IOTL the incomplete Dutch destroyer Isaac Sweers was towed to the UK and completed. Could the same have been done with the 8 Le Hardi and 4 Le Fier class destroyers that had been launched?
WI: France really fights on from 1940?
- Thread starter tomo pauk
- Start date
Took me a minute to figure out what & where the unit referred to below was. ...and another minute to figure out which 'Caproni is referred to. Seems to be the Ca310, designed as a twin engine bomber. https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=773 Have not found any web sources that do not pan it as a failure. Anyone have any other information for it?
This item suggests the Italians had their 'administrative inefficiencies' like the French. Reviewing the Italian aircraft inventory of the summer 1940 a clear problem emerges. Like the Italian artillery arm it has some well designed and some poorly designed equipment, which is mostly relevant to a earlier era. A lot of obsolescent, underarmed, and under performing aircraft appear on the equipment list. The French may be disorganized & have a number of logistics problems, but the principle aircraft are at least state of the art for 1940, and there are more than a few of them. In comparison the modern or state of the art Italian aircraft are relatively thin on the parking areas.
A second question is what a realistic readiness rate is for the Italians, in June, and how much it might improve over the next 60 to 90 days? One source claims a 50% reported readiness in May. Thats probably distorted since peace time criteria for 'ready' are much more stringent than war time. However other third hand sources indicate a still poor ready rate for the remainder of 1940. It would be useful to confirm or contradict this claim & establish the actual operating condition of the machines in the combat groups.
In all this I'm confining my analysis to the first 90-180 days for now. Just estimating the end state of the situation in the Med at the end of 1940 is daunting. Never mind the variables of the following years.
Deleted member 1487
Ok and? They couldn't just throw up a landing site anywhere they needed a special type of ground for it that was well protected, marked out, and scouted and test landed on by a special detachment for that specific mission. That is if they couldn't find a prepared air field like the Sidi Batrani one mentioned. Then the advance party came in after, occupied and prepared it for the rest of the squadron, which I imagine included all the ground support apparatus.
Plus from the below it sounds like a lot of effort and care had to be put in to making the landing zone usable:
Deleted member 1487
I didn't insult him personally and direct, I was fed up with the 'quality' of the argumentation and sources he has claimed and we've gone round and round on and was commenting on that. If that isn't allowed I will refrain from using such strong language in the future.
Deleted member 1487
That is for the actual ground itself, I wasn't talking about that, I was talking about the actual setting up of the support apparatus, including maintenance, housing, and comms facilities among other things.
At this point I don't know if you're being willfully disingenuous or seriously think this is the same thing I'm talking about.
All of that was needed to mark out the landing grounds, not actually make them an operational base with housing, comms, maintenance/repair, supplies, etc. That is what I was talking about, not making the physical ground visible and capable of being landed on.
That said given how hard they are having to work to find appropriate ground that doesn't require major effort to make usable for landing/taking off, it doesn't look like there was a lot in the desert, so they had to put a fair bit of effort to find and mark out such territory and protect it from the army.
I think you completly missed the point. The discussion was not to know if it was easy to find and equip an airfield but to see if the Corsican airfields was servicable or not.
Aber highlited the fact that an airfield could be installed from scratch in the desert, so existing airfields in Corsica could be used despite their poor infrastructure.
And again, there were a lot in Corsica:
http://www.anciens-aerodromes.com/?p=531
http://www.anciens-aerodromes.com/?p=532
Enought to accomodate 3 GC, 2 GB, one GBA, and one or 2 GR.
Of course some were not all weather airfields but this was the case of lots in metropolotain France at this time. Nothing new for French pilots and ground crew.
http://fandavion.free.fr/bataille_de_france.htm
http://fandavion.free.fr/batfra17.jpg
"Curtiss H-75 of the 2nd squadron of the G C-11/5 victim of a "pyloning" on the muddy ground of Toul - Croix-de-Metz in the spring of 1940"
Toul was a major airfield for the french fighters.
Regarding Italians aircraft... I see that website says it all: No real operational units of MC.200 before late 1940, only 140 Cr.42 usable by June 1940 in the entire Regia Aeronautica, they only began to receive Ba.88, of which only about 150 were produced until 1940, when they were revealed to be another failed design, a whooping 100 for the Fiat G.50 (using the Ufficio Storico's numbers for that one)... Bread and butter of the Regia Aeronautica were CR.32 by June 1940. And there were these other failed bombers like the SM.85...
