Just the thought of U-Boats or surface raiders have a safe harbor 1,200 miles from the Atlantic entrance to the Canal and possibly an Axis base/listening station on Clipperton Atoll (1,600 miles from the Pacific entrance) would have driven the War and Navy Departments foaming at the mouth bonkers.
WW2: What if Vichy declares war on Britain after attack on Mers-el-Kébir?
- Thread starter Vylon Disigma
- Start date
@Onkel Willie got a scenario where this happens. Let me call him to give us his opinion.
I posted this in the last Vichy joins the Axis thread. It's about when and why the French colonies joined Free France IOTL.
I also suggested the submarines and the best cruisers because that might be the largest force that Vichy can man with sailors that won't desert at the first opportunity.
Yes, it's likely that more French colonies would join Free French of their own accord. However, the ones that are likely to remain under Vichy to control are also the ones whose possession by the Axis would aid their cause the most. They are North and West Africa.
If Vichy actually declares war then it's certain that Operation Menace will be executed properly, instead of being called off when the local authorities declined to join the Free French.
West Africa goes allied by way of force, probably sooner than later. Vichy reall yhas no force to hold on to it.
The thorny aspect is the other you mention, Torch has to be a real fight. Probably there are no in-Med landings; things develop slowly starting from the Atlantic coast, which however also allows the Germans to deploy reinforcements, in particular air units. Longer, tougher going.
The 30's French left were the enemy of Vichy France from the beginning. They were blamed for the defeat and the shitty state France was in. They, with some noticable exceptions, would never turn to Vichy and the collaboration. But it isn't the former left that is important in this case, it is the former right. That's the group both Vichy and de Gaulle tried to appeal to and Vichy was way more succesfull there than de Gaulle. Everytime the British tried to use de Gaulle for legitimizing their actions, it became a disaster. Vichy troops and personnel were resisting with more resolve when the Free French of the 'traitor' de Gaule was involved. I don't think the level of collaboration or resistance will not differ much from OTL with a decleration of war, because i see what happened in Vichy mainly as a new chapter of the culture war that was raging in France since 1870.
Good list. And i also think that in case of a declaration of war after Mersch only one or two extra fringe colonies would choose the other side.
The Atlantic coast-Morroco was the strongest defended region of NW Africa. The Brits wanted to bypass and isolate it, with the weight of the attack in Algeria. Tunisia was even weaker. Fears of Axis strength in Spain (unfounded) and Italy (more legit) prevented landings in Tunisia and included landings in Morocco as part of Operation TORCH.
I'm reluctant to think there would be less resistance. The increased stress from continuing at war would cause more French to actively choose. The inability of the Facists/Collaborationists to show real compensation of benefit from this continued war would put off increasing numbers from acquiescence. Retain received such energetic and loyal support in 1940 precisely because he caused the war to cease in France and promised a hope of long term peace. The erosion of support for the government from late 1940 largely rested on the inability of the successive leaders under Petain to find a way to move beyond the Armistice and prevent the war from returning to France.
Much of this was the Brits being stretched to thin and under funding these actions. Darlan summed it up when the US ambassador asked the French governments attitude were the US to invade French territory. The short version is 'If you come with three divisions we will fight you. If you come with twenty we will join you.' The Brits were coming with three division level actions, often inadequate which underlined a perception of weakness & discouraged the local French leaders from changing sides. That the initial Allied forces of Op TORCH looked weaker than they were was part of Darlans waffling on ceasing resistance. He had to be persuaded the Allies were coming with twenty not three, to get him another step closer to cease fire.
I think the capture of Dakar would be high upon the British list of priorities. However, the OTL attempts to take Dakar weren't very successful. OTOH the British and Free French are likely to try harder ITTL.
Whether Vichy can successfully defend the Dakar and Casablanca will depend upon Gibraltar. Will the British be able to maintain Force H there if it is under regular bombardment from aircraft operating from French Morocco? Vichy might be able to maintain a sea blockade with their numerous submarines. Though even if they can drive the Royal Navy out of Gibraltar there is still its coast artillery which IIRC includes several 9.2" guns.
After France fell it was decided to develop Gibraltar into a base that could withstand a siege lasting 6 months. That suggests that its defences and supplies meant it was unable to hold out that long in June 1940.
I know, and the reason was exactly that it was the obvious target. With Vichy France being actively in the war, the problem isn't so much landing in Algeria, but forcing the straits in the first place.
Stress on "by force". In OTL, the attempts were in part based on force and in part on the unrealistic hope that the Vichytes would switch over to De Gaulle. In TTL, the British will go all stick.
Re: the three vs twenty. Darlans remarks to Admiral Leahey seem to have been a criticism of Britsh efforts when spread to thin.
Brit planning for these contingencies while Dill was CIGS is really obscure. I've not met many who can write conclusively on contingency plans at the time. Ive seen a number of tangental remarks about seizing the Azores, the origins of the GYMNAST operations & others.
But that's the whole point. Many French in 1940 were hooked to Petain, for the reason you give. A declaration of war at this point means that they must make a hard choice now. Will i support the, at that point of time in most eyes legitimate government of France or will i revolt. For the right the second choice is very counterintuitive. I think many officials would make a different choice in 1940 than in 1943. In 43 it was easier to break with Vichy. And after that choice in 1940 the slippery slope has become a lot steeper compared with OTL.
A second argument is that if you just want to accomodate and desire peace and quiet, resistance is not the natural option you are going to take. Most of the persons who actively resisted in OTL were against the armistice from the start and acted arcordingly.
