12:08 - Redux
- Thread starter Devvy
- Start date
1968-Chunnel-Notes
Devvy
Donor
1968: Channel Tunnel OTL Analysis, for @Simon !
This material from research in "The Official History of Britain and The Channel Tunnel", by Gourvish.
In the upper echelons of government, the Tunnel was hardly mentioned, and the project was not considered officially at any Cabinet meeting between 1964-1966 under Wilson. Tom Fraser, incoming Minister of Transport, made some statements saying "current work on the Tunnel would continue". However, after 1966, despite the Tunnel not appearing in the Labour manifesto, the Prime Minister called for action on the Tunnel, clearly putting European matters and improved relations with the French on a much higher priority. Several pieces of documentation indicate that Wilson wanted the subject handled with "all reasonable speed". By 1966, officials had reached significant agreement on geological feasibility, organisation, financing, and economic viability. Even Barbara Castle as Minister of Transport had informed Callaghan that the economic re-appraisal had produced a positive outcome.
Castle, who enjoyed the support of Brown and Stewart, argued first of all, that the geological survey had demonstrated the technical feasibility of a bored tunnel, but that there was insufficient evidence to permit a considered judgement on the alternative of an immersed tunnel." Britain's confidential (from the French, who Britain feared might be spooked from Britain conducting a re-appraisal of the Tunnel project) re-appraisal of the Tunnel only strengthened the case for building the Tunnel, and it was declared to be a sound investment of UK resources and an attractive financial proposition. Lower estimates of the British study gave a prospective financial return of 17%, and a higher estimate of 21%. A later joint study between UK and France found 14% - 20% respectively.
As Castle and Brown noted, even if the Tunnel were to cost £200 million and was not used after 30 years, the studies indicated it would still produce a net economic benefit of £164-252 million. With additional support from Roy Jenkins, Richard Crossman & Anthony Crosland, the balance of opinion was in favour of proceeding with the tunnel. Even after costs inflated by approx 20-25%, the prospective financial return lessened by only 2% to 15-19% instead of 17-21%. Indeed, Castle's appointment as Minister of Transport shook up the department, which appeared to have become distracted from the Tunnel under Fraser and Padmore, with Padmore being dismissed by Castle for having become "lackadaisical and utterly bored by transport". In October, with the support of an optimistic timetable drawn up by the Ministry of Transport, Castle announced the Tunnel should be opened by 1975. 1967 and 1968 were spent hunting for private sector partners for the Tunnel, and negotiations continued with three consortia. However, attempts started to peter out, and political enthusiasm waned by 1967/1968, with opponents happy to jump on the bandwagon to criticise the project.
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Notes: My suggestion for ATL here would be that the 1962 Concorde Treaty falls through, leading to du Gaulle to veto Britain's first attempt to join the EEC in 1963 as the Brits are not singing from the European hymn sheet. Wilson's new European/French focus after 1966 leads to the Prime Minister (ably supported by Castle and later Marsh at the Ministry of Transport) pushing the project over the line, resulting in the 1968 treaty to largely accomplish the same as Concorde was designed for; to prove the UK could work with Europe and should be allowed in to the EEC. By 1970, du Gaulle is gone, and with a new wind in Europe, the UK reapplies, roughly joining on a similar timeline to OTL.
This material from research in "The Official History of Britain and The Channel Tunnel", by Gourvish.
In the upper echelons of government, the Tunnel was hardly mentioned, and the project was not considered officially at any Cabinet meeting between 1964-1966 under Wilson. Tom Fraser, incoming Minister of Transport, made some statements saying "current work on the Tunnel would continue". However, after 1966, despite the Tunnel not appearing in the Labour manifesto, the Prime Minister called for action on the Tunnel, clearly putting European matters and improved relations with the French on a much higher priority. Several pieces of documentation indicate that Wilson wanted the subject handled with "all reasonable speed". By 1966, officials had reached significant agreement on geological feasibility, organisation, financing, and economic viability. Even Barbara Castle as Minister of Transport had informed Callaghan that the economic re-appraisal had produced a positive outcome.
