chase rather than let his enemy position themselves and snare him. No sooner did he leave the harbor when he remarked on the ominous sight of the smoke billowing from dozens of Spanish ships on the horizon. Here he had a ship far superior to any of them and yet, there seemed to be a score of them headed his way. At this point, it was clear that he would have no choice but to fight them. The men of the Oregon knew full well that the odds were stacked against them but reported for duty with full diligence, as if they expected to win. Clark hoped that even if he lost the imminent battle, his ship's tremendous firepower and formidable armor might be able to inflict enough damage on the Spaniards to cripple their entire armada. He sailed outward and into the annals of history as one of America's bravest and most tragic warriors since Davy Crockett.

    Oregon first met Pelayo, the enemy's battleship in open combat around 10 AM. The American ship would open fire with her 13 inch guns before the old Spanish battleship could return fore. Both engaged at rather extreme range on the high seas so neither made any hits at first but, Oregon began to show her superior gunnery as her shells were falling closer and more frequently than Pelayo's. Within 20 minutes of the engagement, she had scored the first of several hits on Pelayo. If he could sink their only battleship, Clark hoped, the whole fleet might start to break, thus he initially made Pelayo his top priority and closed on the slightly slower enemy battleship. As the two ships rapidly closed distance, the seven cruisers held in reserve swung oforward toward Oregon, with Carlos V and Cristobol colon leading and the others following soon after. 30 minutes into the battle, these cruisers had aligned into firing positions and concentrated their fire onto the American battleship. From this point onward, Oregon's fight would become increasingly desperate. The sporadic 12.6 cm shells gave way to more frequent 11 and 10 inch rounds and then, to a hail of 140 mm rounds. Oregon's own powerful 340 mm guns turned from Pelayo to these cruisers, and may have managed a hit on Almirante Oqueindo, with uncertain effect, but otherwise could accomplish little. Oregon's secondary battery of 8 inch guns picked up much of the slack. She landed hits on her enemies, inflicting at least somed sort of damage on a few, but managing to sink none, and as the Spanish cruisers came closer, the flood of incoming shells had became unbearable, with something landing near or on the heroic Oregon seemingly every second. Shell after shell slammed into Oregon's deck, beam and turrets, knocking her guns out one by one and showering splinters all about. Initially frightened to take on a ship above their weight classes, Spanish sailors grew bolder and more confident as their shells contacted their foe again and again. By this point the Americans should have surrendered, for they had made their point and had no hope of fending the enemy off. Oregon's guns were in bad shape, her hull riddled with damage and major damage to her rudder, yet the ship had not come all this way to die easily and held on like an cornered beast. By noon, the Oregon had absorbed scores of shells and was clearly a stricken wreck yet she stubbornly remained afloat and refused to surrender, even as they had tenuous control over the ship. Perhaps they hoped to exhaust Cervera's ammunition and force him to break off. Whatever the case, Cervera saw no reason to play such games and decdecided finish the Yankee machine off with a volley of torpedoes to put it out of it's misery. He ordered his cruisers and destroyers to launch their underwater weapons at the fallen giant and like the matador standing over a mighty bull, they unleased a salvo of four upon the hapless wreck. To his great frustration, the cruisers managed to miss their target completely, probably because they had fired at close to the maximum range of the Schewrtzkopf's design.

    Meanwhile, Clark was less confident in his ship's armor and ability to resist than he had been a few minutes ago. While it had taken severe damage, his crew had managed to minimize casualties and keep her afloat and it seemed as if the attack would fail to sink the ship; Cervera could not afford to spare much more ammunition on a single ship and there has been a lull in the battle. Clark still hoped that Cervera was on the verge of leaving, as they were known to be on a tight schedule. This hope would be quickly put to rest; in a daring attempt to end things once and for all, Villamil braved the remaining guns of the stricken Oregon and drove his destroyers against her. The wounded beast still had respectable power, with its tertiary batter firing a barrage of deadly fire towards his small warships. He used his quick firing guns to try and suppress that but with even the smaller American gunfire battering his ships, he knew it would be a very risky shot. At just 200 or so yards, the torpedoes of Terror and Pluton closed in on the Oregon. One missed but the next made contact with her stern, causing devastating damage in the first successful torpedo attack against a capital ship. The Americans by now no longer entertained any idea that they could hold out through the battle and aware that the ship was sinking fast, surrendered almost immediately. The Spanish vessels picked up her surviving crew as the ship sank in deep waters (her wreck would not be identified for another 90 years). Cervera thought the Oregon's last stand to be one of the most remarkable and impressive feats of the day, though he was thankful that his men had performed under the stress of combat. The shell shocked survivors had little time to interest with their captors and we're quickly sent to Barbados, where they could receive care as needed while the Spanish squadron hastily planned its next move before the Americans could reach it. In spite of the desperation and vicious fight to the end however, the Spanish treated the Americans with awe and respect, for such bravery was truly exemplary. Indeed, the men of the USS Oregon had fought a battle against great odds and come out with their honor intact. Their bravery and determination in the face of impossible odds would serve as an inspiration to Americans and Spaniards alike. Cervera privately reflected that he expected his own ships to suffer the fate of the Oregon and would die proud of his service if they put up half the fight the Yankees did. And lest the heroism seem too tragic, the Oregon had not fought in vain: in the aftermath, Cervera had suffered significant damage to his lone battleship, Pelayo and moderate damage to Almirante Oqueindo and Cristobol Colon. All in all however, he had managed to frustrate a far superior enemy while using his numerical advantage to the best of his abilities and now the United States Navy had been reduced to 4 battleships. Many in the US fumed with anger and demanded to know how the far superior American fleet could never manage to engage its foe on even ground. The integrity of the blockade looked in doubt and the shipyards at Newport News raced to get the new Kearsage, still under construction, into service by the next year. In contrast, the Spaniards felt that the battle reaffirmed their own confidence, probably excessively, as these early successes would not be easy to repeat. As previously stated, Oregon was in many ways, defeated by poor timing but also by a lack of access to wireless technology. Had the war taken place but 5 years later, it is likely that such an ambush would never have been possible in the first place.


    Note: I'm not shoehorning this in as a freebee for the Spanish; I put it in because it actually almost happened OTL, just like the incident in Puerto Rico where the ships got way too close. In this case, it is again thanks to Cervera's decision to make port in Martinique so that he could make his next move safely. He didn't go through with the interception because he didn't have enough ships and what he had wasn't very combat ready, so Oregon could have mortally wounded his whole squadron even if he took her down. The timing is very similar ITL to OTL so he gets the chance to interdict Oregon. With what he has ITL, Oregon would have been in much more serious danger. The Spanish would probably have tried this and it probably would have worked. Nevertheless, because Oregon was a good, durable design and had such an exceptional crew, I wanted to make sure she would get at least a few good hits in against the attackers but in the end, she was kind of doomed so long as Cervera went to Martinique.
     
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