The bulk of the amphib fleet had been withdrawn, first for the ANVIL operation & then everything to the Pacific. Ike was left with a small lift, the Walchern island operation illustratting it. For what you are proposing a corps minimum is wanted. preferably a army. I've gamed this sort of thing out multiple times. One of the German advantages is the forming Volks army. All those men forming the Volkgrenadier units attacking eighty days later in the Ardennes were called up in September. Not all in well organized units, but armed and defending their home turf. Then there are the training units, anything else from the wrecked units rebuilding with the training units, the Volks Stiurm, Navy personnel, Lufwaffe ground units. Its no longer joyous French or Dutch & Belgian civilians offering wine & pointing to the location of le Boche. Its not even like March 1945 with demoralized Germans just being sullen. A 'Full Blooded Thrust of Forty Divisions' might fear nothing here, a dozen is asking for trouble, & even two dozen is problematic.
What if Montgomery was wrong about Market Garden?
- Thread starter McPherson
- Start date
The bulk of the amphib fleet had been withdrawn, first for the ANVIL operation & then everything to the Pacific. Ike was left with a small lift, the Walchern island operation illustratting it. For what you are proposing a corps minimum is wanted. preferably a army. I've gamed this sort of thing out multiple times. One of the German advantages is the forming Volks army. All those men forming the Volkgrenadier units attacking eighty days later in the Ardennes were called up in September. Not all in well organized units, but armed and defending their home turf. Then there are the training units, anything else from the wrecked units rebuilding with the training units, the Volks Stiurm, Navy personnel, Lufwaffe ground units. Its no longer joyous French or Dutch & Belgian civilians offering wine & pointing to the location of le Boche. Its not even like March 1945 with demoralized Germans just being sullen. A 'Full Blooded Thrust of Forty Divisions' might fear nothing here, a dozen is asking for trouble, & even two dozen is problematic.
Or any other. Right up there with a couple other hypotheticals I wont mention.
Occasionally its asked why the Allies did not also seize Amsterdam and Rotterdam with their ports. The 21 AG did probe that direction, but the Germans defended by breaching dykes and creating successive water barriers in front of any attack. I also have a question about both restoring those ports to operations, and about moving the cargo discharge SE to the Allied armies. Antwerp with its multiple automotive & rail roads, and canals, threatened to become a choke point due to clearance problems. Rotterdam might be worse that winter and spring.
McPherson
Banned
Then what was the point of Market Garden? If you cannot supply an exploitation, or execute a plan to render a supply option available for exploitation if MG succeeded, why burn up 6 divisions and get 17,000 Allied soldiers killed or wounded for a punch into nowhere even if Arnheim is cleared? That makes no sense. Did the people at SHAEF lose touch with reality?
P>S> the Germans blew the dikes before the 21st Army Group probed east. That was revenge for the Dutch railroad strike called by the Dutch government and Resistance to coincide with the MG operation.
Dave Shoup
Banned
Indeed. Not to be blunt, but 21st Army Group was a wasting asset from August, 1944, when the 59th Division was broken up to provide replacements for the rest of 2nd Army's infantry formations. The 50th Division followed in November, while the 70th Brigade (part of the 49th Division) had been broken up in August and had been replaced by the formerly independent 56th Infantry Brigade. In addition, and for the same reason, the independent 27th Armoured Brigade was broken up in July, 1944. Similarly, the 1st Armoured Division, assigned to 8th Army in Italy, was broken up to provide replacements for armoured and infantry formations that remained in action there.
Including the 1st Airborne Division, which was essentially destroyed as a combat formation at Arnhem, the British order of battle in Europe dropped by four divisions (1st Armoured, 1st Airborne, 50th and 59th infantry divisions) out of the 22 (Guards, 1st, 6th, 7th, and 11th Armoured; 1st and 6th Airborne; 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 15th, 43rd, 46th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 56th, 59th, and 78th infantry divisions) they put into action in Italy and NW Europe in 1943-45. The British also lost, broke up, re-assigned, or downgraded at least three armoured brigades (23rd, 25th, 27th) and three infantry brigades (56th, 231st, and 234th infantry brigades) in the same period, making a total of 17 brigades - the equivalent of more than five divisions.
The Canadian 1st Army faced similar issues, which led to the 1944-45 political crisis over deployment of NRMA conscripts from North America to Europe, as well.
