There is another thread going on by Fatboy Coxy called Malaya What If. It goes into many of the issues leading to the fall of Singapore. I don't agree with him that these fundamental problems could be fixed before the war, but his story is well written, and logical. He hasn't gotten up to the sending of Force Z in his timeline yet, so I don't know how he'll deal with that. Take a look at it, you might enjoy it. Take care.I agree to a certain extent. From what I've heard, the Royal Air Force had some room to send some fighters to the British Malaya at the time, but if you don't, you can't say that you're not responsible for it.
I'll take a look when I have time. Thank you.There is another thread going on by Fatboy Coxy called Malaya What If. It goes into many of the issues leading to the fall of Singapore. I don't agree with him that these fundamental problems could be fixed before the war, but his story is well written, and logical. He hasn't gotten up to the sending of Force Z in his timeline yet, so I don't know how he'll deal with that. Take a look at it, you might enjoy it. Take care.
Except it was the Army that got their noses bloodied at Khalkin Gol and not the Navy.Grenfell's "Main Fleet to Singapore" brings up the point that the Japanese air force was rated equal in quality to that of Italy by the RAF, the RAF rated themselves 60% better than the Japanese and Italians. It was pointed out to me a while back than a purely neutral, objective observer could look at the record of the Japanese over the previous couple of years and come to the logical conclusion that they couldn't be all that hot in general military terms because they had been hacked about badly at Khalkin Gol by the same Russian forces that had been slaughtered in far bigger numbers by the Germans. While the Japanese fighters did well at Khalkin Gol, Christopher Shores notes that their bombers lost quite badly against Chinese fighters.
I bet you even the Germans and Italians would have laughed if they had been told in 1941 that Japan possessed bombers with combat radiuses of 1500 km.However, the RN had a reasonably high opinion of the Italian pilots in many ways, and officially operated on the basis that the Japanese were as good as they were in surface ships, although the Brits also thought they themselves would actually be better. Perhaps where the RN was misled was that the Italian level bombers dropped bombs in very impressively tight groups - but almost always missed just like every other air force that tried to hit ships from up on high. That would appear to have given Phillips a fair indication that the long range bombers he may face wouldn't be an impossible foe.
The 336 estimate probably assumes neutral Thailand and a long round trip for the Japanese and a defensive fighter heavy force.Grenfell's "Main Fleet to Singapore" brings up the point that the Japanese air force was rated equal in quality to that of Italy by the RAF, the RAF rated themselves 60% better than the Japanese and Italians. It was pointed out to me a while back than a purely neutral, objective observer could look at the record of the Japanese over the previous couple of years and come to the logical conclusion that they couldn't be all that hot in general military terms because they had been hacked about badly at Khalkin Gol by the same Russian forces that had been slaughtered in far bigger numbers by the Germans. While the Japanese fighters did well at Khalkin Gol, Christopher Shores notes that their bombers lost quite badly against Chinese fighters.
Oddly enough, Grenfell says that the Chief of Air Staff said the Japanese could attack Malaya with 700+ plans and the RAF needed 336 modern aircraft to defend against them. That not only shows a pretty dismissive attitude, but it seems to be well below the 60% ratio.
However, the RN had a reasonably high opinion of the Italian pilots in many ways, and officially operated on the basis that the Japanese were as good as they were in surface ships, although the Brits also thought they themselves would actually be better. Perhaps where the RN was misled was that the Italian level bombers dropped bombs in very impressively tight groups - but almost always missed just like every other air force that tried to hit ships from up on high. That would appear to have given Phillips a fair indication that the long range bombers he may face wouldn't be an impossible foe.
We also have to remember that French Indo China was not fully occupied until the 28 July 1941 - suddenly putting Japanese airpower within striking distance of Singapore, and the IJN with basing much closer to the Malay Peninsular and giving the British about 4 months to scramble to position more forces there at a time when they were rather busy elsewhere!The 336 estimate probably assumes neutral Thailand and a long round trip for the Japanese and a defensive fighter heavy force.
