WI: France really fights on from 1940?

[Carl Schwamberger]

And there is also 0: Try to hamper the evacuation as much as possible while they can. ...

I don't see that dragging out past mid July, if that long. My take is a decision would come between late June & mid July. If the decision is to concentrate against Britain then the 'clean up' of the Mediterranean would be left to the Italians. (No one understands their problems at this point.) Logically its their turf, their task. & yes the southern France battle attritions more German aircraft.

However German airgroups participating in the final battle for southern France would contribute to a decision for the third option. The presence of substantial numbers in the south creates a sort of inertia that leads for a split decision.

There is one option missing: Hitler decide, as IOTL, to invade Russia. ....

That decision came at the end of the year. For myself I am trying to focus on the first 90 to 180 days in the Mediterranean.

Interesting but I don't think French are well aware of the stakes of US election in 1940. They will fight for there own and it will help to be sustained by the USA.

The stakes were less than some might suppose. Wilkie the Republican candidate was not a Isolationist. His style was different than Roosevelt but he saw US interests in unwavering support of the Allies. Wilkie was not a outlier in this. When you run down the names of the Warhawks you find a strong presence of conservatives, businessmen, & Republican party members. Most were men who had to some degree or other actually witnessed the changes in nazi Germany, & unlike dupes like Ford or DuPont they concluded the US best interest was in enabling the Allies to win. Lifelong Republican party members like Know & Stimson were willing to cross party lines and serve in the Roosevelt cabinet. Had Wilkie been elected he'd been very open to the same influences and thinking that led Roosevelt to the Warhawks, and he would have inherited the team Roosevelt had been slowly assembling.

But I agree the French, and Brits, would be under pressure to win one in Africa, for military strategic reasons if not political.

 

[King Augeas]

The Luftwaffe to the Med option is constrained by Mussolini. Without Italian permission, the Luftwaffe is going nowhere. Historically, that permission was only forthcoming when the campaign which drove it was already lost... not a great omen.

 

[merlin]

However German airgroups participating in the final battle for southern France would contribute to a decision for the third option. The presence of substantial numbers in the south creates a sort of inertia that leads for a split decision.

Yes I agree, it makes the third option more likely by default. That is the German army is advancing south it needs the Luftwaffe to go with to support it, and to hamper any evacuation. But the whole Luftwaffe can't go south - it had enough problems OTL sorting out the French airfields for the Battle of Britain.
Seems therefore likely (as I wrote previously), that Luftflotte 2 stays Northern France & Belgium, with Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 going south.

 

[Hardric62]

I don't see that dragging out past mid July, if that long. My take is a decision would come between late June & mid July. If the decision is to concentrate against Britain then the 'clean up' of the Mediterranean would be left to the Italians. (No one understands their problems at this point.) Logically its their turf, their task. & yes the southern France battle attritions more German aircraft.

Actually, Early August is actually a German Best Case in the case of continued resistance ad fighting retreat. It gives the entire Wehrmacht an average advance of 20km/day, when the best Guderian managed in May was 25km/day. No bluff with vanguards rushing alone here. And a logistic pause to make sure the troops are properly supplied in ammo: reports from the Wehrmacht, ad the Luftwaffe were all saying they'd need a pause between one and two weeks to establish logistic lines to fight up to the Mediterranean coast, and they did end the shorter campaign of Poland with said stocks of ammo nearly depleted.

The mentality here is also why I favor 1. beyond the end of the Campaign of France. Mussolini isn't begging before things go desperate, and it will take monthes for him to swallow back his pride. I'm not seing the Luftwaffe trying anything massive in the Mediterranean before the very end of 1940 (by the time Mussolini begs, BoB will be ongoing, so he'll have to wait).

 

[Lascaris]

How many were operational, what did they even achieve IOTL, and were their facilities able to maintain them in North Africa?

How many of the Royal Navy ones in the Mediterranean were operational? You are free to postulate lower availability rates for French submarines after the fall of France. It does not change the fact that you have added 46 more submarines to the Allied order of battle. Did France have facilities to operate submarines outside metropolitan France? I would note that as seen in the link already provided several of the French submarine flotillas in the Mediterranean were already based in North Africa and Syria before the battle of France. Could the French submarines operate even without the several available French overseas bases? In OTL leaving aside the Free French submarines which operated through the war, one might note that we also have the example of the Greek submarines which were all built in France. All 5 escaped to Alexandria in April 1941 (the 6th Proteus had been sunk in action in December) and remained in action despite the lack of facilities suited to them in Egypt. If the RHN and Free French without facilities, sorry but saying France in exile wont be able to do as much with several bases available is... shall we say problematic?

