WI: France really fights on from 1940?

Second would be whatever Italian naval interdiction there eight be with the Traffic between the souther port group & Africa. What happens there depends on how aggressive the Italian get. A secondary factor is Brit assistance from the fleet based at Gibraltar (I abased in the Tunisian ports m not sure if it was labeled "Force H" in June 1940.) I don't think they were hunting surface raiders that summer, so they ought to be free to lend a hand. Based on the track record OTL the Italian submarines are likely to be the most successful here, tho with the density of French warships in the traffic submarine losses would be at least at their historical levels if not higher.

At some loin the Italians are going to try to attack Corsica. That may be tied to interdiction of the evacuation, or come later. How this Leone Marino might develop I'll leave for later.

1. I think OTL RN forces in the region were mostly used against Vichy France (Dakar, Mers-el-Kébir, ...), so they're available.
2. I agree that the more efficient threat from the RM is the subs. I don't really see Italy intensively using their surface fleet when they are outnumbered 2 to 1 or more.
3. Corsica can only be held (for some tine) if Sardinia is neutralized (the airfields and the naval base), or best case invaded. But I don't think Italy have the forces to do more than bomb Corsica until the end of the year, the fighting in France and in Libya will suck up all reserves in men and materials. Bonus if Sardinia is neutralized, it's bases cannot be use to attack French convoys to NA.

I found this on the British strategy following the fall of France https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Med-I/UK-Med-I-7.html
The force at Gibraltar hadn't yet been named H.
The British had to reevaluate the situation in the Med and the Far East telling the ANZACs that there would be no RN reinforcements at the time. Also the link to Turkey vanished.
Also tell of the French Navy since April 1940 had been based in North African ports; there must have been facilities there to support such a move even if Mers-El-Kebir was still building up. On the Richelieu wiki its stated that the ship left French port directed to go to Casablanca a deviation from the initial order to go to the Clyde. The ship carried 250 380mm grenades but only 48 charges and no 152mm shells. At Dakar the ship had replenished with 152mm ammo and stored charges for 340mm guns had been rebagged to serve as 380mm charges - in essence the French had stored some ammunition at the colonial bases. Good idea. Also the local Dock Yard began repairing the damage incurred by the RN attack of 8. July 1940. Even if the repair effort didn't fully restore the ship there was a local capacity. Of course if France fights on the big doorstop isn't needed in Dakar but then it might not be able to replenish its ammo!
Stuff then could be moved around once the French exodus gets its shit together.


I remember reading that a French 380mm gun and a British 15' could exchange their ammo. If it's true, the Richelieu doesn't have an issue for it's main guns.
 
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For information - FTL view - Battle of France

June 9th
Decision to evacuate Army to FNA
June 10th
Weygand, who doesn't believe in the continuation of the fight, is replaced by Huntzinger
1,000 x 75 mm guns plus ammunitions diverted to Casablanca
June 11th
French Army begin evacuation, starting with Maginot line cover troops
June 12th
Governors and HQs of Algeria, Morroco, Tunisia and Syria informed of the decision to continue combat oversea and requested to prepare action
Pétain arrested during the Ministrial Concil
June 13th
Huntzinger delivers his instructions for the continuation:
- retreating while fighting
- defensive lines will be manned manly by non motorized units
- destroying anything of any military value that cannot be evacuated
- ...
June 30th
Logistical pause for German on a line La Rochelle - Limoges - Valence - Geneva
http://www.1940lafrancecontinue.org/images/?q=image/145-t1c1
July 10th - Aug 9th
Last phase of Battle of France
- Toulouse Jul. 28th
- Marseille Jul. 29th
- Toulon Aug. 4th
http://www.1940lafrancecontinue.org/images/?q=image/143-t1c2
 