If 700 planes were attacking they are probably assuming 300 fighters and 400 bombers which gives 300 British fighters a heavy advantage (if you assume the 60% rule).
Also the Japanese attack might be broken into multiple waves giving the British the ability to concentrate.
My point is that they can assume that they are 60% better and that defense gives them a big advantage. They can be wrong though. Even if they believe they are better it relies on quality of plane. The RAF can be 60% better but if Malaya comes last and gets Hurricane Is its a lot differenct than mkv spitfires.
Did I say Philips was an idiot?The point is that it's not a "blunder" if it's caused by the first use of a weapon no one knows about, or by being placed in an impossible situation. Only alien space bats know about every possible weapon or can win all the time.
The fact "isn't" that people, even high commanders, are ultimately responsible for things they cannot alter or avoid. They're not.
There are many British commanders I don't defend; I haven't defended Perceval and I don't think I'd defend Blamey or others. There's also commanders from other nations I do defend. I have actually, in my work in government enquiries, investigated a real life current admiral and an AVM (I tried to get higher-ups to take action but was overruled, sadly) so the reality is that I take real-life steps against people in high places in the military, rather than just criticising dead admirals with hindsight. But that doesn't mean we just ignore the reality of the situation that Phillips was placed in.
But if we just say "Oh, Phillips was an idiot" we lose a great chance to understand why he did what he did, and that's where we learn a lot. We learn very little from saying "X was a moron"; all we get is the ego boost of "proving" we know more than someone else, while conveniently ignoring the fact that we don't have to deal the cards they were dealt with.
It's all too easy for people to criticise people for taking a particular action in a particular situation, and then to ignore what would happen if that approach was followed elsewhere in similar situations. I notice you don't seem to have said what approach you think Phillips should have taken, and why - and you haven't applied a similar approach to similar facts elsewhere.
It seems that you are critical of Phillips' decision to take Force Z into an area where he could have been attacked by about 40 twin engined bombers. Okay, let's then apply that approach to Crete, Greece, Malta Convoys, and other situations....... the result is probably disaster of the highest order.
The Japanese did a lot to make their own luck.Reference Posts #131 and #135-139.
First of all on Tom Phillips suitability as a Force Z Commander. He was a s good of a choice as any given his assigned mission. He was not an ignorant battleship admiral. His step-son Gerald served in HMS Jackal off Crete and gave his father first-hand accounts of the sinking of British ships by air attack. Phillips asked for air cover and was denied it. In April 1941 Phillips in his position at the Admiralty advocated for Hurricanes to be sent to Malaya instead of Buffalos. '
As far as the blame game goes, I don't blame Phillips as much as Palliser and Pulford; or the three of them plus Percival as much as Churchill and Whitehall in general, nor the Government of the day as much as two decades of poor defence policy from 1919-1939.
Having said that, I do not blame the British anywhere near as much as I do CREDIT the Japanese for having run a brilliant, imaginative campaign that was as reckless as say the German invasion of Norway. Japanese planning was incredibly risky, and subject to quite capricious weather and sea conditions. Any clear reading of the campaign, and especially Force Z cannot help but emphasize the extreme streaks of luck the Japanese enjoyed at key times.
The question is - and I believe this to be the rationale for a Re-Do - what impact would the addition of HMS Indomitable and escorts have on the OTL examples of luck the IJN had in the destruction of Force Z?
Concur completely, hence why I credit more than I blame. But the question remains, can HMS Indomitable undo some of that luck?The Japanese did a lot to make their own luck.
From what was posted, a submarine was the one that spotted Force Z. With a carrier, especially one with ASW aircraft onboard, the sub is either sunk or submerged. Force Z might get away. The IJN does not know where Force Z is. How many planes can they spare to search? They CAP should be able to take care of any search aircraft. It could disrupt some of the IJN plans.Concur completely, hence why I credit more than I blame. But the question remains, can HMS Indomitable undo some of that luck?
Quite agree. See more.From what was posted, a submarine was the one that spotted Force Z. With a carrier, especially one with ASW aircraft onboard, the sub is either sunk or submerged. Force Z might get away. The IJN does not know where Force Z is. How many planes can they spare to search? They CAP should be able to take care of any search aircraft. It could disrupt some of the IJN plans.
