Do you happen to have any direct quotes from “The Russian Search for Peace”? I haven’t taken the time to look through the one on British war aims, but I poked around the Rex book and in my admittedly imperfect method of skimming and word searching, I couldn’t find anything about Kerensky desiring a separate peace with Germany. What I found actually mostly contradicts that statement. Like I said, this was mostly cherry-picking so I’d be glad to be proven wrong, but from what I can gather (especially in the conclusion) the author repeatedly emphasizes that the Provisional Government and parliamentary socialists desired peace but only seriously considered it and pursued it in the context of a general negotiated peace alongside the rest of the Entente. A separate peace was rejected as suicidal and was not seriously considered despite German feelers.
Is a Late CP Victory Possible?
- Thread starter CHKeeley
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Why did they think it was suicidal? For themselves or the country?
They believed, not unjustifiably, that a separate peace would lead to a harsh treaty with a German dominated east. Then, they thought, Germany would turn west and win the war entirely, thus dominating Europe and making Russia a mere dependent state. They could then roll back the revolution and crush any chance at international socialism.
Which was a not unreasonable analysis!
Of course, once the military situation has deteriorated to the point that the enemy can literally take ground at will and you've suddenly got an incipient civil war on your hands, it suddenly becomes not unreasonable to take those risks.
I could see Kerensky Russia without USA loans and the prospect of a USA victory coming to the conclusion early the war must be ended, that they go to Britain and France, we need to float the idea again of a USA brokered peace conference now in May 1917 (the Allies feeling more pressure without USA loans, and a failed April 1917 offensive agree.
Such a peace would be compromise (the Germans wouldn't know the full measure of Allied financial troubles). So even if the Germans got the Belgian Congo or Angola and stuff added to Togo, it wouldn't be a German dominated world, and Russia could still have friends.
Failing that the Russians could just forgo the Kerensky offensive or any offensive and just try to stay in the line.
Kerensky had no good options, of course; but this seems like a fair assessment of what they were.
Was the issue at the command level or just the effort to move up the siege guns ?Apologies for the delay in answering. Got stranded in the wrong city returning from vacation (fun with kids under 5) and have been trying to catch up since I finally got back.
I forgot to respond to this the first time through. So I will have a go at it now. Spotting tripods were used right from the first bombardment missions in August 1915. These missions were not delayed by the need for spotting, but by the need to wait for the 12” gunned monitors to arrive. And though the tripods continued in use throughout the war for bombardment, they were actually used less later on, when ranges increased, as accurate systems of aerial spotting were worked out.
If the port is required for channel naval support or cross channel logistical flow? Then absolutely I would keep the force there. That is their job, and if it cannot be done from elsewhere then absolutely you accept the risk of operating from Dover. You take what precautions you can, and move out what you can perhaps, but you do what is required of you.
That’s a good picture of docked motor launches in the Camber, a tidal dock as part of the Eastern Dockyard for launches, pinnacles, and tugs. It’s not really a good view of the Port of Dover as a whole. Here is an artists view of the port in 1914:
And for reference, here is one of the harbour in 1944, while bombardment was a threat:
1944: Smoke drifts across Dover harbour, Kent. In the foreground are belts of barbed wire used as part of the British coastal defences. Both naval and civilian craft can be seen. Picture part of PA Second World War collection Stock Photo - Alamy
Download this stock image: 1944: Smoke drifts across Dover harbour, Kent. In the foreground are belts of barbed wire used as part of the British coastal defences. Both naval and civilian craft can be seen. Picture part of PA Second World War collection. - G58YFG from Alamy's library of millions...www.alamy.com
Here is another from a German recon photo. It’s harder to see but you can make out the blips of ships in the harbour:
Port of Dover - Kent 20th November 1939 Stock Photo - Alamy
Download this stock image: Port of Dover - Kent 20th November 1939 - BMYD4A from Alamy's library of millions of high resolution stock photos, illustrations and vectors.
Dover was under greater threat from 1940-1944 than it was from 1914-1918, yet it remained active. Because it was required.
You misunderstand me. The Germans did attempt to encircle Fifth Army. When von Bulow’s 2nd Army was initially held by Lanzerac’s Fifth Army he requested that von Hausen’s 3rd Army join in the attack with the intent to execute a pincer. Logistics is not the reason that von Bulow did not try to encircle Fifth Army, since he did try, but logistics did contribute to the failure to do so.
Logistics can be broken down into levels. For WW1 I tend to consider 3 levels. The first is national logistics, which is basically the home fronts ability to produce required goods and transport them to the rear area logistics hubs. Germany was deficient in this compared to its enemies as a whole, and this drove the focus on battles of annihilation. However, this difference did not become acute in 1914, so we can ignore it for this question.
