Is a Late CP Victory Possible?

The Soviets probably just believed they had enough forces present to deter a German invasion and defeat it if necessary. And were just diplomatic posturing with their forces, sort of like they thought the Germans were, and really didn't expect a war right then. So really more diplomatic and military stupidity, of which most countries were guilty of in that period.

It seems kind of insanity for the Soviets to attack Germany in 1941 without a major Allied second front present, the Germany just demonstrated their military prowess in 1940 for all to see. The risks vs rewards for such a move seem out of place. Doesn't seem like a Stalin thing to do.

(mostly agree with your other points about the WW1 vs WW2 debate though)
Suvorov raised a lot of interesting questions. Apparently, there's quite a bit of documentation out there that never got declassified, so it's likely we'll never know for sure. Since they reduced access after Yelsin and Co left office.

Two Russian sources (Microsoft Edge can translate them):
Meltyukhov Mikhail Ivanovich - Stalin's missed chance. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Europe: 1939-1941

Boris Vadimovich Sokolov: The truth about the Great Patriotic War - Was Stalin going to attack Hitler?
 
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The associated question is were the annual troop increases the sort Schlieffen (and Moltke) needed? IIUC they were increases to specialised troops; machine gunners etc, and I don't think added to the number of Divisions and Corps available to field armies. It wasn't until the 29,000 troops were added in 1912 that 2 new Divisions were created, and with these 2 new Corps. I imagine it was Corps that Schlieffen wanted with his 300,000 troops rather a steady increase in specialised units.
I don't have the numbers to hand, but IMO, von Schlieffen's plan is obsolete by 1914 precisely because of the rise of the defensive power of machine guns and heavier artillery. So investing in more specialized troops, such as heavy artilery, machine guns and railway units, is therefore a good thing! Then Germany has learned something from the Russo-Japanese war...
 
Does this mean that between 1906 and 1911 the Army grew by about 50,000? So by 1914 the Army was about 210,000 men bigger that when Schlieffen drew up his memo?

The associated question is were the annual troop increases the sort Schlieffen (and Moltke) needed? IIUC they were increases to specialised troops; machine gunners etc, and I don't think added to the number of Divisions and Corps available to field armies. It wasn't until the 29,000 troops were added in 1912 that 2 new Divisions were created, and with these 2 new Corps. I imagine it was Corps that Schlieffen wanted with his 300,000 troops rather a steady increase in specialised units.
To give an impression of how the army grew up:
Strenght oktober 1898 (after ending of army law of 1892):
- 17 Corps
- 23.176 officers and 557.436 NCOs and privates = 580.812 men peace time strenght

Strenght 1st April 1904 (after ending of army law of 1898):
- 19 Corps (2 new)
- 24.374 officers, 81.954 NCOs, 495.000 privates = 601.328 men peace time strenght

Strenght on 1st Oktober 1910 (after ending of army law of 1905)
- 19 Corps
- 25.494 officers, 87.350 NCOs, 505.839 privates = 618.683 men peace time strenght

The last numbers were the ones under which 'impression' Schlieffen published his memo.
As you see the increase during each 5 years period were a about 20.000 men => 4000 men per year.
And yes: Schlieffen counted in whole, complete corps.
The qualitative changes weren't of much interest for him and his planning. Such deliberations he left more or less to the war minster of the time. ... dealing with ... profane 'technicalities'.

source

One of the 'interesting things' imo is the fact that Schlieffen seems to have dreamt of his 'PLAN' all the time but his own actual deployments and staff rides and exercises etc. always played the counter-offense game and NOT the offense-only game (though at times with kinda 'teasing' operation at first).
Nevertheless Moltke the Minor seems to have rendered it possible to realize Schlieffens plan despite well knowing how far 'understrenght' he actually always was (and would have been further for quite some time).
 
