WI: USS Washington alone at 2nd Guadalcanal?

[HMS Warspite]

Two words... Surigao Strait.

One word:

Irrelevant

 

[McPherson]

One word:

Irrelevant

Explain. Terrain. Weather effects. Technology. Tactics. Circumstances. Purpose.

I find that the circumstances and claims posited against the Standards in the thesis presented to indicate they could not fulfill their role as gun platforms in tight maneuver quarters; actually shows a fundamental misunderstanding of what the Standards were, why they were, and how they were refitted and modernized.

McP.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

Explain. Terrain. Weather effects. Technology. Tactics. Circumstances. Purpose.

I find that the circumstances and claims posited against the Standards in the thesis presented to indicate they could not fulfill their role as gun platforms in tight maneuver quarters; actually shows a fundamental misunderstanding of what the Standards were, why they were, and how they were refitted and modernized.

McP.

It would be cool to have the Colorado-class fight in Guadalcanal, and for my part I actually think they'd do rather well (compact, manoeuvrable and very tough). But one question: how are they going to be refuelled and get there? Historically, IIRC, the US forces around Guadalcanal were quite tight on fuel as it was, with not that many oilers to go around (although I may be wrong there - please correct me if I am). In any case, adding two old, slow and rather inefficient BBs may cause logistical problems.

This was why only the Kongo-class ever really got deployed in the area by the Japanese; all the other IJN BBs were fuel-guzzlers. Would the USN, in its 1942, still-learning incarnation, have similar issues?

 

[McPherson]

It would be cool to have the Colorado-class fight in Guadalcanal, and for my part I actually think they'd do rather well (compact, manoeuvrable and very tough). But one question: how are they going to be refuelled and get there? Historically, IIRC, the US forces around Guadalcanal were quite tight on fuel as it was, with not that many oilers to go around (although I may be wrong there - please correct me if I am). In any case, adding two old, slow and rather inefficient BBs may cause logistical problems.

This was why only the Kongo-class ever really got deployed in the area by the Japanese; all the other IJN BBs were fuel-guzzlers. Would the USN, in its 1942, still-learning incarnation, have similar issues?

The way one goes in a more massive ship and larger wetted area the more fuel one guzzles hour/kilometers traveled. I doubt that 29,000 hp (22,000 kW) Colorado is going to burn as many tonnes of oil per km as 121,000 hp (90,000 kW) North Carolina. Even given the more efficient engine plant of the North Carolinas to the Colorados, it would be safe to say that the oil burned in the Colorado at 20 knots (10m/s) would be roughly equivalent to a North Carolina at the same speed, given that the North Carolina was about 10,000 tonnes more massive at full load than a Colorado with more surface area wetted and with more drag in that hull. So, I see no essential difference in the fuel situation. Provided that we argue a 1 Colorado for a 1 South Dakota replacement situation.

 

[CV12Hornet]

It would be cool to have the Colorado-class fight in Guadalcanal, and for my part I actually think they'd do rather well (compact, manoeuvrable and very tough). But one question: how are they going to be refuelled and get there? Historically, IIRC, the US forces around Guadalcanal were quite tight on fuel as it was, with not that many oilers to go around (although I may be wrong there - please correct me if I am). In any case, adding two old, slow and rather inefficient BBs may cause logistical problems.

This was why only the Kongo-class ever really got deployed in the area by the Japanese; all the other IJN BBs were fuel-guzzlers. Would the USN, in its 1942, still-learning incarnation, have similar issues?

Given South Dakota has been shipped off to the States, yeah, the US should have the refueling capacity available. At this stage of the campaign the US could sustain four capital units (battleships and aircraft carriers) in the area; with only Washington and Enterprise there there's definitely scope to add two more battleships even disregarding McPherson's calculations.

 

[HMS Warspite]

Explain. Terrain. Weather effects. Technology. Tactics. Circumstances. Purpose.

I find that the circumstances and claims posited against the Standards in the thesis presented to indicate they could not fulfill their role as gun platforms in tight maneuver quarters; actually shows a fundamental misunderstanding of what the Standards were, why they were, and how they were refitted and modernized.

McP.

