Is a Late CP Victory Possible?

[Catspoke]

@Fehérvári has a pretty good 1916 POD, Austria-Hungary related:

CP victory pods

Some CP victory pods that arent: Italy neutral or Cp, Germany wins Marne, Spring Offensives suceeds, US doesnt join WW1. Also preferably make the POD on the CP side or something that isnt made by an Entente change.

www.alternatehistory.com

(much continues to go well for the CP here, as with all PODs butterflies could occur, where some CP general makes a poor decision in the temporarily better situation which squanders any of the CP goodness slowly built up, but its pretty plausible.)

 

[Catspoke]

A couple late PODs for fun:

Can we have the Austrians not do the 1918 Piave offensive, maybe transfer a good division or two to the Salonika front, which might be enough to hold off the OTL Bulgarian Sept 1918 collapse. Allowing the CP to hold on to the 1918-1919 winter and achieve a more negotiated armistice.

Not try the OTL last ride of the German navy, avoiding revolution, when the Austrians collapse, the Germans occupy the Brenner pass, allowing them to hold on to through winter and achieve a more negotiated armistice (evacuating to the German frontier in the west). (the Italians and South Slavs are far more worried about each other than trying to press into southern Germany at this point).

A more negotiated armistice being like:
Germans evacuate occupied territories and Alsace Lorraine, but otherwise hold the Rhine land and east of the Rhine.
Germans surrender submarines, but don't intern surface navy.
Surrender all two engine aircraft (bombers). But retain other aircraft.
Surrender all artillery > 150 mm, but retain other smaller artillery.
Cease production of new war equipment.
No new draftees or volunteers into army.
Allied POWs returned.
Allied armistice commissions to observe.

(at least the Germans have some ability to resist still)

German able to refuse some of the harshest Allied demands for a final peace and the Allies don't want to push the issue and resume conflict. I am thinking more like pre defined how the plebiscite rules would be (allowing the Germans to hang on to some bits of territory), reparations equal to 1913 German military budget (as percent of GDP) for twenty years, but otherwise retain patents. Sort of a victory over OTL anyway.

 

[Vangogh]

Germany already won on the eastern front in real life with the treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

I would argue that germany could have hunkered down and gone on the defensive and gotten out with a white peace or armistice with France and Britain. perhaps like someone else said they could cede a couple colonies to them in africa or elsewhere. Germany never really wanted their colonies that bad anyway. MittelEuropa was their big commitment

 

[Catspoke]

Germany already won on the eastern front in real life with the treaty of Brest-Litovsk.View attachment 836494

I would argue that germany could have hunkered down and gone on the defensive and gotten out with a white peace or armistice with France and Britain. perhaps like someone else said they could cede a couple colonies to them in africa or elsewhere. Germany never really wanted their colonies that bad anyway. MittelEuropa was their big commitment

I think it's plausible if the Germans give up all their colonies and give up Alsace Lorraine, and do naval limitations, the Allies might not be willing to spend the blood and treasure to defeat Germany over what happens in the Ukraine.

 

[Vangogh]

I think it's plausible if the Germans give up all their colonies and give up Alsace Lorraine, and do naval limitations, the Allies might not be willing to spend the blood and treasure to defeat Germany over what happens in the Ukraine.

is alsace lorraine really necesarry? this seems unnecessarily harsh? both sides very very equal

 

[Catspoke]

is alsace lorraine really necesarry? this seems unnecessarily harsh? both sides very very equal

IMO. If the USA is not in the Germans can retain Alsace Lorraine, if the USA is in the long game is against Germany, and the Allies have more leverage to get what they want.
(also maybe Alsace Lorraine isn't necessary for Germany if the Germans can at least have access to the iron ore of Ukraine, France getting Alsace Lorraine already means the average French soldier may not be willing to go over the top any more)

 

[Riain]

Well, since the military plans of OTL seemed to push their way into the diplomatic and political realm and vise versa I will take the same liberty. My understanding is that Von Moltke (the Elder)’s plan for a war with France and Russia involved a defensive stance to slow and fix French and Russian armies on the German borders followed by counterattacks and encirclements to destroy Entente forces. His would then, preferably, be followed by attempts to gain favourable terms from peace negotiations. Negotiations that would likely not involve the transfer of territory.

To me this represents a much better strategic appreciation. It reduces the chances of bringing in neutrals on the opposite side, it uses the strength of the defensive as well as German Army’s strong ability at counterattack and maneuver. It keeps the Germans operating on their own well-developed rail and logistical network while it forces the enemy to move away from theirs. And it increases the chances of a settlement by not demanding territorial concessions from the enemy.