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Riain

Banned
To give an impression of how the army grew up:
Strenght oktober 1898 (after ending of army law of 1892):
- 17 Corps
- 23.176 officers and 557.436 NCOs and privates = 580.812 men peace time strenght

Strenght 1st April 1904 (after ending of army law of 1898):
- 19 Corps (2 new)
- 24.374 officers, 81.954 NCOs, 495.000 privates = 601.328 men peace time strenght

Strenght on 1st Oktober 1910 (after ending of army law of 1905)
- 19 Corps
- 25.494 officers, 87.350 NCOs, 505.839 privates = 618.683 men peace time strenght

The last numbers were the ones under which 'impression' Schlieffen published his memo.
As you see the increase during each 5 years period were a about 20.000 men => 4000 men per year.
And yes: Schlieffen counted in whole, complete corps.
The qualitative changes weren't of much interest for him and his planning. Such deliberations he left more or less to the war minster of the time. ... dealing with ... profane 'technicalities'.

source

One of the 'interesting things' imo is the fact that Schlieffen seems to have dreamt of his 'PLAN' all the time but his own actual deployments and staff rides and exercises etc. always played the counter-offense game and NOT the offense-only game (though at times with kinda 'teasing' operation at first).
Nevertheless Moltke the Minor seems to have rendered it possible to realize Schlieffens plan despite well knowing how far 'understrenght' he actually always was (and would have been further for quite some time).

Thanks for that.

If the Army strength was to be 618,683 and Schlieffen wanted an extra 300,000 men did he want ~30 Corps? IIUC 1914 Army strength was 25 Corps, and Moltke economised on troops; by not invading Netherlands he saved 2 Corps and be besieged Antwerp with 2 Corps unlike Schlieffen who planned to use 5, so the gap between the two isn't so vast.

However Moltke didn't push his plan through in practice.
 
You basically need two major things (obviously with some important smaller ones underlying):
1. Caporetto needs to take out Italy completely before the end of 1917. This can be used to create another front against France to act as a distraction in time for the Spring Offensive.
2. Germany doesn't do two major things that piss off the US: continuing submarine warfare and sending the Zimmerman telegram.

Another helpful thing is to convince Romania to stay neutral so the Central Powers can still benefit from the extra food production.
 
Thanks for that.

If the Army strength was to be 618,683 and Schlieffen wanted an extra 300,000 men did he want ~30 Corps? IIUC 1914 Army strength was 25 Corps, and Moltke economised on troops; by not invading Netherlands he saved 2 Corps and be besieged Antwerp with 2 Corps unlike Schlieffen who planned to use 5, so the gap between the two isn't so vast.

However Moltke didn't push his plan through in practice.
So Moltke saved 5 corps.

He also beefed up the Guards Reserve and IX Corps. They both had a battalion of 16 heavy field howitzers (15 cm & 10 cm) which Reserve and Landwehr Corps did not possess.

25 Active Corps & the Guard Reserve Corps & the IX Reserve Corps* = 27 Corps with heavy field guns and corps support troops = 54 Divisions

V, VI, VII, IX and XIV Reserve Corps have a Regular brigade in one division = 8 Divisions
The independent 33 Reserve Division has a regular brigade as well.
9 Standard Reserve Corps = 18 divisions.
Frontline divisions = 54 + 8 + 1 + 18 = 71 divisions

4 LW Divisions, and 6 Ersatz Divisions, and 4 reserve divisions (fortress troops mostly) = 14 divisions**
3 independent reserve Divisions = 3 divisions
Secondary divisions = 14 + 3 = 17 second line divisions
=========================================
71 + 17 = 88 divisions total, is that enough for the Schlieffen Plan?

Were the 6 Ersatz Divisions new formations or were they always part of the mobilization plan? They were the equivalent of 3 reserve corps, but without the normal corps troops or Jäger Battalion.

*IX Reserve Corps has 16 10cm heavy howitzers, a regular brigade and a Pioneer regiment, almost the equivalent of a Regular Corps
** Some of the Reserve and Ersatz divisions lack the full compliment of artillery and manpower.
 
