WI: Japan sues for peace after Midway

The premise is highly improbable, as after Pearl Harbor there was no possibility of Japan or the US even considering any peace agreement the other would accept.

Debatable point. Things would have to go radically wrong from the RTL (almost ASB) to actually make the opening premise, possible, but we will P.o.D that a bit and see if we can chase off the ASBs.
But... let's go with this:

Midway, by a series of near-miracles, ends with the complete destruction of not only the Striking Force (the carriers) but also the Main Body. There is nothing left to defend the Home Islands (and the Emperor!) from American carrier raids. The disaster is so bad that it cannot be concealed.

How do we do that with late 1930s US technology? I don't mean miracle weapons and improbables, I mean with Devastators, Dauntlesses, B-17s, PBYs, other American RTL airplanes present, the torpedoes in use, the gun platforms, the doctrines, etc?

It is barely possible, that the 300 planes of the Midway air garrison and aboard the three American carriers can sink the four Japanese aircraft carriers and possibly one of the two seaplane cruisers and one battleship of the screen/scout force that Nagumo took into battle and that the other battleship would succumb to the American submarine that attacked it. Barely possible. It is even conceivable Yorktown survives intact. I have wargamed this result once or twice.

But... the Hornet has to have a competent air staff and a different captain, Miles Browning's decision making and incompetence has to be utterly set aside, air recon from Midway has to ATL be more accurate, Stanhope Ring has to make it to the fight and USS Nautilus has to sacrifice herself to get either Soryu or Kongo. Take your pick of P.o.D.s. And US air casualties, RTL appalling at Midway would have to be even more so, maybe 2/3 loss of pilots and aircrew instead of the 35%.

Is that enough? The Turkey Shoot started the Japanese peace feelers. It was about as catastrophic navally, but not geographically. Maybe a battle of annihilation later in the Eastern Solomon Islands might be necessary. I am looking at that NOW.

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So... Japan decides to make peace immediately and save what they can. This is the offer:

All Japanese forces will be withdrawn to the territory of the Empire. That is, Japan will evacuate Burma, Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, North Borneo, Indochina, the Philippines, New Guinea, the Bismarck, Solomon, and Gilbert Islands, Wake, Guam, and China. (This includes Manchuria; however Japan plans to keep control through several thousand officers and NCOs "seconded" to the army of Manchukuo as its commanders.)

As a token of good faith, all artillery and military vehicles will be left behind. All Allied military and civilian prisoners in Japanese custody will be released immediately.

In addition, Japan agrees to dismantle all military and naval installations in the Trust Territory of the Pacific, and that the Marshall Islands shall be a US mandate and the Caroline Islands will be Australian.

As to war criminals: Japan states that the decision to go to war was imposed on the Emperor by irresponsible military and naval leaders. These men started the war, and having led Japan to defeat, have atoned appropriately for their failure, IYKWIMAITYD. A list of 50 names, or it may be 300, is attached.

This is not what the US wants (e.g. "the Japanese language will be spoken only in Hell"), but it is a huge win for the Allies, allowing them to concentrate on Europe. They can get more, but only at the cost of thousands of men KIA and billions of $, plus massive civilian suffering in Japanese-occupied territory.

Could the Allies possibly settle for it?

No. As long as the Japanese hold the Mariana Islands in any capacity, the war continues. No sane allied military commander or political leader can allow a Japanese presence in the Marianas Islands. The Japanese could establish an air bastion and a raiding base there. The US would have to insist these islands pass into US control.

It is a question of naval geography and air power. In fact I regard the evacuation of those islands by the United States (excepting Guam) as one the stupidest geo-political decisions the US government has ever made.
 
Debatable point. Things would have to go radically wrong from the RTL (almost ASB) to actually make the opening premise, possible, but we will P.o.D that a bit and see if we can chase off the ASBs.


How do we do that with late 1930s US technology? I don't mean miracle weapons and improbables, I mean with Devastators, Dauntlesses, B-17s, PBYs, other American RTL airplanes present, the torpedoes in use, the gun platforms, the doctrines, etc?

It is barely possible, that the 300 planes of the Midway air garrison and aboard the three American carriers can sink the four Japanese aircraft carriers and possibly one of the two seaplane cruisers and one battleship of the screen/scout force that Nagumo took into battle and that the other battleship would succumb to the American submarine that attacked it. Barely possible. It is even conceivable Yorktown survives intact. I have wargamed this result once or twice.

