How would history have changed if HMSIndomitable had successfully joined Force Z?

[Sanderford]

How do you "arrange for land-based air support" when you have been told by the Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Far East that "Fighter protection on Wednesday, 10th will not, repeat not, be possible"?

You reply by informing your superiors that if this is in fact the case, and your local subject matter expert attests it is so, that a sortie on that day will not, repeat not, be possible. Your options then are night attack, await Royal Navy carrier support if you don't already have it, or wait until land-based air support is available.

 

[Belisarius II]

On the Japanese Navy side of things, what many people don't realise is that only 25 A6M Zeros (the Yamada Unit, composed of selected pilots from the Tainan Kokutai under Kikuchi Inano and the 3rd Kokutai under Tadatsune Tokaji) were committed to the Malaya/Singapore campaign.

How many of these could realistically be alloted to escort the bomber strikes against Force Z in the event that Indomitable is accompanying?

10 would be enough. Remember this is a maximum effort.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

The fighters were mostly Buffaloes. A handful of Hurricanes arrived later.

The pilots were also green as grass, to the extent that the fighter squadrons in Malaya could better be considered training squadrons than viable combat units.

 

[HMSIndomitable_92]

The pilots were also green as grass, to the extent that the fighter squadrons in Malaya could better be considered training squadrons than viable combat units.

I think it would have been very difficult to keep the Japanese bomber squadron in check at the time because of their capability.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

On the Japanese Navy side of things, what many people don't realise is that only 25 A6M Zeros (the Yamada Unit, composed of selected pilots from the Tainan Kokutai under Kikuchi Inano and the 3rd Kokutai under Tadatsune Tokaji) were committed to the Malaya/Singapore campaign.

How many of these could realistically be alloted to escort the bomber strikes against Force Z in the event that Indomitable is accompanying?

That was the point I was making earlier

There was what 6 groups/sqns of bombers plus the need to protect shipping from air attack (which did happen)?

And its not a computer game not all 25 aircraft could be in the air at the same time but at most lets say the need to provide a minimal rolling CAP over the main shipping groups sucks up at minimum 8 aircraft that leaves at most 17 fighters so 2 or 3 per group - if all were available - which is not likely.

 

[JasTysoe]

You reply by informing your superiors that if this is in fact the case, and your local subject matter expert attests it is so, that a sortie on that day will not, repeat not, be possible. Your options then are night attack, await Royal Navy carrier support if you don't already have it, or wait until land-based air support is available.

But a sortie IS possible, repeat possible*. And not only is it possible, the expected opposition is far, far weaker than the RN has faced in the past. Why do expect Phillips to run from forces of the sort that the RN had repeatedly faced without disaster?

At Crete, the Med Fleet had faced about 280 bombers, 150 dive bombers and 180 fighters basically without any air cover. Here, if I recall correctly, they are believed to be facing 36 or so bombers and 25 fighters. The odds are far better for Force Z in terms of capital ships, probably as good in terms of smaller craft, and critically Force Z is going to be operating far closer to base for a far shorter period. At Crete the significant losses were largely caused by ships running out of AA ammo after days of combat hundreds of miles from base. That was not a factor for Force Z. The other forces the RN was aware of was a Kongo and some cruisers, which they were not going to run from.

The RN had taken on such odds before and after. The RN ran a bunch of Malta convoys against heavy opposition without air cover or even heavy ships as escorts. During Halberd, PoW had been by herself with not a single RN ship for five miles while chasing the retreating Italian fleet, without issues despite the fact that the convoy was being attacked. Convoy MW10 from Alex to Malta, weeks after Force Z was lost, faced about 150 aircraft (plus a battleship and heavy cruisers) with four light cruisers and some destroyers, and the RN suffered few losses. As another of many possible examples, during Harpoon the damaged cruiser Liverpool was making her way back to Gib at about 4 knots with two destroyers as escort. She was attacked by a total of 15 torpedo bombers, 16 high-level bombers and a bunch of fighter-bombers, without taking a hit and shooting one attacker down.

So there is no way on the historical record that Force Z should have been so scared of a few dozen two-engined bombers that Phillips should have abandoned the defence of Singapore, the very expensive linchpin of British Eastern strategy, without a fight. Heck, if no one is going to leave base without air cover then the entire German fleet would have to stay close to shore for the entire war, which would certainly have made life much, much easier for the Allies.

The disaster that occurred was caused by one factor - the fact that the Japanese torpedo bombers had a far longer range than the torpedo bombers of any other nation. Phillips had no way of knowing that. As far as he was aware, the air threat was high-level bombers - and the first 17 of those to attack his force scored just one hit, with no real damage. So given what he could know, Phillips was arguably completely correct.

