Malê Rising

If there were much more point to continuing to be Devil's Advocate for some version of New Colonia, I suppose your two-line sketch--compromise with the three states being mere territories and a couple generations of black majorities there in an endless struggle to hold off the Redeemer option of mass reconquest and white occupation governments being rubber-stamped, followed by a later period when the Union can more calmly contemplate letting them go entirely--is better than mine. I myself figured that of course they'd be kept in the Union, even if it meant having an irritating black caucus in Congress and Senate-"keep friends close, enemies closer!"

Also I've seen commentary on the Soviet breakup claiming that in fact there was some movement in the direction of separatism in the Soviet Central Asian republics during the Soviet collapse interval, a top down maneuvering of the Party-placed republic leaderships for more autonomy, and this poster blamed Yeltsin personally not for racism but a simple desire to disentangle Russia from all rival power centers the better to have a clear shot at one-man authority himself. It has the nice effect of seeming to absolve Russians in general of severe racism to the point of appalling stupidity that it looked like to me, and lay all blame on Yeltsin's personal vanity. I dunno; even if the Central Asia territory were proven to be of little economic value no matter how wisely policy handles it, I find abandonment of a huge strategic security buffer hard to square with general Russian defensive mentalities. I'd think Yeltsin could not get away with such a maneuver unless a lot of Russians had very mixed feelings about hanging on to the territory.

And it was in Malê Rising that you pointed out that the level of hostility between the Christian Russian overlords and the Muslim Central Asian natives was not nearly as high as I had generally presumed, when we got to the Great War Era chapters where Tolstoy managed to be placed in general charge. To be sure IIRC your ATL Central Asia did secede, on much the same semi-friendly terms as OTL, but with a more genuinely grass roots state--and it stayed together as one big nation, not ethnically gerrymandered into a spectrum of big to mini-states.
 
If there were much more point to continuing to be Devil's Advocate for some version of New Colonia, I suppose your two-line sketch--compromise with the three states being mere territories and a couple generations of black majorities there in an endless struggle to hold off the Redeemer option of mass reconquest and white occupation governments being rubber-stamped, followed by a later period when the Union can more calmly contemplate letting them go entirely--is better than mine. I myself figured that of course they'd be kept in the Union, even if it meant having an irritating black caucus in Congress and Senate-"keep friends close, enemies closer!"

I'd agree that this is the most likely option - after all, such a caucus was tolerated IOTL during and even after Reconstruction, as were black state legislators and statewide officials (the last black member of the Georgia House of Representatives during the Jim Crow era was elected in 1906). But your hypothetical involved a situation where "the white consensus, north and south, is that black-run states are intolerable," meaning that an irritating black caucus isn't on the table. And I think you're correct in saying that this is a necessary condition for a separate black homeland (though not a sufficient one, because conquest also has to be off the table), because otherwise, Unionist sentiment would be strong enough to accept black leadership for now and let political processes play out. Maybe the process by which the black militias take control of the three states could create enough bad blood, especially if it involved a lot of white refugees fleeing north and especially if northern Republicans soured on the situation because they saw fewer political opportunities for themselves than IOTL.

Anyway, bringing things back to the Malêverse, this is another reason why South Carolina managed to stay as a black-ruled state. The Free South Carolina Government applied for and received readmission to the Union during the war when Congress was (a) caught up in the mood of messianic emancipation and (b) willing to accept nearly anything that would help defeat the Confederacy. After the shooting stopped, Robert Smalls' conciliatory policies toward poor whites plus his inclusion of white people (including a few northern Republicans) in his cabinet ensured that postwar Republicans wouldn't see the state as hostile. That, and a 200,000-strong ready reserve with armaments close to hand.
 
