Chapter 16: New Leadership, Same Old Problems
“America has turned the page from the excesses of the Reagan administration and stands on the precipice of a new era of compassionate leadership, one that puts people first over special interests. That means not taking from the poor to give to the rich, but making the rich pay their fair share so that all Americans can rise together. That means keeping young men out of unnecessary conflicts while working to make the world a safer and saner place. That means protecting programs that benefit the most vulnerable groups in our society – the elderly, the unemployed, the poor – while pushing for new programs that help middle-class Americans who’ve been hurt by Reaganomics. And that means investing in our future – our children, our workers, our families – while ensuring that generations to come are not saddled with today’s debt.” - Geraldine Ferraro, January 20, 1989
On a cold, dreary day in January nearly 1 million people, many of them women, crowded onto the National Mall in Washington D.C. to witness the triumph of the feminist movement with the inauguration of America’s first woman president. The journey to this point had been long and fraught with victories and crushing defeats, most recently that of the failure to ratify the ERA. Even Ferraro’s candidacy had been far from a guaranteed success and filled with scandal and controversy. Yet she proved that being a woman was not enough to stop someone from being elected President of the United States. When she uttered those words “I, Geraldine Anne Ferraro, do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States…” was the moment that the progress that had been made toward gender equality would never be able to be reversed, even if a long road lay ahead before men and women would have true equal standing with each other. But Ferraro’s inauguration was not just about this triumph for women, it was about presenting an alternative vision for America that differed from the one espoused by Reagan. Where he talked about smaller government and personal responsibility, Ferraro talked about an active role for government in cooperation with the private sector and collective responsibility to expand opportunities for all Americans. Where Reagan discussed a strong defense and strong stance against communism, Ferraro talked about having a strong but efficient defense and not just standing up against communism but for democracy and human rights as well. And where Reagan talked about defending traditional American values, Ferraro called for standing up for the rights of all Americans.
Entering office with a 56% approval rating, the real work of governing began the day after Ferraro’s inauguration and she had a lot on her plate that she wanted to address. Of chief importance to Ferraro was addressing the crime and drug epidemic facing America, fixing America’s struggling education system, expanding environmental protection and conservation efforts, reining in the deficit that had been growing during Reagan’s administration in large part due to his increases in military spending, and reforming the healthcare system. She was also committed to pushing forward policies aimed at improving the economic wellbeing of women and promoting women’s rights, expanding worker protections and implementing family leave policies, establishing job training and vocational education programs, and pushing campaign finance reform. Many of these agenda items had been discussed with Democratic congressional leadership during the transition and by Day One of the Ferraro administration Congress was already at work on a crime bill and new environmental regulation legislation. President-Elect Ferraro, Speaker Jim Wright, and Majority Leader Wendell Ford had all agreed that crime would be one of the easiest issues to address due to the bipartisan support for some action to reduce crime and Ferraro’s own campaigning on the issue. There was also support for action on the environment although division over how far to take it, with opposition from conservatives over increased environmental regulations that would burden business. Deficit reduction and healthcare reform would prove to be much more difficult to address while there was a lack of consensus on what form education reform should take and whether there should be a federal role or if it should be left to state and local governments. With all of this in mind, Ferraro began to push forward her agenda through the halls of Congress and take advantage of unified Democratic control of the federal government.
The early days of the Ferraro administration were focused on crime, the environment, and the deficit. Consensus on crime was easy to find, with Ferraro reaching out to both Democrats and Republicans in crafting comprehensive crime legislation that would address America’s growing crime problem that had been plaguing cities across the country. Also of great importance to Ferraro was tackling the issue of violence against women, an experience she had first hand as a prosecutor in Queens when she dealt with victims of sexual abuse, rape, and domestic violence. With the support of women’s groups she pushed for sweeping provisions to be included in the crime bill as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1989. These included expansions of protections of women who are victims of rape, defining rape and sexual assault as hate crimes against women, establishing rape education programs for judges, creating a sexual offenders registry, implementing safe spaces programs for women on college campuses, instituting rape prevention programs for women and children, and creating the Federal Commission on Violence Against Women. Most controversial of the provisions that Ferraro pushed for was broadening the rights of victims of these crimes to press charges against their attackers on civil rights grounds, allowing access to federal courts, which saw opposition from conservative judges who thought it proved to be an overstepping of federal power. Nevertheless, it opened up a national dialogue about sexual violence against women that women’s group had been attempting to publicize for years but which had gotten little attention. It was made even starker by a press conference held by President Ferraro in March 1989 where she had with her victims of rape and domestic abuse and talked about the struggles that women faced with a justice system that failed the victims of sexual assault and a society which struggled to treat rape as a violent act and not a sexual one. These provisions ended up gaining widespread bipartisan support, as did efforts to provide federal assistance to state and local governments in creating community programs to bring together groups to address issues of violence against women.
