Was Gavin to blame for the failure of Market Garden?


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How about a detailed presentation?
  • McPherson

    Banned
    Is Cornelius Ryan's book "A bridge too far" and the movie based on it considered to be historically accurate?

    Food for thought...


    You might not agree, or you might, but whatever you think, he does cover the operation and tries (And fails to me, YMMV.), to present a balanced case.
     
    Canadians need help.
  • McPherson

    Banned
    Combat engineers with tank-based CEVs, etc., would have been a better decision. As it was, one of the 79th's three brigades in Normandy was made up of armoured engineers, which makes more sense than combat arms units.

    The Bocage was an unforeseen that was clearly an intelligence failure. Makes one wonder if a siege train might have been something the allies should have purchased to handle little problems like Caen and the ports.

    If the personnel that went into the 79th's two armored brigades (1st Tank and 30th Armoured) had simply been equipped with Churchills or Shermans, the British would have had enough separate armored brigades (1st Tank, 6th Guards, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 21st, 23rd, 25th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 33rd, and 34th) to permanently attach one to each of the 14 British infantry divisions (1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 15th, 43rd, 46th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 53rd, 56th, 59th, 78th) they historically deployed into Europe in 1943-45, with all the advantages that would have brought. (1st and 6th Airborne and 52nd Mountain/Airlanding set aside).

    I'm not sure what is argued here? Make Hobarts engineer's into regular independent tank brigades and dispense with their specialist functions altogether? What really fouled up MG on the ground was the lack of specialist assault troops. (MARINES). A couple of regiments of Marines and 30 Corps might have made across the river assaults. when they were held up by the unsecured bridge at Nijmegen for example. I imagine an alligator battalion would have come in handy here and there?

    Of course I know where I would have sent any spare Marines if there were any to spare in the Allied OOB in the Atlantic. But I digress. The argument about how to get the troops across at Nijmegen and Arnhem never really addresses, though we have stabbed at it: "What do we do now, Monty, that we've punched a 70 km salient in the German lines and we're out of supplies?"

    What are the Germans going to do?
     
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