It does have some potential problems. For starters it does fight the war on German territory, though mostly on territory that had been prepared for that event. It also does not have an immediate answer if the enemy simply refuses to negotiate, which could lead to offensive action following the counterattacks and , if not well managed, the same problems as OTL popping up later.

But perhaps the largest problem is that it requires an appreciation of Germany’s strategic position that Bismarck and Von Moltke (the Elder) seemed to share that the leadership of 1914 did not. Specifically, that Germany was a territorially satisfied power. And that what Germany needed was to gain influence and trust within the existing system while allowing its industrialization to increase its relative strength over time. It did not need to upset the current order to get the position it desired. It needed more patience than the leadership had.

Nonetheless, it seems to me to be Germany’s best bet. Coupled with support for their Allies on their own fronts.

Such a strategy appears to forego one great advantage Germany had over it's enemies, the ability to defend on 2 fronts and attack on a 3rd.

What does Germany do with the 3 field armies not needed to conduct such a defence, that IOTL were used in the offensive through Belgium? IOTL 1 field army of 11 divisions, reinforced by 4 defeated 2 Russian field armies of almost 50 divisions, and 2 field armies defeated 3 French field armies in the west on the defensive. Even adding a spare army to each front leaves 3 armies 'spare', but Germany needs 8 field armies because France has 5 and Russia has 8 up to mid 1914 when they went to 10.

How does that strategy deal with Britain? That strategy applies to France and Russia, but Britain adds a field army of 7 divisions immediately (rising to 10 by October) to the mix that can be deployed flexibly. IOTL Germany had the 'Northern Army' mobilised on the German North Sea coast, and moved its main units to the siege of Antwerp when it became clear the British wouldn't land in Germany itself. The OTL offensive fought Britain from the outset and ensured its non-French left flank activities were limited to what the RM and RN Division could do; which wasn't much.

 

[Riain]

In the short term the Germans could have to reduce the pocket. This will slow them down for the time being. Unlike in 1941 they cannot have the infantry do the grunt work while the armour keeps up the advance. In the medium term this may fulfill the same purpose that Fifth army and the BEF did in OTL; slowing the Germans down to allow armies to be transferred from the French Right to the Left to defend the Marne. Though it may be a less effective delayer than Fifth Army was IOTL. Additionally, the cordon would not, at least initially, be all that strong, so a breakout would be very possible. Even if it succeeds it is probable that Fifth Army’s losses are greater than OTL.

Logistically, the situation is not greatly improved for the Germans. The requirement to reduce the pocket would take time. On the one hand this allows for railheads to move forward. But on the other it allows more time for the French to use their internal lines of transport to move armies to the Marne. It also may create another Namur situation where Armies need to share track to do around the pocket.

IOTL after their success at Battle of the Trouée de Charmes by 26 August part of the French eastern armies was moved westwards towards Paris, by 10 September twenty divisions and three cavalry divisions had been moved west from the German border to the French centre and left, the balance of force between the German 1st–3rd armies and the Third, Fourth, Ninth, Fifth armies, the BEF and Sixth Army had changed to 44:56 divisions.

If the 5th French Army was at least partly removed by encirclement that balance of forces would not be 56 division, it might only be 50. If the German forces sent to the east came from the French frontier the Germans would have 48 divisions against those ~50, making the Battle of the Marne somewhat different.

IIUC the Germans planned a halt day on about 5 September, to give the troops a rest and allow the logistics to catch up. Events showed that they were at their 'culmination point' by then, where the couldn't even defend themselves. I think an encirclement would be like a halt day, troops wouldn't be marching hard and the logistics would have some time to catch up, so when they resumed their advance they might at least be strong and well supplied enough by September 5 to defend their position on the Marne.

BTW this is why WW1 is so much more interesting than WW2. All the troop movements in the world won't stop the A bomb being used, making WW2 strategically uninteresting.

 

[prester.john208]

BTW this is why WW1 is so much more interesting than WW2. All the troop movements in the world won't stop the A bomb being used, making WW2 strategically uninteresting.

Never thought of it that way.
WW 2 really is boring unless you ASB the corporal in June 1940 along with Fermi and his ilk, plus downsize the TVA. Spend the money on railroads, better roads, national health insurance/expansion of low cost medical and nursing schools and community/technical colleges.