This was but one part of the Crime Reduction and Control Act of 1989, which included an increase in the number of police officers on the streets of America’s cities, the creation of gun-free zones in schools, beefed up efforts to fight drug trafficking, an expansion of the use of the federal death penalty, provisions to require states to enforce tougher sentencing guidelines, and greater penalties for the use of firearms in crimes. The act was not without controversy, however, particularly when Ferraro, in a moment of bluntness, said that the bill “was not enough to break the cycle of poverty that contributed to America’s crime problem” and suggested including provisions to fund programs to assist poor families in America’s inner cities since it can’t be called a crime reduction bill “if it only fights crime with brute force without also preventing it in the first place.” Conservatives immediately lambasted Ferraro for suggesting the “same old handouts” to poor Americans that they purported failed to stop crime and only fed into a cycle of welfare dependency that bloated the federal budget “without any returns for American taxpayers.” Bob Dole came out and said that it would be ill advised to “fall back into the same big government policies that failed in the past” and that Senate Republicans would oppose any measures inserted into the CRCA that didn’t deal with enforcement and crime control. Ferraro immediately backtracked on including such provisions in the 1989 crime bill but stuck her ground on the idea that anti-poverty programs were needed if the problem of crime was truly to be addressed, although she stressed the idea that such anti-poverty programs could be achieved in cooperation with the private sector.
Despite bipartisan support the 1989 crime bill, due to its comprehensive nature and the grind of the legislative process, took many months to wind its way through committees and come together as a whole package. Even as the summer turned to fall the bill had yet to get a vote in either the House or the Senate as Congress had been distracted with a fight over the budget and the deficit reduction package that President Ferraro had been crafting with congressional Democrats over the spring and summer of 1989. With deficit reduction as one of the central planks of her presidential campaign Ferraro believed it was imperative to pass a budget that followed through on this and she had broad agreement by both Democrats and Republicans that something needed to be done about the budget deficit which had doubled since Reagan took office in 1981 and had topped $155 billion in 1988 and was expected to be even higher in 1989. However, there was broad disagreement as to how achieve this. Republicans favored spending cuts to welfare programs such as Medicare and AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) while Democrats believed that it could only be achieved with a combination of tax increases and spending cuts, the former of which was anathema to the anti-tax Republican caucuses in both houses of Congress. Even some conservative Democrats, especially those from the South, were skeptical of the wisdom of raising taxes when it was clear the American people were against the idea if they didn’t feel like they were getting anything out of it. Ferraro had promised during the campaign not to raise taxes on poor and middle-class Americans but had dodged questions about whether she would consider tax increases on the wealthy. However, she confirmed in a statement in late January her administration was considering introducing additional tax brackets for the wealthiest Americans, undoing some of the bracket consolidation that had been part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, as well as raising corporate and capital gains tax rates and the gas tax. This immediately sparked outrage from Republicans, with Bob Dole vowing that no Republican in the Senate would back such tax increases that “constituted an anti-business agenda” and hamper economic growth going forward while accusing Ferraro of abandoning her promise not to raise taxes on middle-class Americans. Business lobbyists moved in to push members of both the House and the Senate to oppose any budget legislation that raised the corporate tax rate. Fortunately for Ferraro any deficit reduction package she wanted to pass could be done so through the budget reconciliation process, which meant it only needed a simple majority in the Senate to pass and not the 60 votes most other legislation required in order to avoid a filibuster.
Ferraro’s deficit reduction proposals sparked new controversy when she announced in mid-February that she intended to pursue nearly $100 billion in cuts to defense spending over the following five years as part of an effort to reduce wasteful spending on the military and focus on spending it more efficiently. As expected this did not go down well with defense hawks in Congress, who attacked it as a misguided attempt to reduce spending that would “severely disrupt the operations of the U.S. military…and weaken our ability to defend our allies in Europe against a continued Soviet threat” in the words of Sen. John McCain. There were also leaks that Defense Secretary Nunn was strongly opposed to cuts of such magnitude and had urged Ferraro to consider more modest cuts in the range of $50-60 billion but had been rebuffed, much to his displeasure. Despite these controversies Ferraro continued to work with congressional leadership on her budget proposals through the spring of 1989, including a bipartisan push for a PAYGO (Pay As You Go) model which was hoped would limit spending by allowing only for spending with existing funds as well as an expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit for low and middle-income Americans, until efforts ground to a halt when turmoil embroiled House Democratic leadership. Speaker Jim Wright, increasingly bogged down by an ethics scandal, abruptly announced on June 12 that he was stepping down as Speaker when his successor was elected. After a brief period of uncertainty House Majority Leader Tom Foley secured enough votes from the Democratic Caucus to replace Wright on June 18, becoming the first Speaker of the House from west of the Rocky Mountains. This would not be the only scandal to rock Democratic leadership in the House as only a few days after Wright announced his retirement Tony Coelho, a California Democrat and House Majority Whip, was hit with reports that he had received a loan from a savings and loan executive to purchase junk bonds, forcing his own resignation and setting up a race for Majority Whip. It also scrambled the race for Majority Leader, which Coelho had been running for until his scandal forced him out, ensuring there would be new faces in Democrats’ House leadership.