But... the Hornet has to have a competent air staff and a different captain, Miles Browning's decision making and incompetence has to be utterly set aside, air recon from Midway has to ATL be more accurate, Stanhope Ring has to make it to the fight and USS Nautilus has to sacrifice herself to get either Soryu or Kongo. Take your pick of P.o.D.s. And US air casualties, RTL appalling at Midway would have to be even more so, maybe 2/3 loss of pilots and aircrew instead of the 35%.

Is that enough? The Turkey Shoot started the Japanese peace feelers. It was about as catastrophic navally, but not geographically. Maybe a battle of annihilation later in the Eastern Solomon Islands might be necessary. I am looking at that NOW.

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No. As long as the Japanese hold the Mariana Islands in any capacity, the war continues. No sane allied military commander or political leader can allow a Japanese presence in the Marianas Islands. The Japanese could establish an air bastion and a raiding base there. The US would have to insist these islands pass into US control.

It is a question of naval geography and air power. In fact I regard the evacuation of those islands by the United States (excepting Guam) as one the stupidest geo-political decisions the US government has ever made.


I'm thinking if the Japanese were stubborn enough and kept pushing forwards at Midway despite their initial losses the U.S. could conceivably have inflicted heavy damage on the surface forces.

Perhaps after loosing the bulk of their carrier force the Japanese erroneously conclude that the U.S. forces are incapable of significant further combat and decide to risk landing on midway. The surface elements of the Japanese fleet escort the invasion force to midway. The U.S. detects this and carries out strikes against the Japanese surface force with their remaining Carrier forces. Having to support the invasion force will tie a significant portion of the Japanese fleet to the vicinity of midway. I can see the IJN being very reluctant to abandon the troop transports to their fate.

Assuming the U.S. carriers have enough aviation fuel and munitions (or they can be replenished at sea ?) I could see a well handled US carrier force grinding down a Japanese surface force that decided to stay in the area.
 
I'm thinking if the Japanese were stubborn enough and kept pushing forwards at Midway despite their initial losses the U.S. could conceivably have inflicted heavy damage on the surface forces.

Perhaps after loosing the bulk of their carrier force the Japanese erroneously conclude that the U.S. forces are incapable of significant further combat and decide to risk landing on midway. The surface elements of the Japanese fleet escort the invasion force to midway. The U.S. detects this and carries out strikes against the Japanese surface force with their remaining Carrier forces. Having to support the invasion force will tie a significant portion of the Japanese fleet to the vicinity of midway. I can see the IJN being very reluctant to abandon the troop transports to their fate.

Assuming the U.S. carriers have enough aviation fuel and munitions (or they can be replenished at sea ?) I could see a well handled US carrier force grinding down a Japanese surface force that decided to stay in the area.

One must remember realistically (We have chased off the ASBs, theoretically.), that it was a remarkable confluence of circumstances that torched off the Japanese carriers. None of them were technically "sunk". They were burned out, rendered non-repairable (by the Japanese who did not have the capacity) and self scuttled. When one considers that the Mogami and Mikuma, two badly designed cruisers, took 1/3 of Spruance's remaining air strength to sink, and that the Japanese helped the American cause by wrecking the two cruisers themselves in a collision, and collates that into what it would take to put down a battle-line of four or more battleships? We have an exaggerated sense of [American] air-power at sea in 1942. It can be estimated that it would take at least a full dive bomber squadron to guarantee a WW I era Japanese battleship sunk as rebuilt in 1942. Spruance only had the equivalent of 3 after the Kido Butai was massacred. Given all the breaks, Browning dumped over the side with Mitscher and Yorktown survives, Fletcher and Spruance could have 5 squadrons. That might guarantee 2 battleships. I am confident that if the Japanese attempt a landing on either East or West Island, the troop transports and the SNLF would be annihilated by the Marine garrison. They have too strong a defense. Even Japanese battleship gunfire support would not be enough to get the SNLF ashore. The American task force in question is also just strong enough, itself, to break up any Yamamoto attempt to support the Japanese landings with gunfire. Since the Japanese have no fleet train, if the initial landing fails, they have to decide whether to risk American submarines swimming in and air reinforcements flying in from Oahu, or retreat? This is why Yamamoto abandoned the attempt. He had fuel on hand for two days operations in area and not enough tankers to replenish.

Spruance was in the same exact fix, but Yamamoto did not know it.
 