The issue is not the ships, but the doctrine they were trained for and this seriously lacked one vital element in US Naval thinking, untill learning it the hard way in WW2. The old obsolete and slow below standards, were obsolete to start with long before WW2 started, lacking anything a modern warship should have and they were not even fully mpodernized prior to the outbreak of the conflict. (Just some patchwork and some light AA fitted at best) In other words: They were for teh USN what the Royal Sovereign class was for the Royal Navy: Floating Coffins that were slow, vulnerable and out of date by a very large margin.

The USS West Virginia and Maryland had shown their defects in design at Pearl Harbor, where the first was hit by a large number of torpedoes, no battleship could survive, though the crippling damage was not done by more than two torepdoes actually, which caused servere flooding in the large Boilerrooms and eniginespaces. The other hits only added to the damage. USS Maryland was hit by a heavy AP bomb that went trhough the ship through armored decks like in the ill-fated USS Arizona, but unlike the later not in a magazine, but critical enough to cause several internal integrety lproblems due to distorsiion of hullframe and bulkheads and the flooding created by it.
see:

USS Maryland (BB-46) Action Report: 7 Dec 1941

USS Maryland Action Report, Pearl Harbor

www.ibiblio.org

USS West Virgina, Report of Salvage, Pearl Harbor

U.S. NAVY YARD Pearl Harbor, T[erritory of]. H[awaii]. C-L11-1/BB48/Ser.01161 June 15, 1942 From: The Salvage Officer To: The Commandant, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H. Subject: USS West Virginia, Report of Salvage of. Reference: a. Salvaging of the USS West Virginia - Report...

www.history.navy.mil

 

[McPherson]

The issue is not the ships, but the doctrine they were trained for and this seriously lacked one vital element in US Naval thinking, untill learning it the hard way in WW2. The old obsolete and slow below standards, were obsolete to start with long before WW2 started, lacking anything a modern warship should have and they were not even fully mpodernized prior to the outbreak of the conflict. (Just some patchwork and some light AA fitted at best) In other words: They were for teh USN what the Royal Sovereign class was for the Royal Navy: Floating Coffins that were slow, vulnerable and out of date by a very large margin.

The USS West Virginia and Maryland had shown their defects in design at Pearl Harbor, where the first was hit by a large number of torpedoes, no battleship could survive, though the crippling damage was not done by more than two torepdoes actually, which caused servere flooding in the large Boilerrooms and eniginespaces. The other hits only added to the damage. USS Maryland was hit by a heavy AP bomb that went trhough the ship through armored decks like in the ill-fated USS Arizona, but unlike the later not in a magazine, but critical enough to cause several internal integrety lproblems due to distorsiion of hullframe and bulkheads and the flooding created by it.

1. Warspite and Prince of Wales do not stand up to close examination as to build. compartmentation scheme or damage control features. This was so even after refit.

Here; in the case of Warspite. (Crete, one bomb not in a "critical" area.)

At 1225 hours Admiral Rawlings received a message from CS15, Rear Admiral King, stating that the NAIAD had been badly damaged and he was in need of support. On receipt of the report Rawlings decided to go to the assistance of King and course was set westward at 23 knots into the Aegean.
At 1332 hours just as the combined force was entering the Kithera Channel WARSPITE was attacked by three Me 109 fighter bombers each armed with a 250Kg semi-armour piercing bomb. By manoeuvring the first two bombs missed but the third hit the starboard after 4in gun and penetrated the deck to explode in the starboard quarter 6in battery. 38 of ship's company were killed and 31 injured causing extensive damage, fires and the temporary evacuation of one boiler room. Her speed was reduced to 18 knots.
(The Messerschmitt Bf 109 Es were from Luftwaffe unit 111/Jg 77 which was based at Molai, in the Elos Peninsula, about 60 miles from the position where WARSPITE was hit. The bomb that hit WARSPITE was dropped from a plane flown by Wolf Dietrich Huy or Kurt Ubben).
WARSPITE’s Executive Officer Commander Charles Madden took charge of the damage control and fire- fighting parties, clearing up a gun battery which looked and smelled like an abattoir.
After putting out the fires and some temporary repairs WARSPITE stayed with the Fleet.
At 2230 hours CS7 sent a most immediate signal to the CinC Mediterranean Fleet reporting the loss of GLOUCESTER and FIJI and stating that the AA ammunition situation in all vessels was very low, the battleships had run out of pom pom ammunition.

