This is more information on how the British Government viewed the Fall of France and the consequences of the Vichy Government declaring war on Great Britain. It is from Volume X of Grand Strategy.
CHAPTER X
THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRENCH COLLAPSE (2)
Second in importance only to the French Fleet were the French overseas possessions. Just before the fall of the Reynaud Government the Chiefs of Staff expressed their hope that the French would continue to fight from North Africa, using the abundant shipping at Marseilles to convey all the troops and material possible, with priority for specialist and technical units. But on the same day they advised on the action to be taken in the event of a total French collapse, involving the whole of the army and colonial empire. Much would depend on the attitude of local French authorities, but the general conclusions of the report were that we should intensify the blockade by controlling produce at source and deny the use of French colonial bases to the enemy; there could be no question of taking over the French possessions ourselves. The Mediterranean coast of French Africa would be outside our control but we should press the French to allow us the use of Casablanca should Gibraltar become untenable. By every means the enemy must be kept out of Syria. In the Far East the French defeat might temp the Japanese to occupy Indo-China, whence they could threaten Singapore by both sea and air; we out to do nothing which might disturb the status quo. Here, as elsewhere, American co-operation was most desirable. We should also try to induce Turkey to declare herself a belligerent. In any case, should the Government at Bordeaux make terms with the enemy, we should appeal to the local administrations to disregard a surrender made under duress and fight on with us. General de Gaulle was not as yet a national figure. His broadcasts, especially that of June 23, challenging the authority of the Pétain Government to speak for France, and the British declaration in support of him had naturally incensed Bordeaux, and his initiative was by no means universally applauded even by patriots determined to resist. Nevertheless on June 28 he was recognised by the British Government as "the leader of all Free Frenchmen, wherever they may be, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause".
The Cabinet on June 17 approved both reports. For some days it seemed that the French colonial authorities might respond favourably, but even those who had protested against surrender were reluctant to disobey lawful authority and show a divided front. On the 22nd the British Cabinet authorised a further appeal, but General Noguès, Commander-in-Chief in French North Africa, had accepted defeat by the 25th. He refused to meet Mr. Duff Cooper, Minister of Information, and Lord Gort, who flew to Rabat on the 26th, and they were not allowed to make contact with member of the Reynaud Government.[1] By June 27th it seemed clear in London that there was little hope of resistance in the African colonies. The news from the Levant too was bad. Nowhere, it seemed, in the French overseas empire was anyone of commanding repute prepared to give a lead.[2]
For a few days after the incident at Mers-el-Kebir it was touch and go whether the Government, now installed at Vichy, would be provoked into declaring war on Great Britain. A few French bombs were in fact half-heartedly dropped on Gibraltar and the French Government broke of diplomatic relations. A strategical appreciation of the implications of French hostility was clearly called for, and on July 16 the Chiefs of Staff issued a report on this subject, assuming the worse case, of a France actively hostile.
The most serious military results were likely to appear in the first place in the altered balance of naval strengths in the Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic, particularly if the enemy used French West African ports. This danger, of the enemy using French bases, came next, and thirdly there was the increased risk to some of our own overseas possessions. Gibraltar might become unusable if attacked from North Africa, and it might become very difficult to reinforce Malta. The use of either Cassablanca or Dakar by the enemy, especially Dakar, would be most serious, nor could we tolerate the use of Diego Saurez in Madagascar as a base for enemy raiders in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand we were in a good position to influence by economic pressure the attitude of the more isolated French colonies.
Steps had already been taken to strengthen the defence of Gibraltar. The local anti-aircraft defences were derisory, a mere eight guns, when the Chiefs of Staff decided on June 19 to send sixteen heavy anti-aircraft guns as a matter of urgency. The importance of Gibraltar as "the only capital ship dock between the United Kingdom and Durban" was stressed at meetings a month later, and also the danger to ships in harbour from the Spanish 12-inch howitzers known to be mounted near by. It was agreed that the fortress must be defended to the last, but the Chiefs of Staff recognised that in the absence of fighter aircraft it could not be used indefinitely as a base for the fleet in the face of heavy air attack from Africa or Spain.