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@Shevek: I don't want to sidetrack this into a discussion of the OTL break-up pf the USSR, but if Jonathan doesn't mind...
I was around at that time and closely following the events and discussions (as far as they were public). It was a very tumultuous and chaotic period, and I doubt that the decision makers in Russia, including Yeltsin, did think through the consequences of everything they did, or even were able to foresee the consequences of all their actions. The main goal for Yeltsin and his allies was to avoid a Soviet centre that they would have been subordinated to, even if the centre in the new constitution envisaged by Gorbachev was weaker than what had existed before. The Central Asian republics were content with what Gorbachev offered them (and he had further offered the Kazakh republic head Nazarbayev the carrot of the vice presidency of the USSR). So Yeltsin had to make his coup by having Russia breaking away from the SU; in a solution including the Central Asian Republics he would have got Gorbachev's version and wouldn't have been "top dog".
Also remember that it was Yeltsin who offered even the constituent regions of Russia "as much autonomy as they can stomach" - at that time, he wasn't really thinking in terms of spheres of influence and control for Russia, he was trying to gather allies and to not alienate the regional leaders. This kind of thinking only reasserted itself when Yeltsin had consolidated his position, when it was too late for some kind of rump USSR consisting of Russia and Central Asia.
As for the popular mood, for most people things happened too quickly, and while people did discuss all kinds of scenarios, my impression at that time was not that there was a specific constituency for such a USSR consisting of Russia and Central Asia. People were either against the dissolution of the USSR at all, or supported Russian Independence (and Yeltsin, who still was hugely popular at that time), or some kind of a voluntary Union including also Ukraine and Belarus (and many at that time believed that the CIS would be something like that). If there was any racism / disdain for the Central Asians involved, it showed up later (1992/93) when Russia dumped its currency problems on those republics that wanted to stay in the Rouble zone and treated Central Asia as its back yard..
 
The politics of memory
Marie Camara, Guide to American Civil War Monuments, Chapter 41, South Carolina (Atlanta: Memorial, 2016)

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The Arch of the Rising, along with the Black Marianne in Charleston harbor [1], is an iconic monument of South Carolina, instantly recognizable throughout the world as a symbol of the state. It has been the backdrop for thousands of political speeches, rallies, and memorial services, and is both a mandatory stop for official visitors to Columbia and the place where six governors have taken the oath of office.

A monument to the Great Rising [2] was first suggested soon after the end of the Civil War, with proposed designs ranging from traditional equestrian statues to abstract Gullah-inspired emblems of freedom. But the politics of the immediate postwar era were unfavorable to this idea. The Robert Smalls administration [3] feared that its campaign to reconcile poor whites to black rule, and the state’s still-fragile civic peace, would be endangered by a public symbol of triumph. Although Smalls and his successors encouraged local communities to build their own monuments and made funds available for this purpose, the proposal for a statewide memorial site was shelved.

For the first generation after the war, therefore, the Rising was remembered mainly by the Freedmen’s Circles, most of which built shrines to their own heroes and their own dead. Many of these sites exist today, and some, like the bayonet-leaved Iron Tree at Yemmassee and the rough-cut Whitehall Family lifting each other out of the symbolic captivity of a stone plinth, are visually striking. The Rising, in South Carolina’s civic mythology, has always been a participatory revolution – a story of families and communities choosing the ground where they made their stand [4] – and these early memorials were both consistent with that myth and part of its creation.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, the political equation changed. The older generation of Rising veterans was beginning to die out, and there were increasing calls for a statewide monument that would symbolize the revolt to those who knew it only as history. The violent 1888 election in North Carolina in which thousands of Rising veterans took part in the successful defense of the biracial Republican-populist government [5], and the beginnings of a new Underground Railroad into the Redeemer states [6], fostered the notion that the Rising and all it stood for were something South Carolina should proclaim to the world. And at home, with the first stirrings of opposition to the increasingly ossified Republican and Circle establishment [7], the state government warmed to the idea of a shrine that would re-dedicate the state to revolutionary values.

In 1891, at the suggestion of Governor Robert Elliott, the South Carolina legislature appropriated funds to purchase land in what was then the outskirts of the state capital and build a statewide monument to the Rising. The memorial park and sculpture were designed by George King, a Charleston architect who had been born a slave in Beaufort, and were completed and opened to the public on New Year’s Day 1896.

The park consists of a nine-acre seasonal garden – honeywort and sweet alyssum in winter, an array of native wildflowers for spring and summer, and pink autumn-blooming sweetgrass – surrounding a lake. Unusually for its time, the garden is designed to look unsculpted, with large stones left in place and shade trees in groves rather than lines. And on an island in the center of the lake, reached by a stone bridge, is a 108-foot marble-clad arch in the shape of an inverted Y with sweeping ribbed abutments that suggest Islamic architecture and Gullah basket-weaving. An eternal flame has burned under the arch since the dedication ceremony, accompanied at night by green and white floodlights.

