Come to think of it, it's right. It has been Phillips fans and anti-fans who have been arguing and someone who didn't know who he was.
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How would history have changed if HMSIndomitable had successfully joined Force Z?
- Thread starter HMSIndomitable_92
- Start date
Indo can't get there on time, but if she did her fighters (and her strong AA suite, plus the three N Class destroyers with pretty good AA suites and lots of Med. experience IIRC that came with her) would allow PoW and perhaps Indo to get away, damaged, while Repulse gets out pretty much scot free while the attack concentrates on the newer ships. All we need is one butterfly to keep the central shaft of PoW turning OK and a whole other flock of butterflies is hatched.
The cripples make Singapore and everything the Wallies can find in the area covers them as they then head out for proper repairs. The RN then cops criticism for taking resources out of the theatre and running.
For decades after that, the people who criticised Phillips (not a genius or a fool, IMHO) for going out without air cover criticise him for going out without two carriers.....or three carriers with Hellcats, and for that matter ten Midways and four boy scouts in a canoe.
I was thinking the same thing!
I started reading this with some apprehension given the controversial nature of the topic and I've been pleasantly suprised by the civil discussion that has been going on.
The old trope of "Admiral Phillips was an arrogant fool who believed capital ships were unsinkable by airpower and led his ships to their unavoidable doom, this event alone ending the area of battleships and proving the incontestable superiority of air power" remains the dominant rhetoric in the media when talking about the Force Z affair, event though it is starting to change.
I'm glad people here have pretty clearly debunked that theory.
ok lets get started by ships that could have been part of Force Z. If HMS Indomitable didn't get damage near Jamaica, yes she could have join Prince of Wales and escort at Capetown. Her Naval air squadrons would be: 880 Naval air squadron (12 sea Hurricanes), 800 Naval air squadron (12 Fulmer), 827 Naval air squadron (12 Albacore), and 830 Naval air squadron (12 Albacore). Now here is where the buttleflies could happen. On the thread someone said HMS Kenya (Colony Cruiser class), HMS Bedouin (Tribal class destroyer), and HMS Intrepid (I class dedtroyer) could be her escort but this can't be since these ships are part of the Artic convoy protection. Unless there is a cruiser lying around doing nothing, Kenya won't join. Bedouin has very good ASW on her so she won't join either. Intrepid could join her but what destroyer could replace her? Again here is when buttleflies happen. HMS Hurricane was damage severely in May 1941 by bombs while in dock. If she didn't get severely damaged and only minor damage, she would have been ready by October with her refit for ASW and radar. She could replace Intrepid in the Artic convoy escort. (more information on HMS Hurricane: https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-10DD-33Brazil-HMS_Hurricane.htm). Now here is the good part, HMS Indomitable needs cruisers protection so what cruisers could be provided? Here again is where buttleflies could happen. HMS Dido was damage at the end of May 1941. Left Alexandria in June toward Durban where temporal repairs were done. By the middle of the month. If she left to New York during that time, she would have arrived in July and started repairs on her injury probably by July 20 and not in August. She would be ready by the beginning of September and sail toward UK by the 15. Here she gets her Radar probably finishing the refit by October 10. Start her trials that by the end of October she would be ready. So a cruiser is available now to escort HMS Indomitable. (more information on HMS Dido: https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Dido.htm). Now we got a Anti-Aircraft cruiser and one destroyer. Well three more destroyers could join the escort to Singapore. HMS Duncan station at Gibraltar as well Dutch destroyer HNLMS Isaac Sweers (more information on Isaac Sweers: https://www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Sweers_his.htm). HMS Duncan was going to get a refit in November but seeing that the carrier needs escort well the refit had to wait. (more information on HMS Duncan: https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-10DD-18D-HMS_Duncan.htm). HMS Arrow would also join, increasing now Indomitable to one cruiser and three destroyers.
There is going to be part 2 to this;
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Part 2
There is another cruiser that can be added to this force specially HMS Indomitable, HNLMS Jacob Van Heemskerck (more information on her: https://www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Jacheem_his.htm), which is covering convoys toward UK. In fact she could provide good Anti-Aircraft protection. So now there are 2 Anti-Aircraft Cruisers and 3 destroyers to protect HMS Indomitable. Remember all this is happening because of buttleflies.
Now I been doing many research on ships that were damage and took long to repair. If this ships could have been repair and sent to Singapore, then Force Z would been a good deployment.
The first group would have been Cruisers that could have join. HMS Liverpool which is being repair at Mare Island USA. Now if the hit of the torpedoe was much behind where she got hit, yes her repairs would have been done by August. She would have sailed to UK and by October have completed her refitted with radar and her trials. She would have either join Prince of Wales group or Indomitable group. (more information on HMS Liverpool: https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Liverpool.htm). HMS Glasgow and HMS Mauritius were two cruisers that needed repairs in Singapore but could not provide it since labour work and experience were taken from Singapore to help out in Alexandria, Suez, Aden, Bombay, Mombasa, and Durban. Now if the buttleflies would have happen and no labour workers were sent to Mombasa or Suez, these two cruiser would have been part of Force Z. HMS Exeter could have join Force Z if she would have arrived early if the buttleflies would have happen.
The second group were destroyers. This is the list of destroyers damage and could have been repair quick if buttleflies have happen. HMS Ilex, HMS Isis, HMS Nubian, HMS HMS Jupiter, HMS Encounter, HMAS Voyager, and HMAS Vendetta. Isis, Jupiter, Encounter, and the 2 Australian destroyers were in Singapore but since there were no labour worker to fix them, that's why they didn’t sail with Force Z. HMS Ilex was in Durban after she was barely fix in Suez, Aden, Mombasa, and Durban. If she was sent directly to Durban and fix there, she would have left to Charleston USA to finished her repairs and would have been ready by October 1941. (more information on HMS Ilex: http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-10DD-29I-Ilex.htm). HMS Nubian for me was a dump decision to be sent to Bombay. Doing research, I found out that there was bad experience in India since many components from Singapore were sent there. The fixing of the destroyer was really bad. If Nubian was sent to Sydney or Singapore at least she would have been ready by November.