It's not racist (as some have oddly claimed) to not expect the Japanese to have done what no-one else had done; it's common sense. And the last time the Japanese had come up against a Western military (Khakin Gol) they had been whipped. Given that the Japanese had been clobbered by the Russians, and the Russians had been clobbered by the Germans, and the RN had been able to survive against the Germans, it was reasonable to expect that the RN could survive against the Japanese.

To blame Phillips for not running away because he should somehow have known that the Japanese had a long-range torpedo bombing ability that the British, US, Germans, French and Italians did not have is using 20/20 hindsight. No Admiral can run away from weapons systems they do not know about, and expect to win a war.

If you are going to apply the "I do not have air cover therefore I cannot proceed" formula to other actions, then you would not have rescued the British, NZ and Australian armies from Greece and Crete; you would have let Malta and Tobruk fall; you would probably not have put destroyers into Dunkirk; and you could well have already cost the Allies the entire Med. That is the way to let the Axis take over the world, not the way to defend it.

PS - how do you have the "option" of night attack? Phillips planned to use night as much as possible, but it's some 860 mileds from Singapore to Khota Baru and back. Do you expect Force Z to do the entire run, including a battle, at night? How successful would a "night attack" be?

Phillips may not have been a genius, but he knew far more about his job than you or I do. Why slag him off by ignoring the reality he faced?

* without 100/100 hindsight

 

[Eric C Johnson]

I enjoy these threads because they best lay out a free analytical exchange of ideas. They may wander afield from time to time, but I still learn a thing or two from the process. They also bring out the very best in commentary.

However, when I was a student at the US Army Combined Arms Services Staff School, the most feared words were “Re-Do”; meaning the assigned staff problem had to be re-done from the beginning. I feel this thread also needs a Re-Do. I therefore go back to the original premise, of how to get HMS Indomitable to Force Z, and find it is not impossible.

HMS Indomitable left the Clyde on 23 October 1941 in company with a fast transatlantic convoy, then parted company and relying on her high speed arrived on 28 October in the West Indies for work up that commenced three days later. (Neil McCart – “Illustrious & Implacable Classes of Aircraft Carrier 1940-1969” Pages 117-8.) Her grounding and repairs are well covered above. David Hobbs (“British Aircraft Carriers” Page 103) states her workup schedule was to be completed on 22 November, and she was due to arrive in Gibraltar on 29 November. It is clear that it would be impossible for her to join Force Z under the OTL. I also am not willing to assume changes such as an earlier completion date by VA Barrow, etc.; only different decisions within the OTL framework.

(As an aside, I do not believe HMS Indomitable was intended for the Far East at any time prior to 7 December 1941. I believe she was to relieve HMS Ark Royal, which had not been refitted in 13 months, and was in increasingly difficult operational condition. The sinking of HMS Ark Royal on 13-14 November would likely reinforce those pre-Pearl Harbor plans. If she were intended for the Far East, plans would have been made for storing her and an escort for transit via the Panama Canal, Fiji and Australia to Singapore. This would have been quicker, and from a planning perspective, safer than Cape of Good Hope.)

The West Indies was not the only option for working up HMS Indomitable. October is the beginning of spring in South Africa, and South African waters had been used for warship workup, although never by an aircraft carrier. From Simonstown, she is still in position to steam to Gibraltar, but also to Alexandria, in case of necessity. Workup in South Africa will double the transit time and also require an escort. It is possible for HMS Indomitable to sail with HMS Prince of Wales on 24 October, but this would complicate refueling destroyers later in transit.

The most likely escort are light cruiser HMS Kenya and destroyers HMS Bedouin and Intrepid. From 10-31 October these three ships were at Scapa Flow, then departed for Iceland to search for suspected German weather and replenishment ships. Given the likelihood of success in Icelandic weather compared to the value of a capital ship, these three ships are assigned HMS Indomitable. There is a possible fourth ship. HMNLS Jacob van Heemskerk, an anti-aircraft cruiser has been on escort duties in the Irish Sea since February 1941, and her crew and ship could use a break. South Africa is a friendly, and for the Dutch Government-in-Exile, a valuable political port call. Simonstown is under capacity for short refit and hull cleaning, as compared to UK drydocks.