The Arch was controversial during the first decades of the twentieth century, symbolizing what many saw as the state government reaching for cultural hegemony. Harriet Tubman, during her independent campaign for governor in 1920, pointedly declined to speak there. But with the dawning of a new era in South Carolina’s politics, the monument’s soaring and awe-inspiring form won the people over, and by 1930, it had assumed the iconic status it holds today…

# # #​

Civil War Veterans’ Monument… Affectionately named “The Ramparts,” the Veterans’ Monument across from the state capitol in Columbia is South Carolina’s first Civil War memorial, completed in 1866 toward the end of Robert Smalls’ first full term as governor. The monument, uniquely among war memorials of that era, embodies the delicacy of reconciliation and the difficulty of remembering all the war dead, even the fallen Confederate soldiers, without valorizing the Southern cause.

The Ramparts are exactly that: four ramparts of unpolished red-brown stone meeting at a central plinth. Each length of stone remembers one of the Civil War armies: one for the Union soldiers, one for the Confederates, one for the battalions of the Rising, and one for the armies of the Gullah republics [8]. The reliefs on the Confederate rampart – a soldier embracing his wife and children as he leaves for the battlefield, a nurse tending the wounded, a burning farmstead, loved ones kneeling by a grave – emphasize the sacrifices of war over battle scenes, and the other ramparts are carved with similar themes.

At the center, a soldier from each army jointly supports a broken staff, holding it up together so that the palmetto flag of South Carolina can fly at its summit. This design subtly rejects the idea, common to monuments elsewhere but which the bitterness of the Rising would not allow, that the soldiers were brothers during the war – hence the broken staff – but affirms that all have a part in the rebuilding. That message is softened only somewhat by the inscription carved around the top of the plinth - "To all the people of South Carolina who fought and died during the Civil War: may the earth be a soft pillow for your rest" - which also carefully fails to mention any one cause or sense of shared comradeship.

The Confederate battle flag, along with the flags of the United States, South Carolina and the Sea Island republics and the green and white standard of the Rising, flies at the entrance to the memorial; this is the only place in Columbia, and the only publicly owned site in all of South Carolina, where a Confederate flag is displayed.

Not all former Confederate soldiers appreciated the Ramparts when it was constructed; at the time, the upstate counties were still heavily Democratic, and the more restive parts of their population saw the monument less as a symbol of reconciliation than one of subordination. In 1871, the United Confederate Veterans of South Carolina erected their own monument, a cast-iron statue of an unknown soldier, on private property in Abbeville, and for years this statue served as a rival gathering place. But as the die-hard Confederates left for greener pastures and the remainder got used to (and in some cases came to appreciate) the new order, the Ramparts’ central location made them the natural location for memorial gatherings. By the 1890s, veterans of all four armies held annual Remembrance Day services at the site, separately but peaceably, and in 1928, the last survivors and their descendants held the first joint remembrance ceremony. Though their causes could never be reconciled, the sacrifices of war had indeed proven to be a foundation for common memory…

# # #​

Longstreet Statue in Edgefield… Although military historians consider James Longstreet one of the best battlefield generals in the Confederate army, for many years his memory was virtually erased in the states where the Confederacy was held most dear. When the Edgefield County Historical Society commissioned South Carolina’s Longstreet statue in 1920, one could find a memorial to him in Zanzibar where he led colonial troops during the Great War, but not in Louisiana where he had commanded the Reconstruction-era militia or in Georgia where he lived during his retirement.

The South Carolina Longstreet memorial was nevertheless the second one built in the United States. The first, in Mississippi, was erected in 1889 on the site where he led the successful defense of Jackson against an attempted Redeemer takeover, depicting him on horseback in the uniform of the state militia. The statue at the Edgefield courthouse near Longstreet’s birthplace also shows him mounted and armed, but he is wearing civilian clothes. He is not riding to battle, but instead leading a family out of the darkness of Jim Crow and into safety.

The statue was inspired by Longstreet’s role in Harriet Tubman’s postwar Underground Railroad, on which his Georgia house was a station from 1898 until his death in 1905. His participation in the Railroad was just becoming known in 1920, and also, the ratification of the 1919 civil rights amendment [9] and the fierce resistance that was sweeping Georgia and the other Jim Crow states [10], made the time ripe for the citizens of Longstreet’s birthplace to send a message to those of the state where he had died fighting the Redeemers. The fact that Edgefield County was on the Georgia border and that its freedmen had fought off Redeemer raids during the 1870s made the message all the more pointed; it is entirely by design that Longstreet’s equestrian image faces away from Georgia and that he is leading his charges out of that state.