So in total, Force Z would have been this:
Aircraft Carrier HMS Indomitable
Battleship HMS Prince of Wales (radar)
Battlecruiser HMS Repulse
Heavy Cruiser HMS Exeter (radar)
Light Cruisers: HMS Glasgow, HMS Liverpool (radar), HMS Mauritius
Anti-Aircraft Cruisers: HMS Dido (radar), HNLMS Jacob Van Heemskerck (radar)
Destroyers: HMS Arrow, HMS Duncan, HMS Electra, HMS Encounter, HMS Express, HMS Ilex, HMS Intrepid, HMS Isis, HMS Jupiter, HMS Nubian, HMAS Voyager, HMAS Vampire, HMAS Vendetta, HNLMS Isaac Sweers.
Now it depends if HMS Hermes would join or not. Also if HMAS Sydney didn’t happen then would have joined. I am also adding HNLMS Sumatra if the Dutch could have sent her in 1940 to Singapore to refit her and get better armaments.
Also there is a submarine at Singapore HMS Rover damage and if the workers could have repaired her she would have been a good reconnaissance and support.
There is another cruiser that can be added to this force specially HMS Indomitable, HNLMS Jacob Van Heemskerck (more information on her: https://www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Jacheem_his.htm), which is covering convoys toward UK. In fact she could provide good Anti-Aircraft protection. So now there are 2 Anti-Aircraft Cruisers and 3 destroyers to protect HMS Indomitable. Remember all this is happening because of buttleflies.
Now I been doing many research on ships that were damage and took long to repair. If this ships could have been repair and sent to Singapore, then Force Z would been a good deployment.
The first group would have been Cruisers that could have join. HMS Liverpool which is being repair at Mare Island USA. Now if the hit of the torpedoe was much behind where she got hit, yes her repairs would have been done by August. She would have sailed to UK and by October have completed her refitted with radar and her trials. She would have either join Prince of Wales group or Indomitable group. (more information on HMS Liverpool: https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Liverpool.htm). HMS Glasgow and HMS Mauritius were two cruisers that needed repairs in Singapore but could not provide it since labour work and experience were taken from Singapore to help out in Alexandria, Suez, Aden, Bombay, Mombasa, and Durban. Now if the buttleflies would have happen and no labour workers were sent to Mombasa or Suez, these two cruiser would have been part of Force Z. HMS Exeter could have join Force Z if she would have arrived early if the buttleflies would have happen.
The second group were destroyers. This is the list of destroyers damage and could have been repair quick if buttleflies have happen. HMS Ilex, HMS Isis, HMS Nubian, HMS HMS Jupiter, HMS Encounter, HMAS Voyager, and HMAS Vendetta. Isis, Jupiter, Encounter, and the 2 Australian destroyers were in Singapore but since there were no labour worker to fix them, that's why they didn’t sail with Force Z. HMS Ilex was in Durban after she was barely fix in Suez, Aden, Mombasa, and Durban. If she was sent directly to Durban and fix there, she would have left to Charleston USA to finished her repairs and would have been ready by October 1941. (more information on HMS Ilex: http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-10DD-29I-Ilex.htm). HMS Nubian for me was a dump decision to be sent to Bombay. Doing research, I found out that there was bad experience in India since many components from Singapore were sent there. The fixing of the destroyer was really bad. If Nubian was sent to Sydney or Singapore at least she would have been ready by November.
So in total, Force Z would have been this:
Aircraft Carrier HMS Indomitable
Battleship HMS Prince of Wales (radar)
Battlecruiser HMS Repulse
Heavy Cruiser HMS Exeter (radar)
Light Cruisers: HMS Glasgow, HMS Liverpool (radar), HMS Mauritius
Anti-Aircraft Cruisers: HMS Dido (radar), HNLMS Jacob Van Heemskerck (radar)
Destroyers: HMS Arrow, HMS Duncan, HMS Electra, HMS Encounter, HMS Express, HMS Ilex, HMS Intrepid, HMS Isis, HMS Jupiter, HMS Nubian, HMAS Voyager, HMAS Vampire, HMAS Vendetta, HNLMS Isaac Sweers.
Now it depends if HMS Hermes would join or not. Also if HMAS Sydney didn’t happen then would have joined. I am also adding HNLMS Sumatra if the Dutch could have sent her in 1940 to Singapore to refit her and get better armaments.
Also there is a submarine at Singapore HMS Rover damage and if the workers could have repaired her she would have been a good reconnaissance and support.
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In real time we all know that but if buttleflies had happened and she got hit not in the bow but a lot back near the bridge, then things would have been different. Now about her Radar, if things went like I said before and you read on HMS Liverpool https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Liverpool.htm then you will understand why she could have arrived by September and have her Radar, refit and trials finish by either the 10 -14 and she would be assigned to escort either Prince of Wales or Indomitable.
Remember this can happen if buttleflies happen...
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I know I mentioned this in one of our past discussions of Force Z, but perhaps it bears repeating:
All the World's Battlecruisers-What should have been sent East in '41?
I stumbled across this one over on Warship Projects. I recall putting it up on Bob's now-gone Warship Discussion board, but I don't recall anyone (m
www.tapatalk.com
A thread from the BC board on "What Should have been sent East" with RN dispositions as of October 1941. That map is my own creation, but far from perfect. Liverpool to your point isn't included as she was in transit to the UK and not assigned to a station...
Regards,
Found butterfly, forward gasoline store does not causes secondary explosion, which OTL, wrecks A turret, 1st and 2nd deck back to B barbette , also found Mare Island source that says Liverpool received 9 I stead of 6 x 20mm AA
Please reread my posting more carefully.
All three ships were idle in Scapa Flow when (in my ATL post), HMS Indomitable sails for South Africa. They are available because HMS Kenya is "lying around doing nothing". On 31 October, all three were sent to Iceland, not on ASW duties, but to search for German ships which may aid a possible breakout of KMS Tirpitz. They found nothing. My argument is that escorting HMS Indomitable would be a higher priority mission than Iceland. I do not dispute the ASW capability of HMS Bedouin. However in this timeframe in the OTL she was not used for that purpose.
If HMS Dido left at the end of October, she is 1) unavailable to escort IMS Indomitable; and 2) leaving eight days later. Assuming similar transit times, it is difficult to see her arriving before 10 December. Her choice also requires an infusion of considerable hindsight. While HMS Kenya accompanying the carrier is logical, HMS Dido sailing alone to catch up with her is less so.
