What if Montgomery was wrong about Market Garden?

[Dave Shoup]

Some years ago I read a very good study of how the Wehrmacht got its act together very quickly when the attack started. They were highly experienced at putting together small or reduced units and moving them into suitable positions for the battles they faced, especially learning from the mess of the Eastern Front. IIRC they had units of clerks, cooks and remnants of armour and artillery units that had been withdrawn for rebuilding from the French battles. The German command were surprisingly swift at getting those forces into action effectively. It was this effort that stopped the Allied advance and allowed for the German reinforcements to retake Nijmegen. I forget the title but it may have been It Never Snows in September. Black and red cover, very dry writing, rather technical.

Being on the defensive with a (generally) constantly shrinking perimeter and excellent supply lines helped as well, especially against enemies who had to project power from almost halfway around the world, across the North Atlantic and then the Channel, but yes, even the late-war German military was quite capable at throwing task forces together. Just imagine if they hadn't been trying to slaughter nine million civilians at roughly the same time.

 

[Aber]

The reality is that given the situation the Allies generally and the 21st Army Group specifically found themselves in NW Europe in the autumn of 1944, clearing the Scheldt and putting Antwerp into operation was the number one priority for Montgomery's command.

No.

At the time, Eisenhower's directives were IIRC asking for Antwerp, Rotterdam, the Saar and the Ruhr. It took quite a while before there was a clear directive from SHAEF on priorities (and of course the arguments about what "priority" meant ). Montgomery did not need Antwerp for 21st Army Group supplies - Dieppe and Bolougne were enough for his needs.

Alternatively with hindsight the argument can be made that Antwerp should be tackled first, but the reality is that it cannot be operational before the end of October 1944 due to the tactical challenges posed by Walcheren, which requires an amphibious assault. However if Montgomery had broken off the pursuit to open up the port, we'd still be discussing alternatives today.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

No.

At the time, Eisenhower's directives were IIRC asking for Antwerp, Rotterdam, the Saar and the Ruhr. It took quite a while before there was a clear directive from SHAEF on priorities (and of course the arguments about what "priority" meant ). Montgomery did not need Antwerp for 21st Army Group supplies - Dieppe and Bolougne were enough for his needs ...

What needs are covered there? Just 21 AG as it stood in September? Or 21 AG as it was in the spring? Or that 40 division full blooded thrust so often quoted? The intake from the Channel ports does look something like adequate for September-October. Is it enough if that Yank Army Monty supposedly wanted is added into 21 AG?

 

[McPherson]

What needs are covered there? Just 21 AG as it stood in September? Or 21 AG as it was in the spring? Or that 40 division full blooded thrust so often quoted? The intake from the Channel ports does look something like adequate for September-October. Is it enough if that Yank Army Monty supposedly wanted is added into 21 AG?

Uhm… the difference between 18 division equivalents and 40 equivalents? My gut says you would need Antwerp.

 

[Aber]

What needs are covered there? Just 21 AG as it stood in September? Or 21 AG as it was in the spring? Or that 40 division full blooded thrust so often quoted? The intake from the Channel ports does look something like adequate for September-October. Is it enough if that Yank Army Monty supposedly wanted is added into 21 AG?

Certainly enough for 21 AG at any date; would have to check re another Army.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Allowance per division slice for post OVERLORD was 950 tons daily for full on continuous offensive operations, or 20 x950 = 19,000 tons daily. Reduce by 30% for winter curtailed operations = 13,300 tons daily. 40 divisions = 38,000 & 26,600 respectively. I don't have numbers for the actual intake of the Channel ports. The nominal peacetime intake/capacity collectively was 17,000 to 19,000 tons daily. Antwerp nominal capacity was slightly under 20,000 tons daily. 18,000 according to one secondhand source I'm looking at.

The chart below shows US Army intake through Antwerp as averaging 14,250 daily tho it does not show anything claimed by 21 AG. Other assorted sources suggest a average of 18,000 tons daily, excluding PoL.

Ruppenthal 'Logistics in Overlord' notes the problem of port clearance during 1944. That is the actual capacity under war conditions exceeded the ability of the overland transport to remove the material. Ruppenthal refers to discharge operations being curtailed at Antwerp apporx 20 December as the limited storage capacity of the city was tapped out and cargo was piling up on the docks awaiting transport, & was at risk of damage from the weather.