What did the even achieve... are we seriously claiming here that the French submarine fleet of 80+ boats was useless, hence the majority of it continuing operations unlike OTL would be irrelevant? Well if you are claiming as much you are welcome to prove first that French submarines were inferior in technical characteristics to the rest of the world, second that the French crews lacked in experience and training to the rest of the world and third how you had things like Rubis sinking 24 ships during the war or the torpedoing of HMS Resolution during the attack at Dakar.

Were some detached for special operations to transport people, as happened IOTL after the fall of France?

Lets say that some were. No lets say that several were even forgetting why when someone is doing a repeat of Dunkirk evacuation he'll be using subs as transports. After all you still need to insert commandos, agents etc in enemy held territory. So what? Other allied submarines were also used in such missions as part of their operations. There is still the basic fact that you have 5 times as many submarines in the Mediterranean thus instead of being able to conduct for example 12 patrols per month including commando insertion you now have the abiity to conduct 58 patrols per month.

Same questions as above. Targeting convoys requires knowing where they would be, air support for spotting, proper basing, etc. Where are their supplies of torpedoes coming from, how good was their coordination with the British, could they be based out of Malta, etc. It's all well and nice to have them, but if they are WW1 vintage and ineffective, plus don't have a support facilities and necessary supplies they aren't very useful.

Seriously now? We'll leave aside how almost no fleet that mattered in Europe was not using boats older than the second half of the 1920s (the oldest French boat IMS was Requin completed in 1926 and the only notably older were the Spanish B1 class completed in 1922 which the Spanish were decommissioning in 1940.) But to getto geography Italian convoys to Libya aren't exactly sailing through the Pacific. They are sailing through routes necessarily constrained to the central Mediterranean and to a limited number of end destinations. This before taking into account that the Italians have to operate under even worse constraints than OTL since the Tunisian coast is hostile, that Italian and German codes are still being broken and that even if not a single aircraft (as opposed to several hundred) were added to the allied order of battle still recce planes would be able to use French airstrips as necessary at a minimum.

Supply we have already covered above and as already noted several French made submarines both of Greek and Free French navies were kept operational through the war without the benefit of the French overseas bases (which were controlled by Vichy), where THEY were getting their torpedoes? (Well in the case of the Greeks they were already using British torpedoes in addition to French ones so that should be less of an issue...)

Funny that you'd mention Malta, since this reminds us that in addition to Malta, with France still in the war there is also Sousse (11th Submarine division operating out of it in June 1940) and of course Bizerte (1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 20th submarine divisions operating out of it)

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Actually, Early August is actually a German Best Case in the case of continued resistance ad fighting retreat. It gives the entire Wehrmacht an average advance of 20km/day, when the best Guderian managed in May was 25km/day. No bluff with vanguards rushing alone here. And a logistic pause to make sure the troops are properly supplied in ammo: reports from the Wehrmacht, ad the Luftwaffe were all saying they'd need a pause between one and two weeks to establish logistic lines to fight up to the Mediterranean coast, and they did end the shorter campaign of Poland with said stocks of ammo nearly depleted.

The mentality here is also why I favor 1. beyond the end of the Campaign of France. Mussolini isn't begging before things go desperate, and it will take monthes for him to swallow back his pride. I'm not seing the Luftwaffe trying anything massive in the Mediterranean before the very end of 1940 (by the time Mussolini begs, BoB will be ongoing, so he'll have to wait).

It looks to like your best case for the German consolidation in south France is not best for the Italians. That pushes back many weeks any reasonable German assistance to the Italians, & enables the Allies to take a few more weeks of preparation & action for attacking Tripoli. This date for the end in France sets back any full scale attack on Britain until September, leaving less good weather & daylight. It also means any August air attack on Britain is considerably weaker & easier to deal with by the RAF.

 

[Hardric62]

It looks to like your best case for the German consolidation in south France is not best for the Italians. That pushes back many weeks any reasonable German assistance to the Italians, & enables the Allies to take a few more weeks of preparation & action for attacking Tripoli. This date for the end in France sets back any full scale attack on Britain until September, leaving less good weather & daylight. It also means any August air attack on Britain is considerably weaker & easier to deal with by the RAF.