HMS Exeter escorted a convoy arriving in Singapore on 10 December 1941. That convoy carried 30 Marmon-Herrington I, 26 Bren, 8 2 Pdr to equip 3/Indian Cavalry; 40 18 Pdr howitzers to equip Field Regiments, as well as ammunition, support equipment, and drafts of officers and other ranks for units in Malaya. I doubt the convoy would be allowed to sail without escort. German raiders were active in the Indian Ocean.
So HMS Duncan has to go in for refit on arrival as did HMS Jupiter and Encounter. I do not see the gain here. The delay in HMS Nubian, Ilex and Isis was in part due to prevailing weather patterns in the Western Indian Ocean which their seaworthiness was not considered adequate. I could go on.
Moving a torpedo hit on a ship in December 1940 is a bit too far of a stretch for me. Likewise, HMS Glasgow was not fully repaired when her refit at Singapore ended in September 1941, and her speed was limited until full repairs in 1942. Hence she remained on convoy duty until then (See McCart "Town Class Cruisers" for additional details.) HMS Mauritius arrived at Singapore on 6 November - there is simply not enough time to repair her boilers.
The remainder of this last quote is highly significant, but a two-edged sword. Without moving personnel and equipment to the Mediterranean, few of the ships damaged there would be able to sail elsewhere for full repairs. So the transfers will go through. However, other resources were not utilized as replacements. In Australia, union requirements did not allow trained journeymen to work in shipyards until redundancies were open. Many enlisted in the armed services and no doubt most served well. However Canberra would have been far better off sending these trained but inexperienced personnel to Singapore beginning in the spring of 1940.
In addition, personnel and equipment from the Naval Dockyard in Hong Kong were not transferred to Singapore and lost there. The responsibility for that lies squarely on the Admiralty. Something could have been done and it wasn't.
All these points broaden the scope of this thread far beyond what difference HMS Indomitable would have made, to a broad discussion of should British Policy in the Far East in 1940-41 have been wiser, more realistic, and less myopic.
Sorry for the delay, real life keeps getting in the way.
Before I commence an analysis of events on 10 December 1941, I wish to dispense with the question of fairness. Commentators often wonder what the opposing side could do to counter any ATL scenario. In cases where such options exist, I generally (but not always) shy away from posting a comment – the “I dunno” factor is too great. In this scenario, there is absolutely nothing the Japanese can do to counter an enhanced Force Z, because 1) the OTL Japanese decision-making results were near perfect, and could not be improved upon; and 2) there are no extra assets available to the Japanese. Notably, on 7 December there was only one major Japanese naval combatant not ready for combat, the destroyer HMIJS Usugumo, under repair after mine damage off the coast of China. No other navy in any major 20th Century war could boast only a single ship under refit on its outset. In addition, an increased number of ships in Force Z, on examination, will result in a reduced number of hits, and an increased number of Japanese aircraft lost.
At midnight 9/10 December 1941, Force Z is further to the east than in the OTL by perhaps 50-60 miles or so. In the OTL Phillips did not give much credence to his Chief of Staff’s report of landings at Kuantan sent at 2335 hrs (time of receipt by Phillips not certain); he did not change course until 0052 hrs, and then directly towards Singapore. In all probability, Force Z will be spotted 30-60 minutes earlier than in the OTL, and Japanese aircraft will have additional fuel. I do not take the first factor in consideration for simplicity, but I do the second.
The Japanese made no attempts at radio silence during the sortie. They wanted Force Z to sortie in order to destroy it, and hoped radio traffic would assist in that objective. The IJNAF search pattern was directed over 250 miles to the south of Force Z to ensure it did not slip into Singapore, and squadrons flew in loose formations to provide additional eyes over the South China Sea. Resulting uncoordinated attacks staggered over time was an acceptable risk freely taken. The attack aircraft were launched as in the OTL.
Unit Aircraft Armament Launch Time
4/Genzan Air Corps 9 G3M Nell 2 x 55 kg Bombs (Recce) - 0500
1/Genzan Air Corps 9 G3M Nell 1 x 150 kg Torpedo - 0625
2/Genzan Air Corps 8 G3M Nell 1 x 150 kg Torpedo - 0625
3/Genzan Air Corps 9 G3M Nell 1 x 500 kg Bomb - 0625
1/Kanoya Air Corps 9 G4M Betty 1 x 500 kg Bomb - 0644
2/Kanoya Air Corps 8 G4M Betty 1 x 204 kg Torpedo - 0644
3/Kanoya Air Corps 9 G4M Betty 1 x 204 kg Torpedo - 0644
2/Mihoro Air Group 8 G3M Nell 1 x 500 kg Bomb - 0650
1/Mihoro Air Group 8 G3M Nell 2 x 250 kg Bombs - 0800
3/Mihoro Air Group 9 G3M Nell 2 x 250 kg Bombs - 0800
I will post more as soon as I can.
At midnight 9/10 December 1941, Force Z is further to the east than in the OTL by perhaps 50-60 miles or so. In the OTL Phillips did not give much credence to his Chief of Staff’s report of landings at Kuantan sent at 2335 hrs (time of receipt by Phillips not certain); he did not change course until 0052 hrs, and then directly towards Singapore. In all probability, Force Z will be spotted 30-60 minutes earlier than in the OTL, and Japanese aircraft will have additional fuel. I do not take the first factor in consideration for simplicity, but I do the second.
The Japanese made no attempts at radio silence during the sortie. They wanted Force Z to sortie in order to destroy it, and hoped radio traffic would assist in that objective. The IJNAF search pattern was directed over 250 miles to the south of Force Z to ensure it did not slip into Singapore, and squadrons flew in loose formations to provide additional eyes over the South China Sea. Resulting uncoordinated attacks staggered over time was an acceptable risk freely taken. The attack aircraft were launched as in the OTL.
Unit Aircraft Armament Launch Time
4/Genzan Air Corps 9 G3M Nell 2 x 55 kg Bombs (Recce) - 0500
1/Genzan Air Corps 9 G3M Nell 1 x 150 kg Torpedo - 0625
2/Genzan Air Corps 8 G3M Nell 1 x 150 kg Torpedo - 0625
3/Genzan Air Corps 9 G3M Nell 1 x 500 kg Bomb - 0625
1/Kanoya Air Corps 9 G4M Betty 1 x 500 kg Bomb - 0644
2/Kanoya Air Corps 8 G4M Betty 1 x 204 kg Torpedo - 0644
3/Kanoya Air Corps 9 G4M Betty 1 x 204 kg Torpedo - 0644
2/Mihoro Air Group 8 G3M Nell 1 x 500 kg Bomb - 0650
1/Mihoro Air Group 8 G3M Nell 2 x 250 kg Bombs - 0800
3/Mihoro Air Group 9 G3M Nell 2 x 250 kg Bombs - 0800
I will post more as soon as I can.