One must remember realistically (We have chased off the ASBs, theoretically.), that it was a remarkable confluence of circumstances that torched off the Japanese carriers. None of them were technically "sunk". They were burned out, rendered non-repairable (by the Japanese who did not have the capacity) and self scuttled. When one considers that the Mogami and Mikuma, two badly designed cruisers, took 1/3 of Spruance's remaining air strength to sink, and that the Japanese helped the American cause by wrecking the two cruisers themselves in a collision, and collates that into what it would take to put down a battle-line of four or more battleships? We have an exaggerated sense of [American] air-power at sea in 1942. It can be estimated that it would take at least a full dive bomber squadron to guarantee a WW I era Japanese battleship sunk as rebuilt in 1942. Spruance only had the equivalent of 3 after the Kido Butai was massacred. Given all the breaks, Browning dumped over the side with Mitscher and Yorktown survives, Fletcher and Spruance could have 5 squadrons. That might guarantee 2 battleships. I am confident that if the Japanese attempt a landing on either East or West Island, the troop transports and the SNLF would be annihilated by the Marine garrison. They have too strong a defense. Even Japanese battleship gunfire support would not be enough to get the SNLF ashore. The American task force in question is also just strong enough, itself, to break up any Yamamoto attempt to support the Japanese landings with gunfire. Since the Japanese have no fleet train, if the initial landing fails, they have to decide whether to risk American submarines swimming in and air reinforcements flying in from Oahu, or retreat? This is why Yamamoto abandoned the attempt. He had fuel on hand for two days operations in area and not enough tankers to replenish.

Spruance was in the same exact fix, but Yamamoto did not know it.
All good points. I'm thinking that even moderate damage that didn't sink Japanese surface warships but instead slowed them down for example could ultimately prove to be fatal that far away from Japan without air cover. U.S. Destroyers could try to torpedo stragglers after dark, submarines might get lucky etc.

Sinking some of the tankers might further complicate things for the Japanese.

Edit to add:
I also wonder how many torpedoes and bombs would have been avalaible on the U.S. Carriers after the historical attacks on the Japanese fleet. I have nagging suspicion this may have put a significant limit on the number of follow up strikes against large warships. The losses suffered by the torpedo planes may also have caused issues as well.
 
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Boeing began work on pressurized long-range bombers in 1938, in response to a USAAC request. The Air Corps issued a formal specification for a so-called "superbomber", capable of delivering 20,000 lb of bombs to a target 2,667 mile away and capable of flying at a speed of 400 mph in December 1939.

Boeing received an initial production order for 14 service test aircraft and 250 production bombers in May 1941.


December 7, 1941 Operation AI conducted resulting in 2335 military personnel killed along with 68 civilians.


This results in the USAAC B29 order increased to 500 aircraft in January 1942.


April 18th America demonstrates her capability with the ‘Doolittle Raid.’


On 4th-7th June the Americans get their revenge in the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare.


29/05/43 the Americans began construction of the Shemya airfield for the B29’s. Any reason this could’ve not been done 12-15 months earlier, since the original aircraft were ordered 2 years earlier?


Shemya to Hokkaidō 1600 miles, thus placing around 3.25 million Japanese well within range, and possibly other Japanese homeland targets with a lighter bomb load.


Could it have been possible for more urgency placed earlier in the B29 programme so as bombing of the Japanese home islands coincide with Midway in June ‘42, satisfying American revenge and force even a ceasefire?
 
Boeing began work on pressurized long-range bombers in 1938, in response to a USAAC request. The Air Corps issued a formal specification for a so-called "superbomber", capable of delivering 20,000 lb of bombs to a target 2,667 mile away and capable of flying at a speed of 400 mph in December 1939.

This is accurate, more or less.

Boeing received an initial production order for 14 service test aircraft and 250 production bombers in May 1941.
It takes an average of 3 years to prototype from IOPR.

December 7, 1941 Operation AI conducted resulting in 2335 military personnel killed along with 68 civilians.
PearL Harbor.

This results in the USAAC B29 order increased to 500 aircraft in January 1942.
No where near enough.

April 18th America demonstrates her capability with the ‘Doolittle Raid.’
Another way to look at it, is that the USN muffs a chance to have 4 aircraft carriers present to kill all the Japanese carriers at the Battle of the Coral Sea.

On 4th-7th June the Americans get their revenge in the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare.
Specify with metrics.

29/05/43 the Americans began construction of the Shemya airfield for the B29’s. Any reason this could’ve not been done 12-15 months earlier, since the original aircraft were ordered 2 years earlier?

Probably nothing except the WEATHER and the terrain. Have you any idea how LOUSY the Aleutian Islands are for an air campaign?

Shemya to Hokkaidō 1600 miles, thus placing around 3.25 million Japanese well within range, and possibly other Japanese homeland targets with a lighter bomb load.

Same again.