The struggles of the 1920s would eventually pass, though, and by 1942, Georgia too was ready to remember Longstreet. In that year, the Hall County government commissioned a monument to him in a public square in Gainesville. This statue too is equestrian, and is the only one of the four in which the general is depicted in Confederate uniform…

# # #​

Tubman MuseumThere are no statues of Harriet Tubman in South Carolina; she opposed them when she was alive and forbade them in her will, and even ninety years after her death, few state politicians are brave enough to oppose Miss Harriet’s wishes. Her homes, however, are another matter. She had four during the time she lived in South Carolina: the Congaree swampland where she commanded a battalion of the Rising; the modest Columbia house where she oversaw the early Freedmen’s Circles; the South of Broad townhouse in Charleston she owned when she represented the low country in Congress; and the home on St. Helena Island where she lived during the years of her retirement and returned as often as she could when she was governor.

Tubman herself had no particular desire to preserve her homes for history: she sold the Columbia and Charleston houses when she was done with them and willed the one on St. Helena Island to the neighbor family who cared for her in old age. But the people of South Carolina were another story; within a few years after Tubman’s death in 1922 [11], her homes – especially the Congaree encampment which had become a state park in 1921 and the St. Helena Island house where she was buried – had become places of pilgrimage [12]. In 1948, the state finally made it official: the government bought the three houses and designated them, along with the Congaree site and a room in the state capitol that held an exhibit on her childhood and escape from slavery, as a collective Tubman Museum.

To those looking for Civil War monuments, the branch of the museum that is of most interest is the one in the Congaree; the other locations focus on periods earlier and later in Tubman’s life. The Congaree site (which is actually one of many places where Tubman’s battalion camped during the constantly-moving conflict of the Rising) is a faithful recreation of an 1863 guerrilla camp with exhibits on weapons, tactics and the struggle for survival. The main collection contains materials on Tubman’s campaigns and her role in the Free South Carolina Convention, including rare letters and photographs.

In recent decades, however, the emphasis of this collection has shifted away from Tubman herself and toward the men, women and children who served as fighters and in the Rising’s labor battalions. The museum’s aim is to document, as much as possible, each family who lived and fought in the Congaree, and more than a thousand of them have been featured in rotating exhibits. The iconography of South Carolina’s Civil War memory is shifting once again toward the war as participatory revolution, and given Tubman’s views on the matter, this would likely not displease her…
_______

[1] See post 1040.

[2] See post 386.

[3] See post 486.

[4] See post 1281.

[5] See post 1273.

[6] See post 2941.

[7] See posts 1273 and 3365.

[8] See posts 367 and 386.

[9] See post 3324.

[10] See post 4591.

[11] See post 4215.

[12] See post 4628.
 
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What OTL monument did you use for the picture?

The Azadi Tower in Tehran.

The obvious inspiration for this is the current Confederate-monument controversy in the United States which, whatever else may be said about it, is a hell of a teachable moment about how monuments are often more about the place and time where they're built than the things they commemorate.
 
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The idea of a Civil War monument based on West African designs is intriguing. I wonder if West African culture would also permeate into how the war is remembered. You know, griots and the like.

With recent events in mind, I wonder how Sokoto, Ilorin and Lagos communicate with people whom see their progress as something to be abhorred. Given the greater republicanism and human progress of West Africa and the ITTL Muslim world, I would love to see how TTL racists reason the success of the "lesser races".

On another note, I wonder how the Arabs are handling themselves in the new century. The fact that there are ITTL majority-muslim places around the world with higher human development would sting some Arabs; I remember watching a video on Moroccan-Spanish migrants and how one West African maid lambasted at how her employer (a Muslim woman) called her a slave. Given the higher development of West Africa vis-a-vis the Arab world, I wonder if the former's success would cause the latter to brood.

And last of all, I wonder how the caliph in Stamboul would handle balancing all the different facets of the TTL Muslim world. With different strains of the faith among the populace, with different reasonings for different things, with modernity and human progress raising the question of atheism and heterodox views. And on top of all that, the caliph would need to bridge these gaps and also make his own mark on religious matters, all with a chance of outside events forcing him to state his views on divisive issues (the Afghan and Central Asian Deobandis come to mind, as is the question of transgenderism).