Castle, who enjoyed the support of Brown and Stewart, argued first of all, that the geological survey had demonstrated the technical feasibility of a bored tunnel, but that there was insufficient evidence to permit a considered judgement on the alternative of an immersed tunnel." Britain's confidential (from the French, who Britain feared might be spooked from Britain conducting a re-appraisal of the Tunnel project) re-appraisal of the Tunnel only strengthened the case for building the Tunnel, and it was declared to be a sound investment of UK resources and an attractive financial proposition. Lower estimates of the British study gave a prospective financial return of 17%, and a higher estimate of 21%. A later joint study between UK and France found 14% - 20% respectively.
As Castle and Brown noted, even if the Tunnel were to cost £200 million and was not used after 30 years, the studies indicated it would still produce a net economic benefit of £164-252 million. With additional support from Roy Jenkins, Richard Crossman & Anthony Crosland, the balance of opinion was in favour of proceeding with the tunnel. Even after costs inflated by approx 20-25%, the prospective financial return lessened by only 2% to 15-19% instead of 17-21%. Indeed, Castle's appointment as Minister of Transport shook up the department, which appeared to have become distracted from the Tunnel under Fraser and Padmore, with Padmore being dismissed by Castle for having become "lackadaisical and utterly bored by transport". In October, with the support of an optimistic timetable drawn up by the Ministry of Transport, Castle announced the Tunnel should be opened by 1975. 1967 and 1968 were spent hunting for private sector partners for the Tunnel, and negotiations continued with three consortia. However, attempts started to peter out, and political enthusiasm waned by 1967/1968, with opponents happy to jump on the bandwagon to criticise the project.
--------------
Notes: My suggestion for ATL here would be that the 1962 Concorde Treaty falls through, leading to du Gaulle to veto Britain's first attempt to join the EEC in 1963 as the Brits are not singing from the European hymn sheet. Wilson's new European/French focus after 1966 leads to the Prime Minister (ably supported by Castle and later Marsh at the Ministry of Transport) pushing the project over the line, resulting in the 1968 treaty to largely accomplish the same as Concorde was designed for; to prove the UK could work with Europe and should be allowed in to the EEC. By 1970, du Gaulle is gone, and with a new wind in Europe, the UK reapplies, roughly joining on a similar timeline to OTL.
Great to see this timeline back, Devvy!
As a rail enthusiast and regular long distance rail traveller, I'm always intrigued to see what could have been!
Off topic, have you had a ride on one of the new IEP trains yet? I've been on one between Bristol and Cardiff and was impressed with the acceleration.
As a rail enthusiast and regular long distance rail traveller, I'm always intrigued to see what could have been!
Off topic, have you had a ride on one of the new IEP trains yet? I've been on one between Bristol and Cardiff and was impressed with the acceleration.
1968-Maps
Devvy
Donor
Yeah I've taken it a couple of times down from Reading to Cardiff. Very quick to accelerate, hybrid model seems to work well, and more capacity inside. It feels a little bland and plastic-ey inside, but that's a sign of the times - keep costs down, and get as many people in seats as you can. Also shame the cafe has gone, replaced by the trolley - no guarantee you will actually get any service!
In other news..........
My provisional map for post-Beeching "Reforms". I'm not committing 100% to this; there might be a few little tweaks here and there, but it shows the rough position of BR now. Plenty of cuts, but also most major lines still open (this is from the OTL report, and what I've done is photoshop out any lines that BR have closed here in ATL. The remaining red lines were lines Beeching OTL wanted to keep open, and remaining black lines are lines Beeching OTL wanted to close, but here in ATL have stayed open).
And here is a map of electrification based upon the above map. Dark blue is 1.5kv overhead installed and working. Light blue is currently work in progress, based on circa-1968 status.
Don’t know if this might be of use here, but perhaps an option for feeding the BR grid?
https://twitter.com/BBCArchive/status/1072869537282895879
Is it possible BR might be interested in Alt energy as a way of keeping costs down? Solar panels on trains or station roofs? Wind tribunes for elecy etc?
https://twitter.com/BBCArchive/status/1072869537282895879
Is it possible BR might be interested in Alt energy as a way of keeping costs down? Solar panels on trains or station roofs? Wind tribunes for elecy etc?
What BR needs is a reliable power supply and wind/solar are intermittent, even on a national scale, so someone will have to provide conventional power backup. At that point the cost rise up again and you lose the cost saving. Maybe if they had very cheap storage it might be more attractive, but that requires some massive advances in battery chemistry or lots of very unpopular expensive things (flooding most of the Welsh valleys and using them as pumped storage for instance).
