WI: France really fights on from 1940?

[Carl Schwamberger]

About supplies in North Africa:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Desert_Campaign#Aftermath


So 500 trucks carrying 1 tonne could support two divisions up to 100 km. I was not too far from reality.
Ben Gardane - Tripoli is 200 km, so French have to gather at least 1,000 trucks to have the minimum logistic to reach Tripoli after breaking the front.

Of course, this is not enought to crush the Italian (5 to 6 divisions) but the constant shelling and the aerial bombing will reduce considerably the potential and morale of the Italian army while denying any big movment. The objective of French will be to fix, encircle and destroy the big units. Bombing coastal road, railway and Italian positions during several weeks will be a good start point.

This assumes the Italians sit passively in the border positions & the French can move their main force from the interior Mareth position to the border. I cant say at this point how aggressive the Italians might have been. There is a possibility they ould attempt to secure the region between the border & the main French defense zone. Perhaps someone has information of the Italian plans & we can dismiss this out of hand? But, were the Italians field army ordered forward it would have some advantages for the French. The logistics situation is reversed allowing a more efficient build up for the French & creating problems for the Italians. I suspect the Italian logistics capability wont be sufficient for moving their full army present across southern Tunisia in June-July. If ordered to advance this could mean a partial force of advance guards from each corps, or some sort of light corps that can be sustained. If this is the case what we'd see is some sort of broad but thin battle between them and the French screening forces, plus reinforcements for each side.

...
Of course, this is not enought to crush the Italian (5 to 6 divisions) but the constant shelling and the aerial bombing will reduce considerably the potential and morale of the Italian army while denying any big movment. The objective of French will be to fix, encircle and destroy the big units. Bombing coastal road, railway and Italian positions during several weeks will be a good start point.

Its very unlikely a French attack into the main Italian defense zone would depend on some sort of flanking maneuver in the interior. Between the terrain and a look at the French strengths a methodical attack nearer the coast would be the plan. Raids around the Italian flank & diversions could be made. The goal would be to gain the better coastal road/s & threaten the Italians with having their communications cut. The logical thing at that point is for the Italians to retreat to a intermediate position nearer to Tripoli. A short pursuit or exploitation to disrupt that would be within the capability of the French mobile forces. Fifty or 100 kilometers may be practical, & if they are stalled part way it will not be long before the artillery catches up and fresh air attacks organized.

If the French are lucky the Italians have difficulty coping with such withdrawal under attack. Corps that have lost significant equipment and prisoners & declining morale may be easier to break when the intermediate positions or the main Tripoli defense is attacked.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

They skirmished with the Italians, not really decisively engaging them until Taranto. With whatever the French could spare from maintaining their own shipping lanes, trying to hold Corsica, and threatening Sardinia plus reorganizing to deal with the problems caused by the evacuation they could potentially harass the Italian shipping to Libya, but they also have their plate full and the Brits if anything would get sucked into to helping the French rather than focusing on say Libya convoys.

You can call all those battles skirmishes if you like. I don't know what plans the Brits had for helping the French in June or July. Tho interdicting the sea route to Tripoli looks very helpful in the long run for the remainder of the year.

One likely location for more of that "skirmishing" would be the Sicillian Strait. Allied efforts to interdict Italian mine laying operations in July or August would result in either abandonment of the mine operation, or escalate into a larger series of engagements. The Allies have every incentive to keep the Italians out of the strait & the Italians logically every incentive to contest it. Including Italian efforts vs Malta with Italian efforts there could be three overlapping air and naval battles in the central Mediterranean July-September.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

You can call all those battles skirmishes if you like. I don't know what plans the Brits had for helping the French in June or July. Tho interdicting the sea route to Tripoli looks very helpful in the long run for the remainder of the year.

One likely location for more of that "skirmishing" would be the Sicillian Strait. Allied efforts to interdict Italian mine laying operations in July or August would result in either abandonment of the mine operation, or escalate into a larger series of engagements. The Allies have every incentive to keep the Italians out of the strait & the Italians logically every incentive to contest it. Including Italian efforts vs Malta with Italian efforts there could be three overlapping air and naval battles in the central Mediterranean July-September.