I have a feeling that being a TTL caliph would be a thankless job.
 
There'd probably be a lot of Muslims, among both the modernists and the fundamentalists, who'd reject or otherwise disregard the caliph's authority, especially outside the Ottoman Union. You'd have a lot of "cafeteria Muslims" on one hand, who think that the caliph is out of touch, and fundamentalists (like the Shelterers and the Wahhabis) on the other, who think that he's giving in too much to the modern world. And that's just among the Sunnis. The Shiites, the Sufis, and followers of other branches of Islam would take to him the same way that Protestants regard the Pope. In fact, I'd expect the caliph to be targeted, by both non-Sunni Muslims and fundamentalist Sunnis, with something similar to OTL's conspiracy theories about the Catholic Church and the Jesuits, claiming that he's trying to stamp out "true" Islam and lead the Muslim world into heresy.
 

yboxman

Banned
It seemed like the kind of soaring, spectacular design that a Gilded Age freedmen's state might choose to commemorate its revolution and show off its prosperity, and the Abacarist influence in the low country makes the Islamic elements natural.

Any more thoughts?

Just that the type of monument you described

The Ramparts are exactly that: four ramparts of unpolished red-brown stone meeting at a central plinth. Each length of stone remembers one of the Civil War armies: one for the Union soldiers, one for the Confederates, one for the battalions of the Rising, and one for the armies of the Gullah republics [8]. The reliefs on the Confederate rampart – a soldier embracing his wife and children as he leaves for the battlefield, a nurse tending the wounded, a burning farmstead, loved ones kneeling by a grave – emphasize the sacrifices of war over battle scenes, and the other ramparts are carved with similar themes.

At the center, a soldier from each army jointly supports a broken staff, holding it up together so that the palmetto flag of South Carolina can fly at its summit. This design subtly rejects the idea, common to monuments elsewhere but which the bitterness of the Rising would not allow, that the soldiers were brothers during the war – hence the broken staff – but affirms that all have a part in the rebuilding. That message is softened only somewhat by the inscription carved around the top of the plinth - "To all the people of South Carolina who fought and died during the Civil War: may the earth be a soft pillow for your rest" - which also carefully fails to mention any one cause or sense of shared comradeship.

Is about as good as you can get in terms of a lasting monument which promotes reconciliation, is historically accurate, for a given value of the term, is not exceedingly offensive to anyone and will not be swept away by changing tides of political evolution. Which makes me wonder if there are, in fact, any monuments built on these themes which you drew upon, not necessarily in the USA. The only example I can think as is the Turkish-British monuments at the Dardanelles, but the artwork is not as visual as you describe and of course, the politics are quite different- no real interaction or grounds for acrimony after Charnak.

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Seems I spoke too soon.... https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...-removal-of-ataturk-inscription-at-anzac-cove
 
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The idea of a Civil War monument based on West African designs is intriguing. I wonder if West African culture would also permeate into how the war is remembered. You know, griots and the like.

Certainly. There was already a griot tradition among the Gullah, and given the cultural impact that the Gullah had on postwar South Carolina ITTL (they're a minority but a very influential one), it will affect the folk-memory of the war. There will be griot songs about the Rising, incorporation of Civil War events into folktales, and cloth patterns that symbolize the war and its aftermath; the postwar griot tradition is mentioned in post 2183.

Just that the type of monument you described... is about as good as you can get in terms of a lasting monument which promotes reconciliation, is historically accurate, for a given value of the term, is not exceedingly offensive to anyone and will not be swept away by changing tides of political evolution. Which makes me wonder if there are, in fact, any monuments built on these themes which you drew upon, not necessarily in the USA. The only example I can think as is the Turkish-British monuments at the Dardanelles, but the artwork is not as visual as you describe and of course, the politics are quite different- no real interaction or grounds for acrimony after Charnak.

I managed to find two American monuments that mention both sides of the war, one in Lafayette, Indiana and one on Martha's Vineyard. Both are in northern states (though Indiana is arguably transitional) and both were built well after the war. The Ramparts were built in a much more politically precarious situation - the aftermath of a no-quarter conflict in which ten percent of the prewar South Carolinian population perished, and in which Robert Smalls has to reassure the poor whites that he'll be their governor too while not alienating the freedmen who are his electoral and military base. Hence a monument dedicated as much as possible to the spirits of the dead without promoting any one side, and hence his encouraging everyone to keep their victory memorials on the down-low.

