“Another Splendid Mess You Got Us Into, Teddy!”

[McPherson]

Oh yeah, btw i heard there are plans for an alliance between German, American and the Chinese due to the fear of the Japanese (with Teddy even saying America needed a defeat in land to become much much stronger)

Ahhh.

Roosevelt said and wrote;

The Letter:

MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFTER -

SIR: In a meeting of the general and medical officers called by you at the Palace this morning we were all, as you know, unanimous in our views of what should be done with the army. To keep us here, in the opinion of every officer commanding a division or a brigade, will simply involve the destruction of thousands. There is no possible reason for not shipping practically the entire command North at once.

Yellow-fever cases are very few in the cavalry division, where I command one of the two brigades, and not one true case of yellow fever has occurred in this division, except among the men sent to the hospital at Siboney, where they have, I believe, contracted it.

But in this division there have been 1,500 cases of malarial fever. Hardly a man has yet died from it, but the whole command is so weakened and shattered as to be ripe for dying like rotten sheep, when a real yellow-fever epidemic instead of a fake epidemic, like the present one, strikes us, as it is bound to do if we stay here at the height of the sickness season, August and the beginning of September. Quarantine against malarial fever is much like quarantining against the toothache.

All of us are certain that as soon as the authorities at Washington fully appreciate the condition of the army, we shall be sent home. If we are kept here it will in all human possibility mean an appalling disaster, for the surgeons here estimate that over half the army, if kept here during the sickly season, will die.

This is not only terrible from the stand-point of the individual lives lost, but it means ruin from the stand-point of military efficiency of the flower of the American army, for the great bulk of the regulars are here with you. The sick list, large though it is, exceeding four thousand, affords but a faint index of the debilitation of the army. Not twenty per cent. are fit for active work.

Six weeks on the North Maine coast, for instance, or elsewhere where the yellow-fever germ cannot possibly propagate, would make us all as fit as fighting-cocks, as able as we are eager to take a leading part in the great campaign against Havana in the fall, even if we are not allowed to try Porto Rico.

We can be moved North, if moved at once, with absolute safety to the country, although, of course, it would have been infinitely better if we had been moved North or to Porto Rico two weeks ago. If there were any object in keeping us here, we would face yellow fever with as much indifference as we faced bullets. But there is no object.

The four immune regiments ordered here are sufficient to garrison the city and surrounding towns, and there is absolutely nothing for us to do here, and there has not been since the city surrendered. It is impossible to move into the interior. Every shifting of camp doubles the sick-rate in our present weakened condition, and, anyhow, the interior is rather worse than the coast, as I have found by actual reconnaissance. Our present camps are as healthy as any camps at this end of the island can be.

I write only because I cannot see our men, who have fought so bravely and who have endured extreme hardship and danger so uncomplainingly, go to destruction without striving so far as lies in me to avert a doom as fearful as it is unnecessary and undeserved.

Yours respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, Colonel Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.

We, the undersigned officers commanding the various brigades, divisions, etc., of the Army of Occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army should be at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some point on the Northern sea-coast of the United States; that can be done without danger to the people of the United States; that yellow fever in the army at present is not epidemic; that there are only a few sporadic cases; but that the army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a condition to be practically entirely destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever, which is sure to come in the near future.

We know from the reports of competent officers and from personal observations that the army is unable to move into the interior, and that there are no facilities for such a move if attempted, and that it could not be attempted until too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities of the island say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season without losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever.

This army must be moved at once, or perish. As the army can be safely moved now, the persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives.

Our opinions are the result of careful personal observation, and they are also based on the unanimous opinion of our medical officers with the army, who understand the situation absolutely.

J. FORD KENT, Major-General Volunteers Commanding First Division, Fifth Corps.

J. C. BATES, Major-General Volunteers Commanding Provisional Division.

ADNAH R. CHAFFEE, Major-General Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.

SAMUEL S. SUMNER, Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding First Brigade, Cavalry.

WILL LUDLOW, Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding First Brigade, Second Division.

ADELBERT AMES, Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding Third Brigade, First Division.

LEONARD WOOD, Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding the City of Santiago.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT, Colonel Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.

It was another observation by Mister Roosevelt that if the Americans had been up against Europe's First Teams; the British, French or the Germans, that the American Army would have had its head handed to it on a silver platter.

As a matter of my own opinion, I think Mister Roosevelt underestimated the Spanish and his own American army. The Tercios were tough hombres, led at the top by some vacillators and some quite inept generals. The Isabelline regime of the Queen Regent might have had some questionable navy and army ministers, and some of the field generals were positively useless "politicals"; but the line leadership at regiment and ship and the fleet admirals were remarkably shrewd men.

Example: General Vara de Rey at the Battle of El Canay

 

[Driftless]

It was another observation by Mister Roosevelt that if the Americans had been up against Europe's First Teams; the British, French or the Germans, that the American Army would have had its head handed to it on a silver platter.

As a matter of my own opinion, I think Mister Roosevelt underestimated the Spanish and his own American army.

From what I've read over the years, the Spanish forces in Cuba ranged from very good to competent, if dispirited professionals. They were good at soldiering, but some questioned their ultimate purpose in Cuba. Also, I understood the Spanish forces in Puerto Rico and the Philippines were generally a notch down from the Cuban force. Though, as human nature goes, you put those fellows up against a more-or-less peer force and they'd step up their game and fight hard and effectively - but numbers and firepower are hard to beat.