Eh, finish to conquer a entire country isn't a time-free endeavour, especially when you don't have people surrendering you that country on a silver platter. Fact, is, Germans can hardly go faster: Guderian faced... unfortunately pretty much no resistance while he was rushing through Northern France's plains to the Channel through a narrow corridor so fast his superiors were worried he wasn't securing his flanks. With a wider front, (even marginally) more resistance, sabotages of bridges and the likes after retreat to delay, and this time with mainly not-motorized forces? Doing almost as good as Guderian back in May is pretty much a best case (FTL started with simulations made by people working at France's war college, and the 'medium' result they were getting was end of August/early September). Not my fault Mussolini decided to play the vulture in June 1940 when he was himself telling that the Italian army wouldn't be ready for war before 1942/1943. It (verry much sort of) worked OTL because France surendered. Here? no grace period of a few monthes to round up preparations for the troops.

 

[ramtank2]

How many rounds of ammo for 330mm 340mm and 380mm stored in North Africa for French battleships, been searching the net but can't find info, anyone know?

 

[Tchitchix]

There is one option missing: Hitler decide, as IOTL, to invade Russia.

That decision came at the end of the year. For myself I am trying to focus on the first 90 to 180 days in the Mediterranean.

IOTL, planification of the invasion of Soviet Union started in July 1940. This was asked for by Hitler.
This will probably be the same ITTL, at the latest beginning of August, when France will be fully occupied or close to be.

So the decision could be taken end of the year as IOTL, possibly earlier if Hitler considers:
- He cannot bluff Allied with BoB and Sea Lion
- FNA is out of reach
- It's too late to help Italian in NA
- Defeating Russia before Dec. 1941 will free all Wehrmacht and he could come back to finish French and British by 1942
- French are no longer a threat without industrial bases (he probably won't take into account USA) nor the British alone in Europe

 

[Tchitchix]

How many rounds of ammo for 330mm 340mm and 380mm stored in North Africa for French battleships, been searching the net but can't find info, anyone know?

I didn't find any information on the stock.

But Bizerte was the second French naval base but Toulon in Mediterranean and was upgraded just before the war. One can imagine there was some stock for heavy weapons. Bizerte and Dakar was naval bases before WWI and equiped to supply French vessels overseas. Mers-el-Kebir was under work to extend it and didn't yet have a lot of facilities at this time.

Shells could be delivered by USA as it was done in 1943 after Richelieu refit in New-York facilities. It took four months IOTL.

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richelieu_(cuirassé_de_1939)#La_refonte_à_New-York

But there was the problem of ammunition, because if the Richelieu had received, in November 1940, 316 OPfK of 380 mm Mle 1935, its allocation in April 1943 was limited to 407 shells, and it was necessary to compensate for the breakdown in relations with occupied France, whereas the U.S. Navy did not have ammunition of this calibre. An order had to be placed with the US Crucible Steel Company to build a stock of 1,530 perforation shells, based on plans, drawn up in Dakar, of the French 380 mm OPfK Mle 1935. The 380 mm Mle 1943 OPfK, measuring 1,882m, had characteristics of the 356 mm American shell, in particular the colouring device was limited to colouring sheaves like American shells, not impacts like French shells. The first deliveries of exercise shells came in August 1943, for the start of the tests, but the fire schools showed that the American charges of MCI 420 powder were not rigid enough and sometimes tore during loading, forcing the firing to stop to clean the firing chambers. It was decided for the combat shots to keep the French-made S 21 powder pods.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_battleship_Richelieu#Refit_in_New_York_City

There was still serious concern about the main battery munitions, as Richelieu was provided in March 1943 with 407 APC shells, a little less than half her designed provision (832 APC shells), with no replenishment of shells possible from occupied France, nor from the U.S. Navy (which had no battleship armed with 380 mm guns).

An initial order for 930 rounds was placed on May 1943 with Crucible Steel, on the basis of OPf Model 1936 plans traced at Dakar. The OPfK Model 1943, with a simpler base plug, was 1.882 m long, and weighed 884 kg. Internally, it resembled contemporary U.S. Navy 14" (356 mm) shells.[70] But during firing practice, the U.S.-manufactured MC420 powder charges gave some concern, as they frequently snagged, spilling powder into the firing chamber, thus putting the turret out of service during the time required to sweep it.