It also must be noted Cherbourg & other 'exposed' ports had intake reduced during the winter. This was in part due to weather, tho other factors were at work. It appear the intake at Boulogne, Ostend, Dieppe falls off by approx 50% during November-December. Protected inland ports like Rouen or Antwerp seem to maintain a steady intake through February.

 

[edgeworthy]

Gen Browning's use of nearly what amounted to a Brigade worth of Gliders to bring his Corps Staff into the AO when it was not really needed might have made a difference had they instead been given to 1st AB!

.

I've read one analysis that sums up General Browning with the comment that if Market Garden were an Alistair MacLean Novel, at the climax he would be un-masked as a German Agent.

 

[Dave Shoup]

No. At the time, Eisenhower's directives were IIRC asking for Antwerp, Rotterdam, the Saar and the Ruhr. It took quite a while before there was a clear directive from SHAEF on priorities (and of course the arguments about what "priority" meant ). Montgomery did not need Antwerp for 21st Army Group supplies - Dieppe and Bolougne were enough for his needs. Alternatively with hindsight the argument can be made that Antwerp should be tackled first, but the reality is that it cannot be operational before the end of October 1944 due to the tactical challenges posed by Walcheren, which requires an amphibious assault. However if Montgomery had broken off the pursuit to open up the port, we'd still be discussing alternatives today.

Yes, actually. Directives and priorities are two different things, and Montgomery, as an army group commander leading two motorized armies in northwestern Europe, was well aware of the importance of Antwerp, and the opportunity costs incurred by continuing to rely on Channel coast ports. It's no more hindsight than Marshall and Eisenhower insisting on ANVIL/DRAGOON to get Marseilles and Toulon, much less the Sixth Army Group.

 

[Aber]

Yes, actually. Directives and priorities are two different things, and Montgomery, as an army group commander leading two motorized armies in northwestern Europe, was well aware of the importance of Antwerp, and the opportunity costs incurred by continuing to rely on Channel coast ports.

No, really (if just semantically ).

You said

putting Antwerp into operation was the number one priority

It was important, yes; but at the time less important than continuing the pursuit of the German armies - see Eisenhower's directives. Using that logic should Patton have stopped to clear Brest?

When the port of Antwerp was captured, Montgomery already had Dieppe (undamaged) and would soon have Le Havre (which would also open up Rouen), to be followed by Boulogne. This gave him enough port capacity for his army group, and allowed him to start shifting his logistics base east of the Seine and reducing transport distances and remove the Seine bridge bottleneck. Taking Antwerp was the next step for the Canadian army, after clearing the Channel ports (and capturing V1 launch sites).

It's no more hindsight than Marshall and Eisenhower insisting on ANVIL/DRAGOON to get Marseilles and Toulon, much less the Sixth Army Group.

Don't want to sidestep into that debate, but there were also US generals arguing against. A really cynical view is that Eisenhower wanted to remove an army from Mark Clark.

 

[Aber]

This was in part due to weather, tho other factors were at work. It appear the intake at Boulogne, Ostend, Dieppe falls off by approx 50% during November-December. Protected inland ports like Rouen or Antwerp seem to maintain a steady intake through February.

Not sure about this, but unfortunately Admin History of 21st Army Group doesn't have neat tables. Instead:

 

[Dave Shoup]

It was important, yes; but at the time less important than continuing the pursuit of the German armies - see Eisenhower's directives. Using that logic should Patton have stopped to clear Brest?

No, because Middleton's VIII Corps was more than adequate for Brest. Antwerp-Scheldt was the obvious objective for 21st AG in the autumn of 1944 and Montgomery fumbled it in favor of his (and Browning's) personal pipedream, MARKET-GARDEN. Eisenhower could have sacked Montgomery and Browning (and de Guigand) both after M-G and WSC couldn't have objected; WSC had sacked army and corps commanders right and left, previously. Alexander could have replaced Montgomery at 21st AG, wit McCreery as CoS. Montgomery was in over his head at the army group level, especially an AG that included Allied armies.