Again though the French fleet is tied down with the evacuation in June and perhaps July if we accept the conceit of the FFO TL. So the Brits are stuck with their OTL operations until at least August barring butterflies and events involving the French that the Mediterranean Fleet gets sucked into. ITTL we have to remember the French are going to keep a reserve to ensure the Spaniards stay on their side of the border and move on them if they involve the Germans, defend/supply Corsica, according to one poster potentially go after Sardinia, and at the same time have to at least screen the Italians in Libya. At least in June the French forces are spoken for and probably for most of July at a minimum, perhaps beyond depending on the state of the evacuation and French positions in France assuming there are still any. As of August they still are locking forces down against Spain, defending and/or have lost Corsica along with the forces there, potentially considering a dangerous offensive against Sardinia, and still have Italian Libya to deal with as the Brits cannot. What sort of force distributions do you see given all of these bare minimum necessities? That's not even factoring in any damage to the French fleet, what sort of operational ratings could be maintained in North Africa for all French equipment, and all the training/reorganizing going on.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Again though the French fleet is tied down with the evacuation in June and perhaps July if we accept the conceit of the FFO TL. So the Brits are stuck with their OTL operations until at least August barring butterflies and events involving the French that the Mediterranean Fleet gets sucked into.

I've seen a lot of contradictory statements on what the French OTL naval operations were to 20 June, & what was planned. Generally I don't see significant evacuation ops beyond early-mid July, so French naval forces would be available for other operations. neither do I recall much evidence one way or another for Italian plans to interdict the evacuation. Here there & elsewhere there are assorted third hand claims.

ITTL we have to remember the French are going to keep a reserve to ensure the Spaniards stay on their side of the border and move on them if they involve the Germans, defend/supply Corsica, according to one poster potentially go after Sardinia,

I'd not give much consideration to a Sardinian operation for the Allies in 1940. I'm even skeptical the 'Battle for Corsica' would be much more than a delaying action by a isolated rearguard. Holding onto it may be a clever gambit on the game board, but I don't see that as practical or desirable for the Allies in most real world scenarios. There is the 'Mussolini Stupidity Factor' but thats kind of a unpredictable outlier.

and at the same time have to at least screen the Italians in Libya. At least in June the French forces are spoken for and probably for most of July at a minimum, perhaps beyond depending on the state of the evacuation and French positions in France assuming there are still any. As of August they still are locking forces down against Spain, defending and/or have lost Corsica along with the forces there, potentially considering a dangerous offensive against Sardinia, and still have Italian Libya to deal with as the Brits cannot. What sort of force distributions do you see given all of these bare minimum necessities? That's not even factoring in any damage to the French fleet, what sort of operational ratings could be maintained in North Africa for all French equipment, and all the training/reorganizing going on.

After reviewing the internal Spanish politics, the input from the US, British pressure, and what Franco did vs what folks claim he wanted to do I'm very skeptical Spain would pin down significant French military for long. For the remainder of 1940 the French have one principle strategic military goal & that is to consolidate their position in Africa. Securing Tripoli is one major step to that. Dominating the waters of the Sicillian Strait and central Med is another, adjunct to that is achieving parity with or defeating the Italian air forces efforts. Spain is more of a problem for the Spanish & Axis than for the Allies.

 

[Tchitchix]

True for the MN, but the RN was active OTL & the 9 july Battle of Calabria did cause a Italian convoy to Lybia to be turned back. I am wondering if in this situation the RN might act more aggressively?

and the Brits if anything would get sucked into to helping the French rather than focusing on say Libya convoys.

The RN probably won't help the French in Western Med but will focus on Estern Med to fight the Italian. Remember the theat for the Allies is Axis in North Africa and anything that could help to swep them off is welcome. But I don't over estimate the result and a significant part of the Italian convoys could reach Tripoli. Bombing Tripoli and freighters discharging there will have better results and the French have lots of bombers that can do the job without being intercepted by CR32 or CR42.