The 152 mm battery was completely overhauled, and shells used on USS Brooklyn and similar light cruiser classes were a fit because they were armed with 152 mm/47 calibres Mark 16 guns. The U.S. Navy 152 mm SAP shell weighed 58.8 kg, and 48 kg for the HE shell, registered in the French Navy as 152 mm OPf Mle 1943, for anti-ship fire, and OEA Mle 1943, for anti-aircraft fire.

 

[Tchitchix]

And we can assume ammunitions for capital ships will be part of the high value supplies evacuated from Toulon before the fall of France. Guns of unfinished ships was evactuated IOTL from Saint-Nazaire (even if the freighter was sunk in Gironde estuary).

 

[formion]

What did the even achieve... are we seriously claiming here that the French submarine fleet of 80+ boats was useless, hence the majority of it continuing operations unlike OTL would be irrelevant? Well

I would add to @Lascaris argument that the maintenance of the French submarines would be the easiest of all french vessels: The main torpedo factory was located in Saint-Tropez. Toulon had further extensive facilities to support the submarine fleet. All of this technical personnel would be the most easy to evacuate. Trained engineers and specialists may not have their factories in FNA, but they would still have their expertise. Perhaps even some light equipment would be able to be moved from Toulon and Saint-Tropez.

Now regarding ship capacity to evacuate personnel, I have these notes to present, regarding the spontaneous, unplanned evacuation of MN from Atlantic ports.

- In the morning of June 19th, 74 french warships and 76 merchant vessels (48 french, the rest norwegian, belgian etc) departed Brest.
- By june 22nd, 115 french non-military ships, from liners to tramp steamers found refuge to british ports. I have read no literature that these ships carried evacuees just that they departed to avoid capture.


The protection of the evacuation convoys in the Western Mediterranean would be placed upon the existing ships in the theater:
- 4 BB/BC (2 Bretagne class, 2 Dunkerque) - the decommisioned Jean Bart could only steam at best
- 1 seaplane tender
- 4 CA
- 9 CL
- 26 Contre-Torpilleurs (large DD)
- 29 DD
- 31 sloops
- 60 submarines
- 4 submarine chasers

In Eastern Mediterranean (Alexandria and Levantine ports) were:
- 1 BB
- 3 CA
- 2 CL
- 3 submarines

Source: https://www.amazon.com/French-Navy-Vol-Henri-Masson/dp/B008BBXFN4

 

[arctic warrior]

Jean Bart was in Penhoet, Brittany and not yet commisioned. But made it to Casablanca!

 

[formion]

Well, it's the old one, the Courbet-class BB. It was renamed Ocean when the new fast battleship was laid down.

 

[arctic warrior]

Well, it's the old one, the Courbet-class BB. It was renamed Ocean when the new fast battleship was laid down.

Ooops my bad..

 

[ramtank2]

If France really fights on do Richelieu and Jean Bart head for the Clyde as original planned?
Does Richelieu still suffer gun explosion?
What becomes of Jean Bart, spares for Richelieu, completed as carrier or completed as battleship in UK or USA?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Reviewing everything here that pertains to the first 90 days, to 20 September, I'm contemplating where ethe fighting would be concentrated.

Obviously there would be there residual battle in south France. In the air that includes the German attacks on the ports & ships, & whatever Italians join in.

Second would be whatever Italian naval interdiction there eight be with the Traffic between the souther port group & Africa. What happens there depends on how aggressive the Italian get. A secondary factor is Brit assistance from the fleet based at Gibraltar (I abased in the Tunisian ports m not sure if it was labeled "Force H" in June 1940.) I don't think they were hunting surface raiders that summer, so they ought to be free to lend a hand. Based on the track record OTL the Italian submarines are likely to be the most successful here, tho with the density of French warships in the traffic submarine losses would be at least at their historical levels if not higher.

At some loin the Italians are going to try to attack Corsica. That may be tied to interdiction of the evacuation, or come later. How this Leone Marino might develop I'll leave for later.

The fourth might be called the Sicillian Straits battle. From July the Italians start mining the strait. At least the French destroyer group based in the Tunisian ports would be interested in this. While part would be operating further north covering the evacuation its in the Allies best interest to keep the strait open, so its likely there going to be a series of engagements developing with French and Italian light forces, initially at night. If the Italians break off the effort thats as far as it goes. But, it could escalate with both sides adding cruisers. If escalated this battle will overlap the end of the evacuation battle, and carry on after.