Given the above, limiting 21st Army Group's assignments to clearing the Channel Coast and the Dutch-Belgian border provinces, including the Scheldt littoral, and providing the 12th Army Group with all available supplies and reinforcements - including all the US forces, from 9th Army on down - that historically were assigned to 21st Army Group, would have been a far better decision.
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No one has mentioned yet how there seemed to be a trend of use and abuse of Airborne troops in WWII.
The German Paratroopers had Crete in 1941.
In 1943-44 Italy the 82nd Airborne Division was worn out being used as conventional infantry. The veteran 504th PIR stayed behind in Italy at the request of Mark Clark while the rest of the Division sailed to England to prepare for Operation Overlord. The 504th found itself at the Anzio beachhead and was withdrawn too late and in no condition to make the Normandy jump.
In Normandy the British 6th Airborne and American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions stayed in the line for weeks after D-Day.
On 2 August 1944 the First Allied Airborne Army was officially formed. It was the new shiny toy in the Allied arsenal. Paratroopers were seen as a magic bullet. In fairness you could say that Eisenhower and his Commanders never figured out how to properly use Airborne troops. Several combat jumps were canceled before Market-Garden. After Market-Garden the Airborne were thrown into the fire again for Operation Varsity.
You might also add the airborne assault on Corregidor in the Philippines to not the greatest use of paratroopers.
The point is that it seems that allied Paratroopers were handed some bad missions. Market-Garden was one of those.
Here is a question: what if Ridgeway had jumped in on 17 September instead of Browning?
The German Paratroopers had Crete in 1941.
In 1943-44 Italy the 82nd Airborne Division was worn out being used as conventional infantry. The veteran 504th PIR stayed behind in Italy at the request of Mark Clark while the rest of the Division sailed to England to prepare for Operation Overlord. The 504th found itself at the Anzio beachhead and was withdrawn too late and in no condition to make the Normandy jump.
In Normandy the British 6th Airborne and American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions stayed in the line for weeks after D-Day.
On 2 August 1944 the First Allied Airborne Army was officially formed. It was the new shiny toy in the Allied arsenal. Paratroopers were seen as a magic bullet. In fairness you could say that Eisenhower and his Commanders never figured out how to properly use Airborne troops. Several combat jumps were canceled before Market-Garden. After Market-Garden the Airborne were thrown into the fire again for Operation Varsity.
You might also add the airborne assault on Corregidor in the Philippines to not the greatest use of paratroopers.
The point is that it seems that allied Paratroopers were handed some bad missions. Market-Garden was one of those.
Here is a question: what if Ridgeway had jumped in on 17 September instead of Browning?
Dave Shoup
Banned
On your specific question, presumably if XVIII Corps under Ridgway had been the corps headquarters rather than Br. I Abn Corps under Browning, the operation would have been different, in its planning, execution, and/or both ...
In terms of the use or misuse of airborne units, one could make the case that NOT activating as many airborne units (five US divisions and as many separate regiments, two British divisions and a brigade) would have provided a real benefit to as many or more Allied "leg" infantry divisions.
I've not dug into this in depth, but others estimates and my scratch paper figures suggest it had to be one or the other. There was enough fuel & transport to energize a clearance of the channel ports, including Antwerp, or make a narrow front attack eastwards, but not both.
Dave Shoup
Banned
Given the distances involved from the Channel and southern France to eastern France, the Franco-Belgian-German borderlands area, the Rhine, and a sustainable perimeter around the Ruhr (much less from there to Berlin and Vienna), hard to see the northwestern European campaign as requiring anything less than two campaign seasons.
At which understanding, focusing on pushing 12th Army Group and 6th Army Group as far east as reasonable while focusing 21st AG on the Channel ports and Scheldt-Antwerp complex makes much more sense than a pipedream like MARKET-GARDEN and "bouncing the Rhine."
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More of a hope I'd think. Everyone could see the 12 & 21 AG had outrun their supply, & it was becoming clear US ComZ was overrun by events. No one had anticipated reaching the objectives of December, January, or February at the end of August. Ike saw there was fuel for one relatively narrow attack in September. He gambled that attack would scatter a weak German defense & get a bridgehead over the Rhine before the defense consolidated. It was a gamble & at that it was still a bold move and much of the criticism is insight yapping. I'm all for focusing on Antwerp & clearlythe Scheldt. But thats a safe and conservative move. Had Ike & Monty focused on tidying up their logistics in September. Folks would be savaging them for not being bold and daring. Trolls would be baiting debates over what a weak cissy Ike was , not allowing his armies to blow through the empherial German defense & get on to Berlin...