A bit more plausible is BR could go down the London Underground route and start owning it's own power stations. If there's a "White heat of technology" type moment you could end up with some notionally 'British Rail' nuclear power stations to supply the network, which would be fun. If they specify a big enough standardised fleet of reactors they could even bring the cost down and make a success of the wider nuclear power programme. But sadly that's probably a butterfly too far.
Devvy
Donor
Yes and no. There are are many lines which Beeching intended to be open, which were later closed (ie. Oxford-Cambridge, Norwich-Kings Lynn, Blackpool-Fleetwood, etc etc), and many he did want to close which stayed open anyway in OTL (East Suffolk Line, Ashford-Hastings, Isle of Wight, Liverpool-Southport, etc etc etc). So be careful about drawing conclusions based on the colour of the lines!
What BR needs is a reliable power supply and wind/solar are intermittent, even on a national scale, so someone will have to provide conventional power backup. At that point the cost rise up again and you lose the cost saving. Maybe if they had very cheap storage it might be more attractive, but that requires some massive advances in battery chemistry or lots of very unpopular expensive things (flooding most of the Welsh valleys and using them as pumped storage for instance).
A bit more plausible is BR could go down the London Underground route and start owning it's own power stations. If there's a "White heat of technology" type moment you could end up with some notionally 'British Rail' nuclear power stations to supply the network, which would be fun. If they specify a big enough standardised fleet of reactors they could even bring the cost down and make a success of the wider nuclear power programme. But sadly that's probably a butterfly too far.
Generally speaking, I agree with Pip; it's not really likely here. BR has enough on it's plate anyway, without trying to diversify into a business area in which there is another nationalised industry operating! Also, the amount of electricity the trains draw will require an enormous amount of renewables to be able to power. What I can see, is stations (especially on the south coast) coating their roofs and platform canopies in solar panels to at least power the station equipment themselves eventually. Think of Blackfriars, who OTL have 4,400 panels, generating 900,000kWh per year. It still only covers half of what Blackfriars consume (mostly because it's a busy 24/7 station so open when there's no sun to power the place!).
1971-Manchester-Metro
Devvy
Donor
The Transport Revolution in Manchester, Introduction
The mess of rail routes converging on Manchester, and forming the northern and southern cross-city routes.
The Picc-Vic tunnel project, now known as the mundanely named "Line 1" of the Metro network, is a rail route running underneath the city centre of Manchester. Ever since the railways arrived in Manchester, coalescing around Victoria and London Road (latterly renamed to Piccadilly) stations, there has been a demand for an underground route linking the stations and further points in the city centre. Ironically, this aim has not been directly achieved, but Line 1 went a long way to solving the issue. One of the key issues Manchester had was the lack of direct cross-city services - many rail services remained terminating at the major stations, and routed across two major axis to the north and south of the city centre.
Over the decades, there have been many suggestions and studies to remediate the issue; an idea in 1908 and 1914 was an underground tramway, and fleshed out in 1938. A 1968 study advocated for a "Rapid Transit" line, which was the first stage in the refinement of the Picc-Vic tunnel. The creation of the local passenger transport authority for the Manchester region in 1968 was a boon for the project - finally there was a single unified body which could advocate for the new link, with representatives from each area served. Manchester officials sought to address land-use and transport planning in studies, and the new link was conceived as a high volume electrified network, operating both a commuter service to allow access to the city as well as a inner-city transfer route. Such a redirection of services, away from the large above ground terminii, was also designed to lessen the space requirements of the major stations, potentially freeing up space for sale either to further retail outlets within the station, for external use or potentially redevelopment.
Designs for the future Albert Square
Complications quickly arose however. The (at the time) secret presence of a major underground tunnel network for government around Piccadilly threw a major spanner in the works for linking Piccadilly station in to the route. It was instead redirected for a simpler construction project to the south of Manchester, taking over several suburban routes and releasing capacity which would allow Manchester Central station to be fully closed eventually, although retaining an underground stop.
4 branches to the north and south were settled upon, allowing an initial 20 trains per hour (a service every 3 minutes) through the core with 5 trains (a service every 12 minutes) on each branch.