Could it have been possible for more urgency placed earlier in the B29 programme so as bombing of the Japanese home islands coincide with Midway in June ‘42, satisfying American revenge and force even a ceasefire?

No.
 
Without a viable Navy the Japanese might conclude that transferring resources between their conquests and their home land isn't feasible during war time, and they might seek to end the war.

They had trouble with that concept later in 1945.

One of the problems this discussion is bumping up against is Tojos government was weighted towards the Army & others with no real understanding of naval affairs. They failed to grasp how a naval campaign across the Pacific was relatively low cost for the US. This went hand in hand with their denial of the industrial factor in fighting the US. Even after Tojo lost the Prime ministers seat he remained in the cabinet & was able to influence strategy to the end. He & his faction opposed surrender even after the ability to ship cargo & import critical items had collapsed. He did not admit the problem then, and however badly the navy was defeated he'd have trouble grasping the numbers in 1942. Neither would his fellow travelers or the Zaibatsu they were tied to.

Note that even when prosecuting two trans Pacific campaigns 1943-45, and aiding the Pacific Allies the US still only expended about 20% of its war making capacity against Japan.
 
I had a thought concerning the Japanese Navy and saving face. Surrendering the fleet would be unacceptable to Japan, and letting it survive as a threat is unacceptable to the USA. If the fleet was the remaining sticking point, allow the fleet to commit Sepuku--scuttle itself in deep water with American observers. Their choice as to if they simple let water in, or blow magazines, but they go down with their own flag flying. I expect that a fair number of Japanese high ranking officers would chose to go down with their ships. (Allow them to sail with powder, but no shells, and a limited amount of fuel.)

Likewise, allow the air force to destroy its own planes under supervision, to verify that they really are destroyed.

That allows a certain amount of face saving, and could even be advertised as atoning for bringing destruction on Japan.
 
They had trouble with that concept later in 1945.

One of the problems this discussion is bumping up against is Tojos government was weighted towards the Army & others with no real understanding of naval affairs. They failed to grasp how a naval campaign across the Pacific was relatively low cost for the US. This went hand in hand with their denial of the industrial factor in fighting the US. Even after Tojo lost the Prime ministers seat he remained in the cabinet & was able to influence strategy to the end. He & his faction opposed surrender even after the ability to ship cargo & import critical items had collapsed. He did not admit the problem then, and however badly the navy was defeated he'd have trouble grasping the numbers in 1942. Neither would his fellow travelers or the Zaibatsu they were tied to.

Note that even when prosecuting two trans Pacific campaigns 1943-45, and aiding the Pacific Allies the US still only expended about 20% of its war making capacity against Japan.
Yes I agree. I suppose in order for the events postulated in this thread to occur the hardline Japanese leadership needs to be removed in some way.
 

DougM

Donor
The America people wanted revenge. It is that simple. I had Aunts and Uncles that still had problems with Japan in the 90s because of WW2 and Peril, these folks NEVER forgot and didn’t forgive. And they were not unusual for the time. And non of them were happy the Emperor was allowed to stick around. Yes he was a bit of a puppet but they didn’t care.
So the problem is how are you getting the US Citizens the revenge the will insist on while creating a pease that Japan will accept?
Basically in real world timeline the US did a tremendous amount of damage to Japan. Destroyed its cities, killed huge numbers of its citizens, all but eliminated its Navy and exterminated its Army like it was insects. Then we took over its government and rebuilt it as we saw fit. All but disarmed it and stamped much of its culture with ours. Short of exterminating the whole race it was about as far as could be gone. And Japan barely excepted surrender at that point. And no one sat around in the US think we were to hard on them and should let them get away with it.
So the US average Joe public is going to expect at least the following. Eliminate ALL military 100%. 100% with drawl from all occupied territory (back to the home island only). The US to Occupy at least a good part of Japan while it completely rebuilds its government. Anything less and the voters are going to revolt at the next election.
So exactly how are you getting Japan to agree to what the US will demand or get the US polititions to commit political suicide by accepting the Japanese terms?
You are all looking at this from an intellectual game 75 years later. During the war emotions ran high and you are not taking that into account. Logically if you find your wife in bed with your best friend you should grab a camera and call a lawyer. But many a folks in the heat of the moment grab a ball bat or at least toss someone out a window. Is it logical? No but it is the way things realy work at the time. And that is the problem. The people in the US were majorly upset and you have to take that into account,
Unless you are saying the politicians take the hit and hand the Precidency to Dewey and all the the Senators that voted for it go with FDR
 
The America people wanted revenge. It is that simple. I had Aunts and Uncles that still had problems with Japan in the 90s because of WW2 and Peril, these folks NEVER forgot and didn’t forgive. And they were not unusual for the time. ...

