WI: Japan sues for peace after Midway

[RousseauX]

Both Germany and Japan in WWII fought on long after it became clear that victory was impossible and after suffering defeats which would have gotten saner governments to make peace.

Midway was one such defeat, but what terms could they have gotten if they sued for peace?

Let's say the battle goes even worse for the Japanese, let's say the PoD is that a larger proportion of US torpedo planes survives the attack on Akagi/Soryu/Kaga/Hiryu. Let's say the Japanese refuse to fold their hand and push their ships aggressively trying to find and engage the US carriers in surface action but US torpedo planes finds and sinks a battleship or two (maybe the Yamoto).

In the aftermath obviously the Japanese army/navy wants to fight on but Emperor Hirohito (maybe he has a near miss with death around the same time that changes his world view) announces that he wants to seek peace with the US. There's a failed coup against him which discredits the hardliners in the army/navy and in the end the emperor stays on the throne and uses his moral authority to convince the military to seek peace.

What terms would the Roosevelt administration have offered Japan? Insists on "unconditionally surrender" seems kinda early, maybe withdraw from China, Vietnam, Philippines, DEI and at least China south of the great wall?

 

[The Merovingian]

I'm tempted to say America would still demand unconditional surrender, but I'm no expert on WW2 history. My guess is that the next best thing Japan could hope for would be a withdrawal from China, Korea and all allied territory i.e Singapore, Indonesia etc. They could probably get away with keeping their Micronesian territories and Okinawa, but let's remember that they still bombed Pearl Harbor and invaded the Philippines and Alaska (I mean...Kinda). IF they sue for a reasonable peace, I doubt America would NOT take Taiwan. That's the best I can come up with....hope it helps.

 

[McPherson]

Both Germany and Japan in WWII fought on long after it became clear that victory was impossible and after suffering defeats which would have gotten saner governments to make peace.

Midway was one such defeat, but what terms could they have gotten if they sued for peace?

Let's say the battle goes even worse for the Japanese, let's say the PoD is that a larger proportion of US torpedo planes survives the attack on Akagi/Soryu/Kaga/Hiryu. Let's say the Japanese refuse to fold their hand and push their ships aggressively trying to find and engage the US carriers in surface action but US torpedo planes finds and sinks a battleship or two (maybe the Yamoto).

In the aftermath obviously the Japanese army/navy wants to fight on but Emperor Hirohito (maybe he has a near miss with death around the same time that changes his world view) announces that he wants to seek peace with the US. There's a failed coup against him which discredits the hardliners in the army/navy and in the end the emperor stays on the throne and uses his moral authority to convince the military to seek peace.

What terms would the Roosevelt administration have offered Japan? Insists on "unconditionally surrender" seems kinda early, maybe withdraw from China, Vietnam, Philippines, DEI and at least China south of the great wall?

1. Surrender the Combined Fleet... ALL of it. Return the IJA to their home barracks in Japan proper.
2. Yamamoto, Isoruku delivered to the Americans ALIVE.
3. Withdraw from China, the Marshalls, the Gilberts, the Carolines, the Marianas, Indochina, Burma, Indonesia, and especially from US territories in the Aleutians and withdraw from the Philippine Republic.
4. Prepare to hold free elections under Allied supervision.

I THINK those would be the minimums.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

What terms would the Roosevelt administration have offered Japan? Insists on "unconditionally surrender" seems kinda early, maybe withdraw from China, Vietnam, Philippines, DEI and at least China south of the great wall?

"Unconditional Surrender" wasn't yet official Allied policy yet; it woulden't be adopted until Casablanca, so strictly speaking the WAllies aren't required for political reasons to push for UCS. Given the Germans are still putting alot of pressure on the USSR in 1942, with the prospect of marching into Manchuria still far from Stalin's mind while Hitler is still nipping at the far bank of the Volga, this would probably look to him like the golden oppritunity to free up the British and Americans for the "second front" and will give the international propaganda handle and diplomatic channels a hard twist to take the deal. Britain is also likely keen on the deal, given she's still fighting for her life to crack into Europe and has a policy of wanting to restore the colonial system as soon as possible for the sake of insuring it was stable, and the ability to pull resources back to the Atlantic to finally win the Battle there and back operations in the Med. to hit Europe's "soft underbelly" in her peripheral startegy would probably be popular as well if Japan is willing to evacuate all the territories she's occupied (And, if its of any importance, the Free French will obviously sign on if they're given Indochina back).