Smalls, BTW, is the kind of person who could pull that off. There wasn't much vindictiveness in him IOTL; he did things like let his former master's widow, who was suffering from dementia, stay in his house.

With recent events in mind, I wonder how Sokoto, Ilorin and Lagos communicate with people whom see their progress as something to be abhorred. Given the greater republicanism and human progress of West Africa and the ITTL Muslim world, I would love to see how TTL racists reason the success of the "lesser races".

They'll mostly do so the same way racists account for East Asian success IOTL, i.e. by claiming that the success is stolen and that the Africans are merely imitating the ideas of white people. The case for Africans being unable to rule themselves will be much harder to make (though some will still make it), so the racists will fall back on arguing that they are uncreative imitators.

The other argument that will be made, especially with regard to African-Americans who are Muslim or in Muslim-influenced cultures, is that they are alien - the Jim Crow propaganda about South Carolina will start with black Muslims keeping white women in harems and get worse from there. The fact that even other African-Americans view South Carolinian society as a bit strange doesn't always help.

On another note, I wonder how the Arabs are handling themselves in the new century.

Fairly well, for the most part; the struggles and conflicts of the 20th century resulted in Arabs within the Ottoman Union winning substantial control over local affairs and oil revenues, northern Yemen is much more stable due to its association with Ethiopia; the Gulf states are rich and reasonably cohesive; Egypt is modernizing and prestigious; the eastern Maghreb is mostly content to be a bridge between Bornu and the Ottoman world; and Algeria is prosperous and mostly master of its own house. The western Moroccans and Mauretanians are the ones who feel left behind - some of them probably would have sentiments like what that documentary found in Spain - but they wouldn't have a pan-Arab well of grievance to draw on.

And last of all, I wonder how the caliph in Stamboul would handle balancing all the different facets of the TTL Muslim world. With different strains of the faith among the populace, with different reasonings for different things, with modernity and human progress raising the question of atheism and heterodox views. And on top of all that, the caliph would need to bridge these gaps and also make his own mark on religious matters, all with a chance of outside events forcing him to state his views on divisive issues (the Afghan and Central Asian Deobandis come to mind, as is the question of transgenderism).

There'd probably be a lot of Muslims, among both the modernists and the fundamentalists, who'd reject or otherwise disregard the caliph's authority, especially outside the Ottoman Union. You'd have a lot of "cafeteria Muslims" on one hand, who think that the caliph is out of touch, and fundamentalists (like the Shelterers and the Wahhabis) on the other, who think that he's giving in too much to the modern world. And that's just among the Sunnis. The Shiites, the Sufis, and followers of other branches of Islam would take to him the same way that Protestants regard the Pope. In fact, I'd expect the caliph to be targeted, by both non-Sunni Muslims and fundamentalist Sunnis, with something similar to OTL's conspiracy theories about the Catholic Church and the Jesuits, claiming that he's trying to stamp out "true" Islam and lead the Muslim world into heresy.

The strategy that the caliphs followed after the Ottoman Union became fully democratic was to position themselves above politics as religious scholars, diplomats, and administrators of the waqf (see post 6768). They don't claim religious authority over non-Sunni Muslims, or at most they do so very nominally, so their role isn't contentious among Shi'ites the way it was before the 1950s. As you say, though, the caliphs do have to pronounce opinions on controversial religious matters, so the comparison to the Pope might be an apt one; in an increasingly secular world, many Sunnis will pick and choose when to accept his authority, others might treat him as one authority among many, and still others might consider him irrelevant or out of touch. The aim of the modern caliphs, for the most part, is to remain as much as possible above the fray and position themselves as trusted mediators and resolvers of disputes among the faithful.
 
Can't believe I forgot to add in the last couple of updates, but they're now added to the Malê Rising installments page!

I feel there should be a post on the devlopmentv of anime/manga in this timeline and music.

If you know a thing or two about those topics, you can write a guest update and ask Jonathan for his input. Some parts of the TL were laid down by us forumers, and they were a nice addition to the main narrative.
 
