A Better Rifle at Halloween
- Thread starter diesal
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- britwank rifles ww1 different
? Cordite is a propellant not a burster.
Picric acid has three advantages over TNT (cheaper and easier to make, more powerful, easier to detonate) and two disadvantages (less shock stable, reactivity with metals to form picrates which are bloody dangerous). I do not know the composition of Compound D (it's not listed in my references, do you mean Composition D?). It may have mixed picric acid with other explosives. Shellite is one such mix, reducing power for increased shock stability making it suitable for armour-penetrating munitions. Like almost all picric acid mixes it still had storage issues due to picrate formation.
The problem was understood well before WW1 erupted, Silberrad for example. However his dismissal in 1906 drastically reduce RN interest in TNT.
Britain was (pre-war) a net importer of explosives and their precursors (mainly from Germany). Given the UK preference for picric acid, TNT was produced (IIRR) at three locations and on a small scale, hundreds of tonnes.
If you're assuming a divergence some years before WW1 begins then TNT production would probably have replaced much of the production of picric acid. However this would take, especially in peacetime, several years.
Moulton chaired the committee advising on explosives production, became Director-General of the Explosives Department, which was later folded into the MoM.
He was effectively in charge of UK explosives production during the war and believed, with reason, that well-managed national plants would be more productive and give taxpayers better value.
During the war, even with government money flowing freely, it took around a year for explosives production to expand to even approach meeting the needs of the war. You'll find him extensively in the definitive work on British explosives production in WW1, the History of the Ministry of Munitions.
For example after passage of DoRA(C) he nationalised the toluene distilling plant at Rainham and ran it more efficiently than private enterprise. He also pressued for the use of amatol as a filler.
He brought on-board people like Kenneth Quinan who designed the Oldbury TNT plant, run by Chance & Hunt and who work later became textbooks for industrial chemistry.
I really don't agree with this at all, either during the Great War or in more recent times. I have extensive experience on the periphery of private sector defense contractors and they have invariably have struck me as greedy, incompetent and short sighted.
That is essentially what I am saying. Cordite was cheaper and easier to produce than Lyddite, but could not fulfill the function that Lyddite could (as shell filler). So they made Lyddite. If TNT had been selected to replace Lyddite due to its greater stability then they would have produced TNT, in spite of its greater cost.
Again, we are arguing in agreement here. I am essentially advocating for an earlier switch from the combination of picric acid and guncotton (Lyddite) to a mix of pictric acid and dinitrophenol (Shellite) based on the investigations that are ongoing into naval artillery shells ITTL. And by earlier I mean having the earlier Greenboy equivalent shell that I expect is coming ITTL to be filled with it. If not immediately then by end of war.
Compound D, Explosive D, or Dunnite. Used extensively by the USN for AP shells. Chemically known as ammonium picrate, a salt created by reacting ammonia and picric acid.
Yes, it was, but there still was interest after 1906. To Quote David Brown in The Grand Fleet:
Those trials appeared to show that Lyddite was an acceptable filler for APC shells. War experience would show that this was incorrect. I am not actually advocating for it, but in a hypothetical scenario where the Ediburgh trials were interpreted differently, and TNT seemed to be the only effective answer (and not a switch to Dunnite or an earlier Shellite mix) then the production orders would have been sent out and TNT would probably have replaced Lyddite in new shells by 1914. Production would then need to be rapidly increased as OTL to meet the expanded requirements of wartime. We are effecitvely saying the same thing:
IIRC, (and I may not) Britain was a net importer of explosives stock. Specifically Picric acid. AIUI their production of guncotton met requirements. A similar, or perhaps slightly worse situation would probably have existed with Toulene had TNT been switched for Lyddite. Either way, Toulene or Phenol/Picric Acid, the industry had to massively expand and in some cases shift its buying patterns to compensate for the disruption of wartime. This was the story with most wartime industries.
I'm aware, I just didn't realize he had written on the subject.
I would have been severely shocked if it had taken less time than that. It is actually a miracle that it only took a year. The government in the years leading up to WW1 was not friendly to military expenditure, being both ideologically opposed and focused on expanding social programs. One of the cost saving measures utilized was reduction of stocks whenever possible, which included ammunition. This, among other things lead to prewar naval and land based artillery being limited in their opportunities to train in gunnery and reductions in the allotted shells per gun. When war broke out not only did this lack have to be made good, it was also found that peacetime calculations of shell expenditure were much lower than actual. Plus the army went through a massive increase in size, with the artillery expanding (proportionally) even more than most other arms. And that is besides the naval expansion, which was slower but still ongoing. And the industry had to cope with this mass expansion while also adjusting their logistics chains to account for much of Europe now being removed as a source of material.