There would be a air battle over the strait as the air forces of both side attempt to intervene, and a separate effort to raid each others airfields in Tunisia and Sicilly.

Next would be simiiar to the OTL battle that developed in the central & eastern Med. Each side sparing as they attempt to reenforce Malta and Lybia.

Furtherst south would be the air and ground attacks aimed at Tripoli. The air attacks could start relatively early on a small scale, the ground attacks have a lot of variables for size and when they start.

 

[Palantir]

Jean Bart was in Penhoet, Brittany and not yet commisioned. But made it to Casablanca!

Well, it's the old one, the Courbet-class BB. It was renamed Ocean when the new fast battleship was laid down.

It's confusing but the "new" Jean Bart was constructed in Chantiers de Penhoët in St-Nazaire (which is in Loire-Atlantique, in historical Brittany) and escaped the German advance, finally ending up in Casablanca.
The old Ocean was disarmed in Toulon at the time. It was a school, and I don't know if it can still move by it's own means.

 

[arctic warrior]

I found this on the British strategy following the fall of France https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Med-I/UK-Med-I-7.html
The force at Gibraltar hadn't yet been named H.
The British had to reevaluate the situation in the Med and the Far East telling the ANZACs that there would be no RN reinforcements at the time. Also the link to Turkey vanished.
Also tell of the French Navy since April 1940 had been based in North African ports; there must have been facilities there to support such a move even if Mers-El-Kebir was still building up. On the Richelieu wiki its stated that the ship left French port directed to go to Casablanca a deviation from the initial order to go to the Clyde. The ship carried 250 380mm grenades but only 48 charges and no 152mm shells. At Dakar the ship had replenished with 152mm ammo and stored charges for 340mm guns had been rebagged to serve as 380mm charges - in essence the French had stored some ammunition at the colonial bases. Good idea. Also the local Dock Yard began repairing the damage incurred by the RN attack of 8. July 1940. Even if the repair effort didn't fully restore the ship there was a local capacity. Of course if France fights on the big doorstop isn't needed in Dakar but then it might not be able to replenish its ammo!
Stuff then could be moved around once the French exodus gets its shit together.

@Carl Schwamberger if the Germans need to stop at around OTL armistige positions to replenish Panzer formations and relocate Luftwaffe units that would give a breathing space of 1-2 weeks. Time needed to move bomber KGs from behind the Somme down to the Loire. Basically the distance moved from Germany to the Somme!
Crucial to the final fighting in France would be barring the Germans from entering the Rhône Valley and keeping them from going to Toulouse and beyond.
Problem is the lack of reserves; though the command control had broken down - prior to Fall Rot by 3. June 40 85. DIA (mountain infantry) arrived in Southern France only to be railed north to the Somme which tells me that something did work in France like the raillines.
Another indication is that 2. Lt. Colonial (former 2. Colonial Div - Mountain) following battles in the south with the Italians had been reformed and on 12. June marched to Aquitaine which also happened for 8. Colonial Div which had moved out by 6. June to Aquitaine.
Another 84. DIA (Mountain) had been moved to France during May and ended up in Dordogne/Aquitaine.
These formations it seems had been used to build a new defensive line behind the Loire. Still the divisions will have to march all the way up the Garonne to bar the road to Toulouse.
Should the French gain a few days from OTL they just might march 8. Army out of Alsace into the Rhône Valley; when Guderians Panzers arrived at Besancon on 16. June French engineers were preparing the four bridges for demolition. The Germans reach Dijon the following day and then move up the Swiss border to close the trap on the French Army Group in Alsace-Moselle.

 

[Hardric62]

If France really fights on do Richelieu and Jean Bart head for the Clyde as original planned?
Does Richelieu still suffer gun explosion?
What becomes of Jean Bart, spares for Richelieu, completed as carrier or completed as battleship in UK or USA?

At the very least, I do see them being evacuated.
Timeline changes don't fix mechanical problems, so likely yes.
Spares would be a bit of a waste, and between inch conversion necessities, and overcrowding of British and American shipyards regarding BBs, the second isn't happening in my opinion, so likely a CV.

Second would be whatever Italian naval interdiction there eight be with the Traffic between the souther port group & Africa. What happens there depends on how aggressive the Italian get. A secondary factor is Brit assistance from the fleet based at Gibraltar (I abased in the Tunisian ports m not sure if it was labeled "Force H" in June 1940.) I don't think they were hunting surface raiders that summer, so they ought to be free to lend a hand. Based on the track record OTL the Italian submarines are likely to be the most successful here, tho with the density of French warships in the traffic submarine losses would be at least at their historical levels if not higher.