By contrast, I've gathered that the 1890's US Regulars were a hardened breed, accustomed to the hardships of the field and accustomed to military discipline. Their weak spots were the lack of recent experience against large formation peer foes since 1865. (You can probably count the Little Big Horn forces of Sitting Bull, Gall, and Crazy Horse as the exception). Add to that limit of practical fighting experience, much of the late 19th Century command advanced in rank primarily by seniority, rather than merit, so there were often too many clinkers at the top of the food chain. US militia forces' abilities were all over the place, some with imperfect but useful competence and some with what-the-hell-is-going-on incompetence, both in the ranks and at all levels of command. On the flip side, what most of those forces lacked in skill, they often made up for with fighting spirit.

The US Army Ordnance and the logistic situations were pretty dubious too, as you've noted earlier.

 

[McPherson]

From what I've read over the years, the Spanish forces in Cuba ranged from very good to competent, if dispirited professionals. They were good at soldiering, but some questioned their ultimate purpose in Cuba. Also, I understood the Spanish forces in Puerto Rico and the Philippines were generally a notch down from the Cuban force. Though, as human nature goes, you put those fellows up against a more-or-less peer force and they'd step up their game and fight hard and effectively - but numbers and firepower are hard to beat.

By contrast, I've gathered that the 1890's US Regulars were a hardened breed, accustomed to the hardships of the field and accustomed to military discipline. Their weak spots were the lack of recent experience against large formation peer foes since 1865. (You can probably count the Little Big Horn forces of Sitting Bull, Gall, and Crazy Horse as the exception). Add to that limit of practical fighting experience, much of the late 19th Century command advanced in rank primarily by seniority, rather than merit, so there were often too many clinkers at the top of the food chain. US militia forces' abilities were all over the place, some with imperfect but useful competence and some with what-the-hell-is-going-on incompetence, both in the ranks and at all levels of command. On the flip side, what most of those forces lacked in skill, they often made up for with fighting spirit.

The US Army Ordnance and the logistic situations were pretty dubious too, as you've noted earlier.

The Filipino American War pitted a wily insurgency against American professionals. History shows that national war of liberation movements against imperialist interlopers; when supported by outside enemy to the imperialist interloper competitive peer powers, generally succeed. The Filipinos "should" have succeeded. Note that the Americans won? It was...

the 1890's US Regulars were a hardened breed, accustomed to the hardships of the field and accustomed to military discipline. Their weak spots were the lack of recent experience against large formation peer foes since 1865. (You can probably count the Little Big Horn forces of Sitting Bull, Gall, and Crazy Horse as the exception).

lessons learned against the Native Americans that allowed them to succeed.

 

[Driftless]

The Filipino American War pitted a wily insurgency against American professionals. History shows that national war of liberation movements against imperialist interlopers; when supported by outside enemy to the imperialist interloper competitive peer powers, generally succeed. The Filipinos "should" have succeeded. Note that the Americans won? It was...

lessons learned against the Native Americans that allowed them to succeed.

A bit of a tangent on my part.... I wonder how much of the frustrating experience of trying to capture/kill Geronimo factored into General Hugh Scott's explaining to Secr. Baker of the extreme unlikelihood of capturing/killing Pancho Villa (as an individual) in 1916. By comparison, Geronimo's small, but competent band eluded the Army for years. Had wireless telegraphy rapid communication or aerial reconnaissance been available back then, the cycle might have been shortened.

 

[McPherson]

A bit of a tangent on my part.... I wonder how much of the frustrating experience of trying to capture/kill Geronimo factored into General Hugh Scott's explaining to Secr. Baker of the extreme unlikelihood of capturing/killing Pancho Villa (as an individual) in 1916. By comparison, Geronimo's small, but competent band eluded the Army for years. Had wireless telegraphy rapid communication or aerial reconnaissance been available back then, the cycle might have been shortened.

Geronimo was not Uncle Ho. His own tribes turned on him. Hugh Scott knew exactly what the problem was, and understood it long before Mao discovered his "fish in the ocean" metaphor for successful insurgency. It was not the terrain. The American army knew how to handle terrain. It was not the guerrero tactics. The American army could gut-rip any band of Villistas they could pin down. It was the fiercely patriotic and hostile Mexican people who were Villa's ocean. The Americans could not recruit scouts or generate a pro-American grouping with any of the Mexican population because of a little thing called RACISM. There were actual Mexican factional political schisms and wedges that could be exploited, but "unreconstructed Confederates" (Wilson) and people who thought like them (Pershing and Newton Baker and that "friend of humanity" Robert Lansing) could not make the leap of empathy that a Howard Taft or Hugh Scott could.