Even if the French air groups evacuated are disorganized & unable to address combat operations for many weeks the air groups that were in NA were organized and capable of combat operations. In that context the arrivals from represent a mass of reserves, which can immediately join the NA groups, bringing them to full or over strength, and replace losses very quickly.

Remember the French air group was able to retreat in fighting, it was just a matter of few days to have their ground crew to support them. Look at the list, each group was evacuated and dispached on a specific airfield, meaning keeping their cohesion. Transfered GC have an average of 18 aircraft (half of the theoritical hedcount), and the situation is a little bit better for the GB (esp. for the DB-7 and Glenn 167).

But a mix of existing group and reinforcement could be imagined.

There is a possibility they ould attempt to secure the region between the border & the main French defense zone. Perhaps someone has information of the Italian plans & we can dismiss this out of hand? But, were the Italians field army ordered forward it would have some advantages for the French.

Should the Italian leave their tranchs they will be decimated by French Artillery and AdA. And they only have on motorized artillery regiment.

Its very unlikely a French attack into the main Italian defense zone would depend on some sort of flanking maneuver in the interior. Between the terrain and a look at the French strengths a methodical attack nearer the coast would be the plan.
SNIP

Yes but a frontal attack will cost a lot to French. IMHO, French would fix the Italian in their defense with heavy shelling and bombing; cut them from their rear by bombing coastal road and railway, and anything running on it; attack them slowly to destroy their strong points; launch a motorized attack in the South to outflank them and reach the coast behind defense line. Once trapped, the defense will soon collapse. If Italian decide to retreat, they will do it fighting and under air attacks, as you said, this will be a dead trap.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I've seen a lot of contradictory statements on what the French OTL naval operations were to 20 June, & what was planned. Generally I don't see significant evacuation ops beyond early-mid July, so French naval forces would be available for other operations. neither do I recall much evidence one way or another for Italian plans to interdict the evacuation. Here there & elsewhere there are assorted third hand claims.

Other than some air attacks the Italians weren't interdicting the evacuation, but French warships could carry people out in the evacuation; not using them means leaving a lot of people behind. What sort of operational rating would the French fleet have after evacuating from the mainland as of mid-July? There is still Corsica to consider, defending Tunisia, screening the Spanish, etc.

I'd not give much consideration to a Sardinian operation for the Allies in 1940. I'm even skeptical the 'Battle for Corsica' would be much more than a delaying action by a isolated rearguard. Holding onto it may be a clever gambit on the game board, but I don't see that as practical or desirable for the Allies in most real world scenarios. There is the 'Mussolini Stupidity Factor' but thats kind of a unpredictable outlier.

I agree with your take, but apparently it was in FFO and a certain poster here is pushing it. If the French don't do any of that then they could much more quickly transition to the attack against the Italian in Libya...but would they? As that French poster has said, Corsica is the last bit of France still held and the French may well view that emotionally rather than logically get themselves into trouble.

After reviewing the internal Spanish politics, the input from the US, British pressure, and what Franco did vs what folks claim he wanted to do I'm very skeptical Spain would pin down significant French military for long. For the remainder of 1940 the French have one principle strategic military goal & that is to consolidate their position in Africa. Securing Tripoli is one major step to that. Dominating the waters of the Sicillian Strait and central Med is another, adjunct to that is achieving parity with or defeating the Italian air forces efforts. Spain is more of a problem for the Spanish & Axis than for the Allies.

It isn't just the Spanish, but also the potential for German entry. British and US pressure are one thing, but the Brits are effectively unable to intervene much in Spain in 1940, while the US's only leverage is supply shipments that the Germans could theoretically replace if they want to enter the region. So it would be foolish not to retain a reserve to counter them just in case.

Otherwise I agree that the French main effort should be against the Italians and opening up the Central Mediterranean...but logic doesn't necessarily dominate strategy.