This is the biggest question what are we looking at and how early does the POD start, really does HMS Indomitable send scouts out pre war to join the Hudson & Catalina of OTL and do they find something interesting before the 9/10th and report it back unlike OTL?
This would then potentially lead to huge changes in allowing warning for ground forces and FAA strike on the landing forces before they have landed?
If one of forces Z BBs is lost but HMS Indomitable sinks Awazisan & Ayatosan Maru fully loaded, GB might view it differently long term, but maybe only with hindsight?
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(Note: I do not consider the times listed below as likely. The IJNAF attacks will likely be 30-45 minutes earlier. I use the OTL time to allow the reader to easily compare the OTL sequence of events with my ATL estimate.)
Conditions were not idyllic over Force Z when first sighted at 1015, but the professional skill of IJNAF pilots overcame strong winds. The extra anti-aircraft guns aboard HMS Kenya did little, the poor quality of the RN High Angle Control System directors made them unsuitable for aircraft that flew twice as fast as the RN’s own aircraft – this had long ago been proven in the Mediterranean. More valuable was HMNLS Jacob Van Heemskerk, whose centerline 4-inch guns had better magazine arrangements, and therefore higher sustained rate of fire, where the two paired amidships had the same ammunition difficulties as did HMS Kenya because of the distance from her amidship magazines. Of use was the smoke screens laid by HMS Kenya and the additional escorting destroyers. Although the wet weather conditions hamper its effects, the larger scale than OTL does play a role in IJNAF pilots’ vision and resulting actions. Luck, both good and bad, would play itself out over Force Z.
The RN Combat Air Patrol (CAP) cycle will be based upon flights of three. Beginning at 0600, there Fulmar and three Sea Hurricane are launched. Two Sea Hurricane patrol astern, one Sea Hurricane and one Fulmar to the east, and two Fulmar to the west to cover in order the most likely approach routes of IJNAF aircraft. Although the Fulmar can remain aloft almost twice as long, duration of patrol is based on the lesser range of the Sea Hurricane. A second patrol is launched at 0800, and the first recovered no later than 0815; the third patrol at 1000, with recovery by 1015; by which time the first patrol is refueled and on standby. CAP was focused on defeating a torpedo attack; high level bombing would be left to a ship’s maneuverability and anti-aircraft (AA) crews. Fighter control and skill in interpreting radar fixes had not evolved sufficiently to do both.
Force Z is steaming in line, with HMAS Vampire in the lead, followed by HMS Indomitable with HMNLS Jacob Van Heemskerk to port and HMS Intrepid to starboard. HMS Repulse is next in line with HMS Bedouin to port and HMS Electra to the west. HMS Kenya, HMS Prince of Wales and Express trail. Once within range, a squadron of Albacores armed with bombs is sent in response to the report of landings at Kuantan. They find nothing. As they are returning, Force Z will be under attack and they will land at Kuantan.
It was not the 4/Genzan Air Corps which spotted Force Z, but rather a sister squadron. HMS Tenedos was spotted at 0943, but both 55Kg bombs missed and the aircraft continued to trail the destroyer. She was detached at 0800 hours low on fuel to proceed without zigzagging to Singapore. The first attack, at 1015 was by 3/Genzan Air Corps coming in from the south and also encountering HMS Tenedos. Repeating the colossal error in ship recognition, all nine bombs dropped by the IJNAF aviators failed to strike this nimble, if geriatric and unworthy veteran. En-route home, the bombers passed over Force Z. The position of Force Z was then widely broadcast; and because Phillips is further north than the OTL, E-13A float planes from 7th Cruiser Sqn are also able to join tracking it. In turn, at 1020, 1025 and 1030 warnings from HMS Tenedos were received by Force Z. The standby CAP was launched beginning at 1040.
Approaching from the south 40 minutes later, 1/Mihoro Air Group quickly identified the massive control top of HMS Repulse as symbolic of a capital ship, and lined up in tight three aircraft “V” formations. LT Shirai Yoshimi made the decision to attack the battlecruiser because he believed the deck armour of HMS Prince of Wales to be too thick for his 250Kg bombs to be effective. He was then advised by another plane crew of an aircraft carrier to the west, and decided to switch targets. The anti-aircraft fire was thick; five planes were hit, four seriously of which two did not make it back to Saigon. All made two bomb runs, dropping one each time. For all the care in aiming, only one bomb hit HMS Indomitable, on the starboard side about five feet outside the armoured hanger box, and about ten feet inside the hull. Exploding just aft of the island, it ruptured a fuel tank and started a fire that was quickly extinguished. Her ability to operate aircraft was not impaired. (Note: I based the location of this hit based on the position of the OTL hit on HMS Repulse, and the damage from the accidental explosion aboard HMS Indomitable in February 1953; although this bomb hit is about 10-15 feet further aft than the OTL explosion. That as far as my expertise goes.)
The next squadron, the 1/Genzan Air Corps arrived at 1138 (43 minutes later) from the northeast and was real trouble; forever demolishing the myth of battleship invulnerability so cherished by naval traditionalists (HMS Prince of Wales was undamaged, free to maneuver, and had unimpeded AA fire). CAP engaged as planned, and losses were heavy, two G3M shot down; and two more damaged and prematurely launched their torpedoes before the AA Zone was reached. One more G3M was shot down and one damaged severely, but both launched their weapons. CAPT Leach was able to dodge four of five torpedoes. The deadly 150 Kg warhead exploded on the port side aft, breaking through the armour belt and flooding B Engine Room. The shaft was bent at an odd angle and continued to spin for a few seconds more, gouging the thin bottom plating and permitted Y Engine Room to slowly flood; while at the other end the loosened shaft mountings allowed water into B Boiler Room. Shock damage shut down the diesel dynamos, leaving X Engine and Y Boiler Rooms in the dark. A Boiler and A Engine Rooms were shut down as an unnecessary precaution. Without power, her rudder went limp. She wallowed aimlessly, and was effectively hors de combat.