 

[Scott Washburn]

Blaming a single division commander for the failure of an army-level operation seems a bit disingenuous to me. There was nothing secret about Gavin's plans. He had been given multiple objectives and not enough forces to achieve them all at once. He made his choices, Browning and Montgomery saw what they were and approved. As others have pointed out, MG failed at multiple locations, all of which contributed to the overall failure of the operation.

 

[ivanotter]

I have heard that the US generals 'bullied' Monty as being too cautious and too slow. Then MG got invented to 'show them all' that he was indeed not slow but daring and courageous and a great general.

Maybe completely wrong, but Monty had a slight ego-problem so it could be the truth

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Not sure about this, but unfortunately Admin History of 21st Army Group doesn't have neat tables. Instead:

View attachment 490353

Thats part of what I was looking at. My copycneeds to be resized to upload here. It is more difficult to find averages in that.

The defect with these port intake charts is they don't show the delivery capacity during the critical months of Sept-Dec. That's more difficult to tease out of these second hand sources

 

[McPherson]

No, really (if just semantically ).

You said (Dave Shoup)

putting Antwerp into operation was the number one priority

It was important, yes; but at the time less important than continuing the pursuit of the German armies - see Eisenhower's directives. Using that logic should Patton have stopped to clear Brest?

When the port of Antwerp was captured, Montgomery already had Dieppe (undamaged) and would soon have Le Havre (which would also open up Rouen), to be followed by Boulogne. This gave him enough port capacity for his army group, and allowed him to start shifting his logistics base east of the Seine and reducing transport distances and remove the Seine bridge bottleneck. Taking Antwerp was the next step for the Canadian army, after clearing the Channel ports (and capturing V1 launch sites).

(Dave Shoup)

It's no more hindsight than Marshall and Eisenhower insisting on ANVIL/DRAGOON to get Marseilles and Toulon, much less the Sixth Army Group.

Don't want to sidestep into that debate, but there were also US generals arguing against. A really cynical view is that Eisenhower wanted to remove an army from Mark Clark.

You know I complain that Montgomery cannot read a map?

Well, maps are useful to the objective impaired, to explain logically in a graphical format why you want to cut down the driving time and manpower hours wastage of your supply people, wear and tear on your trucks, total fuel use to move those supplies, and supply delays to your combat units.

Figure it this way. From Newark, New Jersey to Liverpool, UK is 2 weeks by ship. Unload that ammunition from the Liberty ship and rail down to Plymouth is another 5 days. 2 days to Cherbourg and then 2 WEEKS from Cherbourg to unload and truck forward to PATTON stalled in front of Metz, because nobody took Brest yet. You have to cross about 700 kilometers of shot up France to get to Patton. The distance from Cherbourg to Patton is shorter than the distance from Brest to Patton, one will argue by a good 370 kilometers longer. But... you save a week of time by ship and rail and cut out a port in between by going from Newark to Brest direct. Same again by going from Newark to Marseilles to Patton. However, that is the American problem and that actually explains ANVIL. The Americans need those Riviera ports.

Let's look at Antwerp (refer to map.). Huge port. Capacity when it works of about 25,000 tonnes per day (estimated). Distance from Dieppe to Montgomery's 21st Army Group is roughly 350 km. Port capacity is about realistically? 5000 tonnes/day. In a related debacle due to unforeseen mechanical issues, 21st Army Group is short on trucks (1400 of them), about 3000 tons/day division supply or 1 whole corps short of allotted minimum combat tonnage/day use. Another part of the tonnage not getting to the troops is called haulage waste in civilian circles, but that is a truck's life hours being burned up, the additional man hours maintenance used per kilometer traveled, the truck driver not being used efficiently, and the fuel burned being used to haul beans, bullets and bodies back and forth, instead of being poured into a Bren carrier or a Sherman and pointed at the Germans. About 7 days in time as one measures it from Dieppe to the guys up there near the Albert Canal.

Antwerp is 3 DAYS and less than half the overland distance. That means a couple of things. Obviously supply gets to 21st Army Group much faster, but it also means their truck shortage DISAPPEARS. They are not as supply starved.