The RN probably won't help the French in Western Med but will focus on Estern Med to fight the Italian. Remember the theat for the Allies is Axis in North Africa and anything that could help to swep them off is welcome. But I don't over estimate the result and a significant part of the Italian convoys could reach Tripoli. Bombing Tripoli and freighters discharging there will have better results and the French have lots of bombers that can do the job without being intercepted by CR32 or CR42.

Which means doing nothing more in 1940 than they did IOTL which does little to impede the Italians until November.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The RN probably won't help the French in Western Med but will focus on Estern Med to fight the Italian. Remember the theat for the Allies is Axis in North Africa and anything that could help to swep them off is welcome. But I don't over estimate the result and a significant part of the Italian convoys could reach Tripoli. Bombing Tripoli and freighters discharging there will have better results and the French have lots of bombers that can do the job without being intercepted by CR32 or CR42.

I don't see the aircraft bombing of port as a single pancea, but it is more effective than attacking ships at sea. It will be a combination of all arms and tactics that would successfully interdict Tripoli. Submarines, surface ships, aircraft at sea, aircraft over the port...

Should the Italian leave their tranchs they will be decimated by French Artillery and AdA. And they only have on motorized artillery regiment.


Yes but a frontal attack will cost a lot to French. IMHO, French would fix the Italian in their defense with heavy shelling and bombing; cut them from their rear by bombing coastal road and railway, and anything running on it; attack them slowly to destroy their strong points; launch a motorized attack in the South to outflank them and reach the coast behind defense line. Once trapped, the defense will soon collapse. If Italian decide to retreat, they will do it fighting and under air attacks, as you said, this will be a dead trap.

The French methodical battle doctrine was designed for reduce infantry casualties. Applying that I think the results would be similar to Op Compass in 1941. Artillery neutralizing the Italian artillery then pinning the infantry, tanks operating tactically breaking into the strong points, followed closely by infantry. Lacking many AT guns the Italians wont hold up any better than in the Western Desert. Perhaps worse if the French are able to employ their full artillery capability. The Western Desert Force and 8th Army had some missteps with their artillery & the Italians did not seen their full capability until later. The French might be less likely to diverge from a well tested doctrine in this case.

I expect the most obvious loss will be in the French tanks. After several weeks or months of fighting their way to Tripoli few of those D series will be operational.

 

[Tchitchix]

That's not even factoring in any damage to the French fleet, what sort of operational ratings could be maintained in North Africa for all French equipment, and all the training/reorganizing going on.

I'm even skeptical the 'Battle for Corsica' would be much more than a delaying action by a isolated rearguard.

Please refer to the post below:

July-August 1940 - ITTL - Can Corsica be defended?

In addition, dedicate 8 batteries of 24 x 75 mm from USA (they could be manned by artillery regiments evacuated) to defend: Ajaccio, Calvi, l'Ile-Rousse, Bastia (one battery each) and the Eastern coastal plain (hidden in the mountain forest, they will be very difficult to anihilate) and I don't see how Italian could land on Corsica, even with German help. If they succeed, it will be at a very high cost, probably worst than in Crete, and not before beginning of 1941.

ITTL we have to remember the French are going to keep a reserve to ensure the Spaniards stay on their side of the border and move on them if they involve the Germans, defend/supply Corsica, according to one poster potentially go after Sardinia, and at the same time have to at least screen the Italians in Libya.

3e DM in Morocco and two DIA in West Algeria plus 30 R35 tanks, plus several H-75 GC, and several DB-7 or Glenn 167 GB. Already mentionned.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

3e DM in Morocco and two DIA in West Algeria plus 30 R35 tanks, plus several H-75 GC, and several DB-7 or Glenn 167 GB. Already mentionned.

Right, who will have to stay there in case of Spanish entry or even just German invasion of Spain. Which means not available for Libya.