Plans were then handed a major boost, when it was announced that yet another inquiry in to the economics of the tentative "Merseyrail" project in Liverpool meant that Westminster would finally fund the new route in Manchester. Organisational changes due to the perception in Westminster of a wasteful British Rail meant responsibility for the project would pass to Manchester, under a new "Manchester Transport" organisation, mirroring "London Transport", overseen by the local passenger transport authority. This change laid the ground for the tight integration between the Manchester Metro as it was later branded, and other local transport methods such as buses. It also allowed a switch in technology; British Rail had refused to countenance any switch away from a traditional heavy rail solution; the new Manchester Transport would back a switch to a light rail solution, which would also use further batches of new London Underground stock. This had the benefit of reducing procurement expenses and design work for the trains, whilst also reducing tunnelling expenses by a reduction in the tunnel diameter. Platforms would be built at a mere 100 meters, reflecting the smaller size of city, but would still allow significant room. Third rail infrastructure was to be partly reused from areas of the Southern Region which had been switched to an overhead system.
Artists depiction of the new route
Plans for the Metro network, as it was now being called (since the route no longer served Piccadilly station, it seemed incorrect to call it the Picc-Vic Tunnel), nearly hit a brick wall and cancellation upon Manchester Council's desire to also connect to the ever-growing Manchester Airport; a solution which was rectified by the afore-mentioned reduction in diameter to reduce tunneling expenses as well as reducing the underground station/platform lengths to a minimum 100 metres, the desire of British Railways to hand over the Styal Line rather than invest themselves in a new airport link (due to the lack of finance for investment outside of a few major projects) and the quickly growing airport. The branch would also allow direct service of the universities and hospitals to the south of the city - both destinations which many people would use public transport for. It was duly authorised by an Act of Parliament for construction, but was then disrupted by the "Three Day Week", which set back plans and introduced delays.
Promotional pamphlet for the new Metro system
------------------------
Notes: So here the Manchester tunnel system gets underway - at the cost of the Merseyrail system which has less reason to be funded here as Beeching hasn't attempted to axe as many of the Merseyside rail routes. Some tweaks here; Piccadilly is avoided due to the presence of the government tunnel system, which unsurprisingly I'm unable to dig up much information about. This is a nice and short tunnel system - Victoria Station, the under construction Arndale Centre, Albert Square, Central Station.
The mess of rail routes converging on Manchester, and forming the northern and southern cross-city routes.
The Picc-Vic tunnel project, now known as the mundanely named "Line 1" of the Metro network, is a rail route running underneath the city centre of Manchester. Ever since the railways arrived in Manchester, coalescing around Victoria and London Road (latterly renamed to Piccadilly) stations, there has been a demand for an underground route linking the stations and further points in the city centre. Ironically, this aim has not been directly achieved, but Line 1 went a long way to solving the issue. One of the key issues Manchester had was the lack of direct cross-city services - many rail services remained terminating at the major stations, and routed across two major axis to the north and south of the city centre.
Over the decades, there have been many suggestions and studies to remediate the issue; an idea in 1908 and 1914 was an underground tramway, and fleshed out in 1938. A 1968 study advocated for a "Rapid Transit" line, which was the first stage in the refinement of the Picc-Vic tunnel. The creation of the local passenger transport authority for the Manchester region in 1968 was a boon for the project - finally there was a single unified body which could advocate for the new link, with representatives from each area served. Manchester officials sought to address land-use and transport planning in studies, and the new link was conceived as a high volume electrified network, operating both a commuter service to allow access to the city as well as a inner-city transfer route. Such a redirection of services, away from the large above ground terminii, was also designed to lessen the space requirements of the major stations, potentially freeing up space for sale either to further retail outlets within the station, for external use or potentially redevelopment.
Designs for the future Albert Square
Complications quickly arose however. The (at the time) secret presence of a major underground tunnel network for government around Piccadilly threw a major spanner in the works for linking Piccadilly station in to the route. It was instead redirected for a simpler construction project to the south of Manchester, taking over several suburban routes and releasing capacity which would allow Manchester Central station to be fully closed eventually, although retaining an underground stop.
4 branches to the north and south were settled upon, allowing an initial 20 trains per hour (a service every 3 minutes) through the core with 5 trains (a service every 12 minutes) on each branch.