 

[McPherson]

From: General Board
To: Commander East Asia Squadron (ACTUAL)
Subject: Current instructions

Dear George;

• First, do not use the British cable system at Hong Kong. Use ours which we have established through the consulate at Shanghai. We now know the British intercept and attempt to decrypt every telegram sent by undersea cable through Hong Kong. We laid the Shanghai to San Francisco cable at great expense last year. Now is the time to see if the money spent, is worth it.
• Second, the scoundrel, Charles Waller, is a British agent. Use him. Do not trust him.
• Third. Oscar Williams is a good man, but he is state department and is trained to talk matters to a resolution. Use him for his ears but let your guns speak when the war comes. The situation in Cuba has heated to a boil and that matter can no longer be negotiated. We must operate with the assumption that louder voices than speech will be needed to make the Madrid government see that they must let go of Cuba and since that war will come, we must seize the opportunity presented to improve our nation wherever and whenever the war presents the chance.
• Third, the plan, you originally proposed, to recruit auxiliaries, in both men and ships from Chinese resources to fill out your present cadres, is fraught with peril as it may telegraph our intent, but since the Spaniards have spies in Hong Kong, Haiphong and Singapore, we must attempt the risk. Do not recruit your levies from the Eight Banners. Use the Yong Ying. They will make excellent marines. Use our Shanghai man to contact Liu Kunyi (劉坤一) and his deputy, Zhang Zhidong (張之洞). Both men are prominent in the Chinese "Self Strengthening Movement" and both men will supply you with men and the necessary provisions in exchange for "favors".
• Fourth, The ammunition question is a vexing one. Our stocks of 10 centimeter and 15 centimeter are adequate but difficult to ship as no rail handler exists who will transship the shells and charges across our country who can keep his mouth closed to the newspapers. Therefore, we must send the ammunition by sea aboard the collier, Powhatan; and with her we will send the cruisers, Baltimore, Charleston and Columbia. Baltimore is yours, but the Charleston and Columbia are tasked to other purposes and missions and will not be immediately available to you until as such time as those purposes are completed. I am afraid the 20 cm ammunition is critical as the last batch from Phoenix Iron Works was tested for proof and failed. We seek a remedy with the new Midvale Ordnance Works. Mssrs. Driggs and Seabury have promised us a batch within six months. We shall see.
• Fifth. The Monocracy is to be outfitted as your messenger ship. Use her to run your dispatches. No one will suspect her as your messenger boat as she is "worthless" as a sidewheeler.
• Sixth. The proposed meeting with the rebel, Aguinaldo, to coordinate support with his followers is to be postponed for now. The Germans are at it again, and we do not propose to be the other "dummy" in Mister Aguinaldo's game of "Let's you and him bargain and I'll pick the winner." As it stands with us, if we have to resort to the last argument, Mister Aguinaldo will learn that great states tend to act in their own interests. There are not so many Benjamin Franklins to cozen French kings to support revolutions for altruistic reasons.
• Seventh. The danger of reinforcement from Spain, either by purchased ships, or from Spain proper, has been taken into account. Egypt will cooperate in that matter as to the Canal. And we have money to buy the Argentine ships building in Italy and Great Britain, all six of them if needs be.
• Eighth. You must handle the danger of sea-mines locally. Whatever money you need for whatever bribes to the British merchants to hold up the copper cables and the picric acid from the Spaniards, is yours. Bribe wisely. The British are not our friends, but where they see profits they will serve as obstacles when we need them.
• Ninth. Your proposed plan for attack needs to be redone. You will not have battleship support. You must make do with the resources you have. Therefore plan for a night assault, and go for the Spanish fleet. Destroy their ships and hold the anchorage for three months. We can reinforce you from the Atlantic fleet and with troops if you can maintain that control that long. Plan ACCORDINGLY.
• Tenth. Watch the Germans closely. They are up to something.

For the General Board;
Alfred T. Mahan, CAPT USN

The plan that George Dewey originally proposes is to sail for the Philippine Islands upon receipt of the declaration of war with Spain. He will attempt to make landfall at an undefended anchorage in the Archipelago and use his Marines to take and hold the anchorage. From that anchorage he will build up his supply base and then sortie to make sweeps to hunt for the Spanish Pacific squadron which he will then engage and defeat either in piecemeal encounters or in a general action. His plan assumes that he will have the USS Oregon and at least one coast defense ship (USS Puritan) at his disposal. In the above ATL letter, as in the RTL instructions CMMD Dewey received, he was informed that he would not get those "goodies". He has to make do and accomplish the mission as

You will not have battleship support. You must make do with the resources you have. Therefore plan for a night assault, and go for the Spanish fleet. Destroy their ships and hold the anchorage for three months.

Just how much more dangerous that mission becomes with that restriction placed on "poor old George" I have previously laid out. If one reads this fictional; letter, one is also apprized of the unsettled conditions in China and in the South China Sea as the cockpit of war to come. Mahan was RTL correct when he advised Theodore Roosevelt that his Philippine Islands project was fraught with the highest hazard imaginable. One slight error in judgement and Dewey could lose his squadron and the whole entire war before it began in the Caribbean where the main naval focus would be and was intended to be.

 

[Driftless]

^^^ I believe British naval officers in Hong Kong, who were friends with their American counterparts, said something to the effect of "Great fellows, but that's the last anyone will see of them". The British were not at all confident of Dewey's success.

 

[McPherson]

^^^ I believe British naval officers in Hong Kong, who were friends with their American counterparts, said something to the effect of "Great fellows, but that's the last anyone will see of them". The British were not at all confident of Dewey's success.