HMS Indomitable will begin work up about 6 November, and will continue to do so until 17 November, the day after HMS Prince of Wales arrives in Cape Town. With the deterioration of the situation in the Far East, her training only half complete, HMS Indomitable is stored and provisioned and ordered to join the infant Force Z. HMNLS Jacob van Heemskerk will catch up within a day or two, and on 2 December 1941, HMS Prince of Wales, Repulse, Indomitable, Kenya, Jupiter, Bedouin, Intrepid, Express, Electra, Encounter, and HMNLS Jacob van Heemskerk enter the Strait of Johore.

This is the best case composition of Force Z that I can construct within the limits of reasonable alternative decisions in the OTL. I’ve looked for additional escorts and just do not find them. I would like to start here, and leave open for comment or indication of fatal flaws in what I have compiled so far. In two follow up posts, I would cover the most likely events of this hypothetical Force Z respectively on 9 December and 10 December 1941.

 

[jsb]

Apart from the obvious effect a CAP has on the attackers*, there are several other things to consider:

One question is if they would had deployed significantly differently ie much further back south or even the other side of Malaya and simply used the strike aircraft to strike invasion targets from the west?

The RN loses a carrier in addition to two capital ships.

In addition to the 130+ twin engine G3M and G4M based near Saigon the IJNAF had 25 A6M flying out of Soc Trang that had beenb moved forward specifically to provide escort to the bomber force, if necessary (there were also 11 A5M Claudes there but they lacked the range to provide any sort of meaningful escort).

The Indomitable, as was the case across the RN, operating an ever changing mixture of aircraft consisting of around 12-15 Albacore or Swordfish and 8-14 Fulmars, perhaps with a few Sea Gladiators replacing Fulmars as the FAA command shuttled its very limited aircraft inventory about to strengthen one ship at the cost of weakening abother. The Fulmar was the "best" FAA fighter available at the time, based on speed and armament, although less maneuverable than the Sea Gladiator (the slightly better Fulmar Firefly had not yet flown, and the vastly better, arrestor hook equipped, Sea Hurricane was not introduced until March of 1942).

It takes very little imagination to same out the result of the engagement between two horribly mismatched forces. Even if the Zeros were never dispatched as escorts, none were IOTL mainly because there was no expectation of any enemy CAP, something that would not be the case if Indomitable had been with Force Z, a dozen or so fighters, with very little in the way of a speed advantage and less than overwhelming firpower, are not going to be enough to stop even 40 Nells and/or Bettys, much less the 88 the Japanese actually dispatched (keep in mind that an additional 40+ more bombers are available if/as needed.

Indomitable is there on December 10th and she becomes a reef on the bottom of the South China Sea.

The A6M was, as I pointed out in another thread recently explaining why "2,000 miles of range" isn't't really 2,000 miles of useful range, entirely capable of operating, in full fighting trim, at least 650 miles from a land base and did so on a regular basis (most well known example is the Japanese airbase complex near Rabaul to Guadalcanal which was ~650 miles one way) while escorting G3M and G4M into the teeth of the Cactus Air Force. Japanse managed to pull that off for six months, even as their naval aviation took simply insane losses both operating out of Rabaul and in the pair of carrier duels (Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz Islands,) that marked the fighting in the Solomons

10 would be enough. Remember this is a maximum effort.

Would they even be able to send 10 A6M on a bomber escort mission at the range needed that required long scouting for targets? It's not just the range unlike an island thats a known position force Z had to be found by scouting, and thus it's a search after flying to the long range, a lot of the bombers returned very low on fuel, and they had longer range than A6Ms adding FAA fighters that would remove shadowing between groups and break the contact would waste even more time for later groups would use more fuel, could any A6Ms sent with the force without a crystal ball of the location of force Z beforehand actually be in the right place without massive luck?

Also, if you send 10 to cover Force Z can you keep covering the invasion breaches with the remaining 15 as you can realistically fly only maybe 1 CAP mission each day due to the range, are you willing to risk the allowing RAF or FAA strikes on your undefended invasion beaches?

 

[CalBear]

One question is if they would had deployed significantly differently ie much further back south or even the other side of Malaya and simply used the strike aircraft to strike invasion targets from the west?



Would they even be able to send 10 A6M on a bomber escort mission at the range needed that required long scouting for targets? It's not just the range unlike an island thats a known position force Z had to be found by scouting, and thus it's a search after flying to the long range, a lot of the bombers returned very low on fuel, and they had longer range than A6Ms adding FAA fighters that would remove shadowing between groups and break the contact would waste even more time for later groups would use more fuel, could any A6Ms sent with the force without a crystal ball of the location of force Z beforehand actually be in the right place without massive luck?