The next level is theatre logistics, or getting from the rear area logistics hubs to the rail head. This is an interesting one in 1914 since it was, on the one hand, very well managed. And yet, on the other hand, it is here where the problems truly lie. One thing Schlieffen got right was that he closely integrated the Reich Railway Service with the General Staff. The Rail service was well prepared to carry out the latest version of the GGS’s plans, and railway corps for operating and repairing railways were established pre-war. The German Army did a very good job operating railways in 1914.
However, to achieve the speed required through Belgium certain things were dropped. Below is a map of the rail lines that supplied 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies on 5th Sept:
View attachment 836096
The main modification for 21-23 Aug is that Namur had not yet surrendered. Which means that the line from Liege to Charleroi is not available to 2nd Army’s troops at Charleroi. This means that in addition to 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies’ supply lines (as well as part of 4th Army’s) all going through Liege, 1st and 2nd Army had to share the line on to Louvain (though some amount may have been able to be diverted over the single track line at Landen). In order to make this work, and relieve the congestion, certain classes of supplies were simply not carried by the trains, fodder being the most pertinent here.
Finally there is the logistical train from the rail head to the troops. This was where the problems came to roost. Heavy and organic motor transport companies did exist but were very quickly proved inadequate. The bulk of the supply transportation would be by horse. Losing the fodder from the trains saved over 1.5 million lbs per day, or 1 and a third 50 wagon trains, in 2nd Army alone. But, as mentioned earlier, the lack of provided fodder led to sickness and losses in the horses. With the reduced capacity to transport from the railhead, the 18-24 km a day required by the schedule became problematic when the railheads could not be moved up quickly enough. This reduces the combat effectiveness of the formation as artillery and sometimes the machine guns can’t keep pace and when they do there is often a limit on ammunition available.
To be clear, I am not saying that this stopped the Germans from advancing on Fifth Army in late August, but it would make advances 25-50% greater than OTL’s already impressive ones (which is what you are advocating here), while facing determined resistance, highly unlikely. It would also increase the buildup of problems in the rear areas as the troops would be even farther from their supplies. This would most likely cause the German Army to hit the end of its logistical rope sooner than OTL.
Logistics collapse is one of those “suddenly all at once” kind of problems.
Feel free. The German Staff did a great many things very well. Detailed planning and scheduling were almost their hallmarks. However, be aware that the subjugation of logistical reality to strategic requirements also seems to be a German Staff trait. And it was one that destroyed them.
Could you be so kind as to elaborate? You are quoting a pretty wordy post of mine from almost 6 months ago. I’m afraid I am not sure which issue you are referring to from there?
"21-23 Aug is that Namur had not yet surrendered. Which means that the line from Liege to Charleroi is not available to 2nd Army’s troops at Charleroi."
The delay in taking Namur. Your excellent post made clear that every day mattered. Could the Germans have taken it sooner or were they locked in by logistics/resource issues?
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A bit of both I suppose. Liege fell on August 17th. Due partially to the destruction of the rail lines by the Belgians it took until the 20th before the Germans were in front of Namur in strength. My understanding is that without destruction this probably could have been moved up a day or so. But that is outside of the Germans control while Liege holds.
So the Germans could perhaps have tried to assault the defences on the 20th. But that would likely have had the same result as at Liege. Large losses for little gain followed by an artillery bombardment. Instead, learning from Liege, the Germans prioritized the movement of their siege artillery and began bombarding the forts on the 21st. Fog kept the artillery duel somewhat limited on the 21st, though hits were scored. Far fewer and less devastating hits than the artillery believed they had scored (something like 60% of German fire missed the target, with the larger guns dragging the average down) but hits were still scored. The attempted attack on the 22nd was disorganized by Belgian counterattacks. The attack on the 23rd took two of the nine forts and came into range of Northern Namur by evening. With French Fifth Army’s attempt at a relieving counterattack foiled at Charleroi on the 21st, Belgian Fourth Division, which had been stationed in Namur, withdrew to the south on the night of the 23rd and moved behind French Fifth Army. This left only the fortress garrison troops, which took through the 24th and into the 25th to reduce.
On the whole, I wouldn’t use delay to describe the siege of Namur. The Germans went from arriving to basically holding the city in three days. They had full control of the forts within five. Liege, which had almost an identical scheme of defence hadn’t been fully reduced until 11 days after arriving. And Namur required smaller forces committed and caused far fewer German casualties. Certainly the Germans didn’t view it as a failure.
In the relation of Namur to Charleroi, Charleroi was an attempt to relieve the siege of Namur by counterattack, and took place on the 21st, the same day that the bombardment of Namur began. It was the inability of the French to relieve them that caused Belgian Fourth Division to abandon the city. Had Charleroi been a French victory and the French been able to continue pushing north, it’s very possible that the Belgian division would have remained and the Germans would have been facing a very difficult urban battle that would likely have gone on for several days longer. They could even have been stopped there had the French managed to reach and reinforce Namur while battling it out with the surrounding Germans. Though that would be another question of the relative strength each side could bring to bear.
In any case, there doesn’t seem to be a way for the Germans to reduce Namur prior to Charleroi.
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