LOGISTICS: distance, time, haulage calculations. FORCE MULTIPLIER: if you can save time and wear and tear and round trips to bring it from Antwerp forward instead of hauling it all the way from Dieppe. Even if you could over the beach from Ostend it would help enormously by cutting down the time.

Logistics actually wins wars. Do it right and it wins wars faster.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

You know if Horrocks had cleared Arnheim, I think Montgomery might have tried to bag 15th Army by using the Rhine as a right flank guard and driving north? It is the smart move for the winter, despite all those rivers. He's not going to get into Germany before 1945 anyway and it would be something to do that makes some sense within his available means, seeing as how he still does not have the Scheldt cleared.

 

[WILDGEESE]

Is Cornelius Ryan's book "A bridge too far" and the movie based on it considered to be historically accurate?

No . . . only around 80%

Many members of the cast Dirk Bogarde, Edward Fox etc where friends with the actual people they where playing in character in the movie.

There was some serious acrimony because the book altered and invented certain facts, events and wording (what was supposedly said by the characters in question) which movie was based on. Fox said it caused a lot of bad feeling after between him and his friend Brian Horrock's (they still remained good friends) when the film was shown which took ages to die down.

I don't blame the author of the book Cornelius Ryan for this . . . his job as an author is to sell copy.

The 'blame' if I can use the word although it's a bit strong to say that should lie with the Director Mr Attenborough and his producers, script writers for not realizing that not all books are factually accurate if written from a 2nd or 3rd hand perspective.

 

[WILDGEESE]

I feel all the bridges should have been taken in strength on Day 1.

I started a thread based on my answer below a year or so ago.

Would an earlier 'jump' with the Paratroopers have helped?

The kick off for XXX Corp's advance wasn't until 14.30!

How about an earlier drop around dawn and XXX Corp starting their advance at around 7.00 am?

Would that have worked or helped in the operation?

 

[Draconis]

If Market Garden had succeeded what where the immediate plans to exploit the bridgehead across the Rhine? Of course the Allies will want to continue the advance into the Ruhr valley but how best to support that? Apparently there were plans to air lift from the U.K. an entire British infantry division (not paras I think) to an airfield just East of Arnhem that was supposed to be captured directly after XXX Corp crossed the Rhine. I wonder how an ATL Battle of the Ruhr Valley would have unfolded.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

You know I complain that Montgomery cannot read a map?

Well, maps are useful to the objective impaired, to explain logically in a graphical format why you want to cut down the driving time and manpower hours wastage of your supply people, wear and tear on your trucks, total fuel use to move those supplies, and supply delays to your combat units.

Figure it this way. From Newark, New Jersey to Liverpool, UK is 2 weeks by ship. Unload that ammunition from the Liberty ship and rail down to Plymouth is another 5 days. 2 days to Cherbourg and then 2 WEEKS from Cherbourg to unload and truck forward to PATTON stalled in front of Metz, because nobody took Brest yet. You have to cross about 700 kilometers of shot up France to get to Patton. The distance from Cherbourg to Patton is shorter than the distance from Brest to Patton, one will argue by a good 370 kilometers longer. But... you save a week of time by ship and rail and cut out a port in between by going from Newark to Brest direct. Same again by going from Newark to Marseilles to Patton. However, that is the American problem and that actually explains ANVIL. The Americans need those Riviera ports.

Let's look at Antwerp (refer to map.). Huge port. Capacity when it works of about 25,000 tonnes per day (estimated). Distance from Dieppe to Montgomery's 21st Army Group is roughly 350 km. Port capacity is about realistically? 5000 tonnes/day. In a related debacle due to unforeseen mechanical issues, 21st Army Group is short on trucks (1400 of them), about 3000 tons/day division supply or 1 whole corps short of allotted minimum combat tonnage/day use. Another part of the tonnage not getting to the troops is called haulage waste in civilian circles, but that is a truck's life hours being burned up, the additional man hours maintenance used per kilometer traveled, the truck driver not being used efficiently, and the fuel burned being used to haul beans, bullets and bodies back and forth, instead of being poured into a Bren carrier or a Sherman and pointed at the Germans. About 7 days in time as one measures it from Dieppe to the guys up there near the Albert Canal.