And it's not like it's limited to aircraft. I just saw the total numbers that website gives for the 47mm/32 in its AT Gun configuration...
https://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.asp?armor_id=622
600 produced overall. Pretty sure a lot of them weren't produced yet by June 1940, especially since they were frontline material right unitl the capitulation, an given how low priority Lybia had to be by June 1940... I'm not seeing a significiant number of these guns in Lybia by June 1940, not by any stretch of imagination.
They were not looking hard, read it again. All the landing grounds used for the Battle of El Alamein were scouted out and marked up for use by 1 officer and 12 men in 3 days.
Vehicle based and highly mobile. The Desert Air Force were operating from landing grounds behind the German frontline during the post Alamein advance.
Pouvait-on continuer la guerre en Afrique du Nord en juin 1940 ?
Below an interresting contribution to the debate by the général de Larminat in 1955 in the newspaper "Le Monde".
http://www.france-libre.net/continuer-guerre/
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edgard_de_Larminat
Abstract
Général de Larminat answered to général Weygand who wrote in "Le Monde": "Transporter en juin 1940 la lutte en Afrique du Nord eut été la perdre" (transfer the fight in FNA in June 40 will lead to defeat).
- Much more than 50,000 men with some equipment could have been transfered to FNA.
- This would have valued a lot local troops.
- MN would have found in Bizerte and Mers-el-Kebir enought to fight some months and give Allied Mediterranean superiority. After: cannibalization...
- Lots of modern airplanes and infrastructures and skilled men to support them.
- US reinforcement (Curtiss, Glenn, Douglas) delivered in crates in Casablanca.
- Three to four months to obtain local air superiority.
- Anyway, German attempt to FNA after BoE with very low chance to Franco collaboration as of IOTL.
- Operation far away from german bases against opponent with naval superiority and adaquate air power doubtfull.
- Strategic benefit: Italian expelled from North Africa and Mediteranean sea.
Then he tryied to understand why the June 1940 decisions have beeen taken.
He proposed the inhibition comming from the German victory as an explanation, adding that even small Frech success have had strong effect on Allied (South African) for example.
He rejected the discussion about capitulation vs armistice saying the duty was to fight as long as possible to allow French goverment to continue the war.
He concludes saying general Weygand could have argued (but failed to) such an unprepared army would have no chance to continue the fight in FNA bur reject this assumption saying Free French achived a lot with much less means.
Below an interresting contribution to the debate by the général de Larminat in 1955 in the newspaper "Le Monde".
http://www.france-libre.net/continuer-guerre/
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edgard_de_Larminat
Abstract
Général de Larminat answered to général Weygand who wrote in "Le Monde": "Transporter en juin 1940 la lutte en Afrique du Nord eut été la perdre" (transfer the fight in FNA in June 40 will lead to defeat).
- Much more than 50,000 men with some equipment could have been transfered to FNA.
- This would have valued a lot local troops.
- MN would have found in Bizerte and Mers-el-Kebir enought to fight some months and give Allied Mediterranean superiority. After: cannibalization...
- Lots of modern airplanes and infrastructures and skilled men to support them.
- US reinforcement (Curtiss, Glenn, Douglas) delivered in crates in Casablanca.
- Three to four months to obtain local air superiority.
- Anyway, German attempt to FNA after BoE with very low chance to Franco collaboration as of IOTL.
- Operation far away from german bases against opponent with naval superiority and adaquate air power doubtfull.
- Strategic benefit: Italian expelled from North Africa and Mediteranean sea.
Then he tryied to understand why the June 1940 decisions have beeen taken.
He proposed the inhibition comming from the German victory as an explanation, adding that even small Frech success have had strong effect on Allied (South African) for example.
He rejected the discussion about capitulation vs armistice saying the duty was to fight as long as possible to allow French goverment to continue the war.
He concludes saying general Weygand could have argued (but failed to) such an unprepared army would have no chance to continue the fight in FNA bur reject this assumption saying Free French achived a lot with much less means.