Also, if you send 10 to cover Force Z can you keep covering the invasion breaches with the remaining 15 as you can realistically fly only maybe 1 CAP mission each day due to the range, are you willing to risk the allowing RAF or FAA strikes on your undefended invasion beaches?

The air support for the initial Japanese landing in Northern Malaya was provided by IJAAF aircraft operating out of what is now Cambodia and Vietnam, primarily Ki-21 and Ki-48 (Primarily from 3 and 7 Air Brigade along with other units from 2 Air Division), not primarily by any IJN forces. IJNAF units did take part,l but it was in a very much secondary role.

 

[Belisarius II]

One question is if they would had deployed significantly differently ie much further back south or even the other side of Malaya and simply used the strike aircraft to strike invasion targets from the west?



Would they even be able to send 10 A6M on a bomber escort mission at the range needed that required long scouting for targets? It's not just the range unlike an island thats a known position force Z had to be found by scouting, and thus it's a search after flying to the long range, a lot of the bombers returned very low on fuel, and they had longer range than A6Ms adding FAA fighters that would remove shadowing between groups and break the contact would waste even more time for later groups would use more fuel, could any A6Ms sent with the force without a crystal ball of the location of force Z beforehand actually be in the right place without massive luck?

Also, if you send 10 to cover Force Z can you keep covering the invasion breaches with the remaining 15 as you can realistically fly only maybe 1 CAP mission each day due to the range, are you willing to risk the allowing RAF or FAA strikes on your undefended invasion beaches?

Those Zeros aren't the only aircraft covering the Japanese landing force. There were JAAF units as well. Besides by the morning of the 10 the Japanese invasion force at Kota Bharu was already ashore and had taken the town, and airfield. For the IJNAF the priority would shift to dealing with Force Z. Taking on the main body of the RN was what the IJNAF was trained for.

 

[Scerus]

What bothers me about these discussions is how people explain away strategic blunders and disasters by British commanders, using the excuse of "well, everything is hindsight - they followed the rule book." I don't believe they would be so generous to commanders of other nations who made similar egregious and humiliating mistakes. The British were defeated, and were defeated soundly in Malaya and at Singapore, no amount of sophistry can detract from that.

The fact is, both Philips and Perceval are ultimately responsible for what happened, irrespective of whether they were dealt a poor hand.

 

[jsb]

Those Zeros aren't the only aircraft covering the Japanese landing force. There were JAAF units as well. Besides by the morning of the 10 the Japanese invasion force at Kota Bharu was already ashore and had taken the town, and airfield. For the IJNAF the priority would shift to dealing with Force Z. Taking on the main body of the RN was what the IJNAF was trained for.

Rasing the date hits the other big issue that a RN CV might decide to send out a large scout force early? For example on 7th a Hudson & Catalina were sent out if RN had a CV they might do far more scouting and actually find the invasion force the day before the invasion.

 

[HMSIndomitable_92]

Rasing the date hits the other big issue that a RN CV might decide to send out a large scout force early? For example on 7th a Hudson & Catalina were sent out if RN had a CV they might do far more scouting and actually find the invasion force the day before the invasion.

I also agree about it. Of course, when I first posted this thread, I didn't think about it, but when I thought about it later, it was a pretty likely scenario when HMS Indomitable had joined the Force Z.

 

[Belisarius II]

I also agree about it. Of course, when I first posted this thread, I didn't think about it, but when I thought about it later, it was a pretty likely scenario when HMS Indomitable had joined the Force Z.

That assumes Force Z is at sea on December 6th or 7th. In that case the IJN will be out and looking for it earlier. If Force Z is in the Northern Gulf of Siam on December 8th a world of trouble will fall on them on day one of the war. They all die 2 days early.

 

[ArtosStark]

What bothers me about these discussions is how people explain away strategic blunders and disasters by British commanders, using the excuse of "well, everything is hindsight - they followed the rule book." I don't believe they would be so generous to commanders of other nations who made similar egregious and humiliating mistakes. The British were defeated, and were defeated soundly in Malaya and at Singapore, no amount of sophistry can detract from that.

The fact is, both Philips and Perceval are ultimately responsible for what happened, irrespective of whether they were dealt a poor hand.

That’s crap. There are numerous explorations of the conditions faced by MacArthur, Weygand, Gamelin, Clark, Rommel, Paulus (the whole German Army really) and many others besides.

Even those very broadly seen as having failed in their missions often get a more sympathetic reading somewhere even just to give more context than “situation bad = commander bad”. This is far from unique to British Malaya, and is honestly an important part of Alternate History. If you do not understand the context then everyone is tempted to simply write a timeline where you switch the leader and everything goes fine, since it was only the leader being an idiot that caused the problem.