- Accrington/Bacup - Stockport
- Rochdale (West) - Fairfield
- Rochdale (East) - Altrincham
- Royton - Central (later Airport)
Plans were then handed a major boost, when it was announced that yet another inquiry in to the economics of the tentative "Merseyrail" project in Liverpool meant that Westminster would finally fund the new route in Manchester. Organisational changes due to the perception in Westminster of a wasteful British Rail meant responsibility for the project would pass to Manchester, under a new "Manchester Transport" organisation, mirroring "London Transport", overseen by the local passenger transport authority. This change laid the ground for the tight integration between the Manchester Metro as it was later branded, and other local transport methods such as buses. It also allowed a switch in technology; British Rail had refused to countenance any switch away from a traditional heavy rail solution; the new Manchester Transport would back a switch to a light rail solution, which would also use further batches of new London Underground stock. This had the benefit of reducing procurement expenses and design work for the trains, whilst also reducing tunnelling expenses by a reduction in the tunnel diameter. Platforms would be built at a mere 100 meters, reflecting the smaller size of city, but would still allow significant room. Third rail infrastructure was to be partly reused from areas of the Southern Region which had been switched to an overhead system.
Artists depiction of the new route
Plans for the Metro network, as it was now being called (since the route no longer served Piccadilly station, it seemed incorrect to call it the Picc-Vic Tunnel), nearly hit a brick wall and cancellation upon Manchester Council's desire to also connect to the ever-growing Manchester Airport; a solution which was rectified by the afore-mentioned reduction in diameter to reduce tunneling expenses as well as reducing the underground station/platform lengths to a minimum 100 metres, the desire of British Railways to hand over the Styal Line rather than invest themselves in a new airport link (due to the lack of finance for investment outside of a few major projects) and the quickly growing airport. The branch would also allow direct service of the universities and hospitals to the south of the city - both destinations which many people would use public transport for. It was duly authorised by an Act of Parliament for construction, but was then disrupted by the "Three Day Week", which set back plans and introduced delays.
Promotional pamphlet for the new Metro system
------------------------
Notes: So here the Manchester tunnel system gets underway - at the cost of the Merseyrail system which has less reason to be funded here as Beeching hasn't attempted to axe as many of the Merseyside rail routes. Some tweaks here; Piccadilly is avoided due to the presence of the government tunnel system, which unsurprisingly I'm unable to dig up much information about. This is a nice and short tunnel system - Victoria Station, the under construction Arndale Centre, Albert Square, Central Station.
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Wiki has a page on the Guardian Telephone exchange, which occupies the tunnels. The article is quite short and sparse, but it does have links to other sites. The tunnels were no longer secret by 1968, so might have been less of a problem for the builders of railway tunnels.
It was one of three exchanges built, the others being Kingsway in London and Anchor in Manchester. A fourth exchange was planned to be built in Glasgow, but was cancelled.
It was one of three exchanges built, the others being Kingsway in London and Anchor in Manchester. A fourth exchange was planned to be built in Glasgow, but was cancelled.
Guardian tunnels are a bit of an odd one, it's not classified but it is something BT don't like talking about, so I'll say no more.
The actual phone exchange equipment down there were/are still operational, so unless Pic-Vic funds the cost of building the GPO a new exchange and all the connections then it is still going to be a problem. Weaving around them might be possible, it's been done elsewhere, but aside from the cost it's a risk I imagine the project doesn't want.
I might be missing something, but LU is 4th Rail so does 3rd rail electrification kit help all that much? I think you end up spending more modifying it to be 3rd rail than you would just building from scratch. The 100m platform has also got future problem written all over it, when LU go for fixed length train-sets being a different size means nothing fits anymore. Still it's the kind of short sighted, inept, cost saving cock-up that regional transport bodies always make, so seems entirely plausible (sadly).
Devvy
Donor
It's declassified, but as Pip says, it's incredibly hard to find information about it and it's exact specifications. Even though it was not secret by 1968, it still seemed to cause some issues about the OTL Picc-Vic Tunnel - apparently when planners requested details from the GPO, they received no information about it from the GPO at all who were reluctant to reveal anything about it. It's just a headache to deal with, which has been avoided here. Piccadilly can "always be connected up in future" would be the thoughts of the time!