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You've a source for that from 1916 or earlier (as distinct from in hindsight)?
It's been a while since I've read that particular book, but I'll go through it again once I finish moving into my new house and unpacking my boxes.
Expect that in a few days, with either select passage or an apology. If you have that book and can tell me if I'm mistaken, please do.

In the meantime, a speech quoted in a NYT article from June 4th, 1916:

NEWARK, N.J., June 3. -- Vice President Thomas R. Marshall was the guest in Newark yesterday of the Loyal Order of the Moose. He arrived in Newark shortly before 1 o'clock and was escorted to the Robert Treat Hotel. After luncheon the Vice President reviewed the Moose Parade from the City Hall, with Mayor Raymond and the Supreme Officers of the Moose Order. After the parade Mr. Marshall, who was heartily received, delivered an address to 5,000 persons from the reviewing stand.

Mr. Marshall, after stating that he was here as the guest of the Loyal Order of the Moose, not as Vice President of the United States, or even as an old-fashioned Democrat, added that he had come to tell why he happened to be a member of the Order of Moose. Then he branched off into the question of preparedness though he did not mention the word. He said the world was all awry and that nobody knew what tomorrow might bring forth. Many were proclaiming that regardless of what happened, the country should remain at peace and many others were arguing that, regardless of what might happen, the country should get into the war. Continuing, he said:

"Now, I am not a believer in the idea that war is the very worst thing that can come to a people. I hope it may never come. Being old enough myself to avoid any dangers of war, I still see that it would be far better for our American youth to lose his life upon the field of battle in defense of our institutions than to destroy his life by vicious conduct in social affairs. We mistaken, my friend, when we think that death and burial are synchronous. They are not. There are hundreds of men in America walking around the streets -- perhaps some are in the City of Newark -- who are dead, but they have not yet been buried. And there are men who have gone to their graves who are just as much alive today as they were when they walked this earth of ours. Never in all history was George Washington so much alive as he is at this moment. And never was there so great a need for the American to remember, as to remember now, his dying advice to have friendly relations with all people and entangling alliances with none. Abraham Lincoln is as much alive today as he ever was, and no man ever died who lived for a good cause and helps to move it onward. And every man is dead who has no ideals in life. We are talking much about preparation for peace in this country, and I want everything done that can be done by all patriotic people to see to it that there is never any danger of an unfriendly foe setting its feet upon American shores. But you will permit me to say that, while, in common with the great men of this country, I am raising my voice for the cause of preparation for peace in America, you cannot and overcome a foreign foe with mere windy words."

The speaker then said there never had been a braver people than the people of the North, yet it took them nearly two and a half years after the outbreak of the civil war to drill an army that was worthy of the name of an army. He added that he approved of everything that was being said and done in the cause of preparation to prevent war in this country. The speaker also said that patriotism did not consist in wrapping the flag around you and singing the "Star Spangled Banner."

"What the men in this country should be doing is organizing and drilling, finding out how they can take care of themselves, and how to obey an officer, and how to shoots," he said. Mr. Marshall said further that Congress might appropriate billions of dollars for the defense of this country, but it would go for naught if the people were not ready to defend themselves.

"The time has arrived in this American life of ours," he added, "when a man can no longer walk along the streets and proclaim his rights as an American citizen unless he shall also proclaim his responsibilities as a man and a citizen." In conclusion, Mr. Marshall said the reason why he belonged to the Loyal Order of Moose was because it had a great educational institution at Moose-Heart, Ill., where the poor and needy of the order were taken in and trained, not only along educational, but along industrial lines. After finishing his speech Mr. Marshall returned immediately to Washington and did not visit the Industrial Exposition.
The message: "I hope war doesn't come, but war isn't the worst thing in the world [his words], fighting in defense of your country is noble, and our youth must prepare for war!"

At bare minimum, this is an excessively emphatic pro-preparedness argument, and is easily interpreted as "Americans, we're trying to prevent war, but don't be surprised when war does come to us, okay? Si vis pacem, para bellum."