Really, strong "War to the End" Policy against Japan would be the domain of the Americans, so for Roosevelt its a question of weather or not he's going to value the benefits to Cohalition Warfare vs. domestic opinion. Given the US is sworn to prioritize the war in Europe under "Germany First" there's certainly a back door to accept Japanese surrender, though it'd have to be under some pretty hard terms (I imagine it'd be a controlled withdrawal back to pre-invasion of Manchuria borders, if they spin the whole sitaution into military hardliners having taken control of the government and dragged an unwilling population down the line to war in an effort to sell the situation to the public) under American supervision, perhaps with autonomy for or an independence plebecite in Korea and Formosa.

Then there's a big push by the Soviets and US on Britain to sign off on Sledgehammer or Roundup. I could even see Rome getting early gitters and opening up backchannels in this event,

 

[Nivek]

1. Surrender the Combined Fleet... ALL of it. Return the IJA to their home barracks in Japan proper.
2. Yamamoto, Isoruku delivered to the Americans ALIVE.
3. Withdraw from China, the Marshalls, the Gilberts, the Carolines, the Marianas, Indochina, Burma, Indonesia, and especially from US territories in the Aleutians and withdraw from the Philippine Republic.
4. Prepare to hold free elections under Allied supervision.

I THINK those would be the minimums.

nconditional Surrender" wasn't yet official Allied policy yet; it woulden't be adopted until Casablanca

So your terms would work, specially 1-3, those are not negotiable.

 

[Geon]

1. Surrender the Combined Fleet... ALL of it. Return the IJA to their home barracks in Japan proper.
2. Yamamoto, Isoruku delivered to the Americans ALIVE.
3. Withdraw from China, the Marshalls, the Gilberts, the Carolines, the Marianas, Indochina, Burma, Indonesia, and especially from US territories in the Aleutians and withdraw from the Philippine Republic.
4. Prepare to hold free elections under Allied supervision.

I THINK those would be the minimums.

I would agree here. The Americans at this point were absolutely and thoroughly ticked off! They would not have settled for anything less then this. I would add a further condition. Surrender of all members of the Japanese war cabinet including all those leaders involved in the campaigns in the Philippines, Wake Island, Singapore, and elsewhere for war crimes trials. Japan would of course be expected to pay indemnities to China, the UK, and the U.S. to be negotiated later.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

So your terms would work, specially 1-3, those are not negotiable.

4 would likely be considered to heavy and infrindgement on Japanese sovergeinity to be accepted though, especially since I presume in the event of the failed coup the hardline radicals have been arrested and dismissed from their positions. Japan may agree to ban any candidates with previous associations to the war government, but not direct Allied oversight/management.

Term 1 would also likely be tempered down somewhat, as Japan would insist on keeping some Navy of Armastice, and probably wrangle Formosa and Korea being labled "Japan Proper". Remember, the Allies have to offer terms that seem better for Japan than fighting a campaign of attritional resistance, digging into the islands to make the Americans and British bleed, so will need to be at least a "soft landing". Especially with Stalin screaming to just take the deal so they can bring the war to Germany faster.

 

[Nivek]

4 would likely be considered to heavy and infrindgement on Japanese sovergeinity to be accepted though, especially since I presume in the event of the failed coup the hardline radicals have been arrested and dismissed from their positions. Japan may agree to ban any candidates with previous associations to the war government, but not direct Allied oversight/management.

Term 1 would also likely be tempered down somewhat, as Japan would insist on keeping some Navy of Armastice, and probably wrangle Formosa and Korea being labled "Japan Proper". Remember, the Allies have to offer terms that seem better for Japan than fighting a campaign of attritional resistance, digging into the islands to make the Americans and British bleed, so will need to be at least a "soft landing". Especially with Stalin screaming to just take the deal so they can bring the war to Germany faster.

I think 2-3 would be...ACCEPT IT or WAR, 1 they could negotiated how 'reduce' or 'optimize' the fleet to save cost in exchange 'aid' or just an excuse to reduce the IJN in exchange of food for a while, yeah but this is the main point, japan loss the war but won the peace...ENJOY THE MESS Korea and others will be

 

[pjmidd]

1. Surrender the Combined Fleet... ALL of it. Return the IJA to their home barracks in Japan proper.
2. Yamamoto, Isoruku delivered to the Americans ALIVE.
3. Withdraw from China, the Marshalls, the Gilberts, the Carolines, the Marianas, Indochina, Burma, Indonesia, and especially from US territories in the Aleutians and withdraw from the Philippine Republic.
4. Prepare to hold free elections under Allied supervision.

I THINK those would be the minimums.