 

[Sekhmet_D]

The fact is, both Philips and Perceval are ultimately responsible for what happened, irrespective of whether they were dealt a poor hand.

I don't blame Phillips for the Force Z debacle as much as I blame Churchill, honestly.

 

[HMSIndomitable_92]

I don't blame Phillips for the Force Z debacle as much as I blame Churchill, honestly.

I agree to a certain extent. From what I've heard, the Royal Air Force had some room to send some fighters to the British Malaya at the time, but if you don't, you can't say that you're not responsible for it.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I don't blame Phillips for the Force Z debacle as much as I blame Churchill, honestly.

Yep Churchill and Pound deliberated ordering Phillips to withdraw and decided to sleep on it and make a decision in their morning

So until both ships were sunk Phillips was carrying out his mission as he understood it

There was also somewhat of a racial element in that the British and Americans seriously underestimated the Japanese and based (with no intel to suggest otherwise) their expected capability on their own - thinking that the Japanese would be worse and certainly not better.

 

[JasTysoe]

What bothers me about these discussions is how people explain away strategic blunders and disasters by British commanders, using the excuse of "well, everything is hindsight - they followed the rule book." I don't believe they would be so generous to commanders of other nations who made similar egregious and humiliating mistakes. The British were defeated, and were defeated soundly in Malaya and at Singapore, no amount of sophistry can detract from that.

The fact is, both Philips and Perceval are ultimately responsible for what happened, irrespective of whether they were dealt a poor hand.

The point is that it's not a "blunder" if it's caused by the first use of a weapon no one knows about, or by being placed in an impossible situation. Only alien space bats know about every possible weapon or can win all the time.

The fact "isn't" that people, even high commanders, are ultimately responsible for things they cannot alter or avoid. They're not.

There are many British commanders I don't defend; I haven't defended Perceval and I don't think I'd defend Blamey or others. There's also commanders from other nations I do defend. I have actually, in my work in government enquiries, investigated a real life current admiral and an AVM (I tried to get higher-ups to take action but was overruled, sadly) so the reality is that I take real-life steps against people in high places in the military, rather than just criticising dead admirals with hindsight. But that doesn't mean we just ignore the reality of the situation that Phillips was placed in.

But if we just say "Oh, Phillips was an idiot" we lose a great chance to understand why he did what he did, and that's where we learn a lot. We learn very little from saying "X was a moron"; all we get is the ego boost of "proving" we know more than someone else, while conveniently ignoring the fact that we don't have to deal the cards they were dealt with.

It's all too easy for people to criticise people for taking a particular action in a particular situation, and then to ignore what would happen if that approach was followed elsewhere in similar situations. I notice you don't seem to have said what approach you think Phillips should have taken, and why - and you haven't applied a similar approach to similar facts elsewhere.

It seems that you are critical of Phillips' decision to take Force Z into an area where he could have been attacked by about 40 twin engined bombers. Okay, let's then apply that approach to Crete, Greece, Malta Convoys, and other situations....... the result is probably disaster of the highest order.

 

[JasTysoe]

There was also somewhat of a racial element in that the British and Americans seriously underestimated the Japanese and based (with no intel to suggest otherwise) their expected capability on their own - thinking that the Japanese would be worse and certainly not better.

Grenfell's "Main Fleet to Singapore" brings up the point that the Japanese air force was rated equal in quality to that of Italy by the RAF, the RAF rated themselves 60% better than the Japanese and Italians. It was pointed out to me a while back than a purely neutral, objective observer could look at the record of the Japanese over the previous couple of years and come to the logical conclusion that they couldn't be all that hot in general military terms because they had been hacked about badly at Khalkin Gol by the same Russian forces that had been slaughtered in far bigger numbers by the Germans. While the Japanese fighters did well at Khalkin Gol, Christopher Shores notes that their bombers lost quite badly against Chinese fighters.

Oddly enough, Grenfell says that the Chief of Air Staff said the Japanese could attack Malaya with 700+ plans and the RAF needed 336 modern aircraft to defend against them. That not only shows a pretty dismissive attitude, but it seems to be well below the 60% ratio.

However, the RN had a reasonably high opinion of the Italian pilots in many ways, and officially operated on the basis that the Japanese were as good as they were in surface ships, although the Brits also thought they themselves would actually be better. Perhaps where the RN was misled was that the Italian level bombers dropped bombs in very impressively tight groups - but almost always missed just like every other air force that tried to hit ships from up on high. That would appear to have given Phillips a fair indication that the long range bombers he may face wouldn't be an impossible foe.