Well what I mean is a distraction. It doesn't need to be an offensive through the Western Alps to defeat Italy; it just needs to be something else for France to also have to focus on just before a very crucial offensive takes place. Also, I'm aware that the true prize to take out Italy is taking Venice (and/or Milan). I didn't mention it in my first message, by A-H becoming stronger prior to the war is needed as well so all of this is more possible.
Is a Late CP Victory Possible?
- Thread starter CHKeeley
- Start date
Without the Italians, the Germans will need to field three new corps.
New Units in the prewar army
They could do this quickly by using the six Regular infantry brigades in five reserve corps (V, VI, VII, IX and XIV Reserve Corps) and one in the independent 33 Reserve Division.
Those six brigades added to six new brigades would provide infantry for the six new divisions.
They would need to add three new Jäger Battalions and six new pioneer battalions along with the other support units for the six divisions and three corps.
On the artillery side they would need 36 * 7.7 cm Guns and 36 * 10.5 cm Howitzers for each of the six new divisions, and 16 * 15.5 cm Heavy Howitzers for each of the three new corps.
Manpower
Each brigade has 7,000 men. If two existing infantry brigades get used for each corps, they will need 44,000 - 14,000 = 30,000 new men per corps for a total of 90,000 new regular troops.
They could then either:
90,000 new regulars plus 42,000 new reservists = 132,000 new troops total.
New Units in the prewar army
They could do this quickly by using the six Regular infantry brigades in five reserve corps (V, VI, VII, IX and XIV Reserve Corps) and one in the independent 33 Reserve Division.
Those six brigades added to six new brigades would provide infantry for the six new divisions.
They would need to add three new Jäger Battalions and six new pioneer battalions along with the other support units for the six divisions and three corps.
On the artillery side they would need 36 * 7.7 cm Guns and 36 * 10.5 cm Howitzers for each of the six new divisions, and 16 * 15.5 cm Heavy Howitzers for each of the three new corps.
Manpower
Each brigade has 7,000 men. If two existing infantry brigades get used for each corps, they will need 44,000 - 14,000 = 30,000 new men per corps for a total of 90,000 new regular troops.
They could then either:
- Create 6 new Reserve brigades, 42,000 men to replace those units in the reserve divisions or
- Use 6 Ersatz brigades from the 6 ersatz divisions, which would eliminate 3 Ersatz Divisions or
- Use 6 Ersatz brigades from the LW Divisions/Corps, which would eliminate 3 LW Division equivalents or
- Use 6 LW brigades which have lower manpower and less artillery to backfill the Reserve divsions.
90,000 new regulars plus 42,000 new reservists = 132,000 new troops total.
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Well, from what we know of the german deployment plans (ye know ... famous document RH61/96 as registered at the War History Research Center of the Army in germany ... and so popular since Terence Zuber)in the last 4 (at least and IIRC) the possibility of the italians joining was mentioned but rather dilatory and nothing to rely on at all. ... more like the cacao on the milk-foam of a cappuchino.
There was no need for an alteration of plans.
Such 'waiting' wouldn't have been done for the 'sake' of Italy honoring its alliance in word and esp. mind (esp. the german politicians - and the militaries as well - knew that there wasn't much to be expexted from the italians; not since they started their war with the ottomans after having received the 'friendly get-go from the anglo-french Entente granting them a 'palce in the sun' they denied the German Realm. Neutrality was the besrt they expected but actually only hoped for in the negotiantions from July 1914 until italian entry into the war.)
Such waiting actually WAS favoured and argued for by ... Tirpitz (aside others) but aside avoiding the 'onus' of being the agressor in its moral sense (actually such moral deliberations played a quite prominent role at that times in politicians heads) it was rendered a possibilioty to restarin as long as possible the british populace from supporting its goverment in joining war against the German Realm.
... and ... as not being informed by Moltke the Minor of his binning all other military options than advancing through Belgium they were confident that an two front war with an East First scenario was still in the cards and reasonable as well as the 'only' counter-offense stance at the western front.
P.S.:
Dear @Riain if you might keep on 'lurking' on this site ...
You won't be able to measure how much I regret the for me not understandable decision on banning you, esp as I can't see at all evidence of what you was accused for that this ban was initiated at.
But ... how's the saying:
On rough seas
and before admins ... judges
in gods hand alone we are.
I think it's a pity that Riain has been banned as while I mostly disagreed with him (?) he did offer a non-Anglosphere perspective that was very interesting. So I'm going to try to point out where I might actually agree with some of his posts, albeit only in part. Mostly to do with 1914 not the late war though.