What happened to all the other places like Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand etc? Cannot see them keeping anything except on an occupied for a time basis ( trust will be a little low to say the least on the allied side given Japan has shown a tendency to be less than truthful )

 

[FillyofDelphi]

I think 2-3 would be...ACCEPT IT or WAR, 1 they could negotiated how 'reduce' or 'optimize' the fleet to save cost in exchange 'aid' or just an excuse to reduce the IJN in exchange of food for a while, yeah but this is the main point, japan loss the war but won the peace...ENJOY THE MESS Korea and others will be

Agree on 2 and 3 (Assuming in the case of 2 Yamamoto and Isoruku diden't get caught in a literal crossfire during the coup and well... can't be delivered alive due to lack of Lazarus Mechanism). But 1 is a bit extreme in terms of complete disarmament: even Vichy France had been allowed to keep SOME army and navy post-Armastice, and Japan would probably insist on a similar gentelman's treatment if nothing else (If nothing else, Korea and Formosa would have be under continued military presence for some time as there's no recognized authority to hand over power to. Manchuria can easily go back to the Nationalists (Or, perhaps, cohalition between Kai-check and the Nanjing Regeime; China's future is going to be a big question mark). Korea true will be a mess for awhile, but I beleive they can integrate Formosa given time.

 

[Nivek]

But 1 is a bit extreme in terms of complete disarmament:

Pearl Harbor make it a political football, negotiated too little and is a career killer back in the americas even with nazis in europe, too harsh might kill the negotiations but that is the point, negotiated hard to get a 'gentleman agreement' and something can be sold as victory for both side, plus that help japan reducing the size of the navy means less spend and they can modernize it later on.

Korea true will be a mess for awhile

And there a real chance they will loss it...would be for the best... i agree with formosa, they would become perfectures in the future

 

[McPherson]

4 would likely be considered to heavy and infrindgement on Japanese sovergeinity to be accepted though, especially since I presume in the event of the failed coup the hardline radicals have been arrested and dismissed from their positions. Japan may agree to ban any candidates with previous associations to the war government, but not direct Allied oversight/management.

Term 1 would also likely be tempered down somewhat, as Japan would insist on keeping some Navy of Armastice, and probably wrangle Formosa and Korea being labled "Japan Proper". Remember, the Allies have to offer terms that seem better for Japan than fighting a campaign of attritional resistance, digging into the islands to make the Americans and British bleed, so will need to be at least a "soft landing". Especially with Stalin screaming to just take the deal so they can bring the war to Germany faster.

1. I think after Pearl Harbor, the US would have to insist on a full naval turnover of all assets that are possible of offensive action. Japan could have a coast guard post surrender, but after Pearl Harbor I do not see the USN asking for any less guarantee.
2. Could be possibly negotiated if the Japanese hang him themselves. Maybe even give him a pass with jail time? Anyhow this would be a talking point that is remedial.
3. The US geopolitically would have to have Taiwan in hand to guarantee a sea lane to Chiang and prop up his corrupt regime until someone better comes along to replace that monster. Korea might be a write off, I do not know. I think some Japanese counterweight excuse to possess Korea to offset Russia is a BAD idea, given the results of their misrule in that country.
4. Might be negotiable. But it sure would be beneficial if the democratic forces latent in Japan (1945 to 1955, just 10 years! Incredible.) were given some kind of guarantee to take hold.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Bare minimum is the complete disarmament of the Kido Butai, followed by the withdrawal from all occupied WAllied territory, acceptance of war guilt and reparations. I'm not sure the commanders of the attack on Pearl Harbor could be realistically included (open question whether they would commit suicide or not). Japan would probably be allowed to keep its pre-war borders (with maybe the exception of Manchuria as a bone to China) but see its navy gutted and the army significantly reduced.

Japan essentially pays for the damages of the war thus far and in exchange is allowed to continue existing, with a chance of rearming later on in history (given the probable coming Cold War, they might be seen as a regional containment against communism in SE Asia) and with the war in Europe still raging, crushing them when they are willing to have peace would probably be see as an unacceptable waste of resources by the British and the Soviets.

 

[theg*ddam*hoi2fan]

2. Could be possibly negotiated if the Japanese hang him themselves. Maybe even give him a pass with jail time?

Except that arguably Minoru Genda had a far greater role in planning and executing Pearl Harbour and not only was he not hanged, he became a General in the Japan Air Self Defence Force. If he could swing that...