Based on the situation in 1914, it taking a year to catch up is not, IMO, an indictment of the British Chemical industry but a sign of its strength, as it would have not been shocking to see it take longer.
I will have to take a look. I will add it to my list of reading material. Thanks!
That is certainly fair. If the answer to effective management was obvious then we would all probably be doing it! But I note that this argument as a support for public rather than private ownership of defence industries is predicated on the belief that governments are less capable of greed, incompetence and short sightedness. From my experience with government industries I have not found this to be the case.
To use the story of Moulton as an example, let me point out that Moulton believed he could run Rainham better than the private sector. But since he took it over at the end of November 1914 before large scale expansion could be considered by the private owners it is hard to determine whether he did or not. He certainly may well have, but that is hard to say with certainty. More to the point, Moulton worked extensively with private companies and individuals who gained their experience with private companies. If we imagine a scenario where the government had nationalized the chemical industry before the war, it is unlikely that Moulton would have been the one put in charge of it, as there would already be someone from its own ranks or an appointed civil servant at the helm.
I guess my point is best put this way, a well managed enterprise is a well managed enterprise. In a war requiring large expansion whether that enterprise in under the public or private domain is almost irrelevant. If you have a Moulton with a Quinan on hand organizing the use of public funds you can have great success. But if you look at the story of Army vs Navy aircraft procurement during WW1 you will see an argument for the opposite. The Army had intended in the pre-war and early war to depend on the Royal Aircraft Factory for designs and subcontract construction out to any companies it could. The RAF had some very talented designers yet this scheme was abandoned when it was found that the RAF could not supply the numbers or the quality of construction needed. The Navy meanwhile had a robust system of communication and review with their contractors (such as Sopwith, Shorts and Rolls-Royce who was rejected by the Army) and were able to procure more than enough aircraft while encouraging innovation in the direction that they needed. The airframes and companies created in this fashion would later largely arm the Army when they shifted gears.
Neither brilliance or incompetence is unique to private or public industry. The trick when great things are expected is to get the right people in the right place and give them the tools to do their jobs. I believe the best way to keep supply of the best people available while being able to recognize them when they come is to have some government capacity in war sectors, making the government an informed customer while allowing private industry to create infrastructure and train people supported by the private market. This allows the government to keep their hand in, without the industry being in danger of total destruction due to shifting government priorities or government incompetence. It also allows the private sector to be available in wartime to either rise to the occasion or provide material for those in control of the public sector to take advantage of.
Congratulations. I guess we'll be lucky to get one update a month for a while?
Asian Jumbo
Monthly Donor
But why would he want to pace up and down at 3am with a wailing little princess over his shoulder when he could be sitting down teaching her how to type…?Congratulations. I guess we'll be lucky to get one update a month for a while?
(But seriously - many congratulations @diesal, take all the time you need. These are special moments )
If, by a while, you mean at least 20 years, that's about right.Congratulations. I guess we'll be lucky to get one update a month for a while?
My eldest 4 are now 27, 26, 24, and 22.
Not quite got my life back, but close.
Then we adopted twins.
I recommend ear plugs, gin, and the consolation that whatever mistakes you make, and however you screw up, nearly all children seem to follow a self guided course and turn out OK in the end, doing what they want to do despite their parents best efforts to steer them down a chosen path.
Tell me about it. We've got our eldest, his wife and 2 year old grandson staying with us for a couple of months. A few weeks ago we had the middle sons two year old with us as well. two 2 year olds in the house for a week - utter madness. Good fun though.
Ah, right. Of course cordite was a different production bottleneck, due to the need for vast quantities of propanone/acetone, until Weizman and the brewers got involved.
Mass production of TNT, based on decision by (at least) the RN to switch to it as a standard shell filler would probably require 3-5 years to allow industry to upscale production. It's also quite likely that (i) indigenous production would not increase all that much and the explosive would be imported and/or (ii) production would be based on imported methyl benzene/toluene. Both of these would be problematic in the early stages of a major war.
It's possible that the army might retain picric acid as a filler anyway as the shock sensitivity wasn't such an issue for them.