Yep, Manchester Trams completely erased due to this (in part as we've subsumed all the lines which OTL became tram routes!). Central station's future is yet to be determined!
I was thinking about the physical conductor rails, the ceramic insulators which hold the rail and some cabling which is suitable for the power requirements, but not much else apart from that. It won't be a huge amount, but every little bit helps, and it just serves to underline that BR is keen for any bits of money by selling off old equipment, and the financial constraints around cost-control on this project.
The 100m platform was deliberate on my side for the times, agree fully with you. The 1970s were a low level of passenger usage on trains; planners would be seeing a decent upswing for this rapid transit solution, but at the time we wouldn't be looking at anything massive. 100m is a sign of the times for cost cutting and not long term planning - short-sighted, inept, cost saving as you say. On the flip side, 90m is the length of a C-stock LU train, which I'd perhaps see as being built with the middle 2 sets of doors in use and longitudinal seats in between them, and transverse seats to the outer ends of the coach (blocking out the outer sets of doors), for longer distance travelers.
1971-Rolling-Stock
Devvy
Donor
Rolling Stock Evolution, by Mike Portillo
The prototype units on test for what would become the new "standard suburban" train - or "1972 design".
British Rail's rolling stock, the selection of trains that is, underwent a rapid transformation from the mid 1960s to mid 1970s. Steam was finally phased out by 1975, fully replaced by electric and diesel traction, and removing a great deal of smoke and dust from city centres. The evolution away from steam took time; at first British Rail's strategy was to electrify lines and move straight to electric traction - the long project times on electrifying routes and the clamour from both political circles and the public meant it was impossible to wait for this process to complete however. Diesel locomotives would take up the mid-position on many routes which were not to be quickly forthcoming with electricity; the long distance Great Western services embraced fast diesel traction early on.
Shorter distance services were quicker to transform. Routes on almost all radial rail routes in to and out of London were electrified by the 1970s, and would quickly be served by a fleet of new electric multiple units. The 4 car, first generation was for British Rail a ground-breaking design - able to be used on short distance urban routes and longer distance commuter routes with ease, reliable under the 1,500v DC system, and manufactured in large numbers for the different metropolitan areas of the United Kingdom; London, Glasgow and Manchester. The design would later be adopted and evolved as a standard for the second generation of multiple units, utilising many formerly cutting edge features, and bringing them in to one standard design.
The new "1972 Design" was ground breaking due to these changes. It featured electrical compatibility with both the third rail 750v DC system as well as the overhead 1,500v DC system, and could easily be manufactured in a 2-coach, 3-coach or 4-coach formation. The structural design was taken from the evolving "Mark 3" coach design, which would be used for longer distance services, with power operated doors (moving away from the "slam door" approach), and new improved passenger comforts. Seats were of a new ergonomic design, and they were sealed trains with heating and air conditioning capabilities. Regenerative capabilities by using the motor in reverse was provided, providing substantial maintenance advantages by reducing brake wear.
These trains turned out to be the greater part of Beeching's legacy today; the mindset switch in British Rail away from just traction development to improving the passenger experience. The formation used had the outer coaches on each end with motors in, and the middle 1 or 2 coaches as unpowered trailers. This would later evolve by 1980 in the "TMU" or "Trailer Multiple Unit", a self contained rake of 4 coaches with operating cabs in, but no motors - designed to be operated in combination with a locomotive on one end, and allowing bidirectional working without moving the locomotive from one end of the train to the other at it's terminating point. This approach would also allow an easy change in locomotive - envisaged as diesel to electric - without needing to swap out the entire train.
The APT's problems with tilting were well documented by the media
Elsewhere and away from suburbia, there were pressing concerns. A meeting of the British Rail Board to discuss the Intercity business was held in 1971; the Advanced Passenger Train was high up on the agenda list. It would be easy to consider British Rail as schizophrenic at the time; long term planning was frequently at odds with itself. The slowly expanding network of electrification was at odds with the gas turbine powered APT, and conversion of the train to overhead power was the obvious choice. However, the "reliable" 1,500v DC system could not supply enough power for high speed operations much above 100mph, something which BR was loathe to publicly admit for reasons of PR - it's choice of system had come in for considerable criticism from some sectors. Problems with the Leyland gas turbine also began to make gas turbine propulsion unpopular, and Leyland's withdrawal of the gas turbine from the company's road vehicles also led to distrust of long term support despite promises to the contrary from the company. By accident, this would turn out to be an excellent move - 1973 brought a severe oil & gas crisis, with prices almost trebling, severely undermining the economics of such a gas turbine train.