Coastal Defenses Part 1

Coastal Defenses Part 2​

Coastal Defenses Part 3​

Coastal Defenses Part 4​

Siege of Port Arthur - Alchetron, The Free Social Encyclopedia

It was the professional naval opinion in 1898, soon to be proven in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, that guns emplaced on land could hit ships with more accuracy than ship's guns could hit land forts. The problem is that this belief only held for artillery of the same generation. The British navy, like most of the professional European militaries, "assumed" that the Spanish had fortified the main and key positions of their colonial holdings the way a European state would.

The Spaniards had fortified Manila Bay, but they had not fortified Lingayen Gulf, nor was Subic Bay fortified and Dewey knew this was the case. Even if Dewey had not charged into the bay a la "Admiral Farragut", he still could have gone with his RTL Plan B and defeated Montojo. It would have taken six months and Aguinaldo would probably have sold Mindanao out to the Germans as a consequence; but it would have still resulted in the Spanish defeat and the Americans fighting a brutal campaign to suppress Filipino national resistance on Luzon that is a regrettable and ignoble colonialist imperialist interloper chapter in the American history of racism, oppression and conquest which is a part of "Manifest Destiny; the Pacific Chapter".

Plus there is the interesting little fact that Spanish artillery (about 400 barrels all told in Manila Bay) was in the main of American Civil War vintage and capability. Now to be sure, a 9.2 inch Armstrong muzzle loader was still dangerous to the USS Olympia, but only if the USS Olympia came within about 1,000 meters of that gun's position.

The Spanish did have modern Hontoria and Ordonez guns of the type described previously, but these guns were not sited in concentrations that worried CMMD Dewey. The batteries were scattered and out of mutual close interlocking fires support. One gets the impression that the scoundrel, Charles Waller, took great pains to draw cones of fire to show Dewey where Spanish shot should fall. It would explain the odd course of events Dewey took in Manila Bay in the RTL. Why else would he skirt the Spanish minefields the way he did?

 

[McPherson]

The Fiske Telemeter.

 

[McPherson]

USNWTM: 000101 From: LantFlt (Actual) Montgomery Sicard To: Bu_Ord (Actual) William T. Sampson Subject: What the hell is the matter with you? Hello Bill: 1. I am not one to complain much, but I had my staff draw up an ammunition estimate for what the North Atlantic Squadron will need if the rumored war with Spain becomes a reality. 2. Refer to the Table: Ship............................................30 cm shells.....25 cm shells.....20 cm shells.....15 cm shells.....10 cm shells.....05 cm shells needed. BBs USS Indiana..............................600..................................................................................2400...................1600..................2400 USS Iowa...................................600..................................................................................2400...................1600..................2400 USS Massachusetts................600..................................................................................2400...................1600..................2400 ACRs USS Maine *(Augusta).....................................400......................................................2000.......................800..................2400 USS Texas *(Austin)..........................................400......................................................2000.......................800..................2400 USS Birmingham.................................................................................600.......................................................1600.................2400 USS Saratoga.......................................................................................600.......................................................1600.................2400 PCRs USS Cincinnati....................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 USS Detroit..........................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 USS Marblehead.................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 USS Minneapolis.................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 USS Montgomery................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 USS New Orleans................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 USS Newark..........................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 RAMS USS Amphitrite......................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Jason................................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Lehigh..............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Nahant............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Terror................................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Wyandotte.....................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 GUNBOATS USS Annapolis.........................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Bancroft............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Bennington.......................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Concord.............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Helena................................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Machias..............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Marietta.............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Newport.............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Wilmington........................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 Totals needed shells: Type............................................30 cm shells.....25 cm shells.....20 cm shells.....15 cm shells.....10 cm shells.....05 cm shells needed. ......................................................1800...................800......................1200...................17200.................44,800..............69,600 3. At last count what was in the national stockpile for the Army and the Navy combined was: Type............................................30 cm shells.....25 cm shells.....20 cm shells.....15 cm shells.....10 cm shells.....05 cm shells needed. ......................................................1100...................500......................600......................10000.................20000................25000 4. As can be plainly seen... we are a little short of ammunition if the war kicks off this year. 5. I need not point out that the North Atlantic Squadron has 120 torpedo tubes mounted in the fleet. Each tube is authorized 3 torpedoes per war load and thus the requirement is for 360 torpedoes to be on hand and yet the national stockpile in that category is 60 torpedoes in total? You can bet the Spaniards will be fully loaded out for us, Bill. 6. We are short almost 50% of requirements in this fleet across the board. I remind you, that there is the Asiatic, Pacific, Mediterranean and the South Atlantic squadrons in a similar condition, too? Plus, we know the Army will grab off two thirds of the numbers of shells as it will claim it needs them for its Endicott fortress system. How many shells do you think they will require for their 100 or so 30 cm guns? I would guess at least 5000 warshots? 6. So what the HELL is wrong with you? You have on hand about one fifth of what the Army and Navy combined requires at a minimum. We most certainly had the money to buy the ammunition when I was Bu-Ord (Actual) in 1890 when you took over the position. Get with it, Bill, or I will hang you out on the yardarm for the Press to String You Up when we lose this war. You read me, Mister? With best regards; Your friend Monty.

k

 

[Rfl23]

Btw i heard around this era (i think the 1910s onwards) there is plan to build a massive battleship by senator tillman

 

[Karelian]

Slow-motion trainwrecks are the worst.