Antwerp is 3 DAYS and less than half the overland distance. That means a couple of things. Obviously supply gets to 21st Army Group much faster, but it also means their truck shortage DISAPPEARS. They are not as supply starved.

LOGISTICS: distance, time, haulage calculations. FORCE MULTIPLIER: if you can save time and wear and tear and round trips to bring it from Antwerp forward instead of hauling it all the way from Dieppe. Even if you could over the beach from Ostend it would help enormously by cutting down the time.

Logistics actually wins wars. Do it right and it wins wars faster.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

You know if Horrocks had cleared Arnheim, I think Montgomery might have tried to bag 15th Army by using the Rhine as a right flank guard and driving north? It is the smart move for the winter, despite all those rivers. He's not going to get into Germany before 1945 anyway and it would be something to do that makes some sense within his available means, seeing as how he still does not have the Scheldt cleared.

If it works MG bypasses the West wall (highlighted in the map below).

Allows the potential for the Ruhr to be overrun and this would have starved the German army of most of its tank, Artillery and aircraft production and if this was not achievable (because of 'Germans') it lengthens the Western front considerably forcing the German army to defend a much longer front line - forcing them to use forces from teh Eastern front (and / or forces used in 'Watch on the Rhine' instead of conducting a counter attack through the Ardennes)

Traps 15th Army (or forces it to bug out leaving much of its heavy kit and supplies behind)

Overruns V2 sites threatening London

Liberates most if not all of the Netherlands

Isolates the Sheldt anyway (which could not be brought into operation much before it was, even had Monty focused more on it) allowing it to be isolated/besieged/assaulted by the Canadian army and commandos (once they had been RnR'd - they had all just been pulled off the line on or about 1st Sept - most having fought since D-Day so they were not going to be available much before late Oct anyway and Walcheren Island is not going to be taken without them)

As for the truck issue - the 1400 trucks didn't simply all suddenly stop running on the same day - it was simply that the engines did not last as long as expected due to the incorrect piston rings and only a few hundred were in the workshops at any given time - and to put this into context - the UK built 1.5 million vehicles during WW2 - a figure only exceeded by the USA.

The major issue with opening up the Scheldt earlier is the demarcation lines between the British 2nd army and the Canadian 1st Army - this resulted in the Canadians having to do too much as it turned out.

I think it was Carl that in another thread suggested that 'with hindsight' the demarcation lines move north of Antwerp/Ghent (once the Antwerp had been taken on the run on or about 4th Sept - note that Ghent does not fall till Oct 6th) giving some of the responsibility to British units and reducing the subsequent burden on the Canadian army and give freedom to British units and their commanders to act more decisively and to take greater advantage of the quick advance in the first week of Sept.

I am not sure if this should be a 21st Army group decision or one made at SHAEF?

I am certain that it would be unlikely to result in an immediate collapse of the German Army had it worked - but it would be starved it of much of the equipment that those factories produced in the 6 months between Oct and March which would have resulted in a faster collapse than OTL and this or even the greatly lengthening the front that the German army had to cover would have been of far greater benefit to the allied cause than freeing up Antwerp potentially a couple of weeks earlier.

So far from Monty not being able to read a map - I think he was just fine and had his eye on a far larger goal.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

If Market Garden had succeeded what where the immediate plans to exploit the bridgehead across the Rhine? Of course the Allies will want to continue the advance into the Ruhr valley but how best to support that? Apparently there were plans to air lift from the U.K. an entire British infantry division (not paras I think) to an airfield just East of Arnhem that was supposed to be captured directly after XXX Corp crossed the Rhine. I wonder how an ATL Battle of the Ruhr Valley would have unfolded.

Yes 52nd 'Lowland' Division (configured as an Airlanding division with an Appropriate TO&E) - they eventually acted as follow on troops during the invasion of Walcheren Island but had been slated to be flown in to rapidly reinforce XXX / 1st Airborne once Arnhem Airport was captured.

Edit: I did have a book called 'with the Scots' that was a war diary kept by a platoon commander in one the 52nds Infantry Battalions. His units worst day was during the advance into Germany in 45 when their position was fired on by a platoon of M10s with 17 pounder and 50 cal fire due to map mix up resulting in 2/3rd of his platoon being killed or wounded. I no longer appear to have it.