Should Gibraltar become untenable, Freetown in Sierra Leone would become "vitally important" as a bunkering station and a port where convoys could be assembled and routed.[3] Even with Gibraltar still available, Freetown's importance had been greatly increased by the closure of the Mediterranean, since most of the supply ships and transports of the Middle East called at Freetown for water, fuel and stores. This port was also the headquarters of Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, who had a small force of cruisers at his disposal as escorts and for the protection of trade. The Chiefs of Staff recognised that Freetown might be bombarded in the course of raids by German or Italian ships, but they did not consider serious attack likely unless France became hostile, and they thought it unnecessary to send British troops to Freetown at present. There merely recommended that the coastal and anti-aircraft defences and accommodation prepared for an infantry brigade and a squadron of fighter aircraft. An alternative to Freetown, the possible use of Takoradi in the Gold Coast as assembly port for convoys should be investigated, and it might be feasible to route some part of the Australian and New Zealand trade by the Pacific and Panama, whilst a small proportion of the Cape traffic could be routed via Trinidad; this would however greatly increase the distance and the demand for escorts. Freetown would in any case continue to be a link of the first importance in our sea communications.
The recommendations of the Report of July16 included the maintenance of a capital ship fleet at Gibraltar, as well as of the existing fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean; also immediate action to improve the defences of Malta. On July 22 the Cabinet approved the recommendations and later the same day the Defence Committee paid special attention to the defence of Gibraltar against a surprise attack.
Happily the worst did not occur. Marshal Pétain did not declare war on his old ally. The remaining French warships did not fall into enemy hands. The Germans did not seize the Mediterranean or West African ports. Spain did not admit German troops from France, and German attempts later on to make use of Syria merely gave the Allies an opportunity to occupy it. Neither Gibraltar nor Freetown was not seriously attacked, while Malta resisted all assaults from the air. Nor indeed did the whole of the French Empire adhere to adhere to Vichy; before the end of 1940 the vast regions of French Equatorial Africa joined General de Gaulle.[4]
But our good fortune went further. The Vichy Government itself was neither so uniformly ill-disposed nor so incapable of taking a line of its own as was commonly assumed in London. There were many shades of grey between the black malevolence of Laval, the vacillations of the senile chief, and the latent sympathies of Weygand. Moreover there were limits to the pressure which the conqueror would put on them. Hitler explained to Ciano on July 7 that a separate peace with France was undesirable for two reasons; Germany could not at present occupy French African colonies which she proposed to annex when peace was signed, and it was better to leave them meanwhile in French possession; secondly, the Atlantic coast of France must be retained in German hands for the double purpose of intensifying the war against England and maintaining communications with Spain, "a country which was most useful for the Axis game whatever happened, and indispensable should one wish to make an attempt on Gibraltar".[5]
Hitler evidently thought that in the meantime French official goodwill would be a considerable convenience, and he preferred therefore not to humiliate the Pétain Government beyond a certain measure. A further argument, which may have influenced him, for treating France with some leniency was the emergence of the Free French movement; so long as Britain was undefeated nothing must be done to encourage resistance or, least of all, to drive the French colonies into the Gaullist camp. Vichy had in fact a good many counters to bargain with.
The first test of the relationship between victor and vanquished came on July 16. On the previous day the Germans had demanded military facilities in North Africa: eight air bases in Morocco, the use of the railway from Tunis to Rabat, the use of French ports and French ships to convey German air units to Africa. This demand far exceeded the terms of the armistice and Pétain successfully resisted it.[6] We can now see that, while in the last resort Vichy must obey the crack of the German whip, the Germans would be loath to crack it, or at any rate to use it, more often than necessary. This was not, however, fully understood in England at the time.
[1] See Viscount Northwich, Old Men Forget (1953) pp. 282-284.
[2] For the Levant, see below, p. 302 General Catroux, Governor-General of Indo-China, who afterwards joined de Gaulle, was recalled in July.
[3] See Map 8.
[4] See below, p. 317, and Map 12.
[5] Ciano's Diplomatic Papers p. 376.
[6] Weygand, Rappelé au Service p. 320. Baudouin 172-174
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