First, it seems likely that the German and British politico-military leaders actually drew very different conclusions from the events of late 1912. The British thought the Germans would settle for the RN being 60% greater (as Churchill later announced) and that this would reduce tensions between the British Empire and Imperial Germany. The Germans thought differently, especially after the British stance during the Balkans Wars. So it is understandable that the Germans believed that the UK was committed to fighting alongside France and hence it was not worthwhile refraining from invading Belgium and sacrificing the chance of a quick victory. While we think/believe that the political situation in Britain wasn't quite so firm and neutrality would have been feasible without the invasion of Belgium. Or at least a delayed entry. Who knows for sure?
Secondly, there are possibilities for the Germans to do a bit better than OTL with the Schlieffen Plan. In terms of a tactical victory OR placing themselves in an even more advantageous position for a Long War. However, this wasn't what the Germans desired and planned - with the plan flawed by the disregard for logistics, a disregard that Riain also appeared to share. This seems a feature of the Prussian/German Art of War from the 1700s to 1942 so it's unsurprising but historically should be analysed as a potentially fatal flaw in the planning process.
Thirdly, we can agree that British policy towards Germany from 1900 shifted from neutral to a de facto alliance with France and an accord with Russia. So Germany had reasons to worry. But IMHO its best response would have been to try to defuse the naval rivalry not just accept the UK as another enemy. Appeasement or common sense? Rian seemed to think the first but?
First, it seems likely that the German and British politico-military leaders actually drew very different conclusions from the events of late 1912. The British thought the Germans would settle for the RN being 60% greater (as Churchill later announced) and that this would reduce tensions between the British Empire and Imperial Germany. The Germans thought differently, especially after the British stance during the Balkans Wars. So it is understandable that the Germans believed that the UK was committed to fighting alongside France and hence it was not worthwhile refraining from invading Belgium and sacrificing the chance of a quick victory. While we think/believe that the political situation in Britain wasn't quite so firm and neutrality would have been feasible without the invasion of Belgium. Or at least a delayed entry. Who knows for sure?
Secondly, there are possibilities for the Germans to do a bit better than OTL with the Schlieffen Plan. In terms of a tactical victory OR placing themselves in an even more advantageous position for a Long War. However, this wasn't what the Germans desired and planned - with the plan flawed by the disregard for logistics, a disregard that Riain also appeared to share. This seems a feature of the Prussian/German Art of War from the 1700s to 1942 so it's unsurprising but historically should be analysed as a potentially fatal flaw in the planning process.
Thirdly, we can agree that British policy towards Germany from 1900 shifted from neutral to a de facto alliance with France and an accord with Russia. So Germany had reasons to worry. But IMHO its best response would have been to try to defuse the naval rivalry not just accept the UK as another enemy. Appeasement or common sense? Rian seemed to think the first but?
David Flin
Gone Fishin'
If one is in a position of expecting to have to fight a two-front war against France and Russia, the very last thing Germany needed was to have Britain - bringing blockade, maritime power, economic power, access to supplies, the potential of striking at coastal regions, and especially blockade - as another enemy.
From the moment it was clear that France and Russia were cosy, German diplomacy should have been doing its utmost to make sure that Britain didn't join the party. Instead, German diplomacy seemed designed to piss Britain off as much as possible. Indeed, the impression one got was that Germany was gripped by the feeling: "We're going to fight the whole fucking world." Still, they learned from that and never made that mistake again.
(Turns to next chapter of history book. Oh.)
Going back to the original question - is a late war (1917/8?) CP victory possible? I think it would require several changes to German policy.
1. Keeping the US Out of the war is essential. No return to USW and no Zimmerman telegram are the minimum needed. And, Yes this does have adverse consequences with he UK SLOCs far more secure.
2. Have some clear goals for making peace with the UK and France. Ones they can live with.
3. Knock Russia out of the War by late 1917.
These goals though need some PODs in 1916. Such as better organisation of the Germany economy including food rationing - the same as the UK in 1939-45. Plus probably no Verdun offensive but operations on the Eastern Front instead.
Doable??
Even if achievable in theory, could the German leadership actually decide on such a set of policies and goals?
1. Keeping the US Out of the war is essential. No return to USW and no Zimmerman telegram are the minimum needed. And, Yes this does have adverse consequences with he UK SLOCs far more secure.
2. Have some clear goals for making peace with the UK and France. Ones they can live with.
3. Knock Russia out of the War by late 1917.
These goals though need some PODs in 1916. Such as better organisation of the Germany economy including food rationing - the same as the UK in 1939-45. Plus probably no Verdun offensive but operations on the Eastern Front instead.