23rd - At 0408 hours the CinC ordered all warships to withdraw to Alexandria.​

Shock damage...

June​

After temporary repairs remained at Alexandria. Permanent repair arranged in US Navy Dockyard at Puget Sound, Washington state.

3rd - Whilst at Alexandria a conference was held on board to discuss actions to be taken following the arrival of German aircraft in Vichy Syria. The outcome of the discussions was the decision to invade Syria (Operation EXPORTER).

23rd - Sustained further damage after 'near miss' by 500 Kg bomb falling alongside her starboard side during a heavy air raid. Bulge structure fracture caused some flooding.

25th - Took passage to USA with calls at Colombo, Singapore, Manila and Honolulu.​

Patched the hole and sent to Bremerton.

August​

10th - Arrived at Esquimalt.
At Esquimalt a draft of 284 officers and men were sent back to the UK.
In the evening she sailed for Seattle.

11th - Arrived at Puget Sound US Naval Dockyard, Bremerton, Washington.
A further draft of 280 officers and men were then sent back to the UK leaving her with a skeleton crew of 600 who were kept on to assist with the repairs and refit.

​

September to October​

Under refit. WARSPITE’s Walrus aircraft were overhauled at Sand Point US Naval Air Station.

​

November​

During the refit 5 of her 8 x 15in gun barrels were replaced with barrels that were sent out from the UK. Surface warning radar Type 271 and aircraft warning Type 281 fitted. Fire control radar for main armament (Type 284), HA armament (Type 285) and for Close Range AA guns (Type 282) installed.
(According to her newly appointed radar officer Lt. Paddon, later Rear Admiral Paddon, the British radar sets that were to have been fitted were lost when the ship carrying them was torpedoed in the Atlantic. What she was fitted with were American improvised sets that he described 'as a real bag of tricks'.)​

Comment... The British lost the ship carrying the replacement radars. Stuff happens. US radars substituted might have been a "bag of tricks", but were actually better air search warning and fire control sets than what the British sent out. Two bomb hits and the re-barreling, all minor repairs, took about 3 months, mostly due to delays in getting the parts from the UK.

Now I will not point out...

December

​

1st to 17th - QUEEN ELIZABETH at Alexandria.



(On 3/12/41 the Italian submarine SCIRE left the naval base of La Spezia carrying three SLC's [Siluro a Lenta Corsa, Slow Approach Cylinder, also affectionately called Il Maiale, the Pig] manned torpedoes. She sailed to the island of Leros in the Aegean Sea, where the submarine picked up six crewmen of the 10th flotilla MAS, who were to man the Maiale. These were: Luigi Durand de la Penne and Emilio Bianchi, Maiale No 221, Vincenzo Martellotta and Mario Marino, Maiale No 222 and Antonio Marceglia and Spartaco Schergat, Maiale No 223. The SCIRE then steered for Alexandria)



(On 17/12/41 Bletchley Park alerted the CinC Mediterranean Fleet of a decrepit of the Italian C 39m Cypher that indicated that something was being planned against Alexandria in December. This alert was issued because of an aerial reconnaissance made by the Italians of Alexandria harbour in which they had, reported that the two battleships were at their usual moorings and unusually that the sea was calm)



18th - QUEEN ELIZABETH at Alexandria.



(On the 18/12/41 Bletchley Park added to their alert of the previous day; stating that the reconnaissance information in the alert had been urgently requested by the Italians. On the strength of the two alerts the CinC issued a general alert at 1025/18/12/41; ÒAttacks on Alexandria by air, boat or human torpedo may be expected when calm weather prevails. Look outs and patrols should be warned accordinglyÓ)



(At approximate1840 hours the SCIRE arrived in a position about a mile west of the entrance to Alexandria harbour. At 2047 hours three Maiales were launched from SCIRE after launching they headed for the harbour entrance. When they arrived at the harbour entrance they found the anti-submarine boom open for the passage of the cruisers and destroyers returning from escorting the BRECONSHIRE to Malta. The three Maiales followed the British forces into Alexandria harbour and headed for their targets the battleships QUEEN ELIZABETH, VALIANT and a fleet oiler. QUEEN ELIZABETH was the target of the Maiale No 222, manned by Antonio Marceglia and Spartaco Schergat)



19th – At approximately 0230 hours Antonio Marceglia and Spartaco Schergat placed the explosive warhead of the Maiale, which was a standard 270 Kg torpedo warhead, filled with TNT, on the harbour bottom underneath the QUEEN ELIZABETH.