2/Genzan Air Corps flew past their retiring sister squadron to attack HMS Repulse from the east at 1150. Only eight aircraft were present, one having aborted with mechanical difficulties during launch. With CAP drawn towards the north, only one fighter engaged without success, due to CAPT Tennant’s skill. The old girl hiked up her 25-year-old skirts and reached 27.5 knots; and he was now nearly ten miles ahead of the flagship. All eight torpedoes missed, and four attackers were damaged by AA fire, none seriously. HMS Repulse then returned to normal station ahead of the flagship.
Only five minutes later, 4/Mihoro Air Group approached from the southeast, and sighted HMS Indomitable. She had recovered her third fighter patrol launched at 1000, and just completed launching her second fighter patrol from her catapult (which were still in her vicinity). Two Nells were shot down by CAP, and two damaged. In accordance with IJNAF doctrine, torpedoes were dropped as soon as engaged to avoid being lost if its aircraft went down. One more was shot down by HMNLS Jacob Van Heemskerk. None of the torpedoes hit (the OTL effect against HMS Repulse).
VA Phillips at last broke radio silence requesting destroyers from the Singapore local Flotilla and powerful tugs, and reporting his position. There was a lull in attacks of 50 minutes during which HMS Kenya was of most value. Shifting from port to starboard side, she comes alongside a now stationary flagship. This allows HMS Kenya to pass slave cables to supply power to the dynamo room, with 25 minutes of light allows the diesel generators to restart. The risk of stationary ships being sunk by submarines was gladly accepted. As power was restored, the flooding of B and Y Boiler Rooms was staunched and control regained over the rudders. A Boiler and A Engine Rooms were restarted, and then X Boiler and X Engine Rooms. By 1215, HMS Prince of Wales was able to get under way at 14 knots, and redundant power cables were laid out. Gradually compartments were pumped out and resealed.
(Historical note: I know of no incident in which slave cables saved an RN battleship. HMS Sheffield and Edinburgh used them to save HMS Belfast in November 1939. HMS Gloucester sent her own damage control parties, and unsuccessfully attempted to use them in January 1941 to save HMS Southampton, but fires prevented it. The technique was practiced prewar, and equipment generally carried by RN ships. The open question is whether HMS Prince of Wales’ crew is sufficiently trained. I assume that luck cuts both ways, but if not, then HMS Kenya’ damage control parties can help. I also assume the sea conditions are similar to those where she was hit in the OTL. I also assume the OTL level of flooding, about 2400 tons.)
The next three attacks are the most difficult to calculate. The Kanoya Air Corps was ordered to fly the furthest to the south, and when returning north missed Force Z in the weather. It then flew towards Kota Bharu before the mistake was realized. Consequently two squadrons approached from the northwest, the third from the north, and in close sequence. I see nothing in this ATL to change that. It is also quite likely that only one CAP flight is aloft, the other two having almost certainly exhausted their ammunition. The primary effect of CAP is to offset the lack of AA fire from the starboard guns of HMS Prince of Wales – unable to depress because of her list. Without AA fire, I/Kanoya Air Corps was able to close to 550 yards before launching torpedoes. Fighters will force some of them to launch much earlier. The attacks began at 1220, and lasted ten minutes.
2/Kanoya Air Corps chose to attack HMS Repulse on her starboard side, but CAPT Tennant’s luck still held, he dodged all eight. In so maneuvering, he fully exposed his port side to I/Kanoya Air Corps, and three pilots switched to her. One hit punctured a hole beneath the bulge and flooded X Boiler Room. The other six G4M Betty bombers continued on toward HMS Prince of Wales, with one falling to CAP, and one severely damaged. Four dropped their fish, and two hits were scored. The first was in the extreme bow, blowing a hole clean through to the port side, but was not a fatal wound. The second struck even with the after quadruple turret, causing flooding but failing to cause a catastrophic explosion. A third G4M was damaged by AA fire as she passed the ports side of the stricken battleship.
3/Kanoya Air Corps was commanded by LT Iki Hiroshi, who had the fuel to hold back and observe the first five minutes of his squadron mates’ attacks. He will consider three options. Under IJN Doctrine, his primary mission is to damage capital ships so that the main battle squadrons can overtake and sink them. HMS Repulse appears undamaged to him, and allowing an undamaged capital ship to escape will be considered a critical error. (LT Iki is completely unaware that VA Kondo Nabutake’s battleships are too far away to be employed according to doctrine.) Within the IJNAF itself, the prevailing sentiment is that HMS Prince of Wales must not survive so as to prove, once and for all, the supremacy of airpower. That purity of airpower idea will tempt Iki to hunt for HMS Indomitable.
LT Iki will choose, as in the OTL, to attack HMS Repulse. He details six aircraft to attack from the starboard side, as did 2/Kanoya Air Corps. This keeps CAPT Tennant in the same pattern of steaming and allows the three remaining planes to aim at his port side. All three torpedoes hit, abreast “B” turret, directly on the bulge near “B” Engine Room, and one damaging her rudder aft. His two mates' aircraft disintegrated before Ito's eyes due to AA fire, and his own plane was damaged. Belatedly, a torpedo launched far off then hit E Boiler Room on the starboard side, and the battlecruiser is doomed.
(I am actually somewhat agnostic on whether LT Iki goes after HMS Repulse or HMS Prince of Wales. It is impossible to say whether emotions, or doctrinal discipline will win out.)
The last two squadrons went after HMS Prince of Wales. LT Ohira commanding 3/Mihoro Air Group, arrived at 1233, but dropped his bomb well short, and all other bombardiers followed their leader’s example; leaving 3/Mihoro Air Group scoreless. LT Ohira was assigned to the night mission that attacked HMIJS Chokai, and I suspect this OTL error was due to fatigue. 2/Mihoro Air Group was the last to attack at 1241, and scored a single 500 Kg hit on the port side of the catapult deck, and hamaged and caused casualties to X Boiler Room below.
It was over. I suspect with additional attention from destroyers, the casualty list for HMS Repulse will be lower than the OTL 24 officers and 486 ratings. The IJNAF could not attack again, its aircrews cannot rest and aircraft rearmed before dark. The weather on 11 and 12 December did not cooperate with further air operations. I also doubt any losses to submarines will be incurred.