 

[Riain]

Never thought of it that way.
WW 2 really is boring unless you ASB the corporal in June 1940 along with Fermi and his ilk, plus downsize the TVA. Spend the money on railroads, better roads, national health insurance/expansion of low cost medical and nursing schools and community/technical colleges.

The period where Britain fought alone is interesting, the Med and North Africa can have an effect as can the initial campaign against Japan, but these are detailed changes rather than earth moving. Once the US gets in and sorts its shit out WW2 is simply the application of overwhelming force, the only interest is in the cool planes, ships, tanks etc.

 

[prester.john208]

The period where Britain fought alone is interesting, the Med and North Africa can have an effect as can the initial campaign against Japan, but these are detailed changes rather than earth moving. Once the US gets in and sorts its shit out WW2 is simply the application of overwhelming force, the only interest is in the cool planes, ships, tanks etc.

You really need to lose the corporal and change/lose FDR and/or Churchill (after Norway and before Dunkirk) to make it interesting. Otherwise, it's as you said.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

All the troop movements in the world won't stop the A bomb being used, making WW2 strategically uninteresting.

Given that the A-bomb was only used to finish off an already dying enemy at the very end of the war, that statement seems patently false.
If you want interesting troop movements, look no further than the European theater at literally any point.

You really need to lose the corporal

Madman Hitler is a myth made up by the generals to cover up their failures and make themselves look good after the war.

and change/lose FDR and/or Churchill (after Norway and before Dunkirk) to make it interesting.

Words that could only have been spoken by someone who never looked into WW2 with any depth.

Prime example: what if Hitler doesn't get the drop on Stalin, and the Soviets are prepared for Barbarossa?

 

[Athelstane]

Given that the A-bomb was only used to finish off an already dying enemy at the very end of the war, that statement seems patently false.
If you want interesting troop movements, look no further than the European theater at literally any point.

And after all, no one put a gun to Hitler's head and made him declare war on the United States in the first place.

Or, for that matter, the Soviet Union.

 

[prester.john208]

Madman Hitler is a myth made up by the generals to cover up their failures and make themselves look good after the war.

Quite aware of the myth, there's quite a few clowns in administration that can't get dropped as long as he's around. Hess, Borman, Himmler, Goebbels, Wilhelm Frick, Bernhard Rust, Lammers, et al. His administrative practice of splitting things between various deputies causes endless waste of time and resources, not to mention changing decisions depending on who last talked to him.

There's several generals they have to retire to have a chance of winning on the army side. Keitel and Halder for starters. Let Halder get started on his writing career. Promote Georg Thomas and have him work to rationalize army procurement, 150 different kinds of trucks and motorcycles, 24+ different types of artillery, many types of small arms, four different tank chassis (Mk 2, 3, 4 and T38) all in production. The panzer IV tank has a short barrel 75 MM gun that's useless for fighting tanks, the Panzer III tank has a 37 MM gun that's close to useless, no semi-automatic rifles, useless 50 mm mortars, 37 MM AT guns that can't knock out modern tanks... Quite a few units armed with Czeck and other foreign captured equipment.

Put all production under Todt and Speer, not just army, i.e. Navy, Luftwaffe, SS. Eliminate multiple duplicate projects. Georg Thomas, Werner Fuchs, Wilhelm Wimmer, and Gottlob Berger can liaise with this for each service.

The top of the Luftwaffe could use a few retirements/reassignments as well, put Udet back in the field, retire "we don't need to modernize " Milch, bring back Wilhelm Wimmer and Wolfram von Richthofen.

Work with Reichsverkehrsministerium Wilhelm Kleinmann to get the railroads organized for a long war. Work with Reichslastverteiler Dr. Richard Fischer to upgrade power generation and integrate the electrical power of the occupied countries. Bring back Heinrich Brüning at the foreign office.

Retire Erich Raeder. Upgrade the guns on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.

The Gauleiters and Kreisleiters cause endless administrative problems and waste, have to rationalize the parallel party apparatus. Stop the Reichserziehungsministerium from wrecking science and education.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

Quite aware of the myth, there's quite a few clowns in administration that can't get dropped as long as he's around. Hess, Borman, Himmler, Goebbels, Wilhelm Frick, Bernhard Rust, Lammers, et al. His administrative practice of splitting things between various deputies causes endless waste of time and resources, not to mention changing decisions depending on who last talked to him.
*snip*

At this point, you're talking about such a monumental overhaul of the structure that you're in ASB territory to have it done without either causing massive internal turmoil as powerful agencies get their nuts stepped on and then striking back, since the new Fuhrer trying to curtail them is likely the ex-leader of one of their rival agencies; or to have it happen so slowly that it doesn't get done before WW2 starts and the resulting bureaucratic chaos only damages the Germans' performance.