(After placing their charge Antonio Marceglia and Spartaco Schergat attempted to return to the open sea but they found themselves unable to get past the net and out of the harbour. So they destroyed their Maiale and swam to shore and then set off to make a RV with the submarine that was to pick them up. But they didn't make it and they were later captured)



At 0325 hours Durand De La Penne and Emilio Bianchi were sighted sitting on VALIANT's mooring buoy and were taken aboard the VALIANT, where they were questioned, but refused to answer any questions. They were detained in a compartment on board VALIANT until 0600 hours when De La Penne asked to speak to VALIANT's CO, Captain Morgan. De La Penne informed Morgan that the device they had planted was due to explode imminently. De La Penne was then returned to the compartment.

At 0547 hours an explosive device went off under the stern of the Norwegian oiler MV SAGONA 7554 grt, at the time of the explosion the SAGONA had four destroyers alongside refuelling, one of which, the JERVIS, was also damaged by the explosion.

At 0606 hours the explosive device went off under the VALIANT.

At 0610 hours an explosive device went off under the QUEEN ELIZABETH. Immediately after the explosion the QUEEN ELIZABETH began to roll to starboard and sink. The charge detonated under B boiler room and blew in the double bottom in this area; it also damaged the double bottom under A and X boiler rooms. The ship's bottom was damaged over an area of 190 ft x 60 ft and included both the port and starboard bulges. Immediate flooding occurred in A, B and X boiler rooms and in the forward 4.5inch magazines. Other areas including Y boiler room and several other compartments in the vicinity, flooded slowly up to main deck level. Boilers in the boiler rooms and the auxiliary machinery, together with electrical equipment were severely damaged by the explosion and subsequent flooding, all hydraulic power was lost. The armament was undamaged but was unusable due the loss of electrical and hydraulic power.

Both QUEEN ELIZABETH and VALIANT settled on the harbour bottom on an even keel in a few feet of water.



(The crew of Vincenzo Martellotta and Mario Marino attacked the oiler MV SAGONA and had great difficulties in achieving their goal. The plan was to place the warhead under the SAGONA, as well as spread incendiary time bombs around in the basin. So that when SAGONA blew up, her oil cargo would leak into the harbour, the incendiary bombs would ignite the oil and turn Alexandria harbour into an inferno. However as they approached the oiler one member of the crew had a problem and had to surface. The warhead was too heavy for just one man to drag it underneath the ship as planned so he sank the Maiale under the stern of the SAGONA. When the explosive went off it caused severe damage to the oiler but didn't rupture her oil tanks, so when the incendiary bombs went off there was no oil to catch fire. The SAGONA was not repaired until after the war so she remained at Alexandria as bunker ship for the remainder of the war. Vincenzo Martellotta and Mario Marino were captured when they swam ashore)



(At a stroke the six commandos had knocked out the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Battle Fleet. When Churchill received news of the sinkings he said, "Six Italians, dressed in rather unusual diving suits and equipped with materials of laughably little cost, have swung the military balance of power in the Mediterranean in favour of the Axis".

Fortunately for the Allies the enemy was not fully aware of the precarious position of the Mediterranean Fleet. To fool Axis reconnaissance aircraft into thinking that the raid had failed, apparently normal operations were conducted on a day to day basis. Smoke came out of funnels, guns were trained, and all the routine ceremonial rituals performed as if nothing had happened. In fact below the waterline frantic repair efforts were being made which lasted several weeks. Had the Axis realised the truth then Admiral Cunningham, with only a few operational ships at his disposal, could have been driven out of the Mediterranean, with potentially disastrous consequences for the Allies)



Salvage work on the QUEEN ELIZABETH commenced immediately. But because the VALIANT suffered less damage she was given priority for repairs and was first into the Admiralty floating dock AFD 5.