I had a slightly different perspective on this during my childhood in the 1950s & early 1960s. My Irish ancestored Aunts and Uncles, all 3rd 4th 5th 6th generation Americans, were still bitter about English rule in Ireland. I did not take notes, but my memory is they despised the English & were not on the same page as the rest of the US in admiring Britain for its stand against the nazi regime.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
There are a couple different issues here.

1. A clean sweep of the Kido Butai including all the escorts (quite unlikely) and even the Main Body (near ASB) does not cripple the IJN's ability to defend the Home Islands. Zuiho was with the MI Invasion Force (the U.S. Task forces are not going to be able to engage THREE different IJN groups before losses in aircraft end operations) The The Aleutian invasion force has four BB (BATDIV 1) along with Junyo, Ryujo & Zuiho while the two newest decks in the IJN, Shokaku (which left the yard after having her battle damage from Coral Sea repaired on 27 June '42) and Zuikaku (fully operational and dispatched to support the on-going Aleutian operation on 15 June '42) are in close to Home Waters.

Hiyo will be commissioned on 31 July '42, Ryuho on 30 November '42, while the Super BB Musahi will be commissioned on 5 August '42. The land based elements of the JNAF are still available in large numbers presenting a tactical problem that that the still relatively under-equipped (both in number of airframes and performance) American VF squadrons would find extremely difficult to solve.

The Japanese will have lost much of their ability to conduct offensive operations, (the IJN light carriers in general lacked the speed to operate with the fast carriers) although Shokaku and Zuikaku are fairly formidable platforms and can not be entirely discounted, any more than Saratoga and Enterprise were IOTL for the USN.

There is also the rather brutal reality that the Japanese are, even with the obliteration of much of their offensive striking force, in excellent position. They still hold the Mandates, Gilberts, Marianas, Philippines, DEI, Singapore and Malay Peninsula and are consolidating in Burma. Their position on the Chinese mainland is unaffected (since the whole reason for engaging the West was to get the resources needed to complete their conquest of China).

Hirohito was much less of a pacifist than some post war revisionists proclaim. His main question to his military commander, at least until B-29s started to burn Tokyo down around his garden walls,was a variant of "why haven't we achieved the success you forecast and when can we expect that success?"

Considering all of the above it is nearly inconceivable that the Japanese would seek peace terms on anything other than freezing current conditions (maybe throwing the British and Americans a bone or two, like a demilitarized & independent Philippines and some sort of cash consideration for British colonies). IOTL in the middle of 1945 they STILL expected to be allowed to retain their remaining Empire (Formosa and Korea) and avoid full demilitarization (this AFTER Okinawa had fallen and while the USAAF was burning down 20-30 SQUARE MILES of urban Japan every week.

2. The U.S. effort in the Pacific actually did very little to detract from the effort in the ETO. Early American offensives were small, division-division and a half of ground troops and mot of the aircraft were not suited for combat in the ETO (there is an argument to be made that some of it, like the P-400, was not suited for combat anywhere). The U.S. and UK were flatly not ready to open a second front in 1942 or even in 1943. The U.S. Army had to learn how to fight a proper combined arms war (Torch sort of illustrated just how unready the Army was for prime time). The Americans learned quickly, but an attempted entry in 1942 (almost impossible simply due to timing of Midway) or even 1943 would have been a debacle. The WAllies needed Torch, Husky, and Avalanche to get things in order to try the cross channel landing. In addition to the lack of trained and blooded personnel there was woeful lack of landing craft, along with a largely undeveloped set of amphibious doctrine.

About the only way an early end in the Pacific help the Soviets is if Stalin allows the Americans access into Siberia and then gets out of the way while the U.S. does what it did best in WW II, perform civil engineering miracles that allowed for unprecedented feats of logistics. The chances of Stalin allowing a a couple hundred thousand Army Corps of Engineers and combat engineering units to swarm all over Soviet Asia, setting up little islands of U.S. consumerism at its finest, are effectively nil.
 
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How do we do that with late 1930s US technology? I don't mean miracle weapons and improbables, I mean with Devastators, Dauntlesses, B-17s, PBYs, other American RTL airplanes present, the torpedoes in use, the gun platforms, the doctrines, etc?
By a series of near-miracles, as I suggested... The US doesn't have enough torpedo planes to sink the entire Main Body, even without any air opposition. Losses to flak and accidents would use them up too fast. There were seven Jap BBs; it would take about 40 hits to sink them all (one being Yamato). There were only 42 USN TBs. Against fast-moving targets at sea, with torpedoes that were about 50% duds, about 240 launches would be needed, i.e. six missions per plane.