& logistically thats what had been organized. Antwerp was not expected to be captured until D+ 180, Liege later, & Nancy later yet. The wherewithal for transporting supplies at those cities was not even on the docks, let alone shipped to Europe.
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According to Crusade in Europe the D+270 line was south of Antwerp.
A few other points
The "1400 lorries unavailable" is true, but had no impact on British logistics, given the excess stocks of vehicles the British had in France. It was a throwaway remark in the Admin History of 21st Army Group that was picked up by Wilmot, and repeated by other authors, but historians looking at the war diaries of individual units have not found any evidence of abnormal numbers of lorries unavailable.
The post Arnhem plan was to establish XXX Corps on the Ijssel rivers facing east - cutting off 15th Army, preventing V2s from hitting the UK and threatening an advance towards the Ruhr. Later this got replaced by an assault between the Maas and the Rhine east of Nijmegen (Operation Veritable) which IIRC was originally due to be launched in late December. Somewhere I have read (maybe d'Este's Eisenhower) an account of Bradley talking about the cumulative impact on German morale of losing Paris, the Westwall being breached, and the Rhine being crossed with the implication that a total German collapse was close, and that a Rhine crossing might be the final straw.
On Nijmegen and Gavin's decisions Buckingham's book is a good source but he is biased towards the airborne. IIRC the US division commanders were allowed to choose their own dropzones which seems to have caused some issues eg the bridge at Son, as they preferred more concentrated landing zones. Also at the time there were ongoing discussions about moving the US airborne divisions to France and using them in support of 12th Army Group's crossings of the Rhine on completion of Market Garden - see Roger Cirillo's PhD thesis. Decision making at this was very dynamic, mostly face to face, and with Brereton's tendency to cleanse records it is unlikely we can untangle exactly what was ordered, proposed or suggested, when and by whom.
Not directly, but it would probably allow 2 drops on the first day which would make a big difference.
It certainly does on the game board. The German player has some impossible choices with the distinct possibility of reinforcing waves.
Wasn't there a problem with bad weather at the English airfields delaying the take offs? Or was that on the second or third day of the airborne ops?
I believe the Soviets also had disastrous airdrops on the Eastern Front, primarily due to lack of support for the formations when sent in. I believe their drops in support of the Manchurian operations were better, but thats just recollection.
One could make a very strong argument that while smaller commando type formations were efficacious, parachute divisions were a waste of resources, especially after D Day. One could argue there should have been a plan in place to convert them to infantry or mechanized divisions once they landed in France, complete with artillery train and logistics tail on standby in the UK to be shipped over and link up with them.
Second day. The Poles & other reinforcements were set back. I don't know how bad the weather was, but Bereton had 'lost' a training exercise in the 1930s from grounding his fighter planes for bad weather. Lt Col Maitlands bombers flew & practiced bombing runs unmolested.
Thats how the 82d & 101st fought after Market Garden. Moved from 21 AG to "Stratgic Reserve" under SHAEFs direct control, & parked between Paris & Reims. They were released to 1st Army after 16 Dec & were reinforced with assorted armor, artillery, & TD units. Donald Burgetts auto biography has a good perspective of this period. Among other things he notes they had a chance to train replacements, something the other divisions in France were unable to do.
McPherson
Banned
Scheldt or Market Garden
I have looked at the problem. See my comments about transport times and round trip times, previously. I think the Anglo-Canadians might have barely enough to mount both, but they have to move faster. Given their march and pursuit speeds though and the road nets they have, I do not see how they could pursue faster. So they either have to settle for masking the channel ports and gamble on Antwerp or be more methodical and reduce Calais and Dunkirk and I mean reduce them. This sets them up for the Antwerp operation mid-early October if they can OTB that far forward. MG becomes a no-go and the operation is instead to go into winter lines north of the Albert Canal and clear Antwerp. Then plan for the Spring campaign of 45.
THAT is because the lorries that replaced them were initially American. The Americans noticed...
21st Army Group (November 1945). The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of Europe 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. Germany: 21st Army Group. OCLC 911257199. PP44.