(Admiral Cunningham was aware that Lieutenant Keeble [Lieutenant L A J Keeble, RNVR (SA), CO of HMS HARROW] was familiar with salvage work. Keeble was sent to the headquarters of the South African Engineer Corps [SAEC] in Cairo to brief the South African engineers on the critical situation that had developed at Alexandria and to request their urgent help in the salvaging work. Three fully-equipped divers of the 41st South African Harbour Construction Company, SAEC, working on harbour improvements at Marakeb Harbour, were despatched to help with the battleships salvage operations.

In the meantime, Lieutenant Keeble was flown to Cape Town to deliver a special message from Admiral Cunningham to General Smuts, imploring him to send salvage teams to Alexandria Harbour. In response, four South African Railways & Harbours Brigade divers and a petty officer diver from the Seaward Defence Force [SDF], were flown to Cairo. They arrived at Alexandria on 7/1/42.

For the next three months, the South African divers, facing many known and unknown hazards in the muddy waters of Alexandria Harbour, used gas and electric cutting equipment to remove the jungle of twisted steel from the vessels and then patched the holes by welding plates across them to seal the hulls so that the ships could be filled with compressed air, raised and moved to the dry docks for repairs)

1942



January to May

​

During this period the QUEEN ELIZABETH was under repair at Alexandria to prepare her for the voyage to the USA for permanent repair in a US Navy dockyard.



(On 29/3/42 the Italian submarine AMBRA sailed from La Spezia on Operation GA 4, carrying three SLCs. She sailed to the island of Leros in the Aegean Sea, where the submarine picked up six crewmen of the 10th flotilla MAS, who were to man the SLCs. The AMBRA then steered for Alexandria. On 14/5/41 the AMBRA arrived off Alexandria and launched the three SLCs. This time the attack was unsuccessful and again all six frogmen were captured)



On 3/4/42 a new CO was appointed, acting Captain Renfrew Gotto DSO, RN.

Also on 3/4/42 Vice Admiral Miakulin of the Soviet Navy visited the Commander in Chief at Alexandria and lunched with Admiral Cunningham on board the QUEEN ELIZABETH.

June

​

(On 23/6/42 Axis forces captured Tobruk and two days later they crossed the Egyptian boarder in close pursuit of the disorganised and demoralised Allied forces. The frontier crossing gave rise to the infamous 'Ash Wednesday' when the Allied GHQ in Cairo were burning files in expectation of Axis forces shortly entering Cairo. At the same time the Royal Navy were evacuating Alexandria and maximum effort was exerted to get the QUEEN ELIZABETH ready for sailing as soon as possible)



1st to 26th - QUEEN ELIZABETH was under repair.



27th - QUEEN ELIZABETH was undocked.

At 1800 hours the QUEEN ELIZABETH and sailed from Alexandria for Port Said.



28th - The QUEEN ELIZABTH sailed from Port Said for Aden on first stage of passage.

July

​

Passage in Indian Ocean with call at Durban.

August

​

Passage in Atlantic Ocean with call at Cape Town.



11th - QUEEN ELIZABETH was joined by the destroyers BOREAS and VIMY from Freetown.



13th - QUEEN ELIZABETH, BOREAS and VIMY arrived at Freetown.



25th - QUEEN ELIZABETH escorted by the destroyers PATHFINDER, QUENTIN and VIMY sailed from Freetown westward.



26th - The destroyer VIMY detached and returned to Freetown.



28th - In approximate position 14-12N, 37-15W the QUEEN ELIZABETH, PATHFINDER and QUENTIN RVed with the oiler RFA ABBEYDALE escorted by the corvettes ARMERIA and BURDOCK. The oiling force had sailed from Gibraltar on 20/8/42.



31st - The destroyers PATHFINDER and QUENTIN detached for Trinidad.

September

​

6th - QUEEN ELIZABETH arrived at the Norfolk Navy Yard, Virginia and was taken in hand for repair.



8th - Paid off.

October to December

​

QUEEN ELIZABETH at Norfolk Navy Yard under going repair and refit.



In November a new CO was appointed, Commander Reginald Cecil Haskett-Smith DSO, RN.