Conditions were not idyllic over Force Z when first sighted at 1015, but the professional skill of IJNAF pilots overcame strong winds. The extra anti-aircraft guns aboard HMS Kenya did little, the poor quality of the RN High Angle Control System directors made them unsuitable for aircraft that flew twice as fast as the RN’s own aircraft – this had long ago been proven in the Mediterranean. More valuable was HMNLS Jacob Van Heemskerk, whose centerline 4-inch guns had better magazine arrangements, and therefore higher sustained rate of fire, where the two paired amidships had the same ammunition difficulties as did HMS Kenya because of the distance from her amidship magazines. Of use was the smoke screens laid by HMS Kenya and the additional escorting destroyers. Although the wet weather conditions hamper its effects, the larger scale than OTL does play a role in IJNAF pilots’ vision and resulting actions. Luck, both good and bad, would play itself out over Force Z.
The RN Combat Air Patrol (CAP) cycle will be based upon flights of three. Beginning at 0600, there Fulmar and three Sea Hurricane are launched. Two Sea Hurricane patrol astern, one Sea Hurricane and one Fulmar to the east, and two Fulmar to the west to cover in order the most likely approach routes of IJNAF aircraft. Although the Fulmar can remain aloft almost twice as long, duration of patrol is based on the lesser range of the Sea Hurricane. A second patrol is launched at 0800, and the first recovered no later than 0815; the third patrol at 1000, with recovery by 1015; by which time the first patrol is refueled and on standby. CAP was focused on defeating a torpedo attack; high level bombing would be left to a ship’s maneuverability and anti-aircraft (AA) crews. Fighter control and skill in interpreting radar fixes had not evolved sufficiently to do both.
Force Z is steaming in line, with HMAS Vampire in the lead, followed by HMS Indomitable with HMNLS Jacob Van Heemskerk to port and HMS Intrepid to starboard. HMS Repulse is next in line with HMS Bedouin to port and HMS Electra to the west. HMS Kenya, HMS Prince of Wales and Express trail. Once within range, a squadron of Albacores armed with bombs is sent in response to the report of landings at Kuantan. They find nothing. As they are returning, Force Z will be under attack and they will land at Kuantan.
It was not the 4/Genzan Air Corps which spotted Force Z, but rather a sister squadron. HMS Tenedos was spotted at 0943, but both 55Kg bombs missed and the aircraft continued to trail the destroyer. She was detached at 0800 hours low on fuel to proceed without zigzagging to Singapore. The first attack, at 1015 was by 3/Genzan Air Corps coming in from the south and also encountering HMS Tenedos. Repeating the colossal error in ship recognition, all nine bombs dropped by the IJNAF aviators failed to strike this nimble, if geriatric and unworthy veteran. En-route home, the bombers passed over Force Z. The position of Force Z was then widely broadcast; and because Phillips is further north than the OTL, E-13A float planes from 7th Cruiser Sqn are also able to join tracking it. In turn, at 1020, 1025 and 1030 warnings from HMS Tenedos were received by Force Z. The standby CAP was launched beginning at 1040.
Approaching from the south 40 minutes later, 1/Mihoro Air Group quickly identified the massive control top of HMS Repulse as symbolic of a capital ship, and lined up in tight three aircraft “V” formations. LT Shirai Yoshimi made the decision to attack the battlecruiser because he believed the deck armour of HMS Prince of Wales to be too thick for his 250Kg bombs to be effective. He was then advised by another plane crew of an aircraft carrier to the west, and decided to switch targets. The anti-aircraft fire was thick; five planes were hit, four seriously of which two did not make it back to Saigon. All made two bomb runs, dropping one each time. For all the care in aiming, only one bomb hit HMS Indomitable, on the starboard side about five feet outside the armoured hanger box, and about ten feet inside the hull. Exploding just aft of the island, it ruptured a fuel tank and started a fire that was quickly extinguished. Her ability to operate aircraft was not impaired. (Note: I based the location of this hit based on the position of the OTL hit on HMS Repulse, and the damage from the accidental explosion aboard HMS Indomitable in February 1953; although this bomb hit is about 10-15 feet further aft than the OTL explosion. That as far as my expertise goes.)
The next squadron, the 1/Genzan Air Corps arrived at 1138 (43 minutes later) from the northeast and was real trouble; forever demolishing the myth of battleship invulnerability so cherished by naval traditionalists (HMS Prince of Wales was undamaged, free to maneuver, and had unimpeded AA fire). CAP engaged as planned, and losses were heavy, two G3M shot down; and two more damaged and prematurely launched their torpedoes before the AA Zone was reached. One more G3M was shot down and one damaged severely, but both launched their weapons. CAPT Leach was able to dodge four of five torpedoes. The deadly 150 Kg warhead exploded on the port side aft, breaking through the armour belt and flooding B Engine Room. The shaft was bent at an odd angle and continued to spin for a few seconds more, gouging the thin bottom plating and permitted Y Engine Room to slowly flood; while at the other end the loosened shaft mountings allowed water into B Boiler Room. Shock damage shut down the diesel dynamos, leaving X Engine and Y Boiler Rooms in the dark. A Boiler and A Engine Rooms were shut down as an unnecessary precaution. Without power, her rudder went limp. She wallowed aimlessly, and was effectively hors de combat.
2/Genzan Air Corps flew past their retiring sister squadron to attack HMS Repulse from the east at 1150. Only eight aircraft were present, one having aborted with mechanical difficulties during launch. With CAP drawn towards the north, only one fighter engaged without success, due to CAPT Tennant’s skill. The old girl hiked up her 25-year-old skirts and reached 27.5 knots; and he was now nearly ten miles ahead of the flagship. All eight torpedoes missed, and four attackers were damaged by AA fire, none seriously. HMS Repulse then returned to normal station ahead of the flagship.
Only five minutes later, 4/Mihoro Air Group approached from the southeast, and sighted HMS Indomitable. She had recovered her third fighter patrol launched at 1000, and just completed launching her second fighter patrol from her catapult (which were still in her vicinity). Two Nells were shot down by CAP, and two damaged. In accordance with IJNAF doctrine, torpedoes were dropped as soon as engaged to avoid being lost if its aircraft went down. One more was shot down by HMNLS Jacob Van Heemskerk. None of the torpedoes hit (the OTL effect against HMS Repulse).