IOW, realistically it's impossible. It's been hand-waved to allow consideration of the OP's issue: could Japan propose any peace deal in 1942 the Allies would accept short of unconditional surrender?

No. As long as the Japanese hold the Mariana Islands in any capacity, the war continues.
Between the wars, Japan colonized Micronesia, especially the Marianas; over half the population, about 70,000 people, were Japanese settlers. So Japan would want to retain administrative control - having (in this entirely unrealistic scenario) offered to withdraw all military and naval forces and dismantle all installations. Given everything else Japan is offering (in this entirely unrealistic scenario), it seemed vaguely plausible that this could be acceptable. But maybe it's true that allowing any sort of Japanese presence in the Marianas would be tantamount to national suicide for the US. I don't think so, but it's not worth arguing (in this entirely unrealistic scenario).
 
My Uncle fought in Italy and Normandy, to his dying day he HATED Germans. I knew many men who fought in the Pacific including some Battan Death March survivors, to a man they despised the Japanese (and weren't too fond of Dugout Doug either). Lived on Guam in the mid-70's, the older population who had lived through the Japanese Occupation hated the Japanese and treated Japanese tourists as nothing more than cash cows to be milked of everything possible.
 

RousseauX

Donor
One must remember realistically (We have chased off the ASBs, theoretically.), that it was a remarkable confluence of circumstances that torched off the Japanese carriers. None of them were technically "sunk". They were burned out, rendered non-repairable (by the Japanese who did not have the capacity) and self scuttled. When one considers that the Mogami and Mikuma, two badly designed cruisers, took 1/3 of Spruance's remaining air strength to sink, and that the Japanese helped the American cause by wrecking the two cruisers themselves in a collision, and collates that into what it would take to put down a battle-line of four or more battleships? We have an exaggerated sense of [American] air-power at sea in 1942. It can be estimated that it would take at least a full dive bomber squadron to guarantee a WW I era Japanese battleship sunk as rebuilt in 1942. Spruance only had the equivalent of 3 after the Kido Butai was massacred. Given all the breaks, Browning dumped over the side with Mitscher and Yorktown survives, Fletcher and Spruance could have 5 squadrons. That might guarantee 2 battleships. I am confident that if the Japanese attempt a landing on either East or West Island, the troop transports and the SNLF would be annihilated by the Marine garrison. They have too strong a defense. Even Japanese battleship gunfire support would not be enough to get the SNLF ashore. The American task force in question is also just strong enough, itself, to break up any Yamamoto attempt to support the Japanese landings with gunfire. Since the Japanese have no fleet train, if the initial landing fails, they have to decide whether to risk American submarines swimming in and air reinforcements flying in from Oahu, or retreat? This is why Yamamoto abandoned the attempt. He had fuel on hand for two days operations in area and not enough tankers to replenish.

Spruance was in the same exact fix, but Yamamoto did not know it.
that's largely because the Americans lost almost all of their torpedo bombers in the strike on the 4 carriers, dive bombers were pretty good against Japanese carriers especially with armed airplanes below deck, but not very good against battleships and Heavy cruisers. That's why in my OP I made one of the PoDs more US torpedo planes survive.
 
Keep in mind that after Midway, the Allies still had been yet to win a real land battle against Japan. Port Moresby was around the same time and that was largely a case of overextension; it wasn't until after Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona that the Allies demonstrated a real ability to defeat the Japanese Army in the field.

In OTL, the Japanese High Command knew the war was lost after Saipan, but fought on because they were convinced that the war in China could still be won (Operation Ichi-Go was going quite well at the time) and that would negate Allied successes in the Pacific, provided those successes did not go further than the Marshalls, Solomons, and New Guinea.

Midway was suppressed by propaganda (surviving airmen from the carriers were quarantined to prevent word from getting out), and the extent of the losses were to some degree not even known by the IJA, whose relations with the fleet were notoriously bad.

However, if we acknowledge the premise, I think the US at this point would be a bit shocked but likely insist that all territory taken from the Allies must be returned, an indemnity paid for the attack on Pearl Harbor, return of all POWs, etc. Then again, if Japan was asking for peace in 1942, it is likely they have such a dramatic change at the top that the war in China would also be abandoned
 
There are a couple different issues here.