1943



January to May

​

QUEEN ELIZABETH at Norfolk Navy Yard under going repair and refit.



In April a new CO was appointed, Captain Horace Geoffrey Norman RN.

June​

1st - Repairs and refit completed.



Re-commissioned and carried out harbour trials and sea trials.



26th - QUEEN ELIZABETH sailed from Norfolk Navy Yard for Boston.



30th - QUEEN ELIZABETH escorted the frigates BAZELY, BENTINCK, BLACKWOOD and DRURY sailed from Boston for Bermuda.

Comment: That was one lousy half tonne mine.

So... obsolete ships that took anywhere from 8 to 10 bomb and torpedo hits at PEARL HARBOR back in service inside 3 months, versus "better ships" taking fewer hits, but needing up to a half year apiece to restore to fighting condition. The worst hit of the actually repaired American ships, took 2 years but that was a razee and rebuild. *(West Virginia). One Fritz X bomb and Warspite was KAPUT. Finished. Only worth it as a floating bombardment monitor.

How many similar Kamikazes bounded off the USS Colorado? Two? Still fit for line of battle.

This is not to suggest that British ships were not well built. BUT... the proper comparison of a STANDARD is not to the Royal Oak or even to a Mutsu, which were CRAP as constructed. It is to the better Queen Elizabeth class , ship for ship, and in that comparison, there is little to choose between them.

 

[marathag]

The USS West Virginia and Maryland had shown their defects in design at Pearl Harbor, where the first was hit by a large number of torpedoes, no battleship could survive, though the crippling damage was not done by more than two torepdoes actually, which caused servere flooding in the large Boilerrooms and eniginespaces. The

Open for Sunday Inspections.
Everything dogged tight, you get USS Maryland, a torpedo hit to the bow, and thru the miracle of T-E drive, returned to Pearl, in reverse for the whole trip.

 

[HMS Warspite]

1. Warspite and Prince of Wales do not stand up to close examination as to build. compartmentation scheme or damage control features. This was so even after refit.

Here; in the case of Warspite. (Crete, one bomb not in a "critical" area.)



Shock damage...



Patched the hole and sent to Bremerton.



Comment... The British lost the ship carrying the replacement radars. Stuff happens. US radars substituted might have been a "bag of tricks", but were actually better air search warning and fire control sets than what the British sent out. Two bomb hits and the re-barreling, all minor repairs, took about 3 months, mostly due to delays in getting the parts from the UK.

Now I will not point out...

Comment: That was one lousy half tonne mine.

So... obsolete ships that took anywhere from 8 to 10 bomb and torpedo hits at PEARL HARBOR back in service inside 3 months, versus "better ships" taking fewer hits, but needing up to a half year apiece to restore to fighting condition. The worst hit of the actually repaired American ships, took 2 years but that was a razee and rebuild. *(West Virginia). One Fritz X bomb and Warspite was KAPUT. Finished. Only worth it as a floating bombardment monitor.

How many similar Kamikazes bounded off the USS Colorado? Two? Still fit for line of battle.

This is not to suggest that British ships were not well built. BUT... the proper comparison of a STANDARD is not to the Royal Oak or even to a Mutsu, which were CRAP as constructed. It is to the better Queen Elizabeth class , ship for ship, and in that comparison, there is little to choose between them.

Still missing the point I see! So sad but predictable.

No FX-1400 in 1942 existed, Error in conversation
2 hits is not 7+ hits, Error in conversation
HMS Prince of Wales is NOT a Royal Sovereign, Error in conversation
HMS Warspite is not a Royal Sovereign either, Error in conversation
You compare ships sunk in shallow water compared to ships hit in open ocean, Error in conversation

Please do your homework and do not speak this sort of nonsense!

Fact remains: The so called Standards, (Which were not the Collorado's technically as they had not the same guns as the preceding Dreadnoughts) were a muxed bag and certainly not superior to anything else, except the 1st and 2nd generation f Dreadnoughts. Compartimentation wa more extensive then in the 1st and 2nd generation, but still having large compartiments vulnerabe to serious flooding comrpomising the ship's ability to operate safely. (USS Pennsylvania missionkilled by a single torpedo in 1945, breaking and distorting three of the four shafts causing serious flooding, only being saved as the ship was at anchor with supportships nearby. All succeeding ships had the same internal layout and were equally vulnerable to this sort of flooding, when hit in the same way.