VA Phillips at last broke radio silence requesting destroyers from the Singapore local Flotilla and powerful tugs, and reporting his position. There was a lull in attacks of 50 minutes during which HMS Kenya was of most value. Shifting from port to starboard side, she comes alongside a now stationary flagship. This allows HMS Kenya to pass slave cables to supply power to the dynamo room, with 25 minutes of light allows the diesel generators to restart. The risk of stationary ships being sunk by submarines was gladly accepted. As power was restored, the flooding of B and Y Boiler Rooms was staunched and control regained over the rudders. A Boiler and A Engine Rooms were restarted, and then X Boiler and X Engine Rooms. By 1215, HMS Prince of Wales was able to get under way at 14 knots, and redundant power cables were laid out. Gradually compartments were pumped out and resealed.
(Historical note: I know of no incident in which slave cables saved an RN battleship. HMS Sheffield and Edinburgh used them to save HMS Belfast in November 1939. HMS Gloucester sent her own damage control parties, and unsuccessfully attempted to use them in January 1941 to save HMS Southampton, but fires prevented it. The technique was practiced prewar, and equipment generally carried by RN ships. The open question is whether HMS Prince of Wales’ crew is sufficiently trained. I assume that luck cuts both ways, but if not, then HMS Kenya’ damage control parties can help. I also assume the sea conditions are similar to those where she was hit in the OTL. I also assume the OTL level of flooding, about 2400 tons.)
The next three attacks are the most difficult to calculate. The Kanoya Air Corps was ordered to fly the furthest to the south, and when returning north missed Force Z in the weather. It then flew towards Kota Bharu before the mistake was realized. Consequently two squadrons approached from the northwest, the third from the north, and in close sequence. I see nothing in this ATL to change that. It is also quite likely that only one CAP flight is aloft, the other two having almost certainly exhausted their ammunition. The primary effect of CAP is to offset the lack of AA fire from the starboard guns of HMS Prince of Wales – unable to depress because of her list. Without AA fire, I/Kanoya Air Corps was able to close to 550 yards before launching torpedoes. Fighters will force some of them to launch much earlier. The attacks began at 1220, and lasted ten minutes.
2/Kanoya Air Corps chose to attack HMS Repulse on her starboard side, but CAPT Tennant’s luck still held, he dodged all eight. In so maneuvering, he fully exposed his port side to I/Kanoya Air Corps, and three pilots switched to her. One hit punctured a hole beneath the bulge and flooded X Boiler Room. The other six G4M Betty bombers continued on toward HMS Prince of Wales, with one falling to CAP, and one severely damaged. Four dropped their fish, and two hits were scored. The first was in the extreme bow, blowing a hole clean through to the port side, but was not a fatal wound. The second struck even with the after quadruple turret, causing flooding but failing to cause a catastrophic explosion. A third G4M was damaged by AA fire as she passed the ports side of the stricken battleship.
3/Kanoya Air Corps was commanded by LT Iki Hiroshi, who had the fuel to hold back and observe the first five minutes of his squadron mates’ attacks. He will consider three options. Under IJN Doctrine, his primary mission is to damage capital ships so that the main battle squadrons can overtake and sink them. HMS Repulse appears undamaged to him, and allowing an undamaged capital ship to escape will be considered a critical error. (LT Iki is completely unaware that VA Kondo Nabutake’s battleships are too far away to be employed according to doctrine.) Within the IJNAF itself, the prevailing sentiment is that HMS Prince of Wales must not survive so as to prove, once and for all, the supremacy of airpower. That purity of airpower idea will tempt Iki to hunt for HMS Indomitable.
LT Iki will choose, as in the OTL, to attack HMS Repulse. He details six aircraft to attack from the starboard side, as did 2/Kanoya Air Corps. This keeps CAPT Tennant in the same pattern of steaming and allows the three remaining planes to aim at his port side. All three torpedoes hit, abreast “B” turret, directly on the bulge near “B” Engine Room, and one damaging her rudder aft. His two mates' aircraft disintegrated before Ito's eyes due to AA fire, and his own plane was damaged. Belatedly, a torpedo launched far off then hit E Boiler Room on the starboard side, and the battlecruiser is doomed.
(I am actually somewhat agnostic on whether LT Iki goes after HMS Repulse or HMS Prince of Wales. It is impossible to say whether emotions, or doctrinal discipline will win out.)
The last two squadrons went after HMS Prince of Wales. LT Ohira commanding 3/Mihoro Air Group, arrived at 1233, but dropped his bomb well short, and all other bombardiers followed their leader’s example; leaving 3/Mihoro Air Group scoreless. LT Ohira was assigned to the night mission that attacked HMIJS Chokai, and I suspect this OTL error was due to fatigue. 2/Mihoro Air Group was the last to attack at 1241, and scored a single 500 Kg hit on the port side of the catapult deck, and hamaged and caused casualties to X Boiler Room below.
It was over. I suspect with additional attention from destroyers, the casualty list for HMS Repulse will be lower than the OTL 24 officers and 486 ratings. The IJNAF could not attack again, its aircrews cannot rest and aircraft rearmed before dark. The weather on 11 and 12 December did not cooperate with further air operations. I also doubt any losses to submarines will be incurred.
Very well done. But a second wave was being prepared but was called off when they received confirmation that both Repulse & POW were sinking. So, another attack would've come in the afternoon. Two other points, if the Japanese have an additional 30-45 minutes of fuel the attacks would be better coordinated. Knowing that a carrier is present the Japanese would make use of the 20 Zero's that were availed. The landings in upper Malaya were secure so the priority would be escorting the attack on Force Z.
Is there a prospect of the land based air arriving in time to do something useful? OTL they were in time to watch the ships sinking, but ITTL their presence could either deter further attacks - possible if the damage is overestimated or if the attacks took longer, or results in a last gasp attempt to get them before they can escape.
Both could be influenced by quality of Japanese intel on aircraft numbers - if they are reasonably sure the buffaloes are all there is they are more likely to try to finish the job. If, however, they are expecting more, they may be more inclined to accept that there's enough damage to effectively cripple the UK presence for months on end, especially as even if they don't sink, they'll be lost when Singapore is captured.