Darlan, the illusionist of Vichy, the man who insisted he was a defender of the French honor, but at the same time he was the most unreliable weathervane, there could possibly exist (luckily in some way) But you are stating that even in this alternate timeline the Vichy troops would only surrender to heavily superior force. They wouldn't defect so easily as you also suggest.
I don't see it as a imeadiate and final committed choice for everyone. What I see is a faster shift than OTL, with the Germanophobes leading the way. Those of a pragmatic bent may be far behind since the economic disadvantages would be clear to anyone who bothers to think about it for sixty seconds.
Unfortunately for the mass of French who wanted peace, a alliance with the Axis and war with Britain is not peace and quiet. In this case its not a choice between peace, or more properly neutrality, and war. But who's side in a war that matches your politics and goals.
Reading through Paxton & Jacksons later examinations of occupied France and the Vichy regime I don't see that. Participation in the Resistance was very low level into 1941, until the Communists activated in the second half of the year. The invasion of the NW African colonies was the second seminal event & resistance in Metropolitan France rose significantly again as a mass of formerly uncommitted became active.
No that was not my statement. Darlans point was the US could not expect results they hoped for from half measures and wishful thinking. That 'France was not going to abandon neutrality unless it was to join a alliance clearly committing the strength for winning.
A few thoughts:
- If Hitler agrees to let Vichy take on an active role, that almost certainly means he has also agreed to expand German efforts to the Med, precisely due to his fear that Vichy colonies might fall. The most obvious first step in this is the OTL German proposal of deploying forces to Tunisia via Italy, and then along the existing railroad all the way to Morocco, where they would set up naval and air bases.
- Just like the importance of Dakar would become obvious to Allied planners, so too would it be to the German ones. Reinforcing it by air from Morocco, with a stopover in Mauretania, along with the occasional coastal trawler, would be much faster than having a fleet sail from Britain to take it. I expect any ATL Op. Menace would also be facing a couple of Luftwaffe squadrons and some Jäger infantry airlifted there in haste, maybe a random U-Boat or two as well
- Freetown has rightfully been mentioned. If the Germans continue their airlifts hugging the African coast, both Freetown in Sierra Leone and Banjul in Gambia could be rendered effectively useless, as far as convoying goes, by a short overland advance by the Axis (most likely by Germans airlifted into the theater, with French forces playing only a supporting role) that puts their harbors under direct fire:
- The aforementioned Axis airbases in Morocco would render Gibraltar mostly useless to any but the smallest Allied warships. Eventually, I expect efforts would be undertaken to mine approaches to it, making any sort of Club Runs suicidal. Regia Marina redeploying its battleships to Oran would effectively outnumber and outgun whatever force of light units the British could keep over there (this will also butterfly away the attack on Taranto...) in order to make sure the mining is not interrupted
- Vichy in the Axis almost certainly means no hopes of getting Spain into the Axis, although they would most certainly continue to have a favorable attitude towards the Germans
- Vichy in the Axis probably also requires some sort of diplomatic deal be reached wrt Indo-China. My guess is it would entail an iron-clad guarantee by the French to stop any support given to and trade with the KMT
- French Polynesia and Equatorial Africa would instantly switch to Free France, no question about it. There would likely be some very early fighting in the Caribbean, as Britain neutralizes the Vichy presence there
- There would be no hope of reinforcing Gabon. The only way it doesn't fall as OTL is if the Allies redirect those troops somewhere else (probably Sierra Leone)
- What is most interesting IMHO is the situation in the Middle East. If the Italians agree to let German paras use Rhodes as a base from which to invade Cyprus (which was effectively undefended at that point), the way to sending supplies to Vichy Syria would be clear. The British would recognize this as well, hence why we would most likely see a Battle of Cyprus, as Wavel strips Egypt of forces
- The French fishing fleet would be able to operate undisturbed in the western Mediterranean, and to a lesser extent in the Bay of Biscay.
- German raiders can now use Madagascar as a base of operations, which is moderately bad news for traffic in the Indian Ocean in 1940
Im trying to get a take on potential food and petroleum import decline from the Western Hemishpere. Some writers consider this important to sustaining Petains regime 1941-42, but numbers are missing. Roosevelt did work hard at using this conduit as a reward and threat in dealing with Petains government for over two years. I'm guessing the import of the chassis & engines of those White Scout Cars would be off the table LoL.
The US is not going to put up with Axis controlled colonies in the Americas or the Caribbean. So they will take action ASAP.
This may very well start the War between the US and Germany sooner and as noted may result in no pacific war.
We may have just stumbled upon the one way to get Japan to survive the war. Get a war going between the US and France and the US may actually support the Japanese invasion of FIC. As long as Japan is will to toss Germany under the bus.
And I don’t see why they wouldn’t. It is not like Germany was doing anything to help Japan in 1940/41.
We could end up with a really different world when this settles.
This may very well start the War between the US and Germany sooner and as noted may result in no pacific war.
We may have just stumbled upon the one way to get Japan to survive the war. Get a war going between the US and France and the US may actually support the Japanese invasion of FIC. As long as Japan is will to toss Germany under the bus.
And I don’t see why they wouldn’t. It is not like Germany was doing anything to help Japan in 1940/41.
We could end up with a really different world when this settles.
thaddeus
Donor
the subtext is that the invasion of USSR still occurs? absent that the Soviets could supply the Axis countries, and might be more willing under this scenario?