So much of what occurs between 17 June & 31 Dec depends on a single German stratigic decision. Where they concentrate their air Force July - September. As outlined in a earlier post:. 1. Focus on Britain as OTL. 2. Focus on pursuing the French to Africa & moving the air forces to the Med. 3. Attempting to do both, with little focus or concentration.
Logistically 1 is the easiest. It has from the German POV of June or July 1940 a fair chance of forcing Britain to a Armistice.& Peace negotiations.
2 is logistically the toughest. To make the best show of it requires a considerable bribe to Spain compounding the logistic cost. It leads less directly to defeating Britain. A sacrifice of the residual French may not hustle the English to a armistice. & This gives Italy a large possible gain, for a substantial German cost.
In purely logical terms 1 is the way to go. 3 leans towards Hitler's track record. It's probablly the least effective. Complicating the logistics, and politics while having low odds of forcing anything on Britain.
On the Italian side the likely decision is to fight for Lybia/Trpoli. It's all about ego and pride here. That leads to a escalating battle over the Central Med in 1940, or when the Italians collapse.
Logistically 1 is the easiest. It has from the German POV of June or July 1940 a fair chance of forcing Britain to a Armistice.& Peace negotiations.
2 is logistically the toughest. To make the best show of it requires a considerable bribe to Spain compounding the logistic cost. It leads less directly to defeating Britain. A sacrifice of the residual French may not hustle the English to a armistice. & This gives Italy a large possible gain, for a substantial German cost.
In purely logical terms 1 is the way to go. 3 leans towards Hitler's track record. It's probablly the least effective. Complicating the logistics, and politics while having low odds of forcing anything on Britain.
On the Italian side the likely decision is to fight for Lybia/Trpoli. It's all about ego and pride here. That leads to a escalating battle over the Central Med in 1940, or when the Italians collapse.
Last edited:
Driftless
Donor
Even if the Luftwaffe is focused on the French in the South, they'd need to leave a substantial force along the channel to keep the British honest, wouldn't they? I'd guess one of the dilemmas with that thought (for the Germans) is the channel force makeup. If the Luftwaffe is intent on subduing the AdA over Southern France, then it's probably the same mix of Me-109's and tactical bombers as the historic Battle of France. If they're intent on pursuing the French over North Africa, that requires the range of the Bf-110 and the Me-109's aren't as useful. So, what force is left along the channel?
And there is also 0: Try to hamper the evacuation as much as possible while they can. Something that will be logistically hard to, because the bombers can't seriously threaten the ships until Bf 109 escorts are available, meaning the need to amenage bases for them further down south once positions sufficiently close are conquered and repaired. That would take a few weeks to achieve, weeks where the Mediterranean harbors would only have to fear limited Italian attacks (OTL, supporting te Alps' offensive gobbled up the bulk of the Regia Aeronautica's resources once said offensive started). If the British lend even just one CLAA and its radar, results could be... interesting.
That and the fact the 'pursuit' is beyond the Luftwaffe's possibilities in 1940. No fighter can cross the Mediterranean Sea on the Axis' side by then, and not that many bomber either. Well, Corsica is a possibility, but it would take time to rebuild the French bases for an air offensive against the island. So I think 1 is the likeliest option, because Britain looks like a bigger threat than Corsica, and maybe knock out Britain can push the French to reddition, avoiding the logistical nightmare of trying anything against North Africa. Besides, the reverse is true, Allied can't really attack from North Africa by air in 1940, so Britain definitely looks like the bigger threat to Germany in 1940. I guess they'll turn against Corsica (and Sardinia, because taking this island is necessary to hold on Corsica from North Africa, and the political symbol of 'last fragment of Free France' is too big to be ignored) once Seelowe has clearly become a chimera, and to help prop up Mussolini so he can hold up to power for the 'measly one year needed to crush Russia and win Barbarossa'.