Please refer to the post below:

In addition, dedicate 8 batteries of 24 x 75 mm from USA (they could be manned by artillery regiments evacuated) to defend: Ajaccio, Calvi, l'Ile-Rousse, Bastia (one battery each) and the Eastern coastal plain (hidden in the mountain forest, they will be very difficult to anihilate) and I don't see how Italian could land on Corsica, even with German help. If they succeed, it will be at a very high cost, probably worst than in Crete, and not before beginning of 1941.

How do they keep up supply to the island so close to Italy without any air bases besides some grass fields? Or a significant naval base for that matter. 24x 75mm guns spread out over the island aren't really going to stop anything.

 

[Tchitchix]

I agree with your take, but apparently it was in FFO and a certain poster here is pushing it. If the French don't do any of that then they could much more quickly transition to the attack against the Italian in Libya...but would they? As that French poster has said, Corsica is the last bit of France still held and the French may well view that emotionally rather than logically get themselves into trouble.

Corsica will be reinforced only with evacuated men and airplanes not able to cross the Med and American armament (mainly guns). Nothing to be diverted from FNA.

Lybia will be attacked by local FNA units and air reinforcement with evacuated GC and GB.

Sardinia will be attacked after the invasion of Lybia according to FFO, even if I think that it could be possible to launch the attack earlier with smaller units to, at least occupy North of Sardinia and fully destroy Italian air force in the island. Italian won't be able to reinforce the local garnison and will promptly be completly defeated once Lybia was over.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Corsica will be reinforced only with evacuated men and airplanes not able to cross the Med and American armament (mainly guns). Nothing to be diverted from FNA.

AKA minimal forces that are badly disorganized and unable to stop any sort of serious attack.

Lybia will be attacked by local FNA units and air reinforcement with evacuated GC and GB.

So something that won't be happening for months by left overs in North Africa that aren't more than a glorified militia and scattered reservists from France, which gives the Italians plenty of time to prepare and fix their material deficiencies.

Sardinia will be attacked after the invasion of Lybia according to FFO, even if I think that it could be possible to launch the attack earlier with smaller units to, at least occupy North of Sardinia and fully destroy Italian air force in the island. Italian won't be able to reinforce the local garnison and will promptly be completly defeated once Lybia was over.

How? It's not like the French have deep reserves and Libya will result in significant losses of men, material, and supplies plus occupation and the cost of occupation/defense.
In the meantime Corsica will likely be lost and Sardinia is effectively outside the range of any significant fighter cover without the copious use of drop tanks. The French Fleet, assuming it is intact and able to maintain high operational rates, which is up for debate, could be a major force to invade the south of the island, but then you also have to figure on Luftwaffe entry into the Mediterranean once Libya is lost...if it is lost.

You seem to be making the reverse mistake that people claim Wehraboos do in What Ifs: that the enemy sits still, doesn't react, and takes major stupid pills.

 

[Tchitchix]

How do they keep up supply to the island so close to Italy without any air bases besides some grass fields? Or a significant naval base for that matter. 24x 75mm guns spread out over the island aren't really going to stop anything.

Please refer to the already mentionned post:

In operation, these forces, equivalent to two divisions, need 1,000 tons per day; meaning an average 8,000 tons cargo ship per week. Let say two cargo ships, including ALA and MN needs and civilian basic consumption (Corsica was mostly self-sufficient for food in 40), plus one tanker each week is more than sufficient to build up a strategic reserve for these forces.

And please, read carrefully: 8 batteries of 24 x 75, that is 200 guns out the 1,000 delivered by the USA.

EDIT: for the airfields, already discussed:

From Corsica, with love

An RAF airfield in Corsica, 1944

It seems you have no idea of what was an airfield in the beginning of the war and, for some theaters, until the end. A grassfield IS an airfield.

I know you don't agree but this is fact.

 

[Lascaris]

Again though the French fleet is tied down with the evacuation in June and perhaps July if we accept the conceit of the FFO TL.