However, additionally that the British were more handicapped by a lack of transport companies...
Carter, J. A. H.; Kann, D. N. (1961). Maintenance in the Field, Volume II: 1943–1945. The Second World War 1939–1945 Army. London: The War Office. PP300
They had to bring in additional units from the UK or create them from their resources on the spot. 2nd Army burgeoned from 6 to 39 transport companies assigned to them, mostly from ad hocked compositions they created for themselves in France. 12 additional transport companies from the UK were promised for 21st Army Group but in the end only 5 had arrived by Market Garden. Conjecture? Despite the 154,000 thousand vehicles at hand, most assigned forward to the combat units, it appears that 21st Army Group had a SEVERE shortage of dedicated haulage from their RMAs to the front. Based on the improvisations, there was something going on along that 700 kilometer supply line in the beginning of September that screams "trouble". The 1400 Austen K5s are just a symptom.
Let's look at that one?
I like the first option better.
You mean "lie" when you refer to Brereton?
Decision making was "confused". And if we are to believe Cirillo in his opus on command shenanigans at SHAEF, that is being "charitable".
Yet another reason for Brereton to have been cashiered. Sheesh, how did that incompetent continue to advance in US service?
I have looked at the problem. See my comments about transport times and round trip times, previously. I think the Anglo-Canadians might have barely enough to mount both, but they have to move faster. Given their march and pursuit speeds though and the road nets they have, I do not see how they could pursue faster. So they either have to settle for masking the channel ports and gamble on Antwerp or be more methodical and reduce Calais and Dunkirk and I mean reduce them. This sets them up for the Antwerp operation mid-early October if they can OTB that far forward. MG becomes a no-go and the operation is instead to go into winter lines north of the Albert Canal and clear Antwerp. Then plan for the Spring campaign of 45.
THAT is because the lorries that replaced them were initially American. The Americans noticed...
21st Army Group (November 1945). The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of Europe 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. Germany: 21st Army Group. OCLC 911257199. PP44.
However, additionally that the British were more handicapped by a lack of transport companies...
Carter, J. A. H.; Kann, D. N. (1961). Maintenance in the Field, Volume II: 1943–1945. The Second World War 1939–1945 Army. London: The War Office. PP300
They had to bring in additional units from the UK or create them from their resources on the spot. 2nd Army burgeoned from 6 to 39 transport companies assigned to them, mostly from ad hocked compositions they created for themselves in France. 12 additional transport companies from the UK were promised for 21st Army Group but in the end only 5 had arrived by Market Garden. Conjecture? Despite the 154,000 thousand vehicles at hand, most assigned forward to the combat units, it appears that 21st Army Group had a SEVERE shortage of dedicated haulage from their RMAs to the front. Based on the improvisations, there was something going on along that 700 kilometer supply line in the beginning of September that screams "trouble". The 1400 Austen K5s are just a symptom.
Let's look at that one?
I like the first option better.
You mean "lie" when you refer to Brereton?
Decision making was "confused". And if we are to believe Cirillo in his opus on command shenanigans at SHAEF, that is being "charitable".
Yet another reason for Brereton to have been cashiered. Sheesh, how did that incompetent continue to advance in US service?
Bereton was like his peers. He was very good at planning and organizing. During the previous 22 years the US Army had not been in combat, & had no really good way to judge anyone's fitness under that condition. During those decades the up and coming officers were constantly tested in their ability to plan, organize, & train. Those talents could be tested, judged and validated. Bereton was actually very good at it. If you needed a Air Force stood up with all the base infrastructure and ground support Bereton was your man.
When the US mobilization started 1940 Marshal was faced with the problem of turning 420,000 Army and Nantional Guards into a 4,000,000+ Army and air Force (8,000,000 as it turned out.). He needed leaders with brilliant track records organizing and training. It was pretty pointless to make wild guesses who would be the Lee, Sheridan, Stuart. Marshal went for a well organized army which the battlefield commanders needed.
McPherson
Banned
You kriegspiel (wargame) with real troops and weather effects and logistics and you cross your fingers in peacetime and see who does what and how well.
Sure a Fredendall or a Brereton gets through, but Kasserine Pass and Clark Field means you yank those yahoos and put in another guy, preferably a subordinate who was trying his best, while those "gentlemen" fubared.