That said, I don't believe in the battle for Lybia. Between refits of older units and finitions of the new units, Italians only have 2 BB available in June/July 1940, when the Allied could feel 10 of such ships in the Mediterrranean Sea alone, mainly older ones, true, but not that important when they can count on 5-to-1-odds. Outnumbered like that, and with Allied air forces able to establish better and more numerous aircrafts than the Italians at that time, and probable arrival of carrier: Eagle is there, Illustrious incoming, and once new squadrons are formed, the Bearn can assist (it is a slightly more recent ship than the Eagle, with slightly but noticeably better performances, and still useful for 1940 aeronaval planes, I don't think the Regia Marina will sacrifice its chances to defend the Metropole, not even for Lybia, and by the time more BBs are available, the colony will be doomed, making such a move even more senseless.
I freely admit that FTL is influencing my thinking, but I see more likely attempts avorted to avoid bigger Allied forces, before the Allies decide to launch an 'improved' version of Taranto's raid, thanks to the bigger number of CVs available (even the Eagle and Barn are enough to match the Illustrious' carrying capacity), and the possibility of distracting the Italians in Southern Italy by using bases in Malta and TUnisia fo air raids on Sicily.
There is one option missing: Hitler decide, as IOTL, to invade Russia. ITTL, German defeated French and British and invaded the whole metropolitan France within three month. This was never achived before, even in 1870. Hitler is at the top of his glory and may do whatever he wants.
Will he try to finish with the French and the British or will he turn back to the ultimate enemy: Soviet?
On one hand, he knows that landing in FNA would be difficult; IOTL, Sea Lion was a bluff and, with the French continuing the fight, it will be as difficult as expected for Sea Lion, even more due to the distance. The only good card in his hands is Franco and the Spanish Morocco, should Franco and the Spanish decide to help him and should the Spanish Morocco resist long enought to be reinforced by German. Risky gamble.
On the other hand, Hitler could consider British and French are no longer a threat and Barbarossa will be launched as soon as possible. IOTL, having the British still over the Channel and in Lybia didn't prevent him to do so.
I will try to come back to the Spanish variant later on but I think Hitler will definitly choose the Eastern front and the vital space.
in FFO, Barbarossa was postonned until 1942 due to the Greece comming into the war on Allies side and the fight that resulted were the German and Italian didn't succed in invading Crete. One can consider this is too long and Hitler will launch Barbarossa mid 1941 with more or less the same result: German will be stopped earlier butStalin will loose a lot of men and equipment before stabilizing the front.
This is likely if Mussolini don't invade Greece (he don't have the mean to do that after the fall of Lybia and Sardinia) and if Greece stay neutral.
I found this looking for more info on the French - Italian airwar 11.-24. June 1940 http://conflictuel.pagesperso-orange.fr/LGGtemp/Air_war_Italian_front_1940.doc
I think that Germany would consider that the French are a less of a threat to them in North Africa and would shift their focus on the Channel ports and airfields to go after Great Britain.
The Battle of Britain is still going to happen but it will be much different than it was IOTL, with the focus on things like factories, and ports to prevent Great Britain from building up its military.
There might be the earlier introduction of terror bombing of British cities in order to breaks the British people resolve, which by the way did not work for anybody IOTL.
The Germans would think that the Mediterranean as the Italians problem and are more focused on Great Britain and the North Atlantic.
While the back and forth on the various forces and their capabilities has gotten very technical and lost in the tall weeds, the main factor in how everything plays out is politics especially since it is a Presidential election year in the United States and that will determine the amount of aid and support that the Allies get from America.
That is why I think that France needs to prove that it is credibility still fighting the war by attacking the Italians in Libya before the Labor Day campaign kick off in America.
The Battle of Britain is still going to happen but it will be much different than it was IOTL, with the focus on things like factories, and ports to prevent Great Britain from building up its military.
There might be the earlier introduction of terror bombing of British cities in order to breaks the British people resolve, which by the way did not work for anybody IOTL.
The Germans would think that the Mediterranean as the Italians problem and are more focused on Great Britain and the North Atlantic.
While the back and forth on the various forces and their capabilities has gotten very technical and lost in the tall weeds, the main factor in how everything plays out is politics especially since it is a Presidential election year in the United States and that will determine the amount of aid and support that the Allies get from America.
That is why I think that France needs to prove that it is credibility still fighting the war by attacking the Italians in Libya before the Labor Day campaign kick off in America.
Interesting but I don't think French are well aware of the stakes of US election in 1940. They will fight for there own and it will help to be sustained by the USA.