At a very quick count from here https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4006-16French.htm#med there are about oh 46 French submarines located in the Mediterranean in addition to 12 RN submarines (link here https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4006-15RNOverseas-Dominion.htm) which had increased to 17 by January 1941 (link here https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4101-26RNOverseas-Dominion.htm)

The French surface fleet may be mostly committed to the evacuation but French submarines are not. So you have increased the number of allied submarines by about a factor of 5 from 12 to 58 in June 1940 and about 2.5 times as many as the allies had in January (17 British and 6 Greek). Not exactly good for Italian convoys to North Africa.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

At a very quick count from here https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4006-16French.htm#med there are about oh 46 French submarines located in the Mediterranean in addition to 12 RN submarines (link here https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4006-15RNOverseas-Dominion.htm) which had increased to 17 by January 1941 (link here https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4101-26RNOverseas-Dominion.htm)

How many were operational, what did they even achieve IOTL, and were their facilities able to maintain them in North Africa? Were some detached for special operations to transport people, as happened IOTL after the fall of France?

The French surface fleet may be mostly committed to the evacuation but French submarines are not. So you have increased the number of allied submarines by about a factor of 5 from 12 to 58 in June 1940 and about 2.5 times as many as the allies had in January (17 British and 6 Greek). Not exactly good for Italian convoys to North Africa.

Same questions as above. Targeting convoys requires knowing where they would be, air support for spotting, proper basing, etc. Where are their supplies of torpedoes coming from, how good was their coordination with the British, could they be based out of Malta, etc. It's all well and nice to have them, but if they are WW1 vintage and ineffective, plus don't have a support facilities and necessary supplies they aren't very useful.

Please refer to the already mentionned post:

And please, read carrefully: 8 batteries of 24 x 75, that is 200 guns out the 1,000 delivered by the USA.

Since when do batteries have more than 4-8 guns? That said do you have a source for where they were in June 1940? Seems more likely that they'd end up lost in France rather than be evacuated in time.

EDIT: for the airfields, already discussed:
I know you don't agree but this is fact.

Being able to land or take off in a field is different than having a place with fuel tanks, hangers, maintenance facilities, pilot quarters, medical support, etc. Yes you can land and take off aircraft, but that doesn't mean it can sustain them, especially in any sort of extended combat situation. In the evacuation it is unlikely that they are going to get a fully functional airfield support apparatus displaced to them and then have enough supplies be able to be continually brought in to sustain them after the fact. Especially when the island is going to be overloaded with desperate stragglers and refugees that couldn't make it to North Africa.

 

[Hardric62]

I expect the most obvious loss will be in the French tanks. After several weeks or months of fighting their way to Tripoli few of those D series will be operational.

Pretty much. FTL doesn't try to hide it, French tanks break down during that offensive, but since Tripolitaine is taken, that's not that much of a problem to not have them for the next part, Lybia is already doomed.

And it's not like the Italians are getting that much supplies. French air forces are enough to bomb Tripoli to uselessness, especially with naval actions: warships aren't exactly suited to evacuate people, especially BB and BCS, so dissuading the Regia Marina from trying funny stuff, or operations like that, are pretty much what's they have to do. And with the Aeronavale, it is possible to have reco and bomber planes on Malta far sooner. And even reco planes are enough to doom Lybian convoys, since bombing the port can ruin these supplies, and indicate convoys to raid for groups of cruisers/destroyers. You mentioned combined approach as necessary for a blockade, and bluntly told, with how outnumbered the Regia Marina is and the units available, such an approach is perfectly available.

And operations for submarines shouldn't be that much of a problem until long-term, wiking: most of French submarines with the exception of the oceanic classes were designed to operate in the Mediterranean, but experiments were made to see if some of them could be ased as far as Dakar. Bases of north Africa/Malta will be more than enough for them. Some o the oceanic ones can be used in England, and for special operations (eh, Resistance can have a quicker organization time ITTL, since there is clearly one legitimate government, so organization will be easier, and legitimacy more bovious).

