WI: Japan sues for peace after Midway

[theg*ddam*hoi2fan]

This was what the Tokyo and Manila trials were. Homma and Yamashita were tried and punished for lesser crimes than Yamamoto actually committed. Minoru Genda was a professional doing what his commander ordered be done, executing an illegal attack on a nation at peace without formal declaration of war. (Yes; I know about Admiral Nomura's failed mission and his bungled attempt to declare the note initiating hostilities one hour before the air raid, but that is still no excuse.). Yamamoto (Like Robert E. Lee to take an American example.) was in a position of some authority to affect national decisions. Genda was not. His crime, Genda's, was bungling the planning.

I thought that it was accepted that the message had actually arrived before the attack...

Also: genuine question here. Are surprise attacks actually illegal? I mean, Pearl Harbour wasn't exactly the first in history...

Don't get me wrong: Japan was clearly guilty of war crimes in the Pacific and Chinese theatres, no question about that. But can you actually call Pearl Harbour an illegal attack or a war crime? It seems weird to classify it as such when unlike a lot of other Japanese actions in the war, it specifically went for military targets.

 

[McPherson]

1. I would have to say "full" naval turnover might be a little extreme, depending on how we define offensive assets. Any remaining capital ships are certainly a requirement, but for example what about cruisers? Something along the lines of giving Japan a tonnage limit of ships they're allowed to keep, with permission to select any vessels they like that are individually under X-weight (In otherwords, a force limited both in total power and the power of any individual vessel) subject to Anglo-American confiscation of the other vessels as part of reperations payments seems like terms that are more tolerable to both sides.

Java Sea and the battles around the Solomon Islands make that a dubious proposition. Cruisers were just about the most dangerous surface ships Japan's IJN had for long range action aside from their flattops.

2. I think the Americans will insist on trying them both, though maybe they'll agree to joint trial since execution seems like a presumed conclusion if they tried to lead a coup against the Emperor.

Yamamoto is the family surname, and Isoruku is the individual's first name. I know it seems odd, but the Japanese write family name first. He is one individual.

3. Depends. Any personal opinions on Chiang aside from any party here, there was the question of the recently purged membership who the Japanese were setting up in Nainjing. I could see the Americans insisting on a power sharing agreement between the two parties to prevent China from slipping back into a left-right civil war and hedge against a potential Commie resurgance, which the Nationalists would accept as terms of rebuilding loans. Maybe I'm being overly optamistic, but given the relatively poor position the Nationalists will have on the ground at the time of the Japanese surrender Chaing would certainly be pliable to concessions if pressed.

I have to go with what the American polity at the time was willing to stomach. A lot of the collaborator warlords would be anathema to the Americans in any Post Japanese evacuated China government. As a student of the era, I agree with the contemporary American observers about the cabals misruling "free" China. All of them should have been shot and the Kuomintang purged, including especially the double crossing double dealing Peanut and especially his wife.

4. As I said, Japan would probably receive a list of banned candidates/parties and personally keep out anybody associated with the Coup, which basically shoots the Nationalist cause in the heart in terms of election prospects. The retention of control over the policital system would be the key factor here: Japan would have to be seen as having negotiated a surrender rather than being perceived as rolling over to be conquered by its consituents to avoid a "stabbed in the back" myth from taking root, and I think the Emperor and his liberal-anti-expansionist backers would recognize that and insist that terms be put in place that will prevent the resurgence of militerisim in the future. and allow them to legitimize further repressive measures against the far right.

That might work if not for the fact that Hirohito was as guilty as any of the other militarists for the whole China war and the eventual Pacific War. He did nothing to either tamp down the warmongers or dissuade them. There is actually some evidence, he encouraged them. Hence the need for Allied Observers.

 

[McPherson]

I thought that it was accepted that the message had actually arrived before the attack...

Also: genuine question here. Are surprise attacks actually illegal? I mean, Pearl Harbour wasn't exactly the first in history...

Don't get me wrong: Japan was clearly guilty of war crimes in the Pacific and Chinese theatres, no question about that. But can you actually call Pearl Harbour an illegal attack or a war crime? It seems weird to classify it as such when unlike a lot of other Japanese actions in the war, it specifically went for military targets.

The demarche was hand delivered about 45 minutes after Pearl Harbor. I cover what happened and WHY in the ATL to which I currently contribute, about page 22 I think where I discuss code machines, and why the US was faster than the Japanese to break the Kanji characters into English test. It is a fascinating discussion about how communications technology and language structure can be a devastating factor in historical misunderstandings. The American typewriters were 8 times faster in converting Japanese ideographs into consonantal / vowel based Roman script and the Americans skipped the whole ideograph translation step by reading the Romanji text directly.