The so called "Standards" as such were substandard to start with as the all or nothing principle on paper was nice to have, but iit created new problems not seen at the time. Flooding outside the armored citadel remained a serious risk, untill proper bulging was added to increase bouyancy in case of flooding. The so called "superior" underwaterprotection was a mixed bag as well due to the mere reality underwaterexplosions do not behave as calculated for in most cases and the design was not taking into account the heavier warheads used in lateryears. A single airborne torpedo type 91 in 1941 had a smaller warhead than one in 1944 and even the 1941 warhead of this weapon outmatched the torpedodefenses, creating flooding inside the citadel, beyond the inner torpedobulkhead, which was supposed to stop it as last layer in the system. USS Nevada took one single torpedo at Pearl Harbor which outmatched her defenses and she continued to flood untill the ship was run aground. USS Maryland was hit by bombs, causing unforseen flooding as well in parts where the torpedodefense failed to do its designed job as well.

Most importantly, the Collorado and Maryland were not bulged in 1942 so remained basically the old 1920's design awaiting rebuilding, or scrap, as they were beyond their life expetency and if not seriously modernized not much more than big gunboats only capable of shooting at landtargets, something a much smaller vessel, or even a flight of aircraft could do as well for much less costs.

 

[McPherson]

Still missing the point I see! So sad but predictable.

No FX-1400 in 1942 existed, Error in conversation
2 hits is not 7+ hits, Error in conversation
HMS Prince of Wales is NOT a Royal Sovereign, Error in conversation
HMS Warspite is not a Royal Sovereign either, Error in conversation
You compare ships sunk in shallow water compared to ships hit in open ocean, Error in conversation

Please do your homework and do not speak this sort of nonsense!

Fact remains: The so called Standards, (Which were not the Collorado's technically as they had not the same guns as the preceding Dreadnoughts) were a muxed bag and certainly not superior to anything else, except the 1st and 2nd generation f Dreadnoughts. Compartimentation wa more extensive then in the 1st and 2nd generation, but still having large compartiments vulnerabe to serious flooding comrpomising the ship's ability to operate safely. (USS Pennsylvania missionkilled by a single torpedo in 1945, breaking and distorting three of the four shafts causing serious flooding, only being saved as the ship was at anchor with supportships nearby. All succeeding ships had the same internal layout and were equally vulnerable to this sort of flooding, when hit in the same way.

The so called "Standards" as such were substandard to start with as the all or nothing principle on paper was nice to have, but iit created new problems not seen at the time. Flooding outside the armored citadel remained a serious risk, untill proper bulging was added to increase bouyancy in case of flooding. The so called "superior" underwaterprotection was a mixed bag as well due to the mere reality underwaterexplosions do not behave as calculated for in most cases and the design was not taking into account the heavier warheads used in lateryears. A single airborne torpedo type 91 in 1941 had a smaller warhead than one in 1944 and even the 1941 warhead of this weapon outmatched the torpedodefenses, creating flooding inside the citadel, beyond the inner torpedobulkhead, which was supposed to stop it as last layer in the system. USS Nevada took one single torpedo at Pearl Harbor which outmatched her defenses and she continued to flood untill the ship was run aground. USS Maryland was hit by bombs, causing unforseen flooding as well in parts where the torpedodefense failed to do its designed job as well.

Most importantly, the Collorado and Maryland were not bulged in 1942 so remained basically the old 1920's design awaiting rebuilding, or scrap, as they were beyond their life expetency and if not seriously modernized not much more than big gunboats only capable of shooting at landtargets, something a much smaller vessel, or even a flight of aircraft could do as well for much less costs.

One is assuming again. The damage off Crete was conventional bombs. The later Fritz X (1943 ) killed Warspite as a functional battleship forever. I even QUOTED tabular record of movement so that this kind of error one claimed I made was not actually made. So... all of the above? (^^^)

Irrelevant.

For one who wants "homework" done... ? the Colorados were most certainly STANDARDS. Mine is better than yours.

ENDIT.