Ferraro was caught in a bind with her husband still facing court hearings over his indictment, which had been dragging on through the spring without a verdict, creating a media spectacle that distracted her from her legislative agenda. With her deficit reduction push at a standstill and media spin by Republicans blasting Democrats as a “party of corruption” that was failing at governing because of the numerous scandals sidetracking its leaders, Ferraro saw her approval rating dip to 51% in a Gallup poll taken in late June. Losing legislative momentum, Ferraro decided to use the bully pulpit to press forward with her tax legislation, taking to the road in a series of rallies and town halls across the country during the summer of 1989 in an attempt to build public support for her position. What she met was a mix of enthusiasm from core supporters and heckling by anti-tax protestors who called her “Big Government Gerry” and accused her of being a tax-and-spend liberal who was out of touch with the concerns of middle-class Americans. Despite her efforts opinion on her deficit reduction package only marginally improved, going from 40% approving and 45% disapproving of it in a Gallup poll taken in late-May 1989 to 41% approving and 44% disapproving in a poll taken in late-July.
Meanwhile leadership races for Majority Whip and Majority Leader stalled any major legislation in the House during late June. Of the two the Majority Leader race proved to be the more interesting with House Democratic Caucus Chair William Gray of Pennsylvania, who’d be the first African-American to rise to such a high position in House leadership in American history, up against Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski of Illinois, an old-school Chicago machine politician who had long sought a position in House leadership but had either been snubbed or had passed on it. Now, however, he believed it was his time. This set up a huge clash in the House between Chicago and Philly that had the potential to reverberate for years to come. Indeed, almost immediately Congressman Gray earned the support of the Congressional Black Caucus which expressed its belief that “it was time for House Democrats to prove that they are a truly inclusive party and that all are welcome at the highest level of leadership, regardless of race.” Both of them worked to court the support of Ferraro, hoping she would be able to tip the scales in their favor. Ferraro, however, largely stayed out of the fight only saying that everyone running, which included a long-shot bid by Georgia Congressman Ed Jenkins, would all make great majority leaders and she looked forward to working with whoever won enough votes to be elected. Both Rostenkowski and Gray aggressively pursued votes, but Congressman Gray went out of his way to lobby members of Congress to support his bid for majority leader. This would prove decisive in the end when he defeated Rostenkowski for the Majority Leader position, 123 votes to 117 for Rostenkowski and 37 for Ed Jenkins. For the Majority Whip position conservative Southerner and Democratic Congressional Committee Chairman Beryl Anthony Jr. failed to win against Michigan Congressman and Deputy Whip David Bonior, whose popularity proved too much to overcome despite his progressive record. With a new leadership team in place in the House, Ferraro pressed forward with the budget reconciliation bill that would, hopefully, reduce America’s deficit in the long term. It proved, however, to be an extremely tough sell among members of Congress.
Ferraro engaged in a tough round of cajoling many of her former colleagues in the House into backing the bill and reached out to newer members as well. She was not afraid to get into the nitty-gritty of congressional wrangling to get the bill passed, even if it distracted from some of her other priorities. There were many instances of her calling congressmen and Senators to the White House to woo them into supporting the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (as it was officially called), many times to mixed success. Despite her efforts, however, the bill continued to fall short of the necessary support to pass in both the House and the Senate and Ferraro was forced to back down on her ambitious cuts to the military budget to win over congressmen from districts with military installations as well as some defense hawks, parring it down to $50 billion over five years while offsetting it with additional measures meant to raise revenue. The measure was finally able to receive a vote in the House on August 7, where it passed narrowly by a 223-210 vote with almost universal opposition from Republicans as well as from over 40 Democrats before both chambers adjourned for their summer recess. It then passed the Senate 51-49 on similarly partisan lines with several Democratic defections on September 5 and was signed into law by Ferraro six days later on September 11, 1989. With a stroke of a pen key parts of Reaganomics were overturned, even as many others still remained in effect including the reduction in taxes on low and middle-income Americans. Worries continued that economic growth would be negatively affected but, for the moment, hopes remained high that America’s budget deficit would finally be able to be reined in even as signs of a weakening economy abounded. For Ferraro it was a major victory even if one that was unpopular with the general public. It was not the only victory, however, in the first eight months of the Ferraro administration but one of the most important ones.