Being able to land or take off in a field is different than having a place with fuel tanks, hangers, maintenance facilities, pilot quarters, medical support, etc. Yes you can land and take off aircraft, but that doesn't mean it can sustain them, especially in any sort of extended combat situation. In the evacuation it is unlikely that they are going to get a fully functional airfield support apparatus displaced to them and then have enough supplies be able to be continually brought in to sustain them after the fact. Especially when the island is going to be overloaded with desperate stragglers and refugees that couldn't make it to North Africa.

Look, we told you the airfileds are there, that the basic infrastructures are there, and that the supplies to complete these bases can be evacuated several times, linking pages showing these airfields exist, and they were fair for the time. How many airfields in the Desert War had to make do with mere ground for the landing fields already? And for the African forces for France, I already linked docs showing several units are available many times already, and others did, including units your own links showed to be A type units, perfectly able to lead operations, especially with American supplies to complete the stocks. And Aeronavale was getting D520 too for its fighter units, and can eventually use SBC4, M167, Potez 631, and Laté 298 torpedo seaplanes. Not golden standards, but RAF of the time used biplanes like the Swordfish, and they were enough to cause the damages dooming the Bismarck OTL. The planes mentioned here are enough to sink cargoes, especially given thhe fact the Italians cannot give them air escorts worth the name given the action radius of the CR32 and CR42, aka the only fighters available in Southern Italy, Sicily, Lybia, and Sardinia (Okay, I'm using FTL's docs for 20th June to get these units, but that early after POD, I dare say the means of forming these units are there, and they certainly that strangling Lybia is the sort of use they would be conetrated for, in places Like Tunisia and Malta).

 

[Tchitchix]

How many were operational, what did they even achieve IOTL, and were their facilities able to maintain them in North Africa? Were some detached for special operations to transport people, as happened IOTL after the fall of France?

Same questions as above. Targeting convoys requires knowing where they would be, air support for spotting, proper basing, etc. Where are their supplies of torpedoes coming from, how good was their coordination with the British, could they be based out of Malta, etc. It's all well and nice to have them, but if they are WW1 vintage and ineffective, plus don't have a support facilities and necessary supplies they aren't very useful.

Are you serious? Don't you have better argument than raising such question? Mers-el-Kebir, Bizerte and, of course, French sub are as modern as those from other countries!

Since when do batteries have more than 4-8 guns? That said do you have a source for where they were in June 1940? Seems more likely that they'd end up lost in France rather than be evacuated in time.

Who cares the exact number of guns are in a battery? Give the name you want.
And again, please read carrefully my post before answering. The guns came from the USA, not from France, shipped by "Pasteur" which was diverted to Great Brittain (in my previous post with the link).

Being able to land or take off in a field is different than having a place with fuel tanks, hangers, maintenance facilities, pilot quarters, medical support, etc.

Once again, see the history of RAF in desert, in Italy or in Corsica to see how can be maintained aircraft in very rough environment. Look at the videos I provided.

Especially when the island is going to be overloaded with desperate stragglers and refugees that couldn't make it to North Africa.

No civilian to FNA, no civilian to Corsica (100 nautical milles, not a small gap). Remember that very few could escape to Great Brittain over the Channel even in the narrower side.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Look, we told you the airfileds are there, that the basic infrastructures are there, and that the supplies to complete these bases can be evacuated several times, linking pages showing these airfields exist, and they were fair for the time. How many airfields in the Desert War had to make do with mere ground for the landing fields already? And for the African forces for France, I already linked docs showing several units are available many times already, and others did, including units your own links showed to be A type units, perfectly able to lead operations, especially with American supplies to complete the stocks. And Aeronavale was getting D520 too for its fighter units, and can eventually use SBC4, M167, Potez 631, and Laté 298 torpedo seaplanes. Not golden standards, but RAF of the time used biplanes like the Swordfish, and they were enough to cause the damages dooming the Bismarck OTL. The planes mentioned here are enough to sink cargoes, especially given thhe fact the Italians cannot give them air escorts worth the name given the action radius of the CR32 and CR42, aka the only fighters available in Southern Italy, Sicily, Lybia, and Sardinia (Okay, I'm using FTL's docs for 20th June to get these units, but that early after POD, I dare say the means of forming these units are there, and they certainly that strangling Lybia is the sort of use they would be conetrated for, in places Like Tunisia and Malta).