There'd probably be a lot of Muslims, among both the modernists and the fundamentalists, who'd reject or otherwise disregard the caliph's authority, especially outside the Ottoman Union. You'd have a lot of "cafeteria Muslims" on one hand, who think that the caliph is out of touch, and fundamentalists (like the Shelterers and the Wahhabis) on the other, who think that he's giving in too much to the modern world. And that's just among the Sunnis. The Shiites, the Sufis, and followers of other branches of Islam would take to him the same way that Protestants regard the Pope. In fact, I'd expect the caliph to be targeted, by both non-Sunni Muslims and fundamentalist Sunnis, with something similar to OTL's conspiracy theories about the Catholic Church and the Jesuits, claiming that he's trying to stamp out "true" Islam and lead the Muslim world into heresy.
The strategy that the caliphs followed after the Ottoman Union became fully democratic was to position themselves above politics as religious scholars, diplomats, and administrators of the waqf (see post 6768). They don't claim religious authority over non-Sunni Muslims, or at most they do so very nominally, so their role isn't contentious among Shi'ites the way it was before the 1950s. As you say, though, the caliphs do have to pronounce opinions on controversial religious matters, so the comparison to the Pope might be an apt one; in an increasingly secular world, many Sunnis will pick and choose when to accept his authority, others might treat him as one authority among many, and still others might consider him irrelevant or out of touch. The aim of the modern caliphs, for the most part, is to remain as much as possible above the fray and position themselves as trusted mediators and resolvers of disputes among the faithful.
Been maybe a year and a half since I read this, and not all the way to the end, but I think there was stuff were a Ottoman minister, reformer, legislator, or bureaucrat thought that the Sultan should keep away from the dirty work of governance and to deal with scholarly matters. I think a comparison to the Supreme Court was made at ome point. If there are an enormous range of parties in the Ottoman government I can imagine occasional deadlocks (though that probably would happen a lot more often with much smaller legislatures) for which the Sultan (perhaps refered to as Caliph when they are asking for meditation) is asked to help. Probably would also be a good way for people to get rid of their political opponents or to let older people retire with dignity. A palace or library is set aside and used as a grand repository for research. May be that getting the job is for life and that it involves renouncing further public office, so that them trying to become Vizier or something again would bring them disgrace and censure.
 
Can't believe I forgot to add in the last couple of updates, but they're now added to the Malê Rising installments page!

Thanks again for keeping up that page!

I feel there should be a post on the devlopmentv of anime/manga in this timeline and music.

There have been several mentions of music, usually as part of updates with broader themes. Most have focused on West Africa, Portugal, Zanzibar or the United States - for instance, here, here, here, and here, and also a mention of Jamaican music here.

I haven't said anything about anime or manga, which aren't really interests of mine, although I believe there have been some discussions in the comments about whether those or similar art forms would exist ITTL. If you believe they would exist and can fit them into TTL's cultural themes and narrative, then you're welcome, as AI-numbers said, to work up a discussion of them and post it here. Just run your ideas by me first.

Hey, how's the name of car ITTL? How is fiacre's pronunciation?

In most of the world, it's pronounced as in French, but in the United States, most people pronounce it as if it were English (long I and silent E) and call a car a "fi" for short.

I think there was stuff were a Ottoman minister, reformer, legislator, or bureaucrat thought that the Sultan should keep away from the dirty work of governance and to deal with scholarly matters... If there are an enormous range of parties in the Ottoman government I can imagine occasional deadlocks (though that probably would happen a lot more often with much smaller legislatures) for which the Sultan (perhaps refered to as Caliph when they are asking for meditation) is asked to help.

Exactly. Also, as administrator of the waqf, the Sultan is custodian of the holy places, which is another source of subtle authority if he wants to use it, although going too far and being perceived as politicizing the waqf would cause a constitutional crisis.

Finally, on a completely unrelated subject, I've written about two thirds of a Jewish-themed alternate history set in southern France in 1249 for possible submission to an anthology of Jewish counterfactuals. The thread is here, and as always, comments and criticism will be received with gratitude.
 
Exactly. Also, as administrator of the waqf, the Sultan is custodian of the holy places, which is another source of subtle authority if he wants to use it, although going too far and being perceived as politicizing the waqf would cause a constitutional crisis.
I imagine being seen as above it all gives an increased amount of job security for him. Probably also can be used for dealing with corruption, so the various parties can dig up evidence on each other and he deals with the worst of them so everyone thinks justice is for all. The Sultan's family no longer going to be in those gilded cages or strangled when their dad dies?
 
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