That's an entirely possible switch, though one that would require a significant alteration in RN practices if it happens before the war.
Really it took a serious naval engagement to prove the problems with Lyddite as a filler.
Ah right. I was actually familiar with ammonium picrate (I've made the stuff
). It's better from a shock sensitivity perspective though it still degrades and has the issue with metal picrates.Hmmm, perhaps Jellicoe isn't posted to the Atlantic fleet (or is replaced by someone other than Briggs) after the Edinburgh trials? That effectively ended Jellicoe's pressure for a better AP shell. Or maybe the RN gets its hands on details results of the French trials.
Though whatever the impetus it faces the nearly immovable obstacle of the Ordnance Board. And the cost issue.
Guncotton (cellulose nitrate) was made in the UK for decades and used mainly as a propellant ingredient and required (basically) nitric acid and cotton.
The production capacity for phenol and toluene didn't exist until well into 1916 historically, and involved a range of sources (petroleum, coal tar et cetera). The shift required massive monetary infusions and central management; during the war it took well over a year, in peacetime it'd have taken several years,
He didn't really write himself, the history was a HMSO publication (finally declassified in 1953).
Agreed, the lacks of munitions stockpiles led to several problems.
I disagree. The up-scaling was going nowhere until A6 (under Moulton) started issuing directives under DoRA and DoRA(C). Partly this was due to the general belief that the war would be a short one, only Kitchener seemed to see the awful truth,
It's a fairly massive compilation but excruciating in it's level of detail. IIRR it's on Google Books.
I've never seen a shortage of greed, incompetence and short sightedness (I'm mainly in IT and risk management) . However much of the UK chemical industry in the period was small, under-capitalised and lacked practical talent (Moulton imported several experts from SA, which had a significant explosives industry, actually larger than the UK before the war).
Salamon and Co. owned Rainham and were far too small to handle anything like the level of production of toluene that was being forecast.
They were one of a number of companies operating loosely under the umbrella of the North Thames Gas Board (who produced coal-tar 'sludge' as a waste material in producing 'town gas'). They extracted small amounts of hydrocarbons and their derivatives from the 'sludge' (which was then used in road making) for various other companies.
Agreed. Management, capital and expertise are needed.
Which is the opposite to what happened with Oswald Silberrad; he wanted a decent level of remuneration for his work (he developed the 'gaine' to reliably detonate TNT) and was fired for his effrontery.
Hello,
Also agreed. You and your wife deserve a break to enjoy time with your new daughter.
True. RDB Cordite also helped due to the use of diethyl ether in alcohol rather than acetone. With the cost of increasing the need for glycerol and making the chemical workers stumble home feeling drunk from ether and alcohol fumes.
This certainly seems possible. Although I expect some of the larger firms (again, Nobel would be notable) would probably up their production. There was a fair amount of interest at the time in both saving the Scottish shale oil industry and in coke gas production. This was with the view of expanding native oil fuel production and were of limited benefit. Since toulene is a byproduct of both these industries (to a greater or lesser degree) it is possible that the RN's new need for TNT might lead to increases local sourcing of stock materials.
Probably the latter. Jellicoe was considered an up and comer. He had been slated to likely take the top spot at some point for years already. He had a good record as a ship commander, at the Admiralty and as an executive fleet officer. But he needed a fleet command if he wanted to move on. Him going to Atlantic Fleet probably cannot be helped. I am not sure if it would be politically possible but it would be interesting to see Percy Scott follow Jellicoe as first DNO and then Third Sea Lord. Scott might need to have a Battleship command under his belt before then to make it work, or an earlier command of a cruiser squadron then he got.
True, finances would be a problem. However, it is also notable that the Navy only fully gained control of their own ordinance procurement under Jellicoe's tenure as DNO. AIUI up to that point naval ordinance was still generally produced by the Royal Ordinance Factories and was only put out to private companies after 1908ish (I could be wrong on this). If so, then an earlier switchover, or the sudden need for replacement stocks filled with TNT might be the stimulus needed for the British Chemical industry before the war.
True enough. under normal circumstances probably at least 3 years. And then only to switch over new production. Old shells would likely stay in place until aged out or fired off. If there was the money to switch the entire stock it would likely be a 5 year plan.