For information - FTL view - Campain of Lybia

June 19th
Mal Wawell, Air Mal Longmore, Gal Mittlehauser and Gal Jeaunaud plan the French-British cooperation in Egypt
From June 20th to July 14th massive air attacks against Lybia and naval blockade
June 23rd
General Nogues proposes to start operation against Lybia in September-October after warm season, FNA Army has two months of fuel and ammunitions under heavy operation
De Gaulle urges general Noguès to prepare ASAP the invasion without waiting a German reinforcement
June 25th
Operation "Scipion" to be launch on Wertern Lybia on Jul. 14th
19e Corps: 83e, 88e, 180e DIA, 1e REI...
Corps "P": 3e DM, 81 DIA...
Mechanized Group: 6e DLC, 61e, 62e, 65e BCC...
facing
20th Corps: 17e DI Pavia, 27e DI Brescia, 61e DI Syrte (reserve)
10th Corps: 25e DI Bologna, 55e DI Savona, 60e DI Sabratha (reserve)
June 29th
Shelling of Italian position on the Tunisian border and small attacks on fortified points
Naval attack against Bardia
July 2nd
AdA starts action against front line
86e DI, 63e BCC and 352e RA from Syria disembark in Alexandria
July 5th
Giarabub enciclement broken by Italian
July 9th
Shelling Italian position on Tunisian border
July 11th
Air attacks against fortified point on coastal road to Tripoly
July 12th
Fast Italian convoy to Benghazi, unsuccessfull attacks while at sea but deadly in harbour
July 14th
http://www.1940lafrancecontinue.org/images/?q=image/142-t1c3
July 24th
Fall of Tripoli
 
Aggressivity wasn't exactly the Regia Marina's strong point
The smaller the vessel, the more aggressive they were.
640px-0950_-_Taormina_-_Sottomarino_Maiale_alla_Villa_Comunale_-_Foto_G._DallOrto%2C_30_Sept-2006.jpg
ohAgs3e.jpg


Sank HMS Valiant and Queen Elizabeth, damaged HMS Jervis.

Big Brass Ones on those six Frogmen
 
The smaller the vessel, the more aggressive they were. ...

Good point. The massacre of the Brits during Op PEDESTAL was accomplished by small craft. Submarines, aircraft, and torpedo boats IIRC. The Italian capitol ships never sortied, and the few cruisers that attempted to intervene aborted their efforts after opposition was encountered.
 
Getting back to the likely battles June-September.

I don't see any big Mahanian battle from Italian efforts to interdict the evacuation. The French can make things difficult for Italian efforts by routing the bulk of the ships west of the Baleric islands. That adds to the transit time, but could save a lot of trouble. Aside from submarines the interdiction effort would include patrols by lighter craft from torpedo boats to destroyers. The Italians were not well trained for night actions, but they might attempt it to achieve some sort of surprise. Several cruiser sorties might be made as well. That may lead to some actions similar to what they fought with the Brits with these intermediate ships. I cant see them trying anything with their few battleships here, unless some sort of unusual opportunity is seen. The SM 79 were good aircraft for 1940, but the Italaian air to ship doctrines, experience, and training were as bad as anyones in 1940. The OTL track record suggests a unproductive effort against ships at sea. Their best bet is to bomb the harbors and sink some ships confide there.

Just because the Italians lack so much in amphibious doctrine, skill, and experience does not mean they wont make some sort of effort to secure Corsica. It may fail but they probably would think it worth the risk going in. Its also possible the Allies will conclude (right to wrong) the place cant be defended over the long haul and write it off. If the Germans decide to make a effort in the Meditteranean the motivation & ability to capture Corsica would increase.

The Italians may write off Lybia. If it occurs early then it could waive away many further naval battles for 1940. The further on a decision to abandon Lybia comes the more naval actions and eventual chance of larger naval actions occur. If the Germans indicate they will not participate in a Mediterranean campaign, or that they will operate no further than Corsica it pushed the Italians closer to writing off Lybia.

In the end I'm estimating 5-6 surface actions by the end of the year, vs the three of OTL. Destroyer or cruiser action vs the evacuation, ditto in the Sicillian Strait, and another surface action in the Central Med. I'll not try to guess if the Italian battleships sortie or not.
 

SwampTiger

Banned
How long will the French allow the Pelagian islands, Lampedusa, Lampione and Lenosa, and Pantellaria survive? If you want access through the Sicilian Strait, you should seize these islands. It would also ease minesweeping operations. Only Pantellaria had fortifications.
 
Once they had air superiority over the Sicillian Strait the Allies started running ships through unmolested. Warships in April/May 1943, Cargo convoys in June 43. The Axis in Sicilly & Panatelleria were unable to to do much of anything about it. Some unproductive attempts.

Since the Allies still went ahead and seized Pantelleria, Sicilly, and the other islands OTL I assume they'd feel the need in 1940, even if Italy gives up to conserve its fleet. Picking off the small islands would provide some hands on experience at littoral & amphib ops. Tho they might not get to actual landing operations until 1941 if the French naval units in Tunisia are aggresive enough they might not have to do much minesweeping. Preventing the minelayers from operating would be more efficient than after the fact sweeping operations. Even if the Italians conceed the Strait with their surface ships there is still going to be a air battle over head as each side tries to raid the others airfields in Tunis & Sicilly & keep up interceptor & bomber operations over the strait. Such a air battle could drag on into the next year. Aside from interdicting naval ops near Tunisia the Italians have a incentive in attacking the Allied airbases there to reduce pressure on Tripoli.
 