The small air group on Indomitable will hardly form an impenetrable ASW zone. You're only talking about sighting a periscope. When I 58 fired torpedoes it was dark giving no chance to see the periscope. The Japanese have lots of aircraft for scouting out Force Z. You can't assume all the scout planes would be shootdown. The Sea Hurrican wasn't much faster than some of the Japanese scout planes.From what was posted, a submarine was the one that spotted Force Z. With a carrier, especially one with ASW aircraft onboard, the sub is either sunk or submerged. Force Z might get away. The IJN does not know where Force Z is. How many planes can they spare to search? They CAP should be able to take care of any search aircraft. It could disrupt some of the IJN plans.
Nice to see some positivityHMS Indomitable is limited by the number of aircraft she can accommodate. As of 8 December 1941, she was assigned nine Sea Hurricane of No 808 Sqn; ten Fulmar (11 crews) of No 800 Sqn (two were lost en-route to the West Indies, one crew rescued – I assume the same en-route to South Africa); 12 Albacore each from No 827 and 831 Sqn. This is a total 43 aircraft, her capacity was rated at 48. ASW patrols are conducted by Walrus aircraft, six total of which are embarked in HMS Prince of Wales, Repulse and Kenya. Two are launched by catapult, and land aboard HMS Indomitable. They cannot be launched by catapult. (Note: Among the carriers that operated the Walrus were HMS Ark Royal and Victorious.) Recce duties are done in three shifts, the first and second with five Fulmar, third with six Albacore.
ATL events of 9 December:
@0930 – Same.
@1300 – Same.
@1330 – Walrus spots HMIJS I-65 and likely sinks her. RN ASW crews are trained against U-boats with a dive time of 17-25 seconds. HMIJS I-65 takes 56-59 seconds. In addition, the E7K (Alf) seaplane from HMIJS Kinu is not noticed by the submarine’s lookouts for about five minutes. I doubt they would notice a Walrus. Even if not sunk she is probably damaged. Even if undamaged, she will not see or report Force Z.
@1530 – Recce spots HMIJS Kinu. Unless someone on the flag bridge remembers that up until the 1937 edition, “Jane’s Fighting Ships” published the disposition of the IJN, and that light cruisers were flagships of submarine squadrons, Phillips will wait until @1610 to allow a torpedo strike by Albacores. This will allow the strike to land before sunset, and he would be sure no possibility of hitting another target would exist.
@1700-1715 – HMIJS Kinu sunk by torpedo attack. Her report of attack by carrier-borne aircraft comes as a surprise by RA Matsunaga and VA Ozawa. RA Matsunaga orders aircraft rearmed. IJN submarine picket line is moved further east.
1809 – Sunset.
@2000 – G3M2 recce plane begins dropping flares over VA Ozawa’s flagship HMIJS Chokai and destroyer HMIJS Sagiri. Attack is averted at last minute, and air operations are cancelled until dawn 10 December 1941.
Flares are reported by HMS Electra and radar aboard HMS Kenya, HMNLS Jacob van Heemskerk, and once the destroyer has maneuvered to bring her Type 286M to bear, HMS Bedouin.
@2025-2100 – Using tactics exercised prewar, and used very effectively at Cape Matapan; destroyers HMS Intrepid and Electra to lose within searchlight range, while HMS Prince of Wales, Repulse and Kenya close to @6,000 yards before HMIJS Chokai and Sagiri are lit up and firing commences. Neither ship is able to either escape or launch torpedoes. HMS Prince of Wales suffers breakdowns in both her quadruple turrets. As with HMIJS Kinu, full contact report is made but IJN confusion over whether to countermand VA Ozawa’s orders postponing air operations until the next day results in no actions being taken. HMS Indomitable, Tenedos and HMAS Vampire are ordered 20 miles to the south for the duration of the battle
2258 – Same.
2352 – Same.
2359 - Force Z has set curse and speed to a point10 miles east of Kota Bharu at sunrise - @0400.
Note: Slight edit on last line