One would think that, at this stage of the war, loosing the Kriegsmarine was not quite irksome for the course of the war, methinks.
Indeed, which is why Guderian can make the call with only the Kriesgmarine complaining about it. It is not dissimilar to Admiral Toyoda's dilemma before Leyte Gulf: do you preserve the surface fleet in spite of it potentially becoming useless, or do you gamble it in pursuit of a larger strategic goal? Guderian gambles, and though he sacrifices most of what's left in the process, he at least gets the extra 300,000 men to man the Eastern Front. At the same time, he makes a not insignificant enemy in the process.
I don't think I'll get to cover Leyte Gulf - or its equivalent - until "Hagen" (which is to say, Part Three), but it will be interesting to see this dilemma repeated and what the Japanese make of it.
Think you misspelled “Apostle”.
“Long-range fighters”?
It’s still called SHAEF. “SHAPE” is for postwar NATO.
Did you mean “undertake futile efforts”?
Great to see you back.
Thanks so much! I wrote this one after a sudden surge of inspiration last night, so it's filled with such mistakes. Will correct.
What would the German and Allied casualties look like in the brief October 8-11 land battles in central and southern Norway?
A few hundred at most for each side. Greater German casualties due to the lower quality and morale of troops left behind, and greater Resistance casualties on account of being underequipped and/or Rendulic's harsh methods. Allied casualties would be the lowest in spite of the bulk of Thorne's forces lacking experience - minus the 6th Airborne -, so, all in all, a fairly cheap enterprise for the Allies in terms of men. Not so much in terms of - as it will only became clear later - overinvestment of airborne resources.