Doable??
Even if achievable in theory, could the German leadership actually decide on such a set of policies and goals?
Maybe but seemed very aware of and sympathetic to the German POV from say 1890 to 1920. German heritage perhaps? I thought his views on the period interesting and challenging.
Possible, my own Habsburgaboo-y-ness is probably in part from my partial Slovene and Slovak heritage. But I don't think it's strictly necessary, could just be his reading of the sources he is familiar with.
Gerd von Rundstedt "We should have known better after the first war"
David Flin
Gone Fishin'
I was referencing Tom Lehrer. I prefer not to quote literal Nazis in a positive light.
Huh. Given my partial Irish and partial Belgian and partial Sicilian and partial Jamaican heritage, what should I have unreasonable rose-tinted blinkers over?
T
Without US intervention a lot changes. Kerensky wanted to sue for peace in 1917, accepting the German peace proposal. He only didn't do so under the threat of the UK and France ending all financial and economic support and with the promise of US forces arriving quickly.
With the US not intervening this promise doesn't exist and he could accept the German peace proposal. This would free forces and stop fighting at the eastern front half a year earlier.
At the same time without the threat of US troops arriving in Europe, Germany isn't pressured to launch the Spring offensive in 1918. Ludendorff wrote in his notes to the OHL, that the spring offensive was a forced offensive due to the pressure of arriving US troops. Without fresh soldiers for the Entente, the Germans can consolidate in the east and take a more measurable approach.
Without US intervention a lot changes. Kerensky wanted to sue for peace in 1917, accepting the German peace proposal. He only didn't do so under the threat of the UK and France ending all financial and economic support and with the promise of US forces arriving quickly.
With the US not intervening this promise doesn't exist and he could accept the German peace proposal. This would free forces and stop fighting at the eastern front half a year earlier.
At the same time without the threat of US troops arriving in Europe, Germany isn't pressured to launch the Spring offensive in 1918. Ludendorff wrote in his notes to the OHL, that the spring offensive was a forced offensive due to the pressure of arriving US troops. Without fresh soldiers for the Entente, the Germans can consolidate in the east and take a more measurable approach.
Didn't pick up on the Tom Lehrer reference. von Rundstedt was certainly no saint and would likely have gotten convicted like von Manstein/Lewinski was, if he was tried.
Ham handed diplomacy would constitute an upgrade from what Wilhelm II practiced after his dismissal of von Bismark. Looking at the history of the KaiserReich, it seems like they got a lucky alignment of stars with Moltke the Elder, Bismark and Crown Prince/Emperor Frederick III in place at the same time. Once they left the scene it was all downhill.
Has anyone done a timeline where Frederick III does not contract cancer? He would have made a big impact.
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David Flin
Gone Fishin'
From MLF Lullaby:
Once all the Germans were warlike and mean
But that couldn't happen again
We taught them a lesson in 1918
And they've hardly bothered us since then.
Wade, Rex A.: The Russian Search for Peace. February-October 1917, Stanford 1969, pp. 51, 26-56.
Rothwell, British War Aims 1971, pp. 96-100
Thanks
That would make the scenario I outlined above feasible IF the Germans didn’t blunder into war with the USA.
There was, unfortunately, a growing dynamic of Anglophobia in the generation of German leadership that came after Bismarck, a bristling at the confines the great man was content to work within as German economic power waxed. Holstein is a perfect example (and a damaging one at that) . . . but it is also true, just the same, that Wilhelm II and his familial resentments and naval mania really *did* play an important role, once he found Tirpitz.
I always thought Carlton Bach's Es Geloybte Aretz timeline did a vivid job of illustrating how much Wilhelm unfortunately shaped that dynamic. There's not any likely alternative Hohenzollern that's going to make an alliance with Britain, but take away the naval buildup and a very robust detente is certainly possible.
@Athelstane
Thanks
I can understand why the German elite post-Bismarck thought like that. However, their actions on said thinking led them into the encirclement they feared. So, at a very basic level a degree of hubris plus incompetence.
I suppose we might need PODs pre 1880 to get an Anglo-German Alliance. Like in Keith Laumer’s Imperium stories, which I enjoyed. Should I set it as a Challenge in the pre-1900 Forum?
Thanks
I can understand why the German elite post-Bismarck thought like that. However, their actions on said thinking led them into the encirclement they feared. So, at a very basic level a degree of hubris plus incompetence.
I suppose we might need PODs pre 1880 to get an Anglo-German Alliance. Like in Keith Laumer’s Imperium stories, which I enjoyed. Should I set it as a Challenge in the pre-1900 Forum?