I don't see any big Mahanian battle from Italian efforts to interdict the evacuation. The French can make things difficult for Italian efforts by routing the bulk of the ships west of the Baleric islands. That adds to the transit time, but could save a lot of trouble. Aside from submarines the interdiction effort would include patrols by lighter craft from torpedo boats to destroyers. The Italians were not well trained for night actions, but they might attempt it to achieve some sort of surprise. Several cruiser sorties might be made as well.
Agree with you: Marseille - Algiers is:
- 410 NM straight (between Mallorca and Minorca)
- 450 NM West of Mallorca
Not a big difference (4 hours at 10 knots)

But the closest distance of the western route from Cagliari is 310 NM, that is 10 hours at 30 knots, not sure an Italian naval offensive could happend undiscovered; even if Italian succeed to attack French convoys at the end of the night, the escape would be quite difficult. I my opinion, only subs and MTBs could try.

Just because the Italians lack so much in amphibious doctrine, skill, and experience does not mean they wont make some sort of effort to secure Corsica. It may fail but they probably would think it worth the risk going in. Its also possible the Allies will conclude (right to wrong) the place cant be defended over the long haul and write it off. If the Germans decide to make a effort in the Meditteranean the motivation & ability to capture Corsica would increase.
Corsica would be quite difficult to attack. There is not a lot of landing places:
- Bastia is protected by its "Citadelle" and could be defended by two batteries of 12 x 75mm each on the hills.
- Two coastal plains South of Bastia (30 km long and 60 km long) that could be defended by three or four batteries in the North and five or six batteries in the South, hidden in the forest in the hills.
- Porto Veccio: two more batteries.
- On the North side, two batteries will protect l'Ile-Rousse and two others Calvi. Adding the Cap Corse, which could be very difficult to pass by heavy wind (Mistral) that is quite common and unpredictable at this time in every season.

Without specialized landing crafts, Italian couldn't land on the Eastern plains, should they succeed, they will be under fire of the batteries located 5 to 10 km from the beaches.

Bastia is a "big" harbour but well protected. Won't be easy to attack. Should the Italian seize Bastia, they will have to fight in the mountaineous roads to conquier the island. Very easy for the French to defend.

Porto Veccio is a good natural harbour but swallow waters. And its gulf is very narrow, easy to defend by artillery and air attacks could be deadly for Italian. Then, its far from the main harbours of Corsica.

L'Ile-Rousse and Calvi are too far for an initial attack.

So I don't believe Italian have any chance except by overwelming French defenders by at least 3 to 1. Meaning a quite big logistic. Not feasible before end of 1940, beginning of 1941. And the later they try, the stronger the French.

And remember they have to secure Sardinia first, if the Allies didn't take it before.

My opinion is FTL is right saying German and Italian will attack Corsica and Sardinia in Feb.-Mar. 1941.

The Italians may write off Lybia.
Abandon Lybia means abandon a lot of men. I don't think Allies will let them go. As soon as the retreat starts, French and British will attack and the blockade will prevent most of the tropps to be evacuated. Italy will probably try to resist, expecting German help before falling.
 
The Italians may write off Lybia. If it occurs early then it could waive away many further naval battles for 1940. The further on a decision to abandon Lybia comes the more naval actions and eventual chance of larger naval actions occur. If the Germans indicate they will not participate in a Mediterranean campaign, or that they will operate no further than Corsica it pushed the Italians closer to writing off Lybia.

This also writes off East Africa, as the only hope of holding on to that was seizing the Suez Canal.

Could Mussolini survive publicly writing off Africa?
 
This also writes off East Africa, as the only hope of holding on to that was seizing the Suez Canal.

Could Mussolini survive publicly writing off Africa?

No he would not publicly write off Africa. He'd make speeches about the brave Italian soldiers fighting to the last bullet, while hoping a armistice and peace conference comes soon. The alternative is to fight a naval campaign trying to supply Lybia. That looks like a way to steadily attrition away the Italian fleet. Its a devils choice, unless you believe in a 20th Century version of elite Roman legions beating Gauls and Britons again. Given Il Douche mentality that might be the view.
 
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