 

[Driftless]

USNWTM: 000101 From: LantFlt (Actual) Montgomery Sicard To: Bu_Ord (Actual) William T. Sampson Subject: What the hell is the matter with you? Hello Bill: 1. I am not one to complain much, but I had my staff draw up an ammunition estimate for what the North Atlantic Squadron will need if the rumored war with Spain becomes a reality. 2. Refer to the Table: Ship............................................30 cm shells.....25 cm shells.....20 cm shells.....15 cm shells.....10 cm shells.....05 cm shells needed. BBs USS Indiana..............................600..................................................................................2400...................1600..................2400 USS Iowa...................................600..................................................................................2400...................1600..................2400 USS Massachusetts................600..................................................................................2400...................1600..................2400 ACRs USS Maine *(Augusta).....................................400......................................................2000.......................800..................2400 USS Texas *(Austin)..........................................400......................................................2000.......................800..................2400 USS Birmingham.................................................................................600.......................................................1600.................2400 USS Saratoga.......................................................................................600.......................................................1600.................2400 PCRs USS Cincinnati....................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 USS Detroit..........................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 USS Marblehead.................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 USS Minneapolis.................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 USS Montgomery................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 USS New Orleans................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 USS Newark..........................................................................................................................1200......................1600.................2400 RAMS USS Amphitrite......................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Jason................................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Lehigh..............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Nahant............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Terror................................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Wyandotte.....................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 GUNBOATS USS Annapolis.........................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Bancroft............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Bennington.......................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Concord.............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Helena................................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Machias..............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Marietta.............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Newport.............................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 USS Wilmington........................................................................................................................................................1600.................2400 Totals needed shells: Type............................................30 cm shells.....25 cm shells.....20 cm shells.....15 cm shells.....10 cm shells.....05 cm shells needed. ......................................................1800...................800......................1200...................17200.................44,800..............69,600 3. At last count what was in the national stockpile for the Army and the Navy combined was: Type............................................30 cm shells.....25 cm shells.....20 cm shells.....15 cm shells.....10 cm shells.....05 cm shells needed. ......................................................1100...................500......................600......................10000.................20000................25000 4. As can be plainly seen... we are a little short of ammunition if the war kicks off this year. 5. I need not point out that the North Atlantic Squadron has 120 torpedo tubes mounted in the fleet. Each tube is authorized 3 torpedoes per war load and thus the requirement is for 360 torpedoes to be on hand and yet the national stockpile in that category is 60 torpedoes in total? You can bet the Spaniards will be fully loaded out for us, Bill. 6. We are short almost 50% of requirements in this fleet across the board. I remind you, that there is the Asiatic, Pacific, Mediterranean and the South Atlantic squadrons in a similar condition, too? Plus, we know the Army will grab off two thirds of the numbers of shells as it will claim it needs them for its Endicott fortress system. How many shells do you think they will require for their 100 or so 30 cm guns? I would guess at least 5000 warshots? 6. So what the HELL is wrong with you? You have on hand about one fifth of what the Army and Navy combined requires at a minimum. We most certainly had the money to buy the ammunition when I was Bu-Ord (Actual) in 1890 when you took over the position. Get with it, Bill, or I will hang you out on the yardarm for the Press to String You Up when we lose this war. You read me, Mister? With best regards; Your friend Monty.

k

Historically, how long after the battle of Manila Bay, did it take for Dewey's squadron to obtain a sufficient number of reloads? IIRC, they shot through quite a significant portion of their onboard stocks and there wasn't any local stockpile to replenish from. Didn't the reloads have to come from San Francisco, or somewhere else on the West Coast?

 

[McPherson]

Historically, how long after the battle of Manila Bay, did it take for Dewey's squadron to obtain a sufficient number of reloads? IIRC, they shot through quite a significant portion of their onboard stocks and there wasn't any local stockpile to replenish from. Didn't the reloads have to come from San Francisco, or somewhere else on the West Coast?

Dewey shot off fifty percent of his base load in about two and half hours of gunnery. He had actually won by the time he called cease fire for breakfast and to check his ammunition stocks, but he mistook exploding pyro aboard Montojo's ships for continued firing of them at him. So he wasted another hour of shots in a follow up action, pummeling a burned defeated fleet. Also, contributive to this error of judgement, was the Spanish custom of not striking the colors when the ship was abandoned. USS Petrel had to work her way in close enough to determine that Montojo's line was burned down and the Spanish crews had abandoned their ships. That intelligence finally made it to the USS Olympia and the shooting petered out thereafter.

This brings up the interesting question of what would Fermin Jáudenes or Basilio Augustín have accomplished if they had used their land batteries and called CMMD Dewey's bluff threat that he would shell Manila if the Spanish coast defense guns opened fire on his ships off Saganaw Point?

I think Dewey would have bombarded and hoped the Spaniards would lack the guts to ride the shelling out, as Basilio Augustín lacked the guts to call Dewey on it.

In any case, Dewey was in a bad way as to ammunition supply and if von Diederichs had called his, Dewey's, second bluff, the Filipinos would be speaking German... or Japanese. Dewey did not get full resupply until after the Treaty of Paris, or sometime in September 1898.

It had to be made in Pennsylvania and then railroaded to California and then shipped out after the battle. April to September? Five months?