There was also the vocal opinions of those "traditionalists" within BR - predominately the engineering section - who sought a more low key high speed train, with less cutting edge features resulting in far more reliability both in service and for any introduction of such a train, with severe doubts now being placed over the target of "in service by 1978" of the APT. Without tilting though, speed improvements would be difficult to get - tilting would allow faster speeds in curves, whereas straight tracks were limited to 100mph (now 110mph) by electrical systems. It seemed highly unlikely that the Government would authorise new truly high speed line construction through the English countryside. The hydrokinetic brakes were also effective, but complicated and problematic, although a switch to electric traction offered an easy way to provide additional brake force, via regenerative & rheostatic braking with the motors in reverse.
Problems appeared to be mounting for the Advanced Passenger Train. However, in 1973, British Rail decided to finally close the Great Central Main Line after it's freight usage dwindled, and in what turned out to be a fortuitous case, someone asked "why don't we fit the GCML with 25kV AC overhead power for high speed operations and just use that?". It was a proposition with many complications and difficulties, but also many advantages.
--------------------------------------------
Notes: Several things to note here:
The prototype units on test for what would become the new "standard suburban" train - or "1972 design".
British Rail's rolling stock, the selection of trains that is, underwent a rapid transformation from the mid 1960s to mid 1970s. Steam was finally phased out by 1975, fully replaced by electric and diesel traction, and removing a great deal of smoke and dust from city centres. The evolution away from steam took time; at first British Rail's strategy was to electrify lines and move straight to electric traction - the long project times on electrifying routes and the clamour from both political circles and the public meant it was impossible to wait for this process to complete however. Diesel locomotives would take up the mid-position on many routes which were not to be quickly forthcoming with electricity; the long distance Great Western services embraced fast diesel traction early on.
Shorter distance services were quicker to transform. Routes on almost all radial rail routes in to and out of London were electrified by the 1970s, and would quickly be served by a fleet of new electric multiple units. The 4 car, first generation was for British Rail a ground-breaking design - able to be used on short distance urban routes and longer distance commuter routes with ease, reliable under the 1,500v DC system, and manufactured in large numbers for the different metropolitan areas of the United Kingdom; London, Glasgow and Manchester. The design would later be adopted and evolved as a standard for the second generation of multiple units, utilising many formerly cutting edge features, and bringing them in to one standard design.
The new "1972 Design" was ground breaking due to these changes. It featured electrical compatibility with both the third rail 750v DC system as well as the overhead 1,500v DC system, and could easily be manufactured in a 2-coach, 3-coach or 4-coach formation. The structural design was taken from the evolving "Mark 3" coach design, which would be used for longer distance services, with power operated doors (moving away from the "slam door" approach), and new improved passenger comforts. Seats were of a new ergonomic design, and they were sealed trains with heating and air conditioning capabilities. Regenerative capabilities by using the motor in reverse was provided, providing substantial maintenance advantages by reducing brake wear.
These trains turned out to be the greater part of Beeching's legacy today; the mindset switch in British Rail away from just traction development to improving the passenger experience. The formation used had the outer coaches on each end with motors in, and the middle 1 or 2 coaches as unpowered trailers. This would later evolve by 1980 in the "TMU" or "Trailer Multiple Unit", a self contained rake of 4 coaches with operating cabs in, but no motors - designed to be operated in combination with a locomotive on one end, and allowing bidirectional working without moving the locomotive from one end of the train to the other at it's terminating point. This approach would also allow an easy change in locomotive - envisaged as diesel to electric - without needing to swap out the entire train.