The Japanese mistake, aside from criminally inciting aggressive war by crossing an international frontier without legitimate International Law sanctioned cause, which is a war-crime by the way, was to create a long 14 paragraph document explaining their version of events. Dictatorships tend to be long winded with superfluity and self justification (Hitler's speech declaring war on the Americans was a 2 hour compendium of lies for example before he got to the point.). The Japanese should have sent an English speaker to Hull with an oral declaration, "Negotiations have failed, we must settle our dispute by war." Short and to the point and then waited for the Americans to react. That would have been "legal".

And as the Iraq War shows, a demarche first, which is a legal declaration of intent after sanctions are authorized, under International Law, is no bar to a "legal" surprise attack. Which the Japanese would have received in March of 1942, by the way... the American surprise attack that is. I think it would have been in the Caroline Islands.

 

[juanml82]

The USA begins sending troops and LL shipments directly to the soviet far east, german u-boats rendered useless!

Wasn't that happening in OTL with ships sailing under the Soviet flag?

 

[Alanith]

Wasn't that happening in OTL with ships sailing under the Soviet flag?

More or less for some LL supplies.

 

[Simon]

4. Prepare to hold free elections under Allied supervision.

IIRC didn't the Naval Minister and the War Minister have to be serving officers in their respective branches effectively giving the military a veto over cabinets and Prime Ministers? If Allied supervision is too much then perhaps demanding certain persons be banned from running, that serving military members not be allowed to sit as MPs or cabinet members, and that ministers of certain ministries must have retired from the armed forces for a set period before being allowed to take up position would be strong enough reforms but not too offensive.

Yes; I know about Admiral Nomura's failed mission and his bungled attempt to declare the note initiating hostilities one hour before the air raid, but that is still no excuse.

That does raise the interesting question of what sort of complications it might cause if Admiral Nomura had been successful in his delivery of the declaration of war.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I can't possibly see the US accepting any sort of peace deal that the Japanese would or vice-versa. In all likelihood, the negotiations go nowhere and the war continues as per OTL.

That does raise the interesting question of what sort of complications it might cause if Admiral Nomura had been successful in his delivery of the declaration of war.

​

Probably nothing. The timing of a delivery of a piece of paper doesn't really impact on the consciousness as much as a suddenly burning naval base and 3,000 coffins.

"Unconditional Surrender" wasn't yet official Allied policy yet; it woulden't be adopted until Casablanca, so strictly speaking the WAllies aren't required for political reasons to push for UCS.

​

Doesn't really matter, since unconditional surrender did not come out of nowhere and was a result of processes going back deep within both American history and the development of the Second World War. The appeal to total victory or total defeat was part-and-parcel of communist and fascist political language basically from the very beginning of the war (even before it began in many cases) while WAllies embraced it from 1940 onwards, with the US simply incorporating it lock-stock-and-barrel the moment it started getting involved as it appealed to American society's rather "good vs bad" moralistic view of the war as a moral crusade. So while the peace demands of the US may not be explicitly labelled as unconditional surrender, they might as well basically amount to the same thing. The war probably goes on.

 

[Cryptic]

1. Surrender the Combined Fleet... ALL of it. Return the IJA to their home barracks in Japan proper.
2. Yamamoto, Isoruku delivered to the Americans ALIVE.
3. Withdraw from China, the Marshalls, the Gilberts, the Carolines, the Marianas, Indochina, Burma, Indonesia, and especially from US territories in the Aleutians and withdraw from the Philippine Republic.
4. Prepare to hold free elections under Allied supervision.

I THINK those would be the minimums.

Sounds like unconditional surrender and thus no incentive for the Japanese to stop fighting.

 

[CountofDooku]

Japan politics was and is much about loosing one's "face" in public, so anything demanding to surrender all or parts of the IJN, getting out of all of China (or heck even Manchuria and Korea) was something they were unwilling to accept at that time. Getting out of Indochina maybe, under conditions like diplomatic help to settle the Chinese incident (war) or for the US to stop their embargo, but other then that no chance to get any of that list without unconditional surrender and a war as long and bloody as OTL one.

 

[Ian_W]

The other point that makes this unlikely is that Imperial Japan is a loose alliance of the IJA and the IJN - and while Midway was a terrible defeat for the Navy, it affected the Army not at all, so they aren't withdrawing from China, no matter what the Navy think.

 

[trurle]

Remember, the Allies have to offer terms that seem better for Japan than fighting a campaign of attritional resistance, digging into the islands to make the Americans and British bleed, so will need to be at least a "soft landing". Especially with Stalin screaming to just take the deal so they can bring the war to Germany faster.