Sorry, that's not likely. The problem with land-based air cover is it's sporadic. Especially if the battle takes place 60 miles further east, the Buffaloes don't know when to be above Force Z, because they can only stay on station for a short period of time. They don't know when the second wave will show up. It might be 3 hours, or 4, or maybe 5. The Japanese know every operation is a risk, and the possible presence of a handful of piss poor fighters aren't going to frighten them away.
Point noted, but I believe the A6M will be used as they were in the OTL. They flew air cover over the transport force. On 7 December, two recce planes (one RAAF Hudson, one RAF Catalina) were shot down. The Hudson by an IJAAF Ki-97 Nate, off the coast of Cambodia, but the Catalina almost certainly well out to sea by a Zero. On 10 December, not all IJN transports have completely cleared the Gulf of Siam, and their value to follow-on operations is very high. It's not like the fighters were idle on 10 December.
As for the second strike, from my sources I am not aware of it. As for the additional fuel resulting in better coordination, at the last minute RA Matsunaga removed one squadron from the reconnaissance force and another rearmed with bombs rather than torpedoes. This is why 1/Mihoro Air Group and 2/Mihoro Air Group took off so late. The reconnaissance gaps were filled by increasing the distance between the remaining squadrons. I believe the extra fuel benefits Kanoya Air Corps the most- but that group executed the most perfectly coordinated attack in the OTL. A close second is 1/Genzan Air Corps and 2/Genzan Air Corps, but after careful thought I still believe they would attack separate targets, and extra fuel did not negate the skill of CAPT Tennant in maneuvering his ship. I felt the fuel factor had to be taken into consideration, but did not necessarily change the results.
As always, I appreciate greatly the courtesy.
Now comes the hard part. How would History have changed? Although time-consuming, what I have posted so far is the most likely course of events due to close proximity to OTL events. Now we range further afield.
Some things are obvious. HMIJS Chokai is not present at the Battle of Savo Island, with no replacement for operational reasons. HMIJS Aoba will be a shambles. Good news for HMAS Canberra, and possibly USS Astoria as well. Will RA Richmond K turner still withdraw the transports? How does the Battle of Guadalcanal go for the USMC? Not so sure.
VA Ozawa Jisaburo is killed – how does his loss impact the IJN?
It is well known that LTG Yamashita Tomoyuki bluffed LTG Arthur Percival into surrendering on 15 February 1942 when his troops’ ammunition was virtually exhausted. Will this ATL thread buy the additional single day of combat that forces the IJA to abandon the attack on Singapore Island and revert to the original plan to take Singapore in 100 rather than 70 days?
How will HMS Indomitable be used? As a fast transport to bring 50 Hurricane IIA/B fighters from Port Sudan? In the OTL, the voyage took 12 days. If she refueled and departed on 12 December, she would be back in 25 days – i.e 6 January vice the historical 28 January 1942. Do the 50 fighters, plus her air group left behind buy additional time for Malaya – if so, how much? If she returned with a second batch on 31 January 1942, what effects are there?
If HMS Indomitable remains in theater, or for that matter, if the IJN believes she is still present, the sequence of landings in British Borneo will have to be revised. Effect on Japanese operations against Sumatra and Java?
HMS Prince of Wales will be given the HMS Illustrious treatment in January 1941 at Malta. Dry-docking to inspect hull, and then sent on her was to Durban for additions seaworthiness repairs and then to New York Navy Yard for repairs that will last until at least June 1943. HMS Queen Elizabeth will be bumped from repairs, and in return bump HMS Royal Sovereign which will pay off for good in September 1942. Details of HMS Prince of Wales' refit?
VA Phillips has survived. How does he fit in the ABDA Command structure? (He couldn’t be worse than VA Layton.) Given how well he and ADM Hart got along, is the US Asiatic Fleet to operate with the RN rather than RNLN? Effects – such as USS Boise not grounding because VA Conrad Helfrich refused to give navigational charts to the USN?
I could go on, but the questions are prolific breeders…
Some things are obvious. HMIJS Chokai is not present at the Battle of Savo Island, with no replacement for operational reasons. HMIJS Aoba will be a shambles. Good news for HMAS Canberra, and possibly USS Astoria as well. Will RA Richmond K turner still withdraw the transports? How does the Battle of Guadalcanal go for the USMC? Not so sure.
VA Ozawa Jisaburo is killed – how does his loss impact the IJN?
It is well known that LTG Yamashita Tomoyuki bluffed LTG Arthur Percival into surrendering on 15 February 1942 when his troops’ ammunition was virtually exhausted. Will this ATL thread buy the additional single day of combat that forces the IJA to abandon the attack on Singapore Island and revert to the original plan to take Singapore in 100 rather than 70 days?
How will HMS Indomitable be used? As a fast transport to bring 50 Hurricane IIA/B fighters from Port Sudan? In the OTL, the voyage took 12 days. If she refueled and departed on 12 December, she would be back in 25 days – i.e 6 January vice the historical 28 January 1942. Do the 50 fighters, plus her air group left behind buy additional time for Malaya – if so, how much? If she returned with a second batch on 31 January 1942, what effects are there?
If HMS Indomitable remains in theater, or for that matter, if the IJN believes she is still present, the sequence of landings in British Borneo will have to be revised. Effect on Japanese operations against Sumatra and Java?
HMS Prince of Wales will be given the HMS Illustrious treatment in January 1941 at Malta. Dry-docking to inspect hull, and then sent on her was to Durban for additions seaworthiness repairs and then to New York Navy Yard for repairs that will last until at least June 1943. HMS Queen Elizabeth will be bumped from repairs, and in return bump HMS Royal Sovereign which will pay off for good in September 1942. Details of HMS Prince of Wales' refit?
VA Phillips has survived. How does he fit in the ABDA Command structure? (He couldn’t be worse than VA Layton.) Given how well he and ADM Hart got along, is the US Asiatic Fleet to operate with the RN rather than RNLN? Effects – such as USS Boise not grounding because VA Conrad Helfrich refused to give navigational charts to the USN?
I could go on, but the questions are prolific breeders…
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Thats the main issue with this thread are we discussing, what would happen with HMS Indomitable sent to far east or her in exactly the same place as OTL force Z under OTL final air attack that might well never happen simply due to RN not being in the same place as having a CV gives massively more range and options to them.