Whatever else it may be, it certainly expresses growing willingness to get into the war if provocation is given.
The ZT was enough provocation for Wilson, I think it'll be enough for Marshall too.
 
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Another helpful thing is to convince Romania to stay neutral so the Central Powers can still benefit from the extra food production.
Romania entering the war, especially as late as it did rather than earlier or not at all, was actually beneficial for the Germans.

1. The entry of Romania in 1916 only made things worse for the Russians by adding extra miles to the front after their early Galicia offensive had already been defeated, giving the Russians much less advantage than if they'd entered in 1915 and disrupting the Russian defenses, as well as making way for the failed and counterproductive Brusilov campaign, and​
2. The occupation of Romania allowed the Germans to strip it of food, forcing the vast majority of Romanian food production to be sent west and leaving only enough for the Romanians to survive on strict rationing. Basically, a less brutal version of Nazi plundering of Ukraine in WW2 to keep their own home front from starving. One funny story is that the Austrians, whose food situation was even worse than the Germans', actually stole a bunch of German trains carrying food so they could keep Vienna from having food riots, which soured relations between the two CP nations.​
 
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From Soviet deployments and mobilization, it looks like Stalin was only a month or so away from rolling up the Germans in 1941.
How so? Soviet mobilization doesn't show that. Of the combat formations, only 21 Soviet rifle divisions were at wartime readiness and their support service units were at complete peacetime readiness (25 to 30 percent). To focus in on a specific example, let us consider the Red Army's combat engineering assets. According to the mobilization plans, if the Soviets were preparing for war than the independent sapper forces should have been undergoing expansion from 34 regiments which served as cadres to 156 assorted regiments, battalions, and independent companies. But instead of expanding and training a massive force of new sappers, those regiments instead spent the entirety of pre-Barbarossa June 1941 on the construction of fortifications for the Molotov Line. Similarly, if the Soviets had been preparing to attack in July, than the 160 corps and division-level sapper battalions should have been focusing their efforts on the support of the operational forces. Instead, they too spent June working on fortification construction for the Molotov line, reducing their parent formations readiness for combat action in the process by depriving them of engineer support. As another example, road maintenance forces for the motor vehicle services alone should have been expanding up to a force of 49 regiments and 39 independent battalions. In reality, they consisted only of their peacetime establishment of 8 training regiments and 35 cadre'd understrength regiment headquarters (let me emphasize that again: not even the full regiments, just the headquarters and not even full-strength headquarters) in the military districts, with NO such units existing in any of the armies or corps. These are just a small sample of many, many such examples. So the actual example of the state of mobilization shows that the claim that Soviets was "a month away from rolling up the Germans" in 1941 has no basis there.

In terms of deployments, their strategic dispositions were in line with Soviet doctrine since 1935: a covering force on the border and a second echelon of reserve forces hundreds of kilometers behind them for a defense in depth. The only difference between 1941 and 1935 was where the border was and new fortifications and logistical hubs were still in the process of construction when the Germans struck. Operationally, the Soviets deployments even in the covering force were scattered all over the place, with formations, units, and even some sub-units frequently dozens or even hundreds of kilometers from their parents. The 22nd Mechanized Corps, for example, had it's 41st Tank Division just north of Vladimir Volynsky, practically right up on the border, whereas it's 19th Tank Division was almost 100 miles to the east, near Lutsk (where the 22nd's own headquarters was located) and the 215th Mechanized Division was another 65 kilometers, just west of Rovno. If one wants to compare that to an ACTUAL offensive disposition, one needs to look no further than across the border at 1st Panzer Group - effectively an entire army - whose strength was effectively concentrated and effectively echeloned on a 30 kilometer piece of front between Sokal and Vladimir Volynsky. So Soviet dispositions don't indicate any intent for an imminent offensive either.

Suvorov and his followers are known hacks whose writing is full of outright lies and gross distortions which are so egregious and calculated they cannot be accidental. His goal is to convince you of his argument any way he can, not uncover facts and report them accurately, and you cannot trust him. If you want to read some real history, pick up Glantz's "Stumbling Colossus" which utterly decapitates Suvorov's nonsense.
 