Also, on what basis? Pearl Harbour was not a war crime - it was a conventional strike at a military target. There is no conceivable justification for executing or even imprisoning Yamamoto save for victor's justice.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

1. I think after Pearl Harbor, the US would have to insist on a full naval turnover of all assets that are possible of offensive action. Japan could have a coast guard post surrender, but after Pearl Harbor I do not see the USN asking for any less guarantee.
2. Could be possibly negotiated if the Japanese hang him themselves. Maybe even give him a pass with jail time? Anyhow this would be a talking point that is remedial.
3. The US geopolitically would have to have Taiwan in hand to guarantee a sea lane to Chiang and prop up his corrupt regime until someone better comes along to replace that monster. Korea might be a write off, I do not know. I think some Japanese counterweight excuse to possess Korea to offset Russia is a BAD idea, given the results of their misrule in that country.
4. Might be negotiable. But it sure would be beneficial if the democratic forces latent in Japan (1945 to 1955, just 10 years! Incredible.) were given some kind of guarantee to take hold.

1. I would have to say "full" naval turnover might be a little extreme, depending on how we define offensive assets. Any remaining capital ships are certainly a requirement, but for example what about cruisers? Something along the lines of giving Japan a tonnage limit of ships they're allowed to keep, with permission to select any vessels they like that are individually under X-weight (In otherwords, a force limited both in total power and the power of any individual vessel) subject to Anglo-American confiscation of the other vessels as part of reperations payments seems like terms that are more tolerable to both sides.

2. I think the Americans will insist on trying them both, though maybe they'll agree to joint trial since execution seems like a presumed conclusion if they tried to lead a coup against the Emperor.

3. Depends. Any personal opinions on Chiang aside from any party here, there was the question of the recently purged membership who the Japanese were setting up in Nainjing. I could see the Americans insisting on a power sharing agreement between the two parties to prevent China from slipping back into a left-right civil war and hedge against a potential Commie resurgance, which the Nationalists would accept as terms of rebuilding loans. Maybe I'm being overly optamistic, but given the relatively poor position the Nationalists will have on the ground at the time of the Japanese surrender Chaing would certainly be pliable to concessions if pressed.

4. As I said, Japan would probably receive a list of banned candidates/parties and personally keep out anybody associated with the Coup, which basically shoots the Nationalist cause in the heart in terms of election prospects. The retention of control over the policital system would be the key factor here: Japan would have to be seen as having negotiated a surrender rather than being perceived as rolling over to be conquered by its consituents to avoid a "stabbed in the back" myth from taking root, and I think the Emperor and his liberal-anti-expansionist backers would recognize that and insist that terms be put in place that will prevent the resurgence of militerisim in the future. and allow them to legitimize further repressive measures against the far right.

 

[RousseauX]

Also, on what basis? Pearl Harbour was not a war crime - it was a conventional strike at a military target. There is no conceivable justification for executing or even imprisoning Yamamoto save for victor's justice.

Victor's justice is a real thing though, one of the charges against Ribbentropp at Nureumburg was for plotting to violate international treaties

 

[Alstein]

There might be a demand for a DoW on Germany.

 

[McPherson]

Except that arguably Minoru Genda had a far greater role in planning and executing Pearl Harbour and not only was he not hanged, he became a General in the Japan Air Self Defence Force. If he could swing that...

Also, on what basis? Pearl Harbour was not a war crime - it was a conventional strike at a military target. There is no conceivable justification for executing or even imprisoning Yamamoto save for victor's justice.

This was what the Tokyo and Manila trials were. Homma and Yamashita were tried and punished for lesser crimes than Yamamoto actually committed. Minoru Genda was a professional doing what his commander ordered be done, executing an illegal attack on a nation at peace without formal declaration of war. (Yes; I know about Admiral Nomura's failed mission and his bungled attempt to declare the note initiating hostilities one hour before the air raid, but that is still no excuse.). Yamamoto (Like Robert E. Lee to take an American example.) was in a position of some authority to affect national decisions. Genda was not. His crime, Genda's, was bungling the planning.

 

[Changundramon]

Except that arguably Minoru Genda had a far greater role in planning and executing Pearl Harbour and not only was he not hanged, he became a General in the Japan Air Self Defence Force. If he could swing that...

Also, on what basis? Pearl Harbour was not a war crime - it was a conventional strike at a military target. There is no conceivable justification for executing or even imprisoning Yamamoto save for victor's justice.

Agree, it's most likely that Tojo, and whatever generals that ordered atrocities on Allied troops are demanded for trial.

 

[Shadow Master]

There might be a demand for a DoW on Germany.

You beat me to it!

Counter offer to peace:

1. Withdraw to 1932 boarders, all armed vessels over 5,000 tons turned over to US/Allies.
2. All IJA troops stationed in asian mainland forced to entrain for the Eastern front.
3. All IJA troops stationed in Japan/Pacific can return to Japan/1932 boarders.
4. Trade goods/resources flow into Japan when IJA troops begin fighting and dying on the eastern front alongside their soviet counterparts.
5. The USA begins sending troops and LL shipments directly to the soviet far east, german u-boats rendered useless!

Something like that.