Aggressivity wasn't exactly the Regia Marina's strong point. Besides, when you see how ill-prepared both the ground and air forces were, I doubt that much ships could be sent for raiding. And yes, the Force H is probably kept around without corsairs and such an operation happening. I'm also doubtful about Italians' submarines. Not just because of te initial availabilities, but also because of the volume of escorters available, and the fact their standard tactics are 'one zone, one sub'. Coordinating a mass attack with that seems... problematic. Ships will be sunk, but not tht many, and losses are to be expected.

At some loin the Italians are going to try to attack Corsica. That may be tied to interdiction of the evacuation, or come later. How this Leone Marino might develop I'll leave for later.

Sorry, not really seeing that one as possible. They didn't try for Malta OTL, why risk it against a biggest target with more opposition when means aren't any bit better? In summer, there will be no fighter to cover anything: units with G.50 are busy on Metropole for all of July, CR.42 aren't exactly that available both because of the Alps offensive and the Lybian hemorragy, and MC.200 aren't back inunits before September, and there is the time to effectively distribute them, and train the pilots to the new mount where most of them had biplanes in the past. Without talking about the CR.32... And it will be Cr. 32, Ufficio Storico's records give a number of 50 fighters/month in 1940, 20 of them CR.42, and 15 MC.200. Reequipping will be a painful slog.
Also, no torpedo bombers in meaningful numbers, so burden of the battle to secure the shipping lines necessary fall on the Regia Marina alone, which is already lacking BBs, and is still badly outnumbered, and such a move would trigger a massive Allied answer for the threat to evacuation it would cause.
Besides, with what ground units? Italians had to wait 11 days after war declaration before they managed to get the supplies for an offensive OTL, I'm not seeing this as a good sign of how fast and how much forces they can muster for this invasion. Especially since the French will certainly be reinforcing the island on the ground and air front to keep it. And later than summer is too late: Allied fleets are free from the evacuation's burden, and this timeline's version of the Taranto raid probably happened, leaving the Regia Marina unable to win that fight without German air and para support.

The fourth might be called the Sicillian Straits battle. From July the Italians start mining the strait. At least the French destroyer group based in the Tunisian ports would be interested in this. While part would be operating further north covering the evacuation its in the Allies best interest to keep the strait open, so its likely there going to be a series of engagements developing with French and Italian light forces, initially at night. If the Italians break off the effort thats as far as it goes. But, it could escalate with both sides adding cruisers. If escalated this battle will overlap the end of the evacuation battle, and carry on after.

There would be a air battle over the strait as the air forces of both side attempt to intervene, and a separate effort to raid each others airfields in Tunisia and Sicilly.

Next would be simiiar to the OTL battle that developed in the central & eastern Med. Each side sparing as they attempt to reenforce Malta and Lybia.

I'm sorry but again, I'm ot seeing thsi happening. Facing heavier naval and air opposition ( French Aeronavale can reallocate units with training to attack on Malta ITTL for instance) will incite the Italians to even more prudence than OTL. Minie fields will certainly be done, and fleet movements to secure the Mediterranean, but the Italians will probably avoid bigger battles unless they really can't, because they're the outnumbered ones, and the replacements in naval units they can manage are inferior even to the British alone. They can't waste ships, especially when each new ship lost makes the risk of landing invasions in Italy bigger. And I'm thinking about another point: More heavily contested Mediterranean Sea can lead to the Italians reallocating a non-negligeable amount of resources for coastal fortifications, and their war industry...
Nah, I think the Italians will avoid battles in a strategically defavorable situation, leading to this timeline's Taranto raid to seek them in their harbors.

Should the French gain a few days from OTL they just might march 8. Army out of Alsace into the Rhône Valley; when Guderians Panzers arrived at Besancon on 16. June French engineers were preparing the four bridges for demolition. The Germans reach Dijon the following day and then move up the Swiss border to close the trap on the French Army Group in Alsace-Moselle.

I'd say that's why FTL placed the divergence in military operations on the French side at 10th June (Weygand replaced with someone accepting the idea of leading a general retreat/evacuation): so there is still time to get the men in the east of the country before the Germans can trap them all.