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What about a Schlieffen's nightmare scenario in planning?

Schlieffen discounts the possibility of a long war in the East to achieve political decision, and so turns west.
And observes the impossibility of the plan due to march rates.

What's the political result of reporting the impossibility of action resulting in political decision, for a power that can't sustain a long war?

yours,
Sam R.
 
What about a Schlieffen's nightmare scenario in planning?

Schlieffen discounts the possibility of a long war in the East to achieve political decision, and so turns west.
And observes the impossibility of the plan due to march rates.

What's the political result of reporting the impossibility of action resulting in political decision, for a power that can't sustain a long war?
I mean, from what I recall (it's been a few years since I read the relevant accounts), Schlieffen only recognized the "march rate" problem with his plan awhile after his retirement because he kept a copy to keep fiddling around with. While he certainly could then have contacted old colleagues who were still at work and told them about the problem, I don't know if he still had the political capital which could have made a report that would politically "stick" and cause substantive policy change.
 
Okay, this is becoming a thread that's half about WW2 at this point. Can we please stop?
Back to WW 1. Found some interesting tables in Der Weltkrieg.
Der Weltkrieg Western Front Strength.jpg
 
You basically need two major things (obviously with some important smaller ones underlying):
1. Caporetto needs to take out Italy completely before the end of 1917. This can be used to create another front against France to act as a distraction in time for the Spring Offensive.
If you think to attack France by Italy, honestly i suggest to simply kill your troops by yourself, you will save time, equipment and horrible condition for your men. The phrase about only need 5 division of the French army to hold Italy was not for the quality of the Italian army but for the terrible condition of the terrain that favor the defender immensely, it's worse than the Isonzo front only both side get the advantage; plus for do what you suggest Italy need to be totally beaten and this mean a much much greater effort by the CP as while victory at the first Piave was a surprise the Entente was ready to fight on the 'official' new line of defense a little further south
 
If you think to attack France by Italy, honestly i suggest to simply kill your troops by yourself, you will save time, equipment and horrible condition for your men. The phrase about only need 5 division of the French army to hold Italy was not for the quality of the Italian army but for the terrible condition of the terrain that favor the defender immensely, it's worse than the Isonzo front only both side get the advantage; plus for do what you suggest Italy need to be totally beaten and this mean a much much greater effort by the CP as while victory at the first Piave was a surprise the Entente was ready to fight on the 'official' new line of defense a little further south
Italy's pretty well boxed in and tough to knock out.
 
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Riain

Banned
Italy and Germany had an agreement where an Italian army would deploy to the French-German border and replace the German 6th Army so it could be transferred to the right wing. IIUC it was supposed to arrive at M+20.

In the event the Italians didn't join the war on the German side from the start, so that plan had to be altered.
 
Italy and Germany had an agreement where an Italian army would deploy to the French-German border and replace the German 6th Army so it could be transferred to the right wing. IIUC it was supposed to arrive at M+20.

In the event the Italians didn't join the war on the German side from the start, so that plan had to be altered.
If Germany and AH did not DoW Russia and France first, but waited until they invaded, would Italy have honored the Alliance?

Germany could sure have used those extra divisions to reinforce the right wing and 8th army.

Italy would have saved a lot of casualties.
 

Riain

Banned
If Germany and AH did not DoW Russia and France first, but waited until they invaded, would Italy have honored the Alliance?

Germany could sure have used those extra divisions to reinforce the right wing and 8th army.

Italy would have saved a lot of casualties.

That's another of these 'hope' questions; not taking your own course of action that you can rely on in the hope that someone else who can't be relied on will do something for you.

Maybe Italy would have joined in that case, but what happens if they don't or join too late? Germany has given up it's military advantage for nothing. It's the same as not doing something in the hope Britain doesn't join, if Britain does join that action which put Germany at a disadvantage was for nothing.
 
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