How many orders had been placed? In many other war industries the process ended up including the issuance of orders to companies with capacity and then the negotiation with companies to increase capacity with government loan or grant. Which one is more efficient or more costly probably depends on the industry. With Moulton there and willing to centralize the whole thing under competent management, the job was done. But had he been of a different nature I think he could have done much, if not all, of the same things with a more collaborative system with his organization being the control board and customer, as was often done elsewhere.
Fair enough, a smaller industry often needs more work to expand then an established one, and this is often the place that crown corporations fit in. I am a fan of C.D Howe's work in WW2 where he similarly created a ton of Crown Corporations to kick start industries that were almost non-existent prior to the war. However, I equally admire his determination to dismantle most of them after the war (often unpopularly and with a few notable exceptions). Where such structures do good and where they need to be removed is always a bit of a judgement call.
True, but he was fired from a public institution (Woolwich) and was able, as an independent laboratory, to make significant contributions during the war. He actually came up with smokeless cordite during the war but it did not work well in high velocity guns, and so was not adopted. He probably should have been used more in the years immediately after the war.
Tell me about it. Ether is nasty stuff to work with.
That's an interesting possibility, the RN perhaps pushing for local oil sources could have interesting effects.
The amount of toluene (and other aromatics) available would depend on the characteristics of the oil, it's extremely variable, and I don't know the figures for UK oil. Certainly the Far East supplies were extremely rich in toluene, around 10%.
Very true, it would be on the logical career track for Jellicoe.
The RN attempted to extricate itself from the Board of Ordnance. The possibility of significantly different requirements (TNT versus picric acid mixes) might have increased the separation.
Probably.
A6 had sounded out industry about radically increased production but the companies simply hadn't the capacity, the funds to increase size so greatly or the ability to arrange vast amounts of feedstock chemicals. Hence the need for central management,
Small and (like much British industry) under-capitalised and unwilling to borrow for capital expenditures.
Ah economics and planning.
If he'd stayed in government service he might have pushed TNT as a shell filler.
Lille Bloodied.
11th September 1914, Lille.
The response of the First Army to the failure of the assault the previous day was simple and predictable. The only heavy guns available to the First Army were the two regiments of Foot Artillery each regiment was equipped with 4 batteries of 4 guns each, the guns were all 15cm Schwere Feldhaubitze 02, the guns fired a shell weighing almost 40 kg with an effective high explosive shell.
As well as the heavy guns the army also had 4 brigades of artillery, each of 2 regiments, equipped with the 10.5cm howitzers and the 7.7cm field guns. The railway had been established back to Germany, while still not working at full efficiency it was still sufficient to ensure an adequate supply of shells for the guns. The guns opened fire at close to their maximum rate of fire, hoping to catch the defenders out of position, unconcerned at this stage by their prodigious use of shells. The shells bloomed throughout, targeting those defensive positions identified during the initial failed assault.
The French defenders had nothing that could answer the German heavy artillery, even with all the super heavies still smashing Namur. France had some heavy artillery, the De Bange mle 1877 Gun and the Rimailho 1904 Howitzer. The ancient De Bange breech loader which whilst a capable gun lacked a recuperator or means of absorbing recoil this meant that when fired it travelled backwards and had to be dragged back into position, severely hampering its rate of fire, whilst large numbers had been built most were assigned to the most critical border fortresses, a number were allocated to various reserve units including one based in Lille.
The Rimailho was short ranged howitzer and it was complex with only small numbers built, again they were allocated to the field armies and so were nowhere near Lille.
The main guns available were the numerous 75mm mle 1897, a few were available in Lille attached to reserve artillery units which formed part of the garrison. As in every case when guns fought howitzers the guns lost, only a few of the guns had been identified by the attacking artillery but they were subjected to intensive counter battery fire. With the Howitzers taking advantage of even small terrain features to remain invulnerable from the flat shooting guns and forward observers connected to their batteries by telegraph wire who could direct fire to maximum effect, the losses among the 75’s would be heavy.
The small number of De Bange Guns assigned to Lille were in poor repair, having belonged to a badly led reserve unit, already one of the guns was lost its carriage having failed during transit from its storage to the field position chosen for the guns. As it was 7 guns were serviceable for the regiment, sadly the commanding officer of the regiment was as deficient in his positioning of the guns as he was in ensuring their adequate maintenance and he positioned them very close to the main defensive position, this was ostensibly to ensure that the guns could be directed by observers in a nearby church steeple, but was as likely so that he could order their withdrawal at short notice along the main road. The German Air Corps had identified these guns the previous day and a follow up flight this morning confirmed that they still were in the same position, the commander unwilling to order them dispersed or repositioned. They received the first heavy fire of the morning when they got the benefit of an entire regiment of the heavy guns firing on their position, the effect was cataclysmic with guns smashed, limbers shattered, and ammunition cooking off. In addition, the church steeple and all the nearby buildings were smashed as well. The regimental commander who had positioned his headquarters somewhat behind his guns, retreated, he was arrested some days later still retreating in Paris. His fate would be salutary, he was tried by a Court Martial convicted of cowardice and sundry other crimes and shot before the Paris Garrison, his name and crimes circulated throughout France.