1. A clean sweep of the Kido Butai including all the escorts (quite unlikely) and even the Main Body (near ASB) does not cripple the IJN's ability to defend the Home Islands. Zuiho was with the MI Invasion Force (the U.S. Task forces are not going to be able to engage THREE different IJN groups before losses in aircraft end operations) The The Aleutian invasion force has four BB (BATDIV 1) along with Junyo, Ryujo & Zuiho while the two newest decks in the IJN, Shokaku (which left the yard after having her battle damage from Coral Sea repaired on 27 June '42) and Zuikaku (fully operational and dispatched to support the on-going Aleutian operation on 15 June '42) are in close to Home Waters.

a. I am of the opinion that the force on force matrix should be confined to the First Air Fleet and TF 16 and TF 17. I suggested what might be maximally possible with the RTL means present.
b. The nitwittery involved on both sides in the Aleutian Islands has the making of a great comedy, that someone should McHale's Navy someday.

Hiyo will be commissioned on 31 July '42, Ryuho on 30 November '42, while the Super BB Musahi will be commissioned on 5 August '42. The land based elements of the JNAF are still available in large numbers presenting a tactical problem that that the still relatively under-equipped (both in number of airframes and performance) American VF squadrons would find extremely difficult to solve.

c. I call that the Rabaul problem.

The Japanese will have lost much of their ability to conduct offensive operations, (the IJN light carriers in general lacked the speed to operate with the fast carriers) although Shokaku and Zuikaku are fairly formidable platforms and can not be entirely discounted, any more than Saratoga and Enterprise were IOTL for the USN.

d. And here we have Santa Cruz in the timeline to which I contribute, summed up. Should be fun to write that one. Hint: the Japanese and the Americans will have in the ITTL, much the same disappointments they had RTL.

There is also the rather brutal reality that the Japanese are, even with the obliteration of much of their offensive striking force, in excellent position. They still hold the Mandates, Gilberts, Marianas, Philippines, DEI, Singapore and Malay Peninsula and are consolidating in Burma. Their position on the Chinese mainland is unaffected (since the whole reason for engaging the West was to get the resources needed to complete their conquest of China).

e. A point often overlooked in China, is that absent of a powerful mechanized Soviet or American army in China, the Japanese are too well organized and their peasant army is too good in tactics, organization, and logistics for the generally corrupt Kuomintang, even with American help to engage.

Hirohito was much less of a pacifist than some post war revisionists proclaim. His main question to his military commander, at least until B-29s started to burn Tokyo down around his garden walls,was a variant of "why haven't we achieved the success you forecast and when can we expect that success?"

f. Absent documented proof, I am not prepared to label Hirohito a war criminal. I am prepared with the scant evidence we do have in the records, to declare him pro-war and an IJA policy supporter, until it became almost too late to "gentrify" him and absolve him of all blame for the war policies he supported.

Considering all of the above it is nearly inconceivable that the Japanese would seek peace terms on anything other than freezing current conditions (maybe throwing the British and Americans a bone or two, like a demilitarized & independent Philippines and some sort of cash consideration for British colonies). IOTL in the middle of 1945 they STILL expected to be allowed to retain their remaining Empire (Formosa and Korea) and avoid full demilitarization (this AFTER Okinawa had fallen and while the USAAF was burning down 20-30 SQUARE MILES of urban Japan every week.

g. I am not sure about this assessment. They were being hammered hard in 1945, but the first vestiges of real famine and disease had not really bitten into the Japanese population, yet. The revolution, the Shidehara,
government feared, was almost certain to happen in the winter of *45/46.

2. The U.S. effort in the Pacific actually did very little to detract from the effort in the ETO. Early American offensives were small, division-division and a half of ground troops and mot of the aircraft were not suited for combat in the ETO (there is an argument to be made that some of it, like the P-400, was not suited for combat anywhere). The U.S. and UK were flatly not ready to open a second front in 1942 or even in 1943. The U.S. Army had to learn how to fight a proper combined arms war (Torch sort of illustrated just how unready the Army was for prime time). The Americans learned quickly, but an attempted entry in 1942 (almost impossible simply due to timing of Midway) or even 1943 would have been a debacle. The WAllies needed Torch, Husky, and Avalanche to get things in order to try the cross channel landing. In addition to the lack of trained and blooded personnel there was woeful lack of landing craft, along with a largely undeveloped set of amphibious doctrine.

h. Torch indicated that the US army, once ashore, had forgotten what the French had taught it in WW I; much as possibly the 1940 French army had forgotten. Funny thing is that US army divisions thrown into New Guinea OJTed at Buna and Gona. They probably can thank their Australian teachers for much of what they learned.