 

[Sanderford]

Btw i heard around this era (i think the 1910s onwards) there is plan to build a massive battleship by senator tillman

That was a Senator who got sick of the Navy periodically requesting money to build larger, more advanced battleships, and so demanded a plan for the "maximum battleship" the U.S.N. could possibly need, forgetting amidst congratulating himself for his genius that technology advances constantly, that building even one such a ship would obsolete literally the rest of the fleet at a stroke, and failing to realize the infrastructure necessary to build and support such a ship would need to be designed and built before the ship itself would truly advance beyond the drawing board stages.

 

[nick_crenshaw82]

That was a Senator who got sick of the Navy periodically requesting money to build larger, more advanced battleships, and so demanded a plan for the "maximum battleship" the U.S.N. could possibly need, forgetting amidst congratulating himself for his genius that technology advances constantly, that building even one such a ship would obsolete literally the rest of the fleet at a stroke, and failing to realize the infrastructure necessary to build and support such a ship would need to be designed and built before the ship itself would truly advance beyond the drawing board stages.

Considering that Tillman was a Democrat at a time when the Democratic Party was the conservative party it kinda makes sense.

 

[Rfl23]

That was a Senator who got sick of the Navy periodically requesting money to build larger, more advanced battleships, and so demanded a plan for the "maximum battleship" the U.S.N. could possibly need, forgetting amidst congratulating himself for his genius that technology advances constantly, that building even one such a ship would obsolete literally the rest of the fleet at a stroke, and failing to realize the infrastructure necessary to build and support such a ship would need to be designed and built before the ship itself would truly advance beyond the drawing board stages.

I can only imagine what is the reaction of the navy when they hear his proposal

 

[McPherson]

"Sometimes the best way to prepare for war is to bribe the enemy with money and thereby have him for profit tell you what you need to do to gut him like a fish." -- Alfred Thayer Mahan

To our queen regent, Christina, and her Esteemed Council of Ministers,

A report on the confused state and deplorable condition of our Armada’s artillery with a recommendation to rationalize and improve it, in the face of the pending crises we face with the Untied States imperialists and brigands.

Prepared by their most humble servant: Admiral Pasqual y Topete Cervera

Please regard the table or ordnance my staff has prepared for your perusal

Row Number	Muzzle bore in millimeters.	Type of naval gun in our service.	Source of the gun.	Year of introduction.	Number in service.	Description.
1.	25	1-inch Nordenfelt gun	United Kingdom	1888	100	Barrage gun.
2.	57	QF 6 pounder Nordenfelt	United Kingdom	1888	100	Barrage gun
3.	90	Gonzalez Hontoria de 90 cm mod 1879	Spain	1879	50	BLNR black powder type
4.	102	BL 4 inch naval gun Mk I - VI early gunpowder breechloaders	United Kingdom	1888	80	QFNR brown powder type.
5.	102	QF 4 inch Mk I - III 40-calibre cordite guns	United Kingdom	1895	30	QFNR white powder type.
6.	120	Gonzalez Hontoria de 12 cm mod 1879	Spain	1879	100	BLNR black powder type.
7.	120	Gonzalez Hontoria de 12 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	100	BLNR brown powder type.
8.	127	BL 5 inch gun Mk I - V	United Kingdom	1885	50	BLNR brown powder type.
9.	120.7	RBL 40 pounder Armstrong gun	United Kingdom	1867	15	MLNR black powder type.
10.	140	Gonzalez Hontoria de 14 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	80	BLNR brown powder type.
11.	160	Gonzalez Hontoria de 16 cm mod 1879	Spain	1883	150	BLNR black powder type.
12.	160	Gonzalez Hontoria de 16 cm mod 1883	Spain	1888	60	BLNR brown powder type.
13.	178	RBL 7 inch Armstrong gun	United Kingdom	1869	110	MLNR black powder type.
14.	178	RML 7 inch gun	United Kingdom	1871	70	MLNR black powder type.
15.	180	Gonzalez Hontoria de 18 cm mod 1879	Spain	1879	60	BLNR black powder type.
16.	180	Gonzalez Hontoria de 18 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	30	BLNR brown powder type.
17.	200	Gonzalez Hontoria de 20 cm mod 1879	Spain	1879	60	BLNR black powder type.
18.	200	Gonzalez Hontoria de 20 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	30	BLNR brown powder type.
19.	203	BL 8 inch Mk I - VII naval gun various gunpowder guns	United Kingdom	1885	25	BLNR black powder type I-V: brown powder type VI-VII
20.	234	BL 9.2 inch Mk VIII 40 cal cordite gun	United Kingdom	1892	20	BLNR white powder type
21.	240	Gonzalez Hontoria de 24 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	20	BLNR brown powder type
	French guns	Type	Source	Year purchased
22.	200	Paixhans gun	France	1841	100	MLNR black powder type
23.	210	Paixhans gun	France	1841	100	MLNR black powder type
24.	220	Paixhans gun	France	1841	100	MLNR black powder type
25.	230	Paixhans gun	France	1845	100	MLNR black powder type
26.	240	Paixhans gun	France	1845	100	MLNR black powder type
27.	250	Paixhans gun	France	1845	100	MLNR black powder type
29.	254	RML 10 inch 18 ton gun	United Kingdom	1872	40	MLNR black powder type.
30.	254	BL 10 inch Mk II - IV 32 cal guns	United Kingdom	1888	60	MLNR brown powder type.
31.	254	Gonzalez Hontoria de 25,4 cm mod 1870	Spain	1870	40	MLNR black powder type.
32.	280	Gonzalez Hontoria de 28 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	16	MLNR brown powder type.
33.	305	305mm/40 Modèle 1893 gun	France	1892	6	BLNR white powder type.
34.	320	Gonzalez Hontoria de 32 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	10	BLNR brown powder type.
35.	340	340mm/28 Modèle 1881 gun	France	1885	5	BLNR brown powder type.