Most shells fell on the outskirts of Lille churning the ground with high explosives, whilst most of the balloon companies were observing Namur, a squadron of German aircraft had flown spotting missions to identify targets prior to landing and signalling the information to the appropriate artillery units. Soon under the heavy weight of metal the forward defences were smashed and the infantry assaulted forward to capture the initial defences.
This was not all in the Germans favour, some French artillery had survived, and they fired on the attackers, likewise the machine guns played over the waves in field grey. The attack succeeded, they had captured the forward defences of Lille, but only captured the forward defences, the rest of the city remained in French hands and it would have to be fought for.
Whilst it was unlikely that the city would hold for long its defence would again delay the German advance and enable more reservists to be brought up to hold other positions and further delay the German tide. The defending troops now numbering almost 27,000 with reinforcements occupied the main line of resistance on the edge of the city proper, here the taller and more substantial buildings had not come under sustained fire and so they were largely unharmed. They waited, many frankly terrified of what was coming their way, but buoyed by the knowledge that they were defending their homes and the whole of France and with the near constant repetition to hold like the Belgians of Liege they dug in deeper and held their nerve.
The response of the First Army to the failure of the assault the previous day was simple and predictable. The only heavy guns available to the First Army were the two regiments of Foot Artillery each regiment was equipped with 4 batteries of 4 guns each, the guns were all 15cm Schwere Feldhaubitze 02, the guns fired a shell weighing almost 40 kg with an effective high explosive shell.
As well as the heavy guns the army also had 4 brigades of artillery, each of 2 regiments, equipped with the 10.5cm howitzers and the 7.7cm field guns. The railway had been established back to Germany, while still not working at full efficiency it was still sufficient to ensure an adequate supply of shells for the guns. The guns opened fire at close to their maximum rate of fire, hoping to catch the defenders out of position, unconcerned at this stage by their prodigious use of shells. The shells bloomed throughout, targeting those defensive positions identified during the initial failed assault.
The French defenders had nothing that could answer the German heavy artillery, even with all the super heavies still smashing Namur. France had some heavy artillery, the De Bange mle 1877 Gun and the Rimailho 1904 Howitzer. The ancient De Bange breech loader which whilst a capable gun lacked a recuperator or means of absorbing recoil this meant that when fired it travelled backwards and had to be dragged back into position, severely hampering its rate of fire, whilst large numbers had been built most were assigned to the most critical border fortresses, a number were allocated to various reserve units including one based in Lille.
The Rimailho was short ranged howitzer and it was complex with only small numbers built, again they were allocated to the field armies and so were nowhere near Lille.
The main guns available were the numerous 75mm mle 1897, a few were available in Lille attached to reserve artillery units which formed part of the garrison. As in every case when guns fought howitzers the guns lost, only a few of the guns had been identified by the attacking artillery but they were subjected to intensive counter battery fire. With the Howitzers taking advantage of even small terrain features to remain invulnerable from the flat shooting guns and forward observers connected to their batteries by telegraph wire who could direct fire to maximum effect, the losses among the 75’s would be heavy.
The small number of De Bange Guns assigned to Lille were in poor repair, having belonged to a badly led reserve unit, already one of the guns was lost its carriage having failed during transit from its storage to the field position chosen for the guns. As it was 7 guns were serviceable for the regiment, sadly the commanding officer of the regiment was as deficient in his positioning of the guns as he was in ensuring their adequate maintenance and he positioned them very close to the main defensive position, this was ostensibly to ensure that the guns could be directed by observers in a nearby church steeple, but was as likely so that he could order their withdrawal at short notice along the main road. The German Air Corps had identified these guns the previous day and a follow up flight this morning confirmed that they still were in the same position, the commander unwilling to order them dispersed or repositioned. They received the first heavy fire of the morning when they got the benefit of an entire regiment of the heavy guns firing on their position, the effect was cataclysmic with guns smashed, limbers shattered, and ammunition cooking off. In addition, the church steeple and all the nearby buildings were smashed as well. The regimental commander who had positioned his headquarters somewhat behind his guns, retreated, he was arrested some days later still retreating in Paris. His fate would be salutary, he was tried by a Court Martial convicted of cowardice and sundry other crimes and shot before the Paris Garrison, his name and crimes circulated throughout France.