You've asserted a ton of bullshit, you haven't proven anything other than grass fields existed per your own sources. NOTHING ELSE. The fields in North Africa were rolled out and prepared, plus had all sorts of supporting infrastructure and were used by the other side when captured, rather than throwing up shop in a random open area. Again, you can land and take off in an open field, but that tells you nothing about sustainment abilities. For your African forces, all it showed was they weren't nearly as powerful, large, well equipped, or combat ready as you claimed. Instead of addressing it you try to Gish Gallop your way through the argument and continually assert falsehoods as if they were facts.

But go ahead and enjoy your ASBs.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Are you serious? Don't you have better argument than raising such question? Mers-el-Kebir, Bizerte and, of course, French sub are as modern as those from other countries!

Until those questions are answered, your assertions are basically meaningless. You can name places, but what of the facilities there? What of the stocks of spare parts and trained personnel? French subs were mostly from the 1920s and didn't seem to achieve much historically.

Who cares the exact number of guns are in a battery? Give the name you want.
And again, please read carrefully my post before answering. The guns came from the USA, not from France, shipped by "Pasteur" which was diverted to Great Brittain (in my previous post with the link).

Well, if you're asserting there are specific numbers, the number in each battery would be the most important thing. I looked through the last 4 posts you made, no links. The Pasteur was in England and it's cargo would be taken by the Brits who needed it as IOTL to rebuild their armies. If it wasn't diverted there it would end up France proper and use it's cargo to try and equip the collapsing retreating armies of France, who per FFO are supposed to be fighting into August in France. So I don't know why you think they would end up in Corsica except by wishful thinking and ASBs.

Once again, see the history of RAF in desert, in Italy or in Corsica to see how can be maintained aircraft in very rough environment. Look at the videos I provided.

WITH SUPPORT FACILITIES. The French lacked all of that to build a totally new network in June 1940. I think you're forgetting that France proper is gone and the French hadn't ordered such equipment as of the time France falls. Plus you're forgetting the part about how in the 'main' grass field in Corsica the RAF couldn't really use it because the marshy ground flipped over aircraft trying to land on it as cited much earlier in this thread by another poster.

No civilian to FNA, no civilian to Corsica (100 nautical milles, not a small gap). Remember that very few could escape to Great Brittain over the Channel even in the narrower side.

As if they wouldn't flee as IOTL? The French military would just leave civilians behind? The problem with the Channel is that the Germans were advancing along it swiftly, preventing people from leaving via that route and the military was using whatever they could to flee over the Channel, that is those that weren't surrendering.

 

[Tchitchix]

You've asserted a ton of bullshit

Could we please try to avoid such language. This is a forum where we are discussing the possibility for France to continue fighting and the possible outcome.
We don't share the same view but I think Hardric62 and some others (including me) have given some evidence that Corsican airfield could have been used by fighters or middle bombers. You don't agree but YOU didn't gave any evidence this couldn't have been done.

 

[Tchitchix]

I looked through the last 4 posts you made, no links. The Pasteur was in England and it's cargo would be taken by the Brits who needed it as IOTL to rebuild their armies. If it wasn't diverted there it would end up France proper and use it's cargo to try and equip the collapsing retreating armies of France, who per FFO are supposed to be fighting into August in France. So I don't know why you think they would end up in Corsica except by wishful thinking and ASBs.

The post...

USA have sent to French on June 11th on the ship "Pasteur" 1,000 x 75 mm guns with 1 M rounds of ammunitions.
http://canonde75.free.fr/faitsarmes.htm

Of course, as you are flooding the thread to burry the posts you don't want to see, 4 posts ahead is not enought...
This is a poor strategy but I would said it's quite effective when one have no strong argument in the discussion.

The French military would just leave civilians behind?

Yes, of course. We are at war, you know, and military has other thinks to do than helping civilian. That's too bad, but that's war...