ONI notes. This intercepted document was transliterated and conforms to our terminology as to the types of ordnance and descriptions we use. Terms are as close to the Spanish original descriptions as possible but there are subtleties in the language that do not exactly mirror our practice in describing naval artillery. For example, a “battery gun” is the British or French sourced and supplied “tray gun” which is a linear side by side set of barrels that discharges left to right in the British model of the Nordenfelt and right to left in the French pirated version of the British originated weapon. Our rapid fire gun in the Hotchkiss version uses the Gatling system of rotating barrels, and we call this a Gatling cannon; whilst the Driggs version is a single barrel slam feed gun that loads as fast as the crew can slam feed the shells into the tray. This gun is to us, just another rapid fire gun which uses the Driggs load and ram system copied off the Krupp sliding guillotine wedge breech block method.

Terms are defined as follows.
MLSB; is a naval gun, muzzle loaded with a smooth bore and no rifling grooves in the barrel.
MLNR; is a naval gun, muzzle loaded with rifled grooves in the barrel.
BLSB; is a naval gun, breech loaded with a smooth bore and no rifling grooves in the barrel. This describes the experimental Paixhans guns which the Spanish navy purchased in the 1840s.
BLNR; is a naval gun, breech loaded with rifled grooves in the barrel.
Black powder: is gunpowder based on charcoal, sulfur and saltpeter. This is typed by color in the USN.
Brown powder; is gunpowder based on cellulose, sulfur, and niter. More powerful than black powder, it is manufactured in the United States off of plant products such as acorns and other nuts. It was the known principle propellant used in the naval guns of Germany, Britain, Russia, Spain and Italy as of 1895. France’s Marine National is the only navy to have completely abandoned this class of propellant as of 1895.
White powder or “poudre blanc”; is the new propellant being used by the French Marine National. It appears to be based on a highly corrosive nitric acid base and is possibly a derivative of brown powder with a more stasile burn period than even brown powder. While our own efforts to produce this powder have met with mixed success, we know that Great Britain, Germany, Austria Hungary, France (the inventors), possibly Japan and Russia have developed or stolen the formula and they have started to produce the propellant and attendant explosives. If the Spaniards have the formula or a supply, it was probably like the designs of their Gonsolez-Hontoria guns, a licensed copy of French Schneider Canet sourced product.
QFNR or RFG: This is the USN equivalent to the British navy term of "quick firing gun" which is descriptive of a slam feed weapon of the Armstrong/Whitworth/Vickers common pattern variant of the de Bange three point interrupted screw breach plug, or of the Krupp horizontal wedge block system, or of the Driggs variety using the Fletcher wedge guillotine breech block system. It should be noted that we currently do not possess a rapid fire gun of more than 10cm/50 caliber, while the Spanish document actually indicates the Armada has access to 9.0cm, 12.0cm, 14.0cm and 16.0cm bore diameter weapons of this type as well as several classes of British 10.2cm/40.

Be aware that this document does not supply the bore diameter times breech to muzzle lengths of the tubes. (Calibers). Our best estimates are that the Spanish made guns of the black powder variety are 30 to 35 calibers. Their brown powder guns may be 40 calibers. The British guns we know from measurements to conform to these 40 caliber lengths.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Let my staff show your majesty and their excellencies another chart: specifically of the Americans and their so called “New Steel Navy”

Row number	Muzzle bore (in millimeters) by caliber	What they call it	Source of their gun.	Year of introduction.	Number of guns in their service. *(estimated)	Type of gun.
1.	25	2.5cm/50	Driggs/US	1896?	100	RFG brown powder type.
2.	50	5.0cm/50	Driggs/US	1892?	100	RFG brown powder type.
3.	100	10.0cm/50	Driggs?US	1892?	200	RFG brown powder type.
4.	150	15.0cm/50	Hotchkiss?	1895?	200	BLNR brown powder type.
5.	200	20.0cm/40	Driggs/US	1892?	50	BLNR brown powder type.
6.	250	25.0cm/40	Driggs/US	1895?	20?	BLNR brown powder type.
7.	300	30.0cm/40	Driggs/US	1893?	40?	BLNR brown powder type.

As can be seen, our most likely future opponent has a most rational naval artillery which allows him great efficiency and confidence in his means. He has his own means to arm his ships and harm us This does not bode well for our Armada as we cannot even guarantee that our suppliers will not honor their commitments to us should war come as to shells and specialized explosives which we lack the means to build or duplicate with the foreign sourced guns we have purchased in the past.