The APT's problems with tilting were well documented by the media
Elsewhere and away from suburbia, there were pressing concerns. A meeting of the British Rail Board to discuss the Intercity business was held in 1971; the Advanced Passenger Train was high up on the agenda list. It would be easy to consider British Rail as schizophrenic at the time; long term planning was frequently at odds with itself. The slowly expanding network of electrification was at odds with the gas turbine powered APT, and conversion of the train to overhead power was the obvious choice. However, the "reliable" 1,500v DC system could not supply enough power for high speed operations much above 100mph, something which BR was loathe to publicly admit for reasons of PR - it's choice of system had come in for considerable criticism from some sectors. Problems with the Leyland gas turbine also began to make gas turbine propulsion unpopular, and Leyland's withdrawal of the gas turbine from the company's road vehicles also led to distrust of long term support despite promises to the contrary from the company. By accident, this would turn out to be an excellent move - 1973 brought a severe oil & gas crisis, with prices almost trebling, severely undermining the economics of such a gas turbine train.
There was also the vocal opinions of those "traditionalists" within BR - predominately the engineering section - who sought a more low key high speed train, with less cutting edge features resulting in far more reliability both in service and for any introduction of such a train, with severe doubts now being placed over the target of "in service by 1978" of the APT. Without tilting though, speed improvements would be difficult to get - tilting would allow faster speeds in curves, whereas straight tracks were limited to 100mph (now 110mph) by electrical systems. It seemed highly unlikely that the Government would authorise new truly high speed line construction through the English countryside. The hydrokinetic brakes were also effective, but complicated and problematic, although a switch to electric traction offered an easy way to provide additional brake force, via regenerative & rheostatic braking with the motors in reverse.
Problems appeared to be mounting for the Advanced Passenger Train. However, in 1973, British Rail decided to finally close the Great Central Main Line after it's freight usage dwindled, and in what turned out to be a fortuitous case, someone asked "why don't we fit the GCML with 25kV AC overhead power for high speed operations and just use that?". It was a proposition with many complications and difficulties, but also many advantages.
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Notes: Several things to note here:
- The second generation of stock is beginning to roll out here roughly as per OTL, but again with a little more standardisation. However the "trailer set" (my version of Class 438) is pushing out here, and is an answer to locomotive operation with different locomotives; an operational model which seems remarkably common in places such as the DACH region.
- The APT stumbles forward...until someone mentions the GCML. This is not a straight forward solution
Devvy
Donor
Sure you were
Haha. Just realised I said “completely unrelated” twice which looks so dodgy!
Was there as we sold a load of equipment to Siemens, first major project in the rail industry.
How is rail in Scotland doing through the 60-70's? Are Inter Glasgow services and the routes out to the wilds doing better?
Is a better rail service having an effect on politics? If there are less strikes or a less closed shop then there might be an effect esp on Labour.
Do we still have sleepers and the road-rail concept? Esp if the Tunnel is going ahead?
Have better railways effected the growth of the road network? Esp the motorways...
Is a better rail service having an effect on politics? If there are less strikes or a less closed shop then there might be an effect esp on Labour.
Do we still have sleepers and the road-rail concept? Esp if the Tunnel is going ahead?
Have better railways effected the growth of the road network? Esp the motorways...
Devvy
Donor
Defo. Will have to be the new year as I'm off to Iceland on Saturday for the winter period though! Absolutely need a catchup in a suitably respectable watering hole though!
Intra-Glasgow lines (on the map previous) are coalescing as a network along with the Subway. At the risk of sounding boring, a lot will remain similar to OTL - a lot of it is background changes. There will still be steam in Scotland in to the 1970s along smaller routes.
I think it could easily have plenty of butterfly effects, and could affect politics. The amount of money that BR sunk in the 55 Modernisation Plan is a massive deal, and the railways were, as always, a significant talking point and part of the economy. At least thus far, politics is reasonably similar, and probably will remain that way for this TL; I don't want to spin out in to politics, Europe et al in this!
Motorail still exists, although there is the tantalising opportunity to allow Motorail services to operate to the Continent one day! This is one service which will diverge from OTL...
Not so far. A lot of the changes so far as roughly background changes, and haven't affected the overall downturn in passengers and freight on the rails. The motorways were almost unavoidable given the times and amount of vehicles left as surplus after the WW2. Overall I think most motorways have still be built roughly as per OTL, but again there are changes on this.
The main effect is that although BR suffers in the 1960s and 1970s, it is in a much better position to grow once the economy starts going in the 1980s and 1990s. I normally look at OTL BR in three eras; the 50s/60s and technical modernisation, 70s/early 80s and reorganisation, and finally late 80s/90s with growing business.
Mike Portillo, eh?
Always looking for some sneaky (and not so sneaky) author names to use!