By 1942, the Soviet Far East Front was reduced to skeleton divisions stripped of all heavy equipment, and coastal defense sectors (where some heavy equipment remained because it physically cannot be moved) manned by least capable staff. The quality of staff was such what a number of 18-cm coastal batteries during 1943 training exercise were unable to fire at all (because elderly and malnutrition-ed loaders were unable to load a projectiles into the breech). Although i generally agree with other effects of earlier Japanese armistice, the positive effect on combat capabilities of Red Army in Europe will be close to zero. By September 1941 Stalin has already bet everything on Japanese non-intervention on Far East, and left only token forces across Japan-facing borders and coastlines.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

By 1942, the Soviet Far East Front was reduced to skeleton divisions stripped of all heavy equipment, and coastal defense sectors (where some heavy equipment remained because it physically cannot be moved) manned by least capable staff. The quality of staff was such what a number of 18-cm coastal batteries during 1943 training exercise were unable to fire at all (because elderly and malnutrition-ed loaders were unable to load a projectiles into the breech). Although i generally agree with other effects of earlier Japanese armistice, the positive effect on combat capabilities of Red Army in Europe will be close to zero. By September 1941 Stalin has already bet everything on Japanese non-intervention on Far East, and left only token forces across Japan-facing borders and coastlines.

Um... they and them refer to the WAllies, as the I pointed out in (I beleive) the other sections of that same post. Freeing up the resources dedicated to the Pacific to open up the Second Front and bring the war to Europe to take some of the pressure off the struggling Eastern Front

 

[Shadow Master]

Wasn't that happening in OTL with ships sailing under the Soviet flag?

More or less for some LL supplies.

Yes and no. Before the battle of Midway/Aleutians, the Japanese were looking the other way, but after that, then no more LL shipping, just aircraft being flown directly AFAIK.

My idea was that with the Japanese required to DoW Nazi Germany and send the vast majority of her troops to the eastern front, the USA is going to also be sending her troops via the trans-siberian railway, as well. Does this obviate the need for torch? Can the new allied armies be emplaced in time to start a general counterattack in late 42 to early 43? Does the 8th air force even get setup in the UK, or do they all go to the USSR? If the Germans are facing an "Eastern Front" that now has ground troops from the USA, UK, and Japan all fighting them alongside the red army, do they see the writing on the wall and throw in the towel? If not, how much faster does Berlin fall? Would there even be landings in France/Italy/Africa?

 

[nbcman]

Yes and no. Before the battle of Midway/Aleutians, the Japanese were looking the other way, but after that, then no more LL shipping, just aircraft being flown directly AFAIK.

My idea was that with the Japanese required to DoW Nazi Germany and send the vast majority of her troops to the eastern front, the USA is going to also be sending her troops via the trans-siberian railway, as well. Does this obviate the need for torch? Can the new allied armies be emplaced in time to start a general counterattack in late 42 to early 43? Does the 8th air force even get setup in the UK, or do they all go to the USSR? If the Germans are facing an "Eastern Front" that now has ground troops from the USA, UK, and Japan all fighting them alongside the red army, do they see the writing on the wall and throw in the towel? If not, how much faster does Berlin fall? Would there even be landings in France/Italy/Africa?

Actually 50% of Lend-Lease goods went through the Pacific route using Soviet flagged ships. Although it was primarily for non-military items such as raw materials, food, trucks and railroad rolling stock.

 

[Shadow Master]

Actually 50% of Lend-Lease goods went through the Pacific route using Soviet flagged ships. Although it was primarily for non-military items such as raw materials, food, trucks and railroad rolling stock.

Hey, thanks for the link and the information! I didn't realize that the pacific route was still in use after attu and kiska were occupied by the Japanese, so I guess I just learned something new.

With this route now open to any type of shipping, what do you think about a combined ground campaign?

 

[nbcman]

Hey, thanks for the link and the information! I didn't realize that the pacific route was still in use after attu and kiska were occupied by the Japanese, so I guess I just learned something new.

With this route now open to any type of shipping, what do you think about a combined ground campaign?

There isn't enough capacity on the Trans-Siberian Railroad to support US / Japanese forces as well as to move LL shipments. What would be better is for the Soviets and the Allies to shift their forces from the Far East to the West to fight the Germans and to increase the LL shipments through the Far East and drop the dangerous Murmansk LL route.

 

[Expat]

This is one of those AH moments that comes slamming up against our bedrock preconceptions. We- especially the Americans on the board- have spent the last couple of generations building up this idea of the impossibility of an early or "easy" peace with Japan. It permeates so many aspects of our culture. (As an aside I just finished Shogun and it's amazing how much of this book about 17th century Japan reads as a justification for the A bomb.)

Pulling back the decades and trying to imagine how people in 1942 would feel about it...so tough! And I think that's something we should look into; not just what the men in tops and tails think is fair, but what they have to sell to their countries.

I think other posters have laid out the non-US viewpoints pretty well. To sum up: "Fine, yes, whatever, could you just GET YER ASSES TO EUROPE PLS? (But seriously, I want my shit back.)"

But the American viewpoint? Much more complicated.