Therefore, I propose this remedy. Please refer to the chart supplied;

Row Number	Muzzle bore in millimeters.	Type of naval gun in our service.	Source of the gun.	Year of introduction.	Number we need in service.	Description.
1.	25	1-inch Nordenfelt gun	United Kingdom	1888	250	Barrage gun.
2.	57	QF 6 pounder Nordenfelt	United Kingdom	1888	250	Barrage gun
3.	90	Gonzalez Hontoria de 90 cm mod 1879	Spain	1879	100	BLNR black powder type
4.	120	Gonzalez Hontoria de 12 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	200	BLNR brown powder type.
5.	140	Gonzalez Hontoria de 14 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	150	BLNR brown powder type.
6.	160	Gonzalez Hontoria de 16 cm mod 1883	Spain	1888	100	BLNR brown powder type.
7.	180	Gonzalez Hontoria de 18 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	100	BLNR brown powder type.
8.	200	Gonzalez Hontoria de 20 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	50	BLNR brown powder type.
9.	234	BL 9.2 inch Mk VIII 40 cal cordite gun	United Kingdom	1892	100	BLNR white powder type
10.	240	Gonzalez Hontoria de 24 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	100	BLNR brown powder type
11.	254	BL 10 inch Mk II - IV 32 cal guns	United Kingdom	1888	100	MLNR brown powder type.
12.	280	Gonzalez Hontoria de 28 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	100	BLNR brown powder type.
13.	305	305mm/40 Modèle 1893 gun	France	1892	50	BLNR white powder type.
14.	320	Gonzalez Hontoria de 32 cm mod 1883	Spain	1883	200	BLNR brown powder type.
15.	340	340mm/28 Modèle 1881 gun	France	1885	50	BLNR brown powder type.

With your permission, I propose to remedy our dependence on foreign ordinance and ammunition stocks and propellants by modernizing our own Spanish produced guns to at least the brown powder type of which we can manufacture in Spain so that we have the best of explosives and guns which we can make ourselves for ourselves.

I am well aware that we must still rely upon the French suppliers for the white powder explosive and on the British for our best coast defense and barrage guns, but for the bulk of our artillery, for our own shells and the guns and the explosives we need, we are in the happy position of being able to replace most of the Paixhan, Schneider, and Armstrong supplied weapons aboard our ships and emplaced ashore, most of which ordnance has proved to be so disappointing to us, with our own Arsenal de la Carraca manufactured guns. These guns have been tested with the white powder and have been successfully proofed. The proposed program of modernization is still not as efficient as I would like; with twice the calibers which will remain in our service to those calibers of our soon to be active enemy, but within our limited means and without forcing us to rebuild our existent fleet and fortifications; that is in by merely replacing the old deficient guns with the newer better ones of superior quality which we can make in the present one for one trade of gun for gun, I see this program as the quickest remedy to our current dire straits, not requiring more than fifty million pesetas to fund and not more than two years of hard work to accomplish.

I add this additional comforting thought. What will work to give the bandit Americans pause will scare the devil out of the Germans. We must keep in mind “the other wolf who is after our flocks”.

Your Obedient Servant: Admiral Pasqual y Topete Cervera

ONI comments.

While we note with interest the appalling accuracy of Spanish intelligence concerning the pitiful state of US artillery in general and our naval artillery in particular, we are more concerned with the reported state of Spanish ordnance. The presence of more than 1,000 ship and shore mounted guns of all types, never mind that some of the guns date back to the Crimean War has us astounded. We have severely underestimated the strength and gun-power of the Armada. Our own gun park is less than 400 guns in the Endicott system and half of that number in the fleet built or building. We must accept the stark revelation of our colossal intelligence failure in this matter.

We need to consider most carefully how to handle this new information and strongly advise the General Board to urge extreme caution upon the McKinley Administration with regards to the Cuba Crisis. We are not ready for war.

Arent Crowninshield for the Office of Naval Intelligence.

 

[Driftless]

^^^ What date do you place for this intelligence coup?

 

[McPherson]

^^^ What date do you place for this intelligence coup?

LTCDR. Richard Wainwright (April 1896 – November 1897) (ONI Actual) had the US consul in Gibraltar arrange it. I would suggest that Alfonzo de Cordoba (The bribed agent.) made it out of Barcelona "un caballo por delante de la posse" on a British packet steamer bound for Argentina, just a half year ahead of that little incident which will start the war in this ATL.

The Spaniards are about a full year into the Cervera Program refit when the Americans discover this information. It should be interesting to see what happens to the USS Maine *(Augusta) and the USS Texas *(Austin) in that half year? By the way LTCDR Wainwright was blown up with the USS Maine. He survived along with CAPT Charles D. Sigsbee.

It is of interest to note that ADM Vincente Manterola, the Spanish HAVANA naval station commander, will make a bad public relations mistake for Spain when he orders the US flag struck from the USS Maine *(Augusta), after the ship kisses mud in Havana Harbor.

Dígale al oficial a cargo de la guardia que si algún español toca la bandera que ondea desde ese barco, habrá otro naufragio en el puerto de La Habana. Dígale que hundiré su barcaza yo mismo si intenta llevar a cabo esa orden.

"Tell the officer in charge of the guard that if any Spaniard touches the flag that flies from that ship, there will be another wreck in Havana harbor. Tell him I will sink his barge myself if he attempts to carry out that order."

The interpreter was shaking in his shoes when he transmitted via loudhailer that reply Wainwright told him to speak.

To be honest, I think there is some theater I can play with that incident.