Most shells fell on the outskirts of Lille churning the ground with high explosives, whilst most of the balloon companies were observing Namur, a squadron of German aircraft had flown spotting missions to identify targets prior to landing and signalling the information to the appropriate artillery units. Soon under the heavy weight of metal the forward defences were smashed and the infantry assaulted forward to capture the initial defences.
This was not all in the Germans favour, some French artillery had survived, and they fired on the attackers, likewise the machine guns played over the waves in field grey. The attack succeeded, they had captured the forward defences of Lille, but only captured the forward defences, the rest of the city remained in French hands and it would have to be fought for.
Whilst it was unlikely that the city would hold for long its defence would again delay the German advance and enable more reservists to be brought up to hold other positions and further delay the German tide. The defending troops now numbering almost 27,000 with reinforcements occupied the main line of resistance on the edge of the city proper, here the taller and more substantial buildings had not come under sustained fire and so they were largely unharmed. They waited, many frankly terrified of what was coming their way, but buoyed by the knowledge that they were defending their homes and the whole of France and with the near constant repetition to hold like the Belgians of Liege they dug in deeper and held their nerve.
New York Riots
12th September 1914, New York.
“Murder in Butte” screamed the headline, the New York Call was unambiguous, the strike in Montana had been covered but in a desultory manner. The newspaper had backed the socialist affiliated union, which was supporting war industry, the IWW affiliated union were opposed to the war and saw strike action as a way of blocking American involvement. But the murder of 3 unionists by the National Guard, covered up as an escape attempt was too much, party politics for once took a back seat to a chance to embarrass the plutocrats and their lackeys.
The edition sold out promptly, it was read widely, shared amongst other workers and spoken of on factory floors throughout New York. One such factory was the works of the William Demuth Company; a manufacturer of pipes and smoking implements. The factory workers were already on edge as time and motion consultants had come to the factory over the past month and their previous practices were in turmoil, it was in this antagonistic environment that a young firebrand spoke up, he urged his comrades to stop enriching the capitalistic class that was murdering miners in America to ensure it could continue selling weapons to the imperialists of the old world. Soon the workers took up his cry “Strike, Strike, Strike”, the attempts by management to stop the wildcat strike was unsuccessful, in the turmoil two men were beaten and a fire broke out.
The strike spread to other factories nearby and with it the fires, spread by accident, poor safety systems or disaffected workers was never fully determined, but by evening chaos had spread throughout the many factories of New York, the police and fire brigade were overwhelmed, and the Governor Martin Glynn had been forced to call out the National Guard to help suppress the riots.
“Murder in Butte” screamed the headline, the New York Call was unambiguous, the strike in Montana had been covered but in a desultory manner. The newspaper had backed the socialist affiliated union, which was supporting war industry, the IWW affiliated union were opposed to the war and saw strike action as a way of blocking American involvement. But the murder of 3 unionists by the National Guard, covered up as an escape attempt was too much, party politics for once took a back seat to a chance to embarrass the plutocrats and their lackeys.
The edition sold out promptly, it was read widely, shared amongst other workers and spoken of on factory floors throughout New York. One such factory was the works of the William Demuth Company; a manufacturer of pipes and smoking implements. The factory workers were already on edge as time and motion consultants had come to the factory over the past month and their previous practices were in turmoil, it was in this antagonistic environment that a young firebrand spoke up, he urged his comrades to stop enriching the capitalistic class that was murdering miners in America to ensure it could continue selling weapons to the imperialists of the old world. Soon the workers took up his cry “Strike, Strike, Strike”, the attempts by management to stop the wildcat strike was unsuccessful, in the turmoil two men were beaten and a fire broke out.
The strike spread to other factories nearby and with it the fires, spread by accident, poor safety systems or disaffected workers was never fully determined, but by evening chaos had spread throughout the many factories of New York, the police and fire brigade were overwhelmed, and the Governor Martin Glynn had been forced to call out the National Guard to help suppress the riots.