You had this fire in the nation's belly over what was absolutely considered to be the most despicable and cowardly act of all time. We can debate here whether or not Pearl Harbor was really all that perfidious, but that was the drug in the national bloodstream at the time. That's a point against a reasonable treaty as a political reality in the US.

I also find myself thinking of the lengths the government went to to shift the public's loathing to Germany. The needs of Europe-First required it, and it seems to have mostly worked. By 1942 Hitler's the Big Bad (I mean it doesn't really take that much effort when it's Nazis, I guess, but still, it was an accomplishment). And in 1942 people are still being sold on Germany as a nigh invincible enemy. The fact that the US swamped the world with war material and (ultimately unused) divisions, ships, and planes points to the fact that most everyone at every level bought into the idea of Germany as an invincible enemy to some extent. So if that's what's driving people by 1942, you might be able to convince them that a non-retaliatory peace is necessary.

I just wonder if people might follow this train of thought: the need to prosecute the war in Europe is ultimately serving our need for retribution over the attack on Pearl Harbor, even if prosecuting the war in Europe is our most immediate goal. We're removing the ability to get retribution for Pearl Harbor in order to better prosecute the war in Europe. Does this counteract the propaganda machine sufficiently to cause trouble for the Roosevelt administration if they go forward with a treaty?

I guess it all hinges on how much people have been converted to the cause of the European war by 1942 to the sublimation of the Pacific war. And possibly how much the US politicos feel they can get away with in terms of the exigencies of war.

 

[Lord Wyclif]

The other point that makes this unlikely is that Imperial Japan is a loose alliance of the IJA and the IJN - and while Midway was a terrible defeat for the Navy, it affected the Army not at all, so they aren't withdrawing from China, no matter what the Navy think.

Could there be a bloody and brutal civil war??

 

[Blue cat]

This is one of those AH moments that comes slamming up against our bedrock preconceptions. We- especially the Americans on the board- have spent the last couple of generations building up this idea of the impossibility of an early or "easy" peace with Japan. It permeates so many aspects of our culture. (As an aside I just finished Shogun and it's amazing how much of this book about 17th century Japan reads as a justification for the A bomb.)

Pulling back the decades and trying to imagine how people in 1942 would feel about it...so tough! And I think that's something we should look into; not just what the men in tops and tails think is fair, but what they have to sell to their countries.

I think other posters have laid out the non-US viewpoints pretty well. To sum up: "Fine, yes, whatever, could you just GET YER ASSES TO EUROPE PLS? (But seriously, I want my shit back.)"

But the American viewpoint? Much more complicated.

You had this fire in the nation's belly over what was absolutely considered to be the most despicable and cowardly act of all time. We can debate here whether or not Pearl Harbor was really all that perfidious, but that was the drug in the national bloodstream at the time. That's a point against a reasonable treaty as a political reality in the US.

I also find myself thinking of the lengths the government went to to shift the public's loathing to Germany. The needs of Europe-First required it, and it seems to have mostly worked. By 1942 Hitler's the Big Bad (I mean it doesn't really take that much effort when it's Nazis, I guess, but still, it was an accomplishment). And in 1942 people are still being sold on Germany as a nigh invincible enemy. The fact that the US swamped the world with war material and (ultimately unused) divisions, ships, and planes points to the fact that most everyone at every level bought into the idea of Germany as an invincible enemy to some extent. So if that's what's driving people by 1942, you might be able to convince them that a non-retaliatory peace is necessary.

I just wonder if people might follow this train of thought: the need to prosecute the war in Europe is ultimately serving our need for retribution over the attack on Pearl Harbor, even if prosecuting the war in Europe is our most immediate goal. We're removing the ability to get retribution for Pearl Harbor in order to better prosecute the war in Europe. Does this counteract the propaganda machine sufficiently to cause trouble for the Roosevelt administration if they go forward with a treaty?

I guess it all hinges on how much people have been converted to the cause of the European war by 1942 to the sublimation of the Pacific war. And possibly how much the US politicos feel they can get away with in terms of the exigencies of war.

I'd just add to this that IMHO if the U.S. Victory at midway in this time line is complete enough then the U.S. Govt may be able to make the case that by smashing the surface and carrier elements of the IJN in battle that pearl harbour has been avenged.

IOTL I have also read arguments that imply to me that the lack of a comprehensive defeat of the surface elements of the IJN during the battle of midway may have contributed to the Japanese willingness to fight on.

 

[Alanith]

I think you'd also need some more changes where the IJA has been significantly discredited in the war as well. Probably near ASB, but something like "A sudden, catastrophic collapse of the front lines in China, followed by the Chinese rolling up the IJA all the way to the Korean border" or something along those lines. Maybe during the failed coup, someone from the group trying to seize control of the Imperial Palace accidentally wings the Emperor with a bullet that goes through a wall or two, hitting him in a non fatal location?