And this all kinda misses the point that you're not limited to just "What if the other side won instead?" for interesting outcomes.

If anything, I'd say it's one of the less interesting paths to take. For example, Stalin believing the first reports he heard about Barbarossa would have drastic consequences, with the Soviets doing much better in 1941 and '42, and probably getting most if not all of Germany by the end of the war. Similarly, the Americans going for the narrow front strategy in 1944 would result in them getting further east than IOTL. Both of these are "just" an Allied victory scenario, but they have big ramifications for the ensuing cold war.

 

[Riain]

Given that the A-bomb was only used to finish off an already dying enemy at the very end of the war, that statement seems patently false.
If you want interesting troop movements, look no further than the European theater at literally any point.

You're free to find strategically irrelevant operations interesting, but it doesn't do it for me.

I'd suggest you start a thread proposing an interesting operation after December 1941 having a major difference to the outcome and see how that goes.

 

[prester.john208]

Words that could only have been spoken by someone who never looked into WW2 with any depth.

Explain.
Who did the US or GB have that could do a better job? Those two were masters of communication and inspired their populations.
Henry Wallace, Lord Halifax, Attlee, Bevin, Edens too junior, plus Suez mismanagement.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

Explain.
Who did the US or GB have that could do a better job? Those two were masters of communication and inspired their populations.
Henry Wallace, Lord Halifax, Attlee, Bevin, Edens too junior, plus Suez mismanagement.

The who part is irrelevant. The fact is that you don't need to swap out any leaders to make the war's outcome "interesting". For examples, see above.

You're free to find strategically irrelevant operations interesting, but it doesn't do it for me.

I am also free to discount your opinion from now on for calling Barbarossa a strategically irrelevant operation.
Edit: if anything, the A-bomb is (almost completely) strategically irrelevant for the war, since about the only thing it affected was Operation Downfall, and even that was not likely to happen given the Soviet entry into the war against Japan.

 

[prester.john208]

At this point, you're talking about such a monumental overhaul of the structure that you're in ASB territory to have it done without either causing massive internal turmoil as powerful agencies get their nuts stepped on and then striking back, since the new Fuhrer trying to curtail them is likely the ex-leader of one of their rival agencies; or to have it happen so slowly that it doesn't get done before WW2 starts and the resulting bureaucratic chaos only damages the Germans' performance.

And this all kinda misses the point that you're not limited to just "What if the other side won instead?" for interesting outcomes.

If anything, I'd say it's one of the less interesting paths to take. For example, Stalin believing the first reports he heard about Barbarossa would have drastic consequences, with the Soviets doing much better in 1941 and '42, and probably getting most if not all of Germany by the end of the war. Similarly, the Americans going for the narrow front strategy in 1944 would result in them getting further east than IOTL. Both of these are "just" an Allied victory scenario, but they have big ramifications for the ensuing cold war.

The axis kind of needs ASBs to win. They're out numbered, have inferior equipment, few natural resources, chased off a lot of top scientists, Germany had to give up all her patents at the end of WW 1, have terrible internal organization, they have limited industrial production and their key codes are broken. The USSR or USA easily out produce all of them. The British were outproducing Germany by mid-1940. Germany was better prepared for war in 1914, they rely on captured equipment for their army from 1940 on. The Soviets also have them penetrated, Borman, Gestapo Muller and others may have functioned as spies, plus the Red Orchestra and others. The Abwehr was headed by an allied double agent. The Germans never realized on that the Allies had caught and turned their agents and also planted fake agents (Aleksandr Demyanov). U-Boats would radio in reports nightly which helped the allies to avoid them and locate them for attack by planes.

From Soviet deployments and mobilization, it looks like Stalin was only a month or so away from rolling up the Germans in 1941. Either that or his deployments were insane as units were crammed next to the border and planes were on airstrips near the border. He more or less dismantled the Stalin line. IMHO the Germans beat him to the punch. The Soviet BT tank series was optimized for running on roads, something Germany had and the USSR did not. Soviet intel had determined that among other things the Germans did not have motor oil designed for cold weather, (Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster by Pavel Sudoplatov)

 

[Riain]

I am also free to discount your opinion from now on for calling Barbarossa a strategically irrelevant operation.

Cool, we have an accord.