About the only way an early end in the Pacific helps the Soviets is if Stalin allows the Americans access into Siberia and then gets out of the way while the U.S. does what it did best in WW II, perform civil engineering miracles that allowed for unprecedented feats of logistics. The chances of Stalin allowing a a couple hundred thousand Army Corps of Engineers and combat engineering units to swarm all over Soviet Asia, setting up little islands of U.S. consumerism at its finest, are effectively nil.

I. Makes for an interesting north Pacific campaign. One notes that operations to secure the Kuriles and at least northern Hokkaido, to ensure SLOCs to Russian Siberia, are almost inevitable? It is almost inconceivable to me, how 11th Air Force supports such an island hopping campaign.

By a series of near-miracles, as I suggested... The US doesn't have enough torpedo planes to sink the entire Main Body, even without any air opposition. Losses to flak and accidents would use them up too fast. There were seven Jap BBs; it would take about 40 hits to sink them all (one being Yamato). There were only 42 USN TBs. Against fast-moving targets at sea, with torpedoes that were about 50% duds, about 240 launches would be needed, i.e. six missions per plane.

Add about a dozen submarines. I think it is ASB to expect anything but a First Air Fleet scuttled; maybe, just maybe a few escorts sunk.

IOW, realistically it's impossible. It's been hand-waved to allow consideration of the OP's issue: could Japan propose any peace deal in 1942 the Allies would accept short of unconditional surrender?

I think it is unlikely. Going the other way, there is a small chance the Japanese could accept US terms.

Between the wars, Japan colonized Micronesia, especially the Marianas; over half the population, about 70,000 people, were Japanese settlers. So Japan would want to retain administrative control - having (in this entirely unrealistic scenario) offered to withdraw all military and naval forces and dismantle all installations. Given everything else Japan is offering (in this entirely unrealistic scenario), it seemed vaguely plausible that this could be acceptable. But maybe it's true that allowing any sort of Japanese presence in the Marianas would be tantamount to national suicide for the US. I don't think so, but it's not worth arguing (in this entirely unrealistic scenario).

About 40% of the Hawaiian population in 1940 were Japanese. Guess the Japanese wNo way in Hecuba was or should the US allow Japanese administration of the Marianas Islands in any way shape or form whatsoever. The Marianas Islands in Japanese hands is not national suicide for the US, but it means that the islands would have to be US seized in the inevitable round 2 of the Pacific War.
 
About 40% of the Hawaiian population in 1940 were Japanese.
About 40% of Hawaii's population were ethnic Japanese, not Japanese nationals. That document shows that between 40% and 50% of them were under 20, and therefore almost certainly born in Hawaii, so they were US citizens. Many of these younger Japanese-Americans didn't even speak Japanese.

(I knew one of them: my mother's friend George, who passed on a few years ago. As a teenager, George saw the smoke rising from Pearl Harbor. At the end of the war, he was drafted and sent to Japan with the US occupation. They wanted to use him as a plainclothes agent, circulating among the people to find out what they really thought. But as he didn't speak Japanese, they had to send him to language school first.)

Those Japanese-Americans were in no way comparable to the Japanese nationals who settled in the Mariana Islands under Japanese imperial authority.
 
Midway was suppressed by propaganda (surviving airmen from the carriers were quarantined to prevent word from getting out), and the extent of the losses were to some degree not even known by the IJA, whose relations with the fleet were notoriously bad.

According to SHATTERED SWORD all seamen were immediately transferred to other ships without having any chance to see their families or talk to anyone. Many of them died at Guadalcanal...
 
About 40% of Hawaii's population were ethnic Japanese, not Japanese nationals. That document shows that between 40% and 50% of them were under 20, and therefore almost certainly born in Hawaii, so they were US citizens. Many of these younger Japanese-Americans didn't even speak Japanese.

Quite correct.

(I knew one of them: my mother's friend George, who passed on a few years ago. As a teenager, George saw the smoke rising from Pearl Harbor. At the end of the war, he was drafted and sent to Japan with the US occupation. They wanted to use him as a plainclothes agent, circulating among the people to find out what they really thought. But as he didn't speak Japanese, they had to send him to language school first.)

Not unusual. Considering how ignorant, so-called American experts on Japan were, it is a miracle that the Japanese democratic reformers were able to overcome American blundering and make the nascent democracy movement that MacArthur's people found and encouraged work. There has to be something there to encourage, you know?

Those Japanese-Americans were in no way comparable to the Japanese nationals who settled in the Mariana Islands under Japanese imperial authority.

See above. Given a generation or two (as they have been in